Peo in Interest of TAR

25CA2167 Peo in Interest of TAR 06-25-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA2167
City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 23JV30576
Honorable Laurie Clark, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of T.A.R., a Child,

and Concerning M.D.M. a/k/a M.D.R-M. and C.B.G.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN
Pawar and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced June 25, 2026

Miko Brown, City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney, Denver,
Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for
Appellant M.D.M. a/k/a M.D.R-M.

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Appellant C.B.G.
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, C.B.G. (father) and

M.D.M. a/k/a M.D.R-M. (mother) appeal the judgment terminating

their parent-child legal relationships with T.A.R. (the child). We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 When the child was born in December 2022, she tested

positive for opiates. As a result, the parents began working

voluntarily with Denver Human Services (the Department) and

agreed to a safety plan.

¶3 About seven months later, the Department received a report

that the child had ingested fentanyl while in the care of a family

friend. The parents took the child to the emergency room, where

the medical professionals determined that she had overdosed. They

revived her by using Narcan. The parents agreed to another safety

plan that prohibited them from unsupervised contact with the child

and identified a family member to care for the child when she was

released from the hospital. But less than a week later, both parents

were arrested after law enforcement found fentanyl in their car

during a traffic stop. And the family member who had been

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identified to care for the child told the Department that she was no

longer willing to do so.

¶4 Consequently, the Department filed a petition in dependency

and neglect alleging concerns about the parents’ substance use and

involvement in the criminal justice system. The juvenile court

granted temporary legal custody of the child to the Department,

which placed the child in foster care.

¶5 Mother admitted the allegations in the petition, and the

juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent or neglected relating

to mother. The court then adopted a treatment plan that required

mother to address her substance use issues and develop a safe and

supportive relationship with the child.

¶6 Thereafter, genetic testing revealed that father wasn’t the

biological father of the child. Nonetheless, at father’s request, the

juvenile court held a hearing and adjudicated father to be the

child’s legal father. Father then admitted the allegations in the

petition, and the court adjudicated the child dependent or neglected

relating to father. The court adopted a treatment plan that required

father to address his substance use issues, refrain from engaging in

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criminal activity, and develop a safe and supportive relationship

with the child.

¶7 In March 2025, the guardian ad litem (GAL) moved to

terminate the parents’ legal relationships with the child. Shortly

thereafter, the juvenile court granted the Department’s motion to

amend father’s treatment plan to add additional requirements

related to his mental health. The court also granted the

Department’s motion to heighten father’s family time supervision

from monitored to fully supervised based on concerns that (1) the

child was returning from family time with “burst blood vessels,”

which indicated “excessive crying for hours at a time,” and (2) the

child had become more dysregulated when father’s family time

supervision level had decreased. Around the same time, based on a

recent diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder, father requested

accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

(ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.

¶8 About four months later, the juvenile court held a seven-day

termination hearing. Approximately two years after the Department

filed the petition in dependency and neglect, the court granted the

GAL’s termination motion.

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II. GAL’s Standing to Move for Termination

¶9 As a threshold matter, both parents contend that the GAL

lacked standing to file the motion to terminate their parental rights.

We disagree.

¶ 10 Both the supreme court and divisions of this court have held

that a GAL may move to terminate the parent-child legal

relationship. C.W.B. v. A.S., 2018 CO 8, ¶ 24; A.M. v. A.C., 2013

CO 16, ¶ 14; People in Interest of C.N.T., 2026 COA 47, ¶ 15; People

in Interest of M.N., 950 P.2d 674, 676 (Colo. App. 1997). These

decisions are consistent with a GAL’s broad statutory authority to,

among other things, make “recommendations to the court

concerning the child’s welfare” and participate in the proceedings

“to the degree necessary to adequately represent the child.” § 19-3-

203(5), C.R.S. 2025; see also M.N., 950 P.2d at 675 (a GAL’s motion

to terminate the parent-child legal relationship is “no more than a

recommendation or request to the court”).

¶ 11 The parents nonetheless rely on People in Interest of R.M.P.,

2025 CO 34, to argue against the GAL’s standing. In R.M.P., the

supreme court reiterated the longstanding principle that “[t]he State

is the exclusive party entitled to bring an action in dependency and

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neglect.” Id. at ¶ 33 (quoting C.W.B., ¶ 22). As a result, a GAL can’t

“initiate or prosecute a dependency and neglect petition against the

child’s parents.” Id. at ¶ 22.

¶ 12 A division of this court recently interpreted R.M.P. narrowly as

addressing “only the State’s authority to (1) initiate a case and

(2) prosecute the petition to its conclusion — a dependency and

neglect adjudication.” C.N.T., ¶ 10. According to the C.N.T.

division, “R.M.P. says nothing about whether, after an adjudication

is entered, a GAL can file a motion to terminate.” Id. at ¶ 12. The

division therefore rejected the argument that a GAL lacks standing

to move for termination of the parent-child legal relationship. Id. at

¶ 15.

