2025 CO 52, 23SC942, People v. Hudson

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The opinion summaries are not part of the Colorado Supreme
Court's opinion. They have been prepared solely for the reader's
convenience. As such, they may not be cited or relied upon. If
there is any discrepancy between the language in the summary
and the opinion, the language in the opinion controls.

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
September 8, 2025

2025 CO 52

# No. 23SC942, People v. Hudson -Criminal Possession of a Financial Device- Statutory Construction.

The supreme court granted certiorari to decide whether the division below
erred in holding that, to prove criminal possession of a financial device, the
prosecution must separately prove that a statutorily enumerated financial device
(here, a debit card) is capable of use at the time of possession.

The court now concludes, contrary to the division majority's determination,
that the inclusion of debit cards, without qualification, in the definition of a
financial device set forth in section 18-5-901(6)(a), C.R.S. (2024), demonstrates,
without more, that a debit card is a financial device for purposes of section
18-5-901(6). Accordingly, the court further concludes that sections 18-5-903(1),
C.R.S. (2024), and 18-5-901(6) do not require that the prosecution prove that a
financial device was capable of use at the time of possession to support a
conviction for criminal possession of a financial device.

The court therefore reverses the judgment of the division below.

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# The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14th Avenue . Denver, Colorado 80203

2025 CO 52

Supreme Court Case No. 23SC942
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals Case No. 21CA749

Petitioner:
The People of the State of Colorado,

V.

Respondent:

Garry Allen Hudson.

Judgment Reversed
en banc
September 8, 2025

Attorneys for Petitioner:

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General

Joshua J. Luna, Assistant Attorney General

Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent:

Law Office of Suzan Trinh Almony

Suzan Trinh Almony

Broomfield, Colorado

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JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which JUSTICE
BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HART, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE
BERKENKOTTER joined.

CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, joined by JUSTICE HOOD, dissented.

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JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court.

11 We granted certiorari to decide whether the division below erred in holding
that, to prove criminal possession of a financial device, the prosecution must
separately prove that a statutorily enumerated financial device is capable of use at
the time of possession. A majority of the division concluded, as pertinent here,
that the prosecution had presented insufficient evidence to show that defendant
Garry Allen Hudson unlawfully possessed a financial device, namely, a debit card
in someone else's name, because the prosecution did not prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the device could be used to obtain a thing of value, as the
majority believed to be required under section 18-5-903(1), C.R.S. (2024), and
section 18-5-901(6), C.R.S. (2024). People v. Hudson, No. 21CA749, 11 54, 61-63
(Nov. 9, 2023). The division thus vacated Hudson's conviction and sentence for
criminal possession of a financial device. Id. at 11 54, 63.

12 We now conclude, contrary to the division majority's determination, that
the inclusion of debit cards, without qualification, in section 18-5-901(6)(a)'s
definition of a financial device demonstrates, without more, that a debit card is a
financial device for purposes of section 18-5-901(6). Accordingly, we further
conclude that sections 18-5-903(1) and 18-5-901(6) do not require that the
prosecution prove that a financial device was capable of use at the time of
possession to support a conviction for criminal possession of a financial device.

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T3
We therefore reverse the division's judgment.

## I. Facts and Procedural History

14 When police officers contacted Hudson in a motel room, they found, among
other things, a debit card in someone else's name. Hudson denied knowing this
person. Officers subsequently arrested Hudson, and during a search incident to
the arrest, they found another debit card in Hudson's back pocket, this one in a
different person's name.

15
Hudson was later charged with criminal possession of two or more financial
devices, along with other counts not pertinent here.

16
The matter proceeded to trial, and at trial, a detective with the Lakewood
Police Department's economic crimes unit testified that she was unable to contact
either person whose names were on the debit cards and that she did not know
whether Hudson knew either of them. The detective further testified that she did
not know whether either card was active or capable of being used or whether there
was any money in either account. The detective testified, however, that to her
knowledge, at least one of the cards had not been reported stolen in Colorado.

