Peo in Interest of KS

25CA1998 Peo in Interest of KS 05-14-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1998
Montrose County District Court No. 24JV30043
Honorable Valerie J. Robison, Judge
Honorable D. Cory Jackson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of K.S., a Child,

and Concerning P.S.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
Schock and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 14, 2026

Julie R. Andress, County Attorney, Ryan J. Dunn, Assistant County Attorney,
Montrose, Colorado, for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, P.S. (father)

appeals the judgment adjudicating K.S. (the child) dependent or

neglected. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In December 2024, the Montrose County Department of

Human Services received a referral regarding the then-newborn

child based on concerns about the parents’ substance use,

domestic violence, and unstable housing. At that time, the child

was in the neonatal intensive care unit being treated for medical

complications associated with his premature birth. After an initial

investigation, the intake caseworker determined that it wouldn’t be

safe for the child to be discharged from the hospital to either

parent. Consequently, the Department filed a petition in

dependency and neglect.

¶3 The juvenile court granted temporary custody of the child to

the Department. When the child was discharged from the hospital,

he was placed with kin — first with father’s brother and later with a

non-relative kin provider.

¶4 For several months, the Department attempted to locate and

serve father with no success. Thus, the juvenile court granted the

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Department’s request to serve him by publication. Approximately

five months after the case opened, father appeared in court for the

first time. He then denied the allegations in the petition and

requested an adjudicatory jury trial.

¶5 After a three-day trial, the jury rendered a verdict finding that

the child’s environment was injurious to his welfare. Based on the

jury’s verdict, the court adjudicated the child dependent or

neglected.

II. Legal Framework

¶6 The purpose of an adjudicatory jury trial is to determine

whether the factual allegations in the dependency and neglect

petition are supported by a preponderance of the evidence and

whether the status of the child warrants intrusive protective or

corrective state intervention into the familial relationship. People in

Interest of G.E.S., 2016 COA 183, ¶ 13. A child may be adjudicated

dependent or neglected if the government proves that one or more of

the conditions set forth in section 19-3-102, C.R.S. 2025, exists.

People in Interest of S.M-L., 2016 COA 173, ¶ 25, aff’d on other

grounds sub nom People in Interest of R.S. v. G.S., 2018 CO 31. As

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relevant here, a child is dependent or neglected if “[t]he child’s

environment is injurious to his or her welfare.” § 19-3-102(1)(c).

¶7 Adjudication under section 19-3-102(1)(c) doesn’t require proof

of parental fault. People in Interest of J.G., 2016 CO 39, ¶ 40.

Rather, an adjudication may be entered when a child’s environment

is injurious, regardless of the parents’ actions or failures to act. Id.

¶8 Moreover, adjudication under section 19-3-102(1)(c) can be

based on prospective harm. People in Interest of S.N., 2014 COA

116, ¶¶ 15-16; People in Interest of S.G.L., 214 P.3d 580, 583 (Colo.

App. 2009). To determine whether a child is dependent or neglected

based on prospective harm, the fact finder’s task is to determine

whether the child’s environment “will be” injurious to the child if

placed in the parent’s care. S.N., ¶ 16; People in Interest of S.X.M.,

271 P.3d 1124, 1130 (Colo. App. 2011). When a child wasn’t in the

parent’s care at the time of removal, the determination must be

based on a prediction of the home environment to which the child

might be exposed if placed in the parent’s care. See People in

Interest of A.W., 2015 COA 144M, ¶ 22. And that prediction may be

based on the “parent’s past conduct and current circumstances.”

S.N., ¶ 17.

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III. Evidentiary Issues

¶9 Father first contends that the juvenile court erred by admitting

irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial evidence at the adjudicatory trial.

We aren’t persuaded.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 10 To be admissible, evidence must be relevant. CRE 402. Under

CRE 401, evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of

the action more probable or less probable than it would be without

the evidence.”

