Peo in Interest of AH-A

23CA1896 Peo in Interest of AH-A 04-30-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1896
City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 22JD575
Honorable Laurie Clark, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of A.H-A.,

Juvenile-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
Tow and Lipinsky, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 30, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Grant R. Fevurly, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Casey Mark Klekas, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile-Appellant
¶1 A.H-A., a juvenile, appeals his delinquency adjudication for

unlawful sexual contact and harassment. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 A.H-A. and N.H. are cousins. In the fall of 2022, they attended

the same school. A.H-A. had just turned fourteen years old, and

N.H. was twelve years old. On November 2, 2022, N.H. was found

vaping at school. Afterward, she asked to talk to Joseph Kidane,

the school’s dean of culture. She told him that A.H-A. had touched

her without her consent twice. Thereafter, Cherie Nuanes, a

“physician associate,” evaluated N.H. N.H. repeated the allegations

to her. Cori Harris, a forensic interviewer, interviewed N.H. about

the incidents. N.H. repeated the two allegations to Harris and