17 The jury ultimately convicted Hudson of, among other things, one count of
criminal possession of a financial device. The verdict form indicated the jury's
finding that Hudson did not possess multiple devices, but the form did not
indicate which of the two debit cards the jury relied on to find Hudson guilty. The

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trial court subsequently sentenced Hudson on this count to eighteen months in the
Department of Corrections.

18 Hudson then appealed, arguing, as pertinent here, that the prosecution was
required to prove that the financial device at issue could be used to obtain a thing
of value and that the prosecution had presented insufficient evidence to establish
this fact. Hudson, 1 54.

19 In a divided, unpublished opinion, a majority of the division below agreed
with Hudson and vacated his conviction and sentence for criminal possession of a
financial device. Id. at 11 54, 61-63. In support of this ruling, the majority
observed that section 18-5-903(1), which establishes the crime of criminal
possession of a financial device, when read together with the definition of a
"financial device" set forth in section 18-5-901(6), required the prosecution to
prove that Hudson possessed a financial device that could be used to obtain a
thing of value. Hudson, 1 61. Moreover, according to the majority, the prosecution
was required to prove that the debit card at issue had to be capable of use "at the
time of possession." Id. In so concluding, the majority was unpersuaded by the
People's contention that because the definition of a financial device expressly
includes debit cards, simply possessing a debit card was sufficient. Id. at 1 62. In
the majority's view, such an assertion was contrary both to the language of section

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18-5-903(1) and to a prior division's interpretation of that statute in People v. Reed,
2013 COA 113, 1 63, 338 P.3d 364, 375.

110 Judge Kuhn dissented in pertinent part, concluding, contrary to the
majority's opinion, that the prosecution was not required to prove separately that
the debit card was capable of use at the time of possession. Id. at 1 81 (Kuhn, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Kuhn began by noting that
section 18-5-901(6) starts by defining a "financial device" as "'any instrument or
device that can be used to obtain ... any ... thing of value"" and ends with the
phrase "including but not limited to," followed by a list of enumerated items, one
of which is a debit card. Id. at 1 85 (omissions in original; quoting § 18-5-901(6)).
Judge Kuhn observed that the majority's analysis interpreted the list of
enumerated items as "possible examples of financial devices." Id. at 1 86. Such a
construction, however, required the enumerated list "to be conditionally included
within the definition of financial device." Id. Thus, a debit card would constitute
a financial device only if it could be used to obtain a thing of value at the time of
possession. Id. In Judge Kuhn's view, such a reading would either render the
enumerated list superfluous or require a court to read words into the statute. Id.
at 1 87. Accordingly, Judge Kuhn opined that the better reading of the statute was
to construe the items in the list as items that the legislature had determined satisfy
the definition of a financial device. Id. at 1 88. Judge Kuhn therefore concluded

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that a debit card, which is included in the list, is a financial device regardless of
whether the prosecution proves that it is capable of obtaining a thing of value at
the time it is possessed. Id.

111 The People petitioned and Hudson cross-petitioned for certiorari review.
We granted the People's petition and denied Hudson's cross-petition.

## II. Analysis

112 We begin by addressing the applicable standard of review and principles of
statutory construction. We then address sections 18-5-903(1) and 18-5-901(6) to
determine whether the statutory language requires the prosecution to prove that
a financial device is capable of being used at the time of possession. We conclude
that it does not.

### A. Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory Construction

113 We review questions of statutory construction de novo. McBride v. People,
2022 CO 30, 1 22, 511 P.3d 613, 617.

114 In interpreting statutes, we seek to ascertain and give effect to the
legislature's intent. Id. at 1 23, 511 P.3d at 617. In doing so, we consider the
statutory language, and we give words and phrases their plain and ordinary
meanings. Id. We read these words and phrases in context, construing them
according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Id. We also read the
statutory scheme as a whole; we give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect

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to all of its parts; and we avoid constructions that would render any words or
phrases superfluous or that would lead to illogical or absurd results. Id. And we
do not add words to a statute or subtract words from it. Id.

115 If the statutory language is unambiguous, then we apply it as written, and
we need not resort to other rules of statutory construction. Id. If, however, a
statute is ambiguous, then we may consider other aids to statutory construction,
including the consequences of a given construction, the end to be achieved by the
statute, and the statute's legislative history. People v. Iannicelli, 2019 CO 80, 1 21,
449 P.3d 387, 391-92. A statute is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible of
multiple interpretations. Id.