¶ 11 However, relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”

CRE 403. Unfair prejudice occurs when evidence has a tendency to

suggest a decision on an improper basis. A.W., ¶ 25. In weighing

whether the probative value of evidence is substantially outweighed

by the danger of unfair prejudice, the proffered evidence should be

given its maximal probative weight and its minimal prejudicial

effect. Alhilo v. Kliem, 2016 COA 142, ¶ 9.

¶ 12 We review the juvenile court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse

of discretion. M.A.W. v. People in Interest of A.L.W., 2020 CO 11,

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¶ 32. The court abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law or

when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.

Id.

B. Analysis

¶ 13 Father argues that that under CRE 401, 402, and 403, the

court erroneously admitted the following evidence: (1) testimony

from a police officer about a 2023 arrest in which the officer

reportedly found methamphetamine and a pipe in father’s pocket;

(2) testimony and evidence about two drug-related convictions, one

from 2005 and the other from 2013; (3) audio from a 911 call that

was made by one of father’s older children during a recent incident

of alleged domestic violence between father and his estranged wife;

and (4) testimony about the circumstances related to the recent

incident of domestic violence.

1. Testimony About the 2023 Arrest

¶ 14 Father asserts that the juvenile court should have excluded all

testimony related to his 2023 arrest because all of the criminal

charges related to the arrest were dismissed. We decline to address

the argument because father failed to preserve it.

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¶ 15 True, father filed a pretrial motion to exclude the police report

related to the 2023 arrest, arguing that the “evidence contained in

[the] report [was] highly prejudicial and not relevant given that the

criminal charges were dismissed” and that the report contained

hearsay. On the first day of trial, however, the Department stated

that it no longer planned to introduce the police report as an

exhibit. Instead, it planned to call the responding officer to testify

about “the situation [and] . . . what he observed” on the day of the

arrest. Father’s counsel then stated that she would make the

“usual objections” to the officer’s testimony. In response, the

juvenile court noted that it “obviously” couldn’t rule on those

objections at that time because it “[didn’t] know what [would] come

up” during the officer’s testimony. Thus, the court directed father’s

counsel to “make those objections during the testimony.”

¶ 16 Nonetheless, except for one objection regarding lack of

foundation, father’s counsel didn’t object to any of the officer’s

testimony. Accordingly, we decline to address father’s argument

that the police officer’s testimony about the 2023 arrest was

irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. See CRE 103(a); Am. Fam. Mut.

Ins. Co. v. DeWitt, 218 P.3d 318, 325 (Colo. 2009) (to properly

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preserve an objection to evidence admitted at trial, a timely and

specific objection must appear in the trial court record); see also

People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 14 (in dependency and

neglect cases, appellate courts review only issues presented to and

ruled on by the lower court).

2. Evidence Related to the 2005 and 2013 Convictions

¶ 17 Next, father argues that the juvenile court should have

excluded any evidence of his past drug-related criminal convictions.

Specifically, he argues that the convictions were too old to be

relevant to the child’s status at the time of the trial, and that the

age of the convictions also made the evidence unfairly prejudicial.

We disagree.

¶ 18 To start, we note that it’s unclear whether father preserved

this argument. On the first day of trial, as a preliminary matter,

father’s counsel moved the juvenile court to exclude two of the

Department’s exhibits — the sentencing orders showing father’s

2005 and 2013 convictions — arguing that they were irrelevant and

unfairly prejudicial. The court then asked father’s counsel to clarify

if he was “asking for a ruling on the 2005 and 2013 conviction

records” and counsel affirmed that he was requesting the court to

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exclude the exhibits. In response, the Department noted that, in

addition to the exhibits, it expected to elicit testimony about father’s

past convictions because the convictions were relevant to his “long

history of substance use.” Father’s counsel replied that she was

“going to object to that testimony” as well.

