of Wright

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
January 23, 2020

2020COA11

No. 18CA2342, Marriage of Wright — Family Law —
Dissolution — Spousal Maintenance

A division of the court of appeals discusses the specific

findings a district court must make when determining a

maintenance award and concludes that a district court errs by

failing to follow the detailed procedure set forth in section 14-10-

114, C.R.S. 2019.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2020COA11

Court of Appeals No. 18CA2342
El Paso County District Court No. 18DR2009
Honorable Theresa M. Cisneros, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Wayne Marcus Wright, Jr.,

Appellant,

and

Karen Cadine Wright,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE TOW
J. Jones and Fox, JJ., concur

Announced January 23, 2020

Gwendolyn M. Lawson, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant

McKinney & Associates P.C., Nathan D. McKinney, Erin Gardner, Amanda C.
Musselwhite, Austin G. Jackson, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
¶1 Wayne Marcus Wright, Jr. (husband), appeals from the

property division, maintenance award, and an attorney fees

sanction entered in connection with the dissolution of his marriage

to Karen Cadine Wright (wife). We affirm in part, reverse in part,

and remand for further proceedings. In doing so, we hold that a

district court errs when it fails to make specific findings to support

its maintenance award, and we set forth in detail the step-by-step

procedure the district court must follow when determining

maintenance.

I. Property Division

¶2 Husband contends that the property division is inequitable,

arguing that the court (1) failed to value the personal property; (2)

failed to include wife’s Jamaican property as part of the marital

estate; and (3) ordered him to pay more of the marital debts. We

perceive no abuse of discretion in the property division. See In re

Marriage of Powell, 220 P.3d 952, 954 (Colo. App. 2009).

A. Applicable Law

¶3 The district court shall divide the marital property in such

proportions as it deems just. § 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2019. The

property division must be equitable, but not necessarily equal. In re

1
Marriage of Antuna, 8 P.3d 589, 594 (Colo. App. 2000). And an

equitable division depends on the facts and circumstances of each

case. In re Marriage of Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 35 (Colo. 2001). “The

key to an equitable distribution is fairness, not mathematical

precision.” In re Marriage of Gallo, 752 P.2d 47, 55 (Colo. 1988).

B. Analysis

1. Valuation

¶4 A district court is required to find the approximate current

value of all property owned by the parties. In re Marriage of

Zappanti, 80 P.3d 889, 892 (Colo. App. 2003). But specific findings

as to the value of each asset are not always required. See In re

Marriage of Page, 70 P.3d 579, 582 (Colo. App. 2003). For example,

if the parties’ valuations of an asset conflict, the court may order

that each party should retain the property in his or her possession

without attributing a value. See Antuna, 8 P.3d at 595.

¶5 Wife valued the personal property at $2900, and husband

initially said it was worth $500. But at the hearing, husband

offered unsubstantiated “estimates” of value for particular items,

such as $500 for the bedroom furniture, “somewhere in the range of

2
$600, $700” for lamps, and “several hundred [dollars]” for paintings

and mirrors.

¶6 On this conflicting and imprecise evidence, we do not find an

abuse of discretion in the court’s conclusion that it was “almost an

impossibility” to value the personal property and its finding that it

was equitable for each party to retain the property in his or her

possession. See id.

2. Jamaican Home

¶7 Husband believed that wife and her mother owned a home in

Jamaica. Wife testified that she no longer owned the home after her

mother refinanced it but acknowledged that it was worth $3600.

Even if we assume that wife still owns the home, husband testified

without contradiction that the home was wife’s premarital property.

¶8 Marital property does not include property acquired by one

party before the marriage. See § 14-10-113(4); see also § 14-10-

113(1) (court must set separate property aside to each spouse

before dividing marital property). Save for exceptions not relevant

here, only the increase in value of separate property is marital

property subject to division. See § 14-10-113(1)(d), (4). Yet there

was no evidence at the hearing to show any increase in value for the

3
property in Jamaica and, thus, no marital value for the court to

attribute as part of the property division. See Zappanti, 80 P.3d at

892 (parties must provide evidence sufficient to support their

claims); see also In re Marriage of Krejci, 2013 COA 6, ¶ 23 (a

party’s failure to give the court sufficient information to rule on an

issue does not provide grounds for reversal). We thus perceive no

error in the omission of this property from the property division.