## B. Sections 18-5-903(1) and 18-5-901(6)

116
Section 18-5-903(1) provides:

A person commits criminal possession of a financial device if the
person has in his or her possession or under his or her control any
financial device that the person knows, or reasonably should know,
to be lost, stolen, or delivered under mistake as to the identity or
address of the account holder.

117
A "[f]inancial device," in turn, is defined, in pertinent part, as "any
instrument or device that can be used to obtain cash, credit, property, services, or
any other thing of value or to make financial payments, including but not limited
to ... [a] credit card, banking card, debit card, electronic fund transfer card, or
guaranteed check card .... " § 18-5-901(6)(a) (emphasis added).

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118 As this language makes clear, and as Judge Kuhn observed below, Hudson,
1 88 (Kuhn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), a debit card is an
enumerated example of a financial device, and the legislature did not include any
qualifiers in the examples listed in section 18-5-901(6)(a). Specifically, neither
section 18-5-901(6) generally nor section 18-5-901(6)(a) in particular says anything
about a debit card being usable at the time of possession. This is in stark contrast
to the language of section 18-5-901(7), which defines "[f]inancial identifying
information" to mean "any of the following that can be used, alone or in
conjunction with any other information, to obtain cash, credit, property, services,
or any other thing of value or to make a financial payment" and then includes a
list of items. That phrasing makes clear that the items listed qualify as financial
information only if they can be used to obtain things of value. We must presume
that the legislature did not adopt this different language idly. See Nieto v. Clark's
Mkt., Inc., 2021 CO 48, 1 21, 488 P.3d 1140, 1145. Moreover, as Judge Kuhn noted,
Hudson, 1 87 (Kuhn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), were we to adopt
Hudson's contention that section 18-5-901(6)'s requirement that a financial device
"can be used" to obtain a thing of value applies to the enumerated list of devices
in section 18-5-901(6)(a), then that list would become superfluous. As noted above,
however, we must avoid such statutory constructions. McBride, 1 23, 511 P.3d at
617.

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119 For this reason alone, we conclude that a debit card is, without more, a
financial device under section 18-5-901(6).

120 We likewise disagree with the division majority's conclusion that under
section 18-5-901(6), to constitute a "financial device," the instrument must be
capable of being used to obtain a thing of value at the time of possession. Hudson,
1 61. Again, section 18-5-901(6) does not contain the phrase "at the time of
possession," and, as noted above, we must interpret statutes as written, and we
may not add language to statutes or subtract words from them. McBride, 1 23,
511 P.3d at 617. For this reason as well, we conclude that the prosecution need not
prove that a financial device be capable of use at the time of possession.

121 Although we believe that the foregoing plain language analysis resolves this
case, we acknowledge Hudson's contention that section 18-5-901(6) is ambiguous.
We need not decide, however, whether the statutory language is, in fact,
ambiguous because, even if it were, we would reach the same conclusion.

122 As noted above, if a statute is ambiguous, we may consider other aids to
statutory construction, including the consequences of a given construction, the end
to be achieved by the statute, and the statute's legislative history. Iannicelli, 1 21,
449 P.3d at 391-92. Here, these tools support our conclusion that the legislature
did not intend that a debit card be capable of use at the time of possession in order
to satisfy section 18-5-901(6)'s definition of a financial device.

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123 Looking to protect victims of identity theft, in 2006, the legislature passed
several statutes addressing identity theft and related offenses. Ch. 289, sec. 8,
§§ 18-5-901 to -905, 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws 1317, 1319-23. Testimony relating to
these statutes' enactment focused on the harm that identity theft causes and the
inadequacy of other laws to address the problem. See, e.g., People v. Perez, 2016 CO
12, 1 16, 367 P.3d 695, 699 (citing Hearings on H.B. 06-1326 before the H. Judiciary
Comm., 65th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Feb. 23, 2006), and Hearings on H.B. 06-1326
before the S. Judiciary Comm., 65th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Apr. 24, 2006)). Most
notably for purposes here, one senator testified at the Senate Judiciary Committee
Hearing that there were incidental crimes that go along with identity theft,
including criminal possession of a financial device, that would be a "precursor to
identity theft." Hearings on H.B. 06-1326 before the S. Judiciary Comm., 65th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Sess. (Apr. 24, 2006).