¶ 19 The juvenile court then ruled that it was “not going to foreclose

the testimony and evidence presented with respect to” the past

convictions. It found that the evidence and testimony was relevant

because the jury could consider father’s past conduct, specifically

his history of substance use, to determine whether prospective

harm existed. The court went on to say that it was “concerned”

about the two exhibits containing confusing information, noting

that they may be admissible “depending on what the evidence is

during the trial.” The court concluded that it wouldn’t

“perfunctorily” admit the exhibits but that “preclusion of the

convictions” shouldn’t occur.

¶ 20 Thereafter, father testified about his past convictions without

objection. But when the Department sought to introduce the

sentencing reports into evidence as exhibits, father objected based

on relevance and unfair prejudice. The court found that the

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exhibits were relevant and noted that “a significant amount of

testimony” had already been presented about the convictions. But

the court ordered the Department to redact the charges that had

been dismissed, finding that without the redaction, the exhibits

would be unfairly prejudicial and confusing to the jury.

¶ 21 It’s unclear whether the court’s preliminary ruling that

“preclusion of the convictions” shouldn’t occur permitted all

evidence of father’s past convictions or simply denied father’s

request to preemptively exclude that evidence. At any rate, only

after father testified about his past convictions without objection

did he object to the sentencing reports being admitted as evidence.

By that time, however, the jury had already heard about the

convictions.

¶ 22 Thus, even assuming that father preserved his challenges to

the evidence about his past convictions by making the preliminary

request to exclude it, we disagree that the juvenile court abused its

discretion by admitting it. First, as the court found, father’s past

conduct — specifically, his history of substance use — was relevant

to the jury’s consideration of prospective harm and whether the

child would be in an injurious environment if placed in father’s

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care.1 See A.W., ¶ 22; S.N., ¶¶ 16-18 (a parent’s past conduct,

“such as drug use,” is relevant to prospective harm); see also People

in Interest of D.M.F.D., 2021 COA 95, ¶ 24 (a parent’s convictions

and pending charges may support a determination that a child is

dependent and neglected when there is “a link between the

convictions and pending charges and the factors identified in

section 19-3-102”).

¶ 23 Second, the court repeatedly found that evidence showing that

father had been convicted of two drug-related charges wasn’t

unfairly prejudicial. And while the court didn’t elaborate on its

prejudice finding, father hasn’t developed his appellate argument

related to prejudice. To be sure, although father makes some broad

1 Citing a People in Interest of D.L.R., 638 P.2d 39, 43 (Colo. 1981),

father asserts that his past drug-related convictions and substance
use weren’t relevant to prospective harm because a “prospective
harm case is one where the fact finder considers the treatment of
one or more children in determining whether the child at issue is
dependent or neglected.” Father’s argument in this regard is
premised on too narrow a reading of D.L.R. While D.L.R. certainly
holds that a fact finder may consider a parent’s past treatment of
other children in relation to prospective harm, other cases relying
on D.L.R. make clear it can also consider a parent’s other past
conduct or current circumstances, such as a parent’s history of
substance use or domestic violence. See People in Interest of S.N.,
2014 COA 116, ¶ 18 (discussing D.L.R. among other cases).

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assertions that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial to him, he

doesn’t explain in any detail how the danger of the alleged prejudice

substantially outweighed its probative value. See C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B);

People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 531 (Colo. App. 2004) (an

appellate argument is undeveloped if it’s presented without

supporting facts or specific argument). And development of this

argument is particularly important in light of the juvenile court’s

findings that the evidence related to father’s past substance use

was specifically relevant to the question the jury was required to

answer — whether the child would be in an injurious environment

if placed in father’s care. See Alhilo, ¶ 9; see also People v. Rath, 44

P.3d 1033, 1043 (Colo. 2002) (“Because the balance required by

CRE 403 favors admission, a reviewing court must afford the

evidence the maximum probative value attributable by a reasonable

fact finder and the minimum unfair prejudice to be reasonably

expected.”).