3. Marital Debt

¶9 The court should not assign marital liabilities

disproportionately to one spouse. In re Marriage of Speirs, 956 P.2d

622, 623 (Colo. App. 1997) (citing In re Marriage of Kiefer, 738 P.2d

54 (Colo. App. 1987)). However, Speirs cannot be read to require a

mathematically equal division of marital debt. For one thing, such

a requirement would be inconsistent with the “equitable, but not

necessarily equal” principle reiterated in Antuna. Moreover, in

Kiefer, on which the Speirs division relied, a division of this court

reversed a property division that had divided a portion of the value

of the marital home between the spouses but had allocated all of

the encumbrance on the home to only one spouse. The division

specifically disavowed any requirement that the court deduct the

4
amount of the encumbrances before dividing the net value of the

home. 738 P.2d at 56. Moreover, it noted that under the

circumstances of that case — where the court had found that the

parties’ contributions to the marriage and the marital estate were

roughly equal — “equity requires that wife share a part of the debt

incurred on the home during the marriage as well as a part of the

increase in the home’s value.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, Kiefer

and, by extension, Speirs merely stand for the general proposition

acknowledged in Antuna — that the property and debt division

must be equitable.

¶ 10 The court here found that all the parties’ debt was marital,

which husband does not appear to dispute on appeal. Given the

disparity in the parties’ income, the court deemed it fair to divide

the marital debt proportionately to the parties’ incomes, so it

required husband to pay $29,486.90 of the marital debt while wife

would pay the remaining $12,886.47. As the record shows that

husband’s income is more than four times wife’s, the court could

reasonably conclude that husband had the financial means with

which to pay more of the debts. See § 14-10-113(1)(c) (requiring the

court to consider the economic circumstances of each spouse when

5
dividing property); see also In re Marriage of Faulkner, 652 P.2d

572, 574 (Colo. 1982) (“It should appear obvious that a spouse’s

earning capabilities are properly part of the ‘economic

circumstances’ the court must consider in compliance with [the

maintenance statute].”). We thus see no abuse of discretion in the

unequal, but equitable, division of debts.1

4. The Overall Property Division

¶ 11 The parties’ marital estate included their marital debt, the

personal property, and husband’s $4000 401(k). As mentioned, the

court ordered that the parties would keep the personal property in

their possession, and it divided the marital debt in proportion to

income. The court also allocated the 401(k) equally between the

parties. In light of the limited estate, and recognizing that husband

was earning $9583 per month while wife was “living at poverty

level,” this property division is fair and equitable. See § 14-10-

1 In allocating the debts “in proportion to income,” the court used a
“40/60” split, reflecting the relative income figures after adjusting
for the maintenance award. Because property division is supposed
to be completed before maintenance is determined, see In re
Marriage of de Koning, 2016 CO 2, ¶ 21, this procedure may have
been erroneous. However, because neither party challenges this
aspect of the order, we will not disturb the order on that basis.

6
113(1)(c) (property division requires the court to consider the

parties’ economic circumstances).2

II. Maintenance Award

¶ 12 Husband contends that the district court abused its discretion

by awarding wife spousal maintenance without applying the

required statutory factors. We agree, and therefore reverse and

remand the maintenance award for reconsideration.

¶ 13 Section 14-10-114(3), C.R.S. 2019, details a specific process a

district court must follow when considering a maintenance request.

In re Marriage of Vittetoe, 2016 COA 71, ¶¶ 8-9.

¶ 14 First, a court considering a maintenance request

shall make initial written or oral findings
concerning:

(A) The amount of each party’s gross income;

(B) The marital property apportioned to each
party;

(C) The financial resources of each party,
including but not limited to the actual or

2 We have not considered husband’s new assertion that wife failed
to disclose her current finances and provide mandatory disclosures
before the hearing, as he did not raise such challenges in the
district court. See In re Marriage of Wells, 252 P.3d 1212, 1215
(Colo. App. 2011) (reviewing court will not address issues not
presented in the district court).