124 Whether expired, cancelled, or active, a debit card generally contains the
cardholder's name, financial institution, and signature. This information could be
used to steal the cardholder's identity, even if the card has been deactivated (e.g.,
after a cardholder realizes that the card is missing and calls their financial
institution to report it). Accordingly, the criminal possession of a debit card
establishes the very precursor to identity theft about which the legislature was
concerned. And were Hudson correct that to prove criminal possession of a debit

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card, the prosecution must establish that the card is capable of being used to obtain
a thing of value at the time of possession, then many acts of criminal possession of
a debit card would evade prosecution simply because the cardholder acted
diligently to report a missing card. For all of these reasons, we believe that the
legislative history underlying sections 18-5-903(1) and 18-5-901(6) undermines
Hudson's contention that a debit card must be usable at the time of possession to
constitute a financial device for purposes of those provisions.

125 We are not persuaded otherwise by Hudson's reliance on the division's
opinion in Reed. In Reed, 11 57-64, 338 P.3d at 374-75, the division examined
whether a gift card constitutes a "financial device" under section 18-5-901(6). Id.
at 1 63, 338 P.3d at 375. There, the gift card at issue had no available funds, and
the division concluded that the prosecution was required to prove that Reed
"possessed something that could be used to 'obtain cash, credit, property, services,
or any other thing of value or to make financial payments' at the time of
possession." Id. at 11 55, 63, 338 P.3d at 374-75 (quoting § 18-5-901(6)). Because
the cardholder testified that he had exhausted the available funds on the gift card
and it could no longer be used for purchases, and because no witness testified as
to how to render the card usable, the division concluded that the prosecution had
not presented sufficient evidence that Reed could have used the gift card to obtain
anything of value. Id. at | 64, 338 P.3d at 375.

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126 Although we acknowledge the perhaps overly broad language employed
by the Reed division, as Judge Kuhn observed below, Hudson, 1 91 (Kuhn, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), Reed is distinguishable from the present
case. Most notably, unlike the debit card at issue here, gift cards are not on the
enumerated list of financial devices found in section 18-5-901(6)(a)-(e).
Accordingly, unlike a debit card, which, as noted above, the legislature has
expressly deemed to satisfy the definition of a financial device, a gift card has not
been deemed to satisfy that definition. Thus, in a case involving a gift card, the
prosecution is required to establish that the card was capable of being used to
obtain a thing of value at the time it was possessed. Indeed, such a conclusion
makes sense given the facts that gift cards are often discarded when their funds
have been exhausted, see Hudson, 1 90 (Kuhn, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part), and gift cards do not generally reveal personal identifying information
that would render them a precursor to identity theft.

127 Having thus decided that the prosecution here was not required to prove
that the debit card at issue was capable of being used to obtain a thing of value at
the time Hudson possessed it, the question becomes whether the evidence was
sufficient to support Hudson's conviction for criminal possession of a financial
device. Although Hudson contends that it was not, his argument is premised
exclusively on his view that the prosecution was required to prove that the debit

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card at issue was capable of being used at the time of its possession. Because we
disagree with Hudson's premise, we reject his assertion that the evidence did not
support his conviction.

## III. Conclusion

128 For these reasons, we conclude that the inclusion of debit cards, without
qualification, in section 18-5-901(6)(a)'s definition of a financial device
demonstrates, without more, that a debit card is a financial device for purposes of
section 18-5-901(6). We thus further conclude that sections 18-5-903(1) and
18-5-901(6) do not require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
a debit card is capable of use at the time of its possession to support a conviction
for criminal possession of a financial device.

129 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the division below, and we
remand this case for further proceedings to reinstate Hudson's conviction for
criminal possession of a financial device.

CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, joined by JUSTICE HOOD, dissented.