¶ 24 Accordingly, we discern no reversible error by the juvenile

court when it admitted the testimony and evidence related to

father’s past convictions.

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3. Audio of the 911 Call

¶ 25 Next, father asserts that the audio of a 911 call, made by his

older daughter during a domestic violence incident, was irrelevant

and unfairly prejudicial. We aren’t persuaded.

¶ 26 Prior to trial, the Department moved the court to find that the

911 call was admissible. Father objected, arguing that the audio

was irrelevant because neither mother nor the child were present

during the incident that led to the 911 call. He also argued that

any probative value of the audio was substantially outweighed by

the unfair prejudice of admitting the audio into evidence.2 In a

written order, the court granted the Department’s motion to

introduce the audio of the 911 call, finding that it was relevant

because it was probative of father’s home environment, specifically

whether the child would be exposed to domestic violence if he was

returned to father’s care. It further found that the audio wasn’t

unduly prejudicial.

2 Father also asserted that the audio of the 911 call contained

inadmissible hearsay. But father doesn’t advance this argument on
appeal, so we don’t address it.

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¶ 27 During trial, father re-asserted his prejudice objection when

the Department sought to introduce the audio of the 911 call. After

listening to the audio, the juvenile court found that the danger of

unfair prejudice didn’t outweigh the probative value of the audio,

“particularly given the timing of it being January 2025.”

¶ 28 We reject father’s argument that the juvenile court abused its

discretion by admitting the audio of the 911 call. First, we agree

with the court’s finding that regardless of whether mother or the

child were present at the time of the incident, the audio was

probative of father’s home environment, specifically that there was

domestic violence in his home, and that was relevant to jury’s

consideration of whether the child would be in an injurious

environment if returned to father. See A.W., ¶ 22; S.N., ¶ 16.

Second, the court implicitly acknowledged some level of prejudice in

relation to the 911 call but still found that the probative value of the

evidence wasn’t substantially outweighed by the danger of that

prejudice. And father doesn’t develop his argument about prejudice

on appeal. Specifically, he doesn’t explain in any detail how the

prejudicial effect of the 911 call substantially outweighed its

probative value, particularly in light of the court’s finding that it

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was probative of the recent conditions of father’s home

environment. See C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B); D.B-J., 89 P.3d at 531; Rath,

44 P.3d at 1043.

¶ 29 Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s

decision to admit the 911 call into evidence.

4. Testimony About the Domestic Violence Incident

¶ 30 Finally, father argues that the juvenile court abused its

discretion by allowing several witnesses to testify about the

domestic violence incident in January 2025 — about a month after

the petition was filed. He asserts that the testimony was irrelevant

because the incident involved his wife and older children, not

mother and the child, and because the testimony was unfairly

prejudicial, and thus, inadmissible. We aren’t persuaded that the

juvenile court abused its discretion.

¶ 31 Father filed a pretrial motion to exclude all evidence related to

the January 2025 domestic violence incident, arguing that the

evidence related to the incident was irrelevant and unfairly

prejudicial. The juvenile court denied that motion, finding that

“[e]vidence of an incident of domestic violence[,] despite involving

[f]ather and a third-party[,] is probative of his fitness to parent and

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whether the child would be in an injurious environment if placed in

his care.” The court further rejected father’s contention of unfair

prejudice, finding that such evidence “does not invite the jury to

make findings based on irrelevant or inadmissible grounds”

because “[w]hether there is domestic violence in the home is itself

the relevant issue.”

¶ 32 We discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s ruling. Like

the 911 call, the evidence related to the January 2025 domestic

violence incident was probative of father’s home environment.

Specifically, evidence that there was domestic violence in his home

within a month after the petition was filed was relevant to jury’s

consideration of whether the child would be in an injurious

environment if returned to father. See A.W., ¶ 22; S.N., ¶ 16. And,

again like the 911 call, the probative value of that evidence to the

question of father’s home environment and the risk it may pose to

the child isn’t dependent on whether mother or the child were

present at the time of the incident. Instead, the fact of the domestic

violence incident involving father in his home so close in time to the

adjudicatory hearing was probative of father’s home environment.