¶ 13 We agree with the division’s analysis in C.N.T. and perceive no

reason to depart from it here. Had the supreme court in R.M.P.

intended to overrule its prior holdings recognizing a GAL’s authority

to move to terminate parental rights, see C.W.B., ¶ 24; A.M., ¶ 14, it

would have done so expressly, not sub silentio.

¶ 14 Accordingly, we reject the parents’ argument that the GAL

lacked standing to move for termination of their parental rights.

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III. Termination of Parental Rights

¶ 15 Both parents argue that the juvenile court erred by

terminating their parental rights. Specifically, father challenges the

court’s findings that he was unfit and that he couldn’t become fit

within a reasonable time. Mother challenges the court’s finding

that no less drastic alternatives to termination existed. We aren’t

persuaded by either parent.

A. Legal Framework and Standard of Review

¶ 16 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent or neglected; (2) the parent hasn’t complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan hasn’t been

successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or

condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time. § 19-3-

604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 17 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of

S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10. Thus, we review the court’s factual

findings for clear error but review de novo its legal conclusions

based on those facts. Id.

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B. Finding of Father’s Unfitness

¶ 18 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

he was unfit because the record showed that he complied with every

aspect of his treatment plan and demonstrated that he was capable

of providing a safe and stable home for the child. We discern no

error.

1. Applicable Law

¶ 19 A parent is unfit if their conduct or condition renders them

unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.

S.R.N.J-S., ¶ 9. “Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum,

that the parent provide nurturing and protection adequate to meet

the child’s physical, emotional, and mental health needs.” Id.

¶ 20 While a treatment plan must be reasonably calculated to

render a parent fit to provide adequate parenting to their child, see

§ 19-1-103(12), C.R.S. 2025, a parent’s partial or even substantial

compliance with the treatment plan may not be sufficient to render

the parent fit, see People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 909

(Colo. App. 2005).

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2. Analysis

¶ 21 The juvenile court found that although father substantially

complied with his treatment plan, he “ha[d] not internalized the

services provided in such a way to address the child protection

concerns” that brought the family to the Department’s attention.

Specifically, the court found that father was unable to “safely

parent [the child] with her high level of needs.” It further found that

father struggled to understand the child’s needs or the impact of

trauma from the child’s perspective, and that such understanding

was necessary to care for the child, particularly when she was

dysregulated. The court also found that father’s mental health

impacted him on a daily basis, which affected his ability to parent

the child. The court noted that some of father’s mental health

triggers were “exactly the behaviors the minor child displays when

she is feeling most dysregulated,” which it found concerning

because father “may need to regulate himself” in those moments

instead of helping the child regulate. The court ultimately

concluded that father’s conduct or condition rendered him unfit.

¶ 22 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. In terms of

the child’s “high level of needs,” the child’s pediatrician and her

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child-parent psychotherapy (CPP) therapist testified that the child

had severe sleep issues, episodes of extreme dysregulation, and

regressive behaviors. Both providers also testified that the child’s

issues and behaviors weren’t typical of children her age. The CPP

therapist was “gravely concerned” about the child because her

symptoms were the “most acute” the therapist or her team had ever

seen. Similarly, the pediatrician had “maybe seen one other child”

who had symptoms of the “same intensity.”

¶ 23 To that end, the pediatrician testified that the child wasn’t

getting enough sleep because she took a “really long time” to fall

asleep and experienced night terrors, which frequently interrupted

her sleep. The pediatrician noted that although the child needed

twelve to sixteen hours of sleep every night, she was only sleeping

for two hours on some nights, and her sleep was interrupted

“almost every night.” The pediatrician expressed concern about the

child’s lack of sleep because “poor sleep is associated with both

short-term and long-term health consequences,” such as mental

illness, obesity, behavioral difficulties, poor school performance,

and developmental delays.

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¶ 24 The CPP therapist testified that the child regularly experienced

“sudden onset dysregulatory episodes where she los[t] physical

control of her body” and engaged in aggression toward herself and

others. During those episodes, the child screamed, thrashed,

banged her head, hit, and kicked. The CPP therapist further

testified that the child “disassociate[d] on a regular basis” and had

recently experienced extreme “regression in toileting behaviors.”