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CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, joined by JUSTICE HOOD, dissenting.

130 The majority holds that, to support a conviction for criminal possession of a
financial device, section 18-5-903(1), C.R.S. (2024), and section 18-5-901(6), C.R.S.
(2024), do not require the prosecution to prove that a financial device is capable of
use at the time of possession. Maj. op. 1 2. This holding defies the plain language
of the statute. Moreover, the majority's analysis inconsistently applies the
definitional requirements of section 18-5-901(6) to different types of financial
devices, which not only risks confusion but may lead to unjust outcomes in future
cases. Indeed, the majority's attempt to harmonize People v. Reed, 2013 COA 113,
338 P.3d 364, with its construction of section 18-5-901(6) betrays the majority's
internally inconsistent approach. Because I cannot subscribe to the majority's
statutory analysis, and because the prosecution failed to prove that the debit cards
here were capable of use, I respectfully dissent.

131 The majority concludes that the items enumerated in section 18-5-901(6) are
per se "financial devices," regardless of whether a specific item actually "can be
used to obtain cash, credit, property, services, or any other thing of value or to
make financial payments," as required by that provision. Maj. op. 11 17-19
(quoting § 18-5-901(6)(a)). Because Garry Allen Hudson possessed an enumerated
device, the majority sees no need to further consider the statute's definitional
language. Id. at [] 18-19, 27.

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132 Section 18-5-901(6) defines a "[f]inancial device" as "any instrument or
device that can be used to obtain cash, credit, property, services, or any other thing
of value or to make financial payments, including but not limited to" credit cards,
debit cards, checks, and money orders-among other enumerated items.
(Emphasis added.) Under the plain language of this provision, an item must be
capable of being used to obtain something of value to qualify as a financial device.
133 The majority acknowledges this requirement with regard to certain items.
A gift card, for example, qualifies as a financial device only when it is capable of
being used to obtain something of value. Maj. op. 1 25 (citing Reed, 1 64, 338 P.3d
at 375). However, the majority asserts that this requirement does not apply to the
enumerated items in section 18-5-901(6). See id. at | 18. This approach defies the
plain language of the statute and is inconsistent with our case law.

134 The majority posits that the General Assembly uses particular language to
indicate when a definitional phrase applies to enumerated items. Id. Specifically,
the majority points to the phrase "'any of the following"" in the definition of
""[f]inancial identifying information"" in section 18-5-901(7) and asserts that this
"phrasing makes clear that the items listed qualify as financial information only if
they can be used to obtain things of value." Id. (emphasis added) (quoting
§ 18-5-901(7)). This reasoning is unpersuasive.

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135
There is no material contrast-let alone a "stark contrast," id. - between
section 18-5-901(6) and (7) that would signal the General Assembly's intent to treat
these definitional subsections of the same statute completely differently. The
difference in language signals nothing more than the introduction of a
nonexclusive, rather than a finite, list of examples for a given definition.
Section 18-5-901(6) sets forth a nonexclusive list: a "[f]inancial device" means "any
instrument or device that can be used to obtain cash ... or any other thing of
value ... , including but not limited to .... " (Emphasis added.) Section 18-5-901(7)
sets forth a finite list: "[f]inancial identifying information" means "any of the
following [items] that can be used . . . to obtain cash . . . or any other thing of value."
(Emphasis added.) Simply put, whether the list of examples is nonexclusive or
finite has no bearing on whether the definitional language applies to the list. The
proper interpretation of both section 18-5-901(6) and section 18-5-901(7) requires
all items, including those enumerated, to satisfy the statutory definition.1

136 Our case law supports this approach. In People v. Hollis, 2025 CO _, 1 20,
P.3d _, announced today, we hold that the definitional phrase "suffered by a

1 I note that, if anything, the majority's logic that the enumerated examples in
section 18-5-901(6) need not meet the definitional language (because they
automatically qualify as "financial devices") should dictate that the enumerated
examples in section 18-5-901(7) likewise automatically qualify as "financial
identifying information" under that provision. Yet the majority holds the
opposite. Maj. op. 1 18.