See A.W., ¶ 22 (a parent’s prior acts is relevant to predicting the

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home environment to which a child might be exposed, particularly

when the child hasn’t previously been that parent’s care); S.N., ¶ 17

(holding that a prospective harm determination “requires a

prediction of whether, based on the parent’s past conduct and

current circumstances, it is likely or expected that the parent will

fail to provide proper care for the child in the future”).

¶ 33 Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s

decision to admit evidence related to the January 2025 domestic

violence incident.

IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 34 Father next contends that the Department failed to present

sufficient evidence for the jury to find the child dependent or

neglected. We aren’t persuaded.

A. Applicable Law

¶ 35 In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain an

adjudication, we review the record in the light most favorable to the

prevailing party, and we draw every inference fairly deducible from

the evidence in favor of the jury’s decision. See S.G.L., 214 P.3d at

583; People in Interest of T.T., 128 P.3d 328, 331 (Colo. App. 2005).

The credibility of the witnesses and the probative effect and weight

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to be accorded the evidence, as well as the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn therefrom, are within the purview of the

jury. S.G.L., 214 P.3d at 583. We are bound by a jury’s findings,

and we won’t reverse those findings if the record supports them,

even if reasonable people might arrive at different conclusions

based on the same evidence. See S.G.L., 214 P.3d at 583; T.T., 128

P.3d at 331.

B. Analysis

¶ 36 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent or

neglected pursuant to section 19-3-102(1)(c) because the jury found

that the child’s environment was injurious to his welfare. The

evidence admitted at trial supports the jury’s verdict.

¶ 37 The ongoing caseworker, who testified as an expert in child

welfare and case management, opined that it wouldn’t be safe to

return the child to father because the Department had ongoing

concerns about father’s substance use, the domestic violence in

father’s home, and his lack of understanding of the child’s needs.

Moreover, the caseworker opined that she would be “very

concerned” about the child’s safety if he was returned to father

while mother was living in the same home because the Department

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had significant concerns about mother’s substance use and mental

health, as well as the ongoing domestic violence and “volatility”

between the parents. Ample evidence supported the caseworker’s

opinions.

¶ 38 First, the Department presented evidence of father’s long

history of substance use. Father testified that he became addicted

to methamphetamine as a teenager and had been convicted of drug-

related crimes in 2005 and 2013. Next, a police officer testified that

in 2023, during an arrest, he found methamphetamine and a pipe

in father’s pocket. Further, the intake caseworker testified that

shortly after the child was born, father went to the emergency after

overdosing on what father reported to be caffeine pills. The intake

caseworker was concerned about that incident because the

symptoms that father reported were consistent with

methamphetamine use. And father never provided medical records

showing that he had, in fact, overdosed on caffeine pills, as opposed

to an illegal substance. Finally, although father testified that he

had been sober for several years, the intake caseworker testified

that he wasn’t able to confirm father’s asserted sobriety because,

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despite the caseworker’s request for father to take a drug test,

father didn’t do so.

¶ 39 Second, the Department presented evidence showing a history

of domestic violence between father and his intimate partners. The

intake caseworker testified that as part of his initial assessment, he

learned that there had been past reports of domestic violence

between father and mother. The ongoing caseworker testified that

mother had disclosed an ongoing pattern of domestic violence

between her and father. Specifically, mother told the caseworker

that, in the past, father had taken her phone and left her stranded

outside of town without food, water, or a way to get help. Although

father denied any domestic violence between him and mother, he

admitted that at one point, he became upset because mother

wanted to spend time with a particular friend, and in response,

mother purposely hit father with her car.

¶ 40 Moreover, a police officer testified that in January 2025, he

responded to a 911 call reporting domestic violence at the home

where father, his estranged wife, and his two older daughters lived.