¶ 25 The CPP therapist, who testified as an expert in infant mental

health with an emphasis on trauma and attachment, opined that

the child needed a stable, consistent caregiver who could

understand her high level of needs and co-regulate with her during

episodes of dysregulation. The child’s occupational therapist and

pediatrician reiterated the same things. Based on her work with

father, however, the CPP therapist didn’t believe that he fully

understood the child’s needs or that he had the ability to co-

regulate with the child in the way that she needed. The CPP

therapist testified that despite father’s consistent attendance and

engagement with CPP, he hadn’t made any sustained progress in

viewing the child’s trauma and behaviors from the child’s

perspective. The CPP therapist testified that while father made

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some progress during each session, the progress didn’t carry over to

the next session. Without such progress, father hadn’t moved past

the foundational stage of CPP, meaning he hadn’t engaged in any

joint therapy sessions with the child.

¶ 26 The CPP therapist also testified that father’s mental health

issues, specifically his post-traumatic stress disorder, hindered his

ability to meet the child’s needs. The CPP therapist noted that “the

first step to helping a young child regulate is regulating yourself.”

But father had told the CPP therapist that the child’s feelings of

distress were overwhelming and distressing to him, which made co-

regulation “even harder.” Indeed, father testified that some of his

triggers aligned “exactly” with the child’s behaviors when she

became dysregulated. And father’s individual therapist testified

that she had concerns about father being able to consistently and

safely manage his mental health while caring for the child.

¶ 27 Moreover, the caseworker testified that the Department moved

to restrict father’s family time from monitored visits to supervised

visits approximately four months before the termination hearing

because it was concerned about father’s mental health. In support

of its concerns, the Department referenced numerous reports it had

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received of marks and bruises on the child that seemed to correlate

with father’s family time. The caseworker confirmed that the child’s

marks and bruises decreased significantly when father’s family time

became supervised again. The caseworker also testified that the

Department objected to father’s request for overnight visits with the

child approximately one month before the termination hearing.

And, despite testifying that father was fit, the caseworker didn’t

believe that the child could be returned to him immediately.

¶ 28 On appeal, father argues that the juvenile court erred by

finding him unfit because (1) the evidence showed that he had

substantially complied with his treatment plan; (2) the caseworker

opined that he was fit; (3) the family time supervisor testified that

father met the child’s needs during family time; and (4) the parent-

child interactional evaluator opined that the child was bonded and

attached to him. But the juvenile court heard all that evidence and

still found father unfit. And we can’t reweigh the evidence. See

People in Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA 56, ¶ 62; see also In re

Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63,

¶ 15 (when the record supports the trial court’s findings, its

resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on review); In re

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Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 329 (Colo. App. 2007) (an

appellate court may presume that the trial court considered all

admitted evidence).

¶ 29 While we recognize that father made great strides in complying

with his treatment plan, the record shows that the court properly

considered the evidence supporting father’s compliance, weighed it

against the contrary evidence and the needs of the child, and

determined that father was unfit because he couldn’t meet the

child’s needs. Because the record supports the court’s findings, we

decline to disturb them on appeal.

C. Father’s Fitness Within a Reasonable Time

¶ 30 Father also contends that the juvenile court erred by finding

that he couldn’t become fit within a reasonable time. He asserts

that he “maintained a loving and bonded relationship with the

child” and “made consistent and substantial progress on his

treatment plan from the outset of the case.” We discern no error.

1. Applicable Law

¶ 31 A parent must have a reasonable amount of time to work on a

treatment plan before the juvenile court terminates their parental

rights. People in Interest of D.Y., 176 P.3d 874, 876 (Colo. App.

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2007). The determination of a reasonable period is necessarily fact

specific; thus, what constitutes a reasonable time to comply with a

treatment plan may vary from case to case. Id. In determining

whether a parent can become fit in a reasonable time, the juvenile

court may consider whether any change has occurred during the

pendency of the proceeding. In Interest of K.D., 139 P.3d 695, 700

(Colo. 2006). A reasonable time isn’t an indefinite time, and it must

be determined by considering the physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs of the child. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022

COA 133, ¶ 24.

¶ 32 Additionally, when a child is under six years old, the juvenile

court must consider the expedited permanency planning provisions,

which require that the child be placed in a permanent home as

expeditiously as possible. See §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, 19-3-

702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

2. Analysis

¶ 33 The juvenile court considered whether father could become fit

within a reasonable amount of time but ultimately concluded he

couldn’t. The court noted that because of the child’s “young age”

and “high need for permanency,” it prioritized expedited placement.

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The court found that the child needed a caregiver who was attuned

to her needs and could provide a high level of support “right now.”

The court also found that the child couldn’t wait for “the mere

possibility of a successful transition” to father and that any delay in

permanency would be “physically, emotionally, and

developmentally” detrimental to the child. The court concluded that

despite the Department’s reasonable efforts and accommodations

for father, he couldn’t “become rehabilitated . . . in a reasonable

amount of time as it pertain[ed] to [the child] and her need for

permanency,” especially when considering “the severity of her

behaviors and regressions.”