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victim" applies to each enumerated item in section 18-1.3-602(3)(a), C.R.S. (2024).
Section 18-1.3-602(3)(a) defines restitution as "any pecuniary loss suffered by a
victim and includes but is not limited to" out-of-pocket expenses, anticipated
future expenses, and money advanced by law enforcement agencies-among
other enumerated items. The enumerated items do not automatically qualify as
restitution-rather, each enumerated item must reflect (1) a pecuniary loss,
(2) suffered by a victim. See Hollis, 1 20. The same approach should govern here.
137 To qualify as a "financial device," section 18-5-901(6) unambiguously
requires an item to be capable of being used to obtain cash or some other thing of
value. Logically then, if a particular item cannot be used to obtain cash or some
other thing of value, it cannot meet the statutory definition of a "financial device,"
and a person cannot be held criminally liable for the possession of such an item.
138 Such a scenario is readily conceivable, even among the listed examples in
section 18-5-901(6): a debit card or credit card may be expired on its face or
obviously damaged beyond use, or a check may be stamped "VOID." Such items
cannot "be used to obtain cash, credit, property, services, or any other thing of
value or to make financial payments," as the statutory definition requires. The
majority's reasoning criminalizes the possession of such enumerated items, even
if there is no possibility that they can be used to obtain cash or anything of value.

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139 To support this position, the majority quotes a comment by a bill sponsor
during a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing. The majority concludes, based on
that single comment, that the legislature intended to criminalize the possession of
even patently unusable items (such as an expired debit card) because they may be
a "precursor to identity theft." Maj. op. 1 23 (quoting Hearings on H.B. 06-1326
before the S. Judiciary Comm., 65th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Apr. 24, 2006)).
However, nothing in the actual language of section 18-5-903 (establishing the
offense of criminal possession of a financial device) signals such legislative intent
or otherwise suggests there are exceptions to the unambiguous definitional
requirements in section 18-5-901(6). Moreover, the majority's reasoning overlooks
the distinct crime of identity theft, which includes the knowing possession of
"financial identifying information," § 18-5-902(1)(b), C.R.S. (2024) (defining the
crime of identity theft), such as "credit card number[s], banking card number[s],
checking account number[s], [and] debit card number[s]," with the intent to obtain
a thing of value, § 18-5-901(7)(a) (defining "[f]inancial identifying information").

140 Finally, the majority's treatment of the gift cards in Reed highlights the
inconsistency of its approach. According to the majority, Reed is distinguishable
from the present case because "gift cards" do not appear on the list in
section 18-5-901(6). Maj. op. [26. Therefore, "in a case involving a gift card, the
prosecution is required to establish that the card was capable of being used to

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obtain a thing of value at the time it was possessed." Id.2 The majority's reasoning
means, however, that a person in possession of a patently unusable enumerated
item (such as an obviously expired debit card, a credit card damaged beyond use,
or a voided check) can be held criminally liable, but a person in possession of a
similarly unusable gift card could not. Nothing in the language of
section 18-5-901(6) supports such a distinction.

141 I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and hold that the
prosecution must prove that an item is capable of being used to obtain a thing of
value to qualify as a financial device. Here, although the debit cards at issue were
not obviously expired or damaged (and so, in theory, were capable of being used
to obtain cash), the prosecution's own witness also expressly acknowledged on
cross-examination that she did not know if the cards were capable of being used.
On this record, the prosecution failed to produce evidence that the cards were
capable of being used to obtain anything of value.

142 Proving that an item is capable of being used to obtain cash or other value
is not an exceptionally high bar-but it is a necessary one. The prosecution's
burden under section 18-5-903 should not be lessened because the items at issue

2 I struggle to square this statement with the majority's holding that
"sections 18-5-903(1) and 18-5-901(6) do not require that the prosecution prove that
a financial device was capable of use at the time of possession to support a
conviction for criminal possession of a financial device." Maj. op. 1 2.

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happened to be debit cards instead of gift cards. Because the majority's
interpretation of section 18-5-901(6) fails to give consistent, harmonious, and
sensible effect to the statutory definition of "financial device," I respectfully
dissent.