When the officer arrived, he could hear yelling, but by the time he

went inside the house, father had fled the scene. Father’s wife then

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showed the officer numerous threatening text messages from

father — for example, father said that he would burn their house

down and that his wife would “be with [him] or with no one.” After

further investigation, the officer filed an arrest warrant for father,

and father was charged with stalking, felony menacing, and

harassment. At the time of the adjudicatory hearing, those charges

were still pending. Although father denied the domestic violence

allegations related to that incident, he admitted that there had been

at least one other incident in which his daughter called the police

because of an argument between him and his wife. Father

acknowledged that his daughters were scared and upset during

those incidents and admitted that it’s “not good for children to be in

that type of situation.”

¶ 41 Third, the Department presented evidence related to father’s

lack of understanding of the child’s needs. The ongoing caseworker

testified that the child had special needs and required a higher level

of care than the average infant. She further testified that the child

became dysregulated very easily, had problems with swallowing and

eating, was very stiff, and was not consistently gaining weight.

Indeed, the child’s kin provider testified that the child needed

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occupational therapy for his stiffness and feeding issues and that

he needed his caretaker to do specific stretches and exercises with

him every day.

¶ 42 Nonetheless, the ongoing caseworker testified that when she

discussed the child’s special needs with father, he minimized them,

saying that the child “appears to be normal” except for having an

issue with grasping. She also testified that father blamed the

child’s placement provider for his medical issues instead of trying to

learn about them. Indeed, father testified that even when the child

was in the hospital, he “looked like a normal child” and that the

child was “doing fine” when he was placed with father’s brother and

only started having feeding issues when he was placed with his

current kin provider. And father also admitted that he didn’t ask

the medical providers to help him understand the child’s medical

needs or reach out to the caseworker to ask about them.

¶ 43 Finally, the Department presented evidence related to its

concerns about father’s living situation. Specifically, father testified

that he was living with his mother because there was a protection

order preventing him from living at his own house (with his wife and

two daughters). He further testified that mother was living in the

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home with him. The ongoing caseworker testified that it wouldn’t

be safe for the child to live in a home with mother because she

hadn’t addressed the Department’s concerns about her substance

use and general stability.

¶ 44 Specifically, despite admitting to using methamphetamine

during her pregnancy and after the child was born, mother hadn’t

provided any drug tests during the case. Further, mother hadn’t

engaged in any treatment or services offered by the Department.

And the caseworker from a previous dependency and neglect case

involving mother and her other children, testified that when that

case closed, mother hadn’t mitigated the Department’s concerns

about her ability to parent. Even so, father testified that he

believed mother was in a position to safely parent the child.

Moreover, as noted above, the ongoing caseworker had concerns

about continuing domestic violence between the parents.

¶ 45 In sum, based on the evidence presented at trial, it was

reasonable for the jury to infer that the safety concerns related to

father’s substance use and domestic violence still existed at the

time of adjudication, and thus, that it would likely be unsafe to

place the child in his care. See A.W., ¶ 22 (the prediction of

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whether it’s likely that a child will be in an injurious environment if

returned to the parent can be based on the parent’s past conduct

and current circumstances). It was also reasonable for the jury to

infer that, regardless of father’s specific conduct, it would likely be

unsafe to place the child in father’s care because of the ongoing

safety concerns about mother and the fact that the parents were

living together. See J.G., ¶ 40 (adjudication under section 19-3-

102(1)(c) does not require proof of parental fault).

¶ 46 Based on the foregoing, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the Department, the evidence was sufficient to support

the jury’s finding that the child was dependent or neglected under

section 19-3-102(1)(c). Accordingly, we are bound by the jury’s

findings and discern no basis to reverse the jury’s verdict. See

S.G.L., 214 P.3d at 583; T.T., 128 P.3d at 331.

V. Disposition

¶ 47 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE SCHOCK and JUDGE LUM concur.

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