Peo in Interest of AK

25CA2163 Peo in Interest of AK 06-04-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA2163
Arapahoe County District Court No. 22JV266
Honorable Shay Whitaker, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of Ad.K. and Ar.K., Children,

and Concerning E.R.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS
Tow and Brown, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced June 4, 2026

John Christofferson, Interim County Attorney, Alison A. Bettenberg, Assistant
County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee

Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, E.R. (mother) appeals

the judgment terminating her parent-child legal relationships with

Ad.K. and Ar.K. (the children).1 She contends that the juvenile

court erred by determining that (1) she was not fit and could not

become fit within a reasonable time and (2) there was no less

drastic alternative to termination. We disagree and affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In May 2022, police arrested both parents following a domestic

violence incident during which sixteen-month-old Ad.K. and four-

month-old Ar.K. were present. The Arapahoe County Department of

Human Services (the Department) filed a petition in dependency

and neglect, alleging a history of domestic violence by the children’s

father against mother. The children were placed with family

friends.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and

neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother. The treatment

plan required mother to, among other things, participate in

1 During the pendency of the case, mother gave birth to two other

children (the younger siblings). The younger siblings are not part of
these proceedings.

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domestic violence treatment and develop protective parenting

capacity to provide a safe and stable environment for the children.

¶4 Over the next two years, mother complied with most

components of her treatment plan: she maintained housing and

employment; she worked cooperatively with the Department; she

underwent a mental health evaluation and engaged in therapy,

including domestic violence treatment; and she consistently

attended visits with the children. She also obtained a protection

order prohibiting father from contacting her.

¶5 But the Department had concerns about mother’s continued

contact with father. In 2023, after she gave birth to her third child,

mother moved to new housing provided through a domestic violence

program. The program’s rules prohibited mother from giving father

her address. In July 2023, father appeared at the home and

threatened mother and a neighbor. Then in December 2023, father

came to the home drunk; mother let him in, and he beat her,

breaking her nose and back. Father was arrested and incarcerated

for several months.

¶6 In July 2024, while father was incarcerated, the children were

returned to mother’s care, and that fall, the parties agreed to an

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allocation of parental responsibilities (APR). But before the APR

entered, father bonded out of jail, and the Department received

multiple reports that father had “been around the home where the

children [were] living.” According to one report, father went to

mother’s home in September 2024 and assaulted her, and the

police were called. Although mother denied any contact with father,

the court decided to continue its jurisdiction to allow the

Department to investigate the reports.

¶7 In January 2025, father was stopped by police while driving in

tandem with mother, who was driving a U-Haul truck. Father was

under the influence of alcohol, and the younger siblings were in the

car, unrestrained. The juvenile court again removed the children

from mother’s care and placed them with the same kin provider.

¶8 The Department moved to terminate mother’s parental rights

shortly after the second removal. Three years after the petition was

filed, the court held a hearing on the motion. By that time, father

had been sentenced to sixteen years in prison in connection with

the December 2023 assault against mother. After hearing evidence

over three days, the juvenile court terminated mother’s parental

rights.

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II. Discussion

¶9 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by determining

that (1) she was not fit and could not become fit within a reasonable

time and (2) there were no less drastic alternatives to termination.

A. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review

¶ 10 A juvenile court may terminate the parent-children

relationships if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that

(1) the children were adjudicated dependent and neglected; (2) the

parent has not reasonably complied with an appropriate, court-

approved treatment plan, or the plan has not been successful;

(3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or condition is

unlikely to change within a reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c),

C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 11 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of fact and law because it involves

application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. “We review the juvenile

court’s findings of evidentiary fact — the raw, historical data

underlying the controversy — for clear error and accept them if they

have record support.” People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,

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¶ 10. But we review de novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions

based on those facts, including whether a parent is fit. Id. at ¶ 11;

People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 246 (Colo. 2010) (fitness is

a legal conclusion).

¶ 12 A requirement that the juvenile court consider and eliminate

less drastic alternatives is implicit in the statutory criteria for

termination. A.M., ¶ 19. Whether there is a less drastic alternative

to termination that serves the children’s best interests is a fact

question reviewed for clear error. People in Interest of H.L.B., 2025

COA 86, ¶ 10.

B. Mother’s Fitness

¶ 13 Mother contends that because father’s incarceration

neutralized the Department’s only child protection concern, and she

otherwise complied with her treatment plan, the court erred by

concluding that she was unfit and unlikely to become fit within a

reasonable time.

¶ 14 A parent is unfit if her conduct or condition renders her

unable or unwilling to provide the children with reasonable parental

care. § 19-3-604(2); People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 74.

Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent

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provide nurturing and safe parenting adequate to meet the

children’s physical, emotional, and mental health needs and

conditions. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 23.

¶ 15 We acknowledge, as the juvenile court did, that mother

generally complied with her treatment plan. But the court found

that the plan was not successful in rendering mother a fit parent

because she failed to internalize the lessons from her domestic

violence treatment and to develop the protective capacity necessary

to keep the children safe from the risk of emotional and physical

harm caused by exposure to domestic violence. See K.D. v. People,

139 P.3d 695, 699 (Colo. 2006) (“[E]ven a parent’s substantial

compliance with a [treatment] plan may not render the parent fit.”).

¶ 16 Those findings are supported by the record. The caseworker

testified that mother was unfit because she lacked an

understanding of how the presence of an abusive partner affected

the children. According to the caseworker, mother did not have the

protective capacity required to keep the children safe: she was

reluctant to obtain a protection order against father; even after the

order issued, she maintained contact with him; she allowed father

to see the children in violation of the juvenile court’s orders; and

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she lied to the Department about her relationship with father. The

caseworker noted that although it seemed at times that the

Department had “buy in” from mother, it turned out that her

commitment to severing ties with father was illusory.