7
potential income from separate or marital
property;

(D) Reasonable financial need as established
during the marriage; and

(E) Whether maintenance awarded pursuant to
this section would be deductible for federal
income tax purposes by the payor and taxable
income to the recipient.

§ 14-10-114(3)(a)(I); see also People in Interest of C.N., 2018 COA

165, ¶ 35 (the word “shall” in a statute has a mandatory

connotation).

¶ 15 Next, the court

shall determine the amount and term of the
maintenance award, if any, that is fair and
equitable to both parties after considering:

(A) The guideline amount and term of
maintenance set forth in paragraph (b) of
subsection (3), if applicable, based upon the
duration of the marriage and the combined
gross incomes of the parties;

(B) The factors relating to the amount and
term of maintenance set forth in paragraph (c)
of this subsection (3); and

(C) Whether the party seeking maintenance
has met the requirement for a maintenance
award pursuant to paragraph (d) of this
subsection (3).

8
§ 14-10-114(3)(a)(II). The section 14-10-114(3)(b) guidelines do not

create a presumptive amount or term of maintenance. § 14-10-

114(3)(e). Moreover, the factors set forth in section 14-10-114(3)(c)

are not exclusive, as the final factor is “[a]ny other factor that the

court deems relevant.” § 14-10-114(3)(c)(XIII). Thus, “[t]he court

has discretion to determine the award of maintenance that is fair

and equitable to both parties based upon the totality of the

circumstances.” § 14-10-114(3)(e).

¶ 16 Finally, the court must consider whether the party seeking

maintenance has met the requirement for a maintenance award

under section 14-10-114(3)(d). § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(C). The statute

makes clear, however, that the court is to consider this issue only

“[a]fter considering the provisions of this section and making the

required findings of fact.” § 14-10-114(3)(d). Under this section,

the court shall award maintenance

only if it finds that the spouse seeking
maintenance lacks sufficient property,
including marital property apportioned to him
or her, to provide for his or her reasonable
needs and is unable to support himself or
herself through appropriate employment or is
the custodian of a child whose condition or
circumstances make it inappropriate for the

9
spouse to be required to seek employment
outside the home.

In other words, although the legislature has instructed the trial

court to consider this arguably threshold inquiry last, it is

nevertheless an essential finding before maintenance may be

awarded.

¶ 17 Whether the court grants or denies a maintenance request, it

“shall make specific written or oral findings in support of” its

decision. § 14-10-114(3)(e).

¶ 18 The following is the court’s maintenance order:

3. The Court Orders that Mr. Wright pay
spousal maintenance to Mrs. Wright.

a. The Court finds that Mrs. Wright has a need
for spousal maintenance and that Mr. Wright
has the ability to pay.

b. The Court Orders that Mr. Wright pay
$2,585 per month in spousal maintenance for
6 years and 4 months. The Court calculates
that amount based on a finding that the
parties were married for 12 years and 8
months, that Mrs. Wright earns $2,080 per
month and Mr. Wright earns $9,583 per
month. The Court finds that under C.R.S. §
14-10-114, the Court is able to find that the
guideline amount is the proper amount.

c. The Court generated a Spousal Maintenance
and [a] Child Support worksheet to reflect
these calculations which have been filed

10
contemporaneously with this Order and are
hereby incorporated as a part of the Order.

¶ 19 These findings are insufficient under the statute, since they

lack most of the required findings under subsections (3)(a)(I) and

(3)(d) and do not demonstrate consideration of any of the thirteen

factors within subsection (3)(c). The first step requires specific

findings, either written or oral. The district court did not make any

findings regarding the parties’ reasonable needs as established

during the marriage, or whether the maintenance would be

deductible for federal income tax purposes.

¶ 20 The second step does not require explicit findings. However,

while a district court has no obligation to make specific factual

findings on every factor listed in section 14-10-114(3)(c), it must

“make sufficiently explicit findings of fact to give the appellate court

a clear understanding of the basis of its order.” In re Marriage of

Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9. We are not convinced by wife’s

argument that it is enough for the court to have made a

“generalized statement” that it looked at the statutory factors. See

id. Although the district court alluded to “the additional criteria set

11
out in [section] 14-10-114,” there is no other indication in the

court’s findings that those criteria were meaningfully considered.

¶ 21 For example, the district court made no mention of husband’s

claim that wife was underemployed. 3 Moreover, the district court

did not mention, and it is unclear whether it considered, the impact

of the disproportionate allocation of marital debts on either wife’s

needs or husband’s ability to pay.

¶ 22 Here, the district court first considered whether wife qualified

for maintenance, which pursuant to statute is supposed to be the

last thing considered. Next, the district court calculated the

amount and term pursuant to the statutory guideline, incorporating

the first of the required written findings under section 14-10-

3 Husband’s opening brief includes a variety of factual assertions
regarding the income potential of someone who holds a
phlebotomist license. We cannot consider those assertions, as they
rely on factual material not provided to the district court. Nor do
we express any opinion as to whether wife is voluntarily
underemployed. That decision is for the district court to make after
considering the relevant evidence and case law. See, e.g., People v.
Martinez, 70 P.3d 474, 475 (Colo. 2003) (“The income imputation
inquiry must start with whether the parent is shirking a child
support obligation.”). Though Martinez was a child support case,
the analysis of voluntary underemployment is the same in a
maintenance case. See In re Marriage of Tooker, 2019 COA 83,
¶¶ 25-27.

12
114(3)(a)(I). Finally, the court observed in its oral order that the

evidence “as well as the additional criteria set out in [section] 14-

10-114 cause the court to be able to find that the guideline amount

is the proper amount for spousal maintenance.” In other words, it

appears that the court gave the guideline amount presumptive

effect, then looked for but did not find any reason to deviate from

that amount. This is not the process required by statute.

¶ 23 Accordingly, we reverse the maintenance award and remand

for the district court to follow the procedure specified by section 14-

10-114(3), making findings where required and addressing the

factors relevant to its maintenance determination. The findings

entered on remand must be sufficient for us to determine the basis

for the maintenance award. See Gibbs, ¶ 9.

¶ 24 Because maintenance is based on the parties’ financial

circumstances at the time the order is entered, the district court

should consider the parties’ current circumstances on remand. See

In re Marriage of Kann, 2017 COA 94, ¶ 79. For that reason, we

need not consider husband’s argument that the court improperly

calculated wife’s income.

13
III. Attorney Fees Sanction

¶ 25 Wife moved to compel husband’s disclosure of bank

statements, credit card statements, and additional income

documentation. Her motion sought sanctions under C.R.C.P.

16.2(e) and attorney fees under C.R.C.P. 37. A few days after filing

her motion, wife submitted a trial management certificate on her

own behalf. Wife later submitted an attorney fee affidavit showing

that “[t]o date,” she had incurred $6681.47 in attorney fees.

¶ 26 After the permanent orders hearing, the court ordered

husband to pay wife $2500 of attorney fees “for causing [wife] to

have to file a [m]otion to [c]ompel by providing incomplete

disclosures and for his failure to participate in the drafting of the

[t]rial [m]anagement [c]ertificate.” Husband contends that this

order is an abuse of discretion. We disagree.

¶ 27 Under C.R.C.P. 16.2(e), parties must disclose all information

material to the resolution of the case, including mandatory

disclosures such as sworn financial affidavits, personal bank

statements, and income documentation. Under C.R.C.P. 16.2(h)(2),

if at least one party is represented by counsel the parties shall

prepare and file a joint trial management certificate (TMC). The

14
district court has considerable discretion to impose appropriate

sanctions if a party fails to comply with the provisions of C.R.C.P.

16.2. See C.R.C.P. 16.2(e), (j); In re Marriage of Cardona, 321 P.3d

518, 527 (Colo. App. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 2014 CO 3.

¶ 28 Under C.R.C.P. 37, a party may move for an order compelling

disclosure and imposing sanctions. C.R.C.P. 37(a)(4)(A) allows the

district court to require the party whose conduct necessitated the

motion to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred

in making the motion, including attorney fees.

¶ 29 We will not disturb the district court’s imposition of sanctions

absent an abuse of discretion. See Cardona, 321 P.3d at 527

(C.R.C.P. 16.2); Antolovich v. Brown Grp. Retail, Inc., 183 P.3d 582,

598 (Colo. App. 2007) (C.R.C.P. 37).

¶ 30 Despite husband’s cursory statement that he complied with

disclosures, the record shows that he provided wife with limited

financial information, which prompted wife’s motion to compel. In

addition, husband did not cooperate in drafting the TMC, which the

court concluded resulted in needlessly incurred expenses. Based

on this record, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its

discretion by imposing a sanction.

15
¶ 31 Nor did husband ever challenge the reasonableness of the fee

award or request a hearing in the district court to test that

reasonableness. In fact, when submitting his objections to the form

of the written order, he challenged only the decision to order fees,

not the amount ordered.4 Thus, any challenge to the

reasonableness of the fees ordered is not before us. See Metro Nat’l

Bank v. Roe, 675 P.2d 331, 333 (Colo. App. 1983) (where the

question of reasonableness of the attorney fees was not raised at

the trial or hearing, it was not properly an issue on appeal).

¶ 32 Similarly, because it was first raised in the reply brief, we do

not consider husband’s argument that section 13-17-102(6), C.R.S.

2019, prohibited the court from entering the sanction because he

was pro se at the hearing. See In re Marriage of Drexler, 2013 COA

43, ¶ 24 (reviewing court will not consider issues not raised until

the reply brief).

4 Husband’s version of the written order asserted that he had to pay
his own attorney fees and that both parties should be responsible
for their own fees. Husband’s argument appears to misunderstand
the nature of the fee order. Fees were not ordered pursuant to
section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2019, which provides for a balancing of
the parties’ respective financial resources; rather, the fee award was
a sanction for husband’s misconduct in pretrial disclosures.

16
¶ 33 In any event, husband’s pro se status does not excuse his

noncompliance with C.R.C.P. 16.2. See Prefer v. PharmNetRx, LLC,

18 P.3d 844, 850 (Colo. App. 2000) (acting pro se does not excuse a

party’s noncompliance with discovery rules); see also Rosenberg v.

Grady, 843 P.2d 25, 26 (Colo. App. 1992) (“A pro se litigant who

chooses to rely upon his own understanding of legal principles and

procedures is required to follow the same procedural rules as those

who are qualified to practice law and must be prepared to accept

the consequences of his mistakes and errors.”). To be sure,

C.R.C.P. 16.2 is drafted in a way that requires the parties, not just

parties with counsel, to comply with its provisions. See, e.g.,

C.R.C.P. 16.2(b) (requiring the parties, counsel, and the court to

evaluate the case at all stages); C.R.C.P. 16.2(c)(1)(B) (parties and

counsel, if any, shall attend the initial status conference); C.R.C.P.

16.2(h)(1) (unrepresented parties shall file a brief statement

identifying the disputed issues, witnesses, and exhibits).

IV. Bias or Prejudice

¶ 34 Husband contends that the permanent orders must be

reversed because the district court’s bias and prejudice against men

and his religion are evident in its rulings. While we disapprove of

17
some of the court’s commentary, we disagree that it requires

reversal.

¶ 35 At the hearing, wife testified that she volunteered at the

parties’ church during the marriage. However, when wife accepted

a job offer that would prevent her from continuing to volunteer with

the church, husband told her not to come back to the church. A

few days later, husband packed up his belongings from the parties’

shared apartment and sent a text to wife saying that she had to

move out by the end of the week. Thereafter, wife testified that

husband stopped giving her financial assistance, which required

her to obtain food stamps, stay with friends until she could obtain

Section 8 housing, and rely on state-paid day care facilities. Wife

also testified that husband changed his phone number and

cancelled their child’s health insurance without telling her. Finally,

wife testified that husband stopped asking about the parties’ child.

¶ 36 Peppered in among the court’s factual findings and legal

conclusions were the following comments:

• “The Court is disappointed with Mr. Wright. And quite

frankly, I’m glad I don’t attend the church that he goes

to.”

18
• “Mr. Wright caused his child to be without a home

when he was upset at Ms. Wright, when he took steps

to have the home given back to whoever owned the

home. That caused Ms. Wright and that child to have

to go – I think the kids call it couch surfing. And I just

think that’s unconscionable. I just think that’s

unconscionable. I’m disappointed that Mr. Wright, as

a churchgoing man, would do that to his little girl.”

• “The Court’s position is is [sic] that dads who are

putting their children’s needs first make sure that the

other parent has accurate health insurance

information. And the fact that Mr. Wright chose to

withhold that is very offensive to the Court, especially

when he comes in and he’s shedding some tears,

wanting me to believe that he’s putting his child first,

when that fact – that’s the second fact that shows that

he didn’t put the child’s needs first.”

• “You’re not so different from a lot of other dads I’ve

seen that come into court and claim that they love

their child and, ‘Oh, the child is the end all and the be

19
all and I would do anything for the child.’ I don’t

believe them any more than I believe you. Because

good dads don’t do to their child what you did to your

child.”

• “I don’t know what to make of this church. I’m just

glad I don’t go there. Most churches I know support

family units and support kids and support dads

involved in kids. And what has been described to me

today just makes me glad I don’t go to your church.

And I’d be willing to bet God is disappointed with you,

too.”

• “Mr. Wright, I am disappointed in you. I’m

disappointed in you. Your child will not be well served

by your behavior. And truthfully, I would expect better

of a churchgoing man.”

• “Mr. Wright, I am so disappointed in you. I’m just

disappointed. I just hope you don’t continue to behave

like this. That would not be good for your daughter,

honestly. And I happen to believe everything you said

about the importance of dads in kids[’] lives. I know

20
that’s a fact. But not when you’re behaving like a

knucklehead.”

¶ 37 A judge must be free of all taint of bias and partiality. Watson

v. Cal-Three, LLC, 254 P.3d 1189, 1192 (Colo. App. 2011); see also

C.J.C. 2.3(B) (a judge shall not manifest bias or prejudice). But

prejudice is distinguishable from the sort of personal opinions that

as a matter of course arise during a judge’s hearing of a cause. See

Smith v. Dist. Court, 629 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Colo. 1981). Thus,

“judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or

disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their

cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge.”

Liteky v. Unites States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994); see also People

v. Roehrs, 2019 COA 31, ¶ 33 (a judge ordinarily cannot be

disqualified on the basis of opinions, attitudes, and knowledge

gained during her participation in judicial proceedings).

¶ 38 We disapprove of the court’s comments about husband’s

church. However, when read in context with the evidence

presented at the hearing, the comments do not reflect a bias or

prejudice about husband’s gender or religion. Instead, the

comments reflect the court’s opinion, based on the evidence, that

21
husband made poor decisions to withhold money, parenting time,

and proper living quarters from the child “[a]ll because he’s upset

with the mom.” While the tone of these comments and the

expression of the court’s opinion about husband’s church were ill

advised, they were based on the evidence the court heard in the

course of the proceedings and thus do not show an unreasonable or

unfair bias against husband.

V. Appellate Attorney Fees Request

¶ 39 We deny husband’s request for appellate attorney fees because

he has failed to cite any legal authority for the request. See C.A.R.

39.1 (party claiming attorney fees must explain the legal and factual

basis for an award). Citing the appellate fee rule as the sole legal

basis for an attorney fees request is not sufficient. See In re

Marriage of Roddy, 2014 COA 96, ¶ 32. (“A request which merely

identifies the statute under which fees are requested, without

stating specific grounds that justify an award of fees, does not

adequately comply with [Rule 39.1].”).

¶ 40 Husband does not assert that wife’s defense of the appeal

lacked substantial justification, see section 13-17-102, or that the

parties’ respective financial resources warrant an award of fees, see

22
section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2019. He merely contends that he is

entitled to fees due to his “having to file an appeal to address the

abuse of discretion and reversal of spousal support decision, for fair

and equitable property divisions, debts and bias.” Rule 39.1

provides the procedural mechanism for this court to award fees “[i]f

attorney fees are recoverable for the appeal.” The rule does not, by

itself, provide a substantive entitlement to fees.

¶ 41 We also deny wife’s request for appellate attorney fees under

C.A.R. 39.1 and section 13-17-102, for what she calls an appeal

filed without “any good faith legal basis.” Given our disposition, we

disagree that the appeal is frivolous, groundless, or vexatious.

VI. Conclusion

¶ 42 The portion of the judgment regarding maintenance is

reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment is

affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE FOX concur.

23