¶ 34 The record supports these findings. By the time of

termination, the child had been in foster care for over two years. A

year and a half had passed since the court adopted father’s initial

treatment plan, and six months had passed since the court adopted

his amended treatment plan. But, as discussed above, the juvenile

court found that father hadn’t mitigated the court’s concerns about

his inability to meet the child’s significant needs.

¶ 35 As an expert in infant mental health, the CPP therapist opined

that children need permanency, consistency, and stability to grow

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and develop. The CPP therapist further opined that, from a

psychological perspective, the child was “out of time” and couldn’t

wait for permanency because her symptoms were “growing more

intense by the day.” The therapist explained that the child

struggled with unpredictability and changes to routine and that

every transition between the foster parents and father was

triggering and traumatic for the child. According to the CPP

therapist, the child couldn’t heal from her trauma if she remained

in the current “impermanent” situation.

¶ 36 In addition, the CPP therapist doubted that father could meet

the child’s needs in the timeline that the child needed. She

explained that father had made “very minim[al] sustained progress”

in the eight or nine months that he had been working with the CPP

therapist.

¶ 37 As father points out, the caseworker, who testified as an

expert in social casework with an emphasis in child protection,

opined that the child could transition to father’s care in

approximately two months. Contrary to that testimony, the juvenile

court found that the caseworker “believe[d] a transition home could

happen within [six] to [twelve] months” and that the child couldn’t

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wait that long. Thus, we agree with father that this specific finding

was clearly erroneous because no evidence or testimony supported

it. See People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15 (a trial

court’s factual finding is clearly erroneous if it has no record

support).

¶ 38 But we disagree that this error requires reversal. Ample

evidence supports the court’s ultimate finding that father couldn’t

become fit within a reasonable time. In particular, the court relied

heavily on the CPP therapist’s opinion, and the therapist repeatedly

stated that the child was already “out of time” and that any further

delay in permanency would be detrimental to her. Thus, even if the

court had accurately quoted the caseworker’s testimony that a

transition home could occur within two months, nothing in the

record suggests that the court would have found that father could

become fit within a reasonable time or that it would have ultimately

denied the GAL’s motion to terminate father’s parental rights. See

C.A.R. 35(c) (we may “disregard any error or defect not affecting the

substantial rights of the parties”); People in Interest of R.J., 2019

COA 109, ¶ 22 (an error affects a substantial right only if it can be

17
said with fair assurance that it substantially influenced the case’s

outcome or impaired the basic fairness of the trial itself).

¶ 39 To the extent that father argues that his strong bond with the

child demanded that he be permitted more time to demonstrate his

fitness, we disagree. As already discussed, the juvenile court heard

testimony about father’s bond with the child. But the court still

found, based on the child’s high needs, that any further delay in

permanency wouldn’t be in her best interests. That finding was

supported by the record. And we can’t reweigh the evidence. See

K.L.W., ¶ 62; B.R.D., ¶ 15; Hatton, 160 P.3d at 329.

¶ 40 Finally, to the extent that father argues that the juvenile court

should have allowed more time for the Department to provide the

ADA accommodations he requested, we conclude that his argument

is undeveloped. True, father requested ADA accommodations about

six months before the court terminated his parental rights. But on

appeal, father doesn’t identify any specific services or

accommodations that were lacking during the six months leading

up to termination. Nor does he explain how more services or

accommodations would have rendered him fit within a reasonable

time, particularly in light of the juvenile court’s extensive findings

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about the child’s immediate need for permanency. Given this, we

decline to address father’s ADA argument. See People in Interest of

D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 531 (Colo. App. 2004) (declining to address an

appellate contention that lacked supporting facts and specific

arguments).

¶ 41 Accordingly, we conclude that the juvenile court properly

analyzed whether father could become fit within a reasonable time.

And because the court’s findings are supported by the record, we

decline to disturb its determination.

D. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 42 Last, mother contends that the juvenile court erred by

determining that there were no less drastic alternatives to

termination. Specifically, she argues that, assuming the juvenile

court erred by terminating father’s parental rights, an allocation of

parental responsibilities to father was a viable less drastic

alternative.

¶ 43 But mother concedes that she doesn’t have standing to

challenge the propriety of the juvenile court’s termination of father’s

parental rights. See People in Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 261

(Colo. App. 2007). And she acknowledges that her argument is

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premised on our reversal of the juvenile court’s order terminating

father’s parental rights. Because we have affirmed the juvenile

court’s termination of father’s parental rights, we necessarily reject

mother’s argument.

IV. Disposition

¶ 44 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

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