¶ 17 There was also ample evidence that exposure to domestic

violence is harmful to children. The caseworker testified that

domestic violence causes trauma and developmental delays and

affects a child’s ability to develop healthy relationships. The family

time coach said that children who witness domestic violence often

resort to violence to solve conflicts. (The caseworker testified that

the children acted much more aggressively after they were returned

to mother’s care in 2024.) We recognize that father was the cause

of the violence and that he victimized mother as well as the

children. But at the same time, the court could not ignore mother’s

failure to keep the children safe. See People in Interest of A.N-B.,

2019 COA 46, ¶ 30 (concluding that a parent who did not recognize

the danger that the other parent posed to the children had not

resolved protective concerns addressed in the treatment plan);

People in Interest of C.T.S., 140 P.3d 332, 334 (Colo. App. 2006)

(“[W]here a parent chooses to remain in a relationship with a person

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who poses a threat to the welfare of the child[ren],” the parent is not

providing protection adequate to meet the children’s needs and

“may be found unfit.”).

¶ 18 Mother argues that termination was not necessary to protect

the children once father was sentenced to a lengthy prison term.

But neither the caseworker nor the family time coach were

persuaded that father’s absence alleviated the child protection

concerns. Both witnesses testified that domestic violence victims

often repeat patterns of abuse with multiple partners. The

caseworker said that because mother did not appear to understand

the children’s need to have “safe people around them,” she might

expose the children to other abusive intimate partners. And the

caseworker pointed out that father anticipated being released from

custody in eight years, at which time the children would still be

preadolescents in need of protection.

¶ 19 Finally, we disagree that the court erred by determining that

mother could not become fit within a reasonable time.

¶ 20 In determining whether the conduct or condition that renders

a parent unfit will change within a reasonable time, the court may

consider whether any change has occurred during the proceeding,

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the parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of

the parent’s conduct or condition. People in Interest of K.B., 2016

COA 21, ¶ 31.

¶ 21 The children were initially removed from mother’s care as

infants three years before the termination hearing and had been

living with the kin provider for most of their lives. The caseworker

opined that it would take an additional six months to a year of

intensive therapy for mother to become fit and that the delay would

have “a negative impact on [the children].” And the evidence

underscored that mother’s trauma and victimization was a chronic

condition that did not improve much during the pendency of the

case.

¶ 22 To the extent mother contends that because the younger

siblings are the subject of a separate dependency and neglect

proceeding, and she is continuing to receive services in that case,

the court should have given her more time to try to become fit in

this case, we reject that contention. The court considered the effect

of the other case but ultimately concluded that delaying

permanency for the children at issue in this proceeding was not in

their best interests. We are not in a position to second guess that

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finding. A reasonable time is determined according to the unique

needs of each child. People in Interest of D.L.C., 70 P.3d 584, 588

(Colo. App. 2003) (“A parent may be unfit as to one, but not all, of

his or her children.”).

¶ 23 In sum, we perceive no error in the court’s factual findings or

legal conclusions that mother was unfit and unlikely to become fit

within a reasonable time.

C. Less Drastic Alternative

¶ 24 Mother also argues that the juvenile court erred by finding

that there was no less drastic alternative to termination. She says

that the court could have granted an APR to one of her friends.

¶ 25 The inquiry concerning whether a less drastic alternative to

termination exists must be guided by the children’s best interests;

the court must give primary consideration to the child’s physical,

mental, and emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3). To be

a viable alternative to termination, the alternative must be in the

“best interests” of the children and not merely “adequate.” A.M.,

¶¶ 27, 37-38.

¶ 26 The juvenile court considered less drastic alternatives to

termination but found that no alternative would meet the children’s

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needs and that termination of mother’s parental rights was in their

best interests.

¶ 27 The court’s finding is not clearly erroneous. The caseworker

testified that even if there was a placement provider willing to agree

to an APR, that arrangement would not be appropriate for the

children. Instead, the caseworker opined that termination was in

the children’s best interests because it would allow them to have a

“normal childhood” with a permanent caregiver who would keep

them safe. The caseworker endorsed the kin provider’s view that

termination would prevent a “back and forth in the court system”

and help the children “have some emotional healing from everything

that[] happened.”

¶ 28 The caseworker also explained that moving the children to a

new placement would be disruptive and detrimental. Mother’s

friend did not have the same relationship with the children as the

kin provider: she met the children in July 2024, when they were

returned to mother’s care, and, after the second removal, she had

contact with the children for a few hours a week during mother’s

visits. Moreover, the friend testified that she had no concerns

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about mother’s protective capacity and that, if it were up to her, the

children would be returned to mother’s care.

¶ 29 On this record, we discern no basis for disturbing the court’s

finding that there were no less drastic alternatives to termination.

¶ 30 Still, mother contends that the court should have given greater

weight to the friend’s willingness to be a placement for the children

as well as the younger siblings, thereby maintaining the sibling

bond. But the caseworker testified that all four children should not

be placed together, except in a therapeutic home.

¶ 31 Mother also says that in opting for termination rather than an

APR, the court disregarded expert testimony that disparate

permanency outcomes — i.e., termination of mother’s parental

rights to the children but not the younger siblings — could cause

enduring emotional distress for the children. The court was not

required to accept the expert’s testimony, however, even if it was

uncontroverted. In re Estate of Owens, 2017 COA 53, ¶ 22. And

mother’s expert had never met mother or the children, so the court

could reasonably have decided to give greater weight to the

caseworker’s testimony that termination was in the children’s best

interests. See id. (the trial court determines the “weight to accord

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testimony,” and the appellate court may not substitute its judgment

for that of the trial court).

III. Disposition

¶ 32 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE BROWN concur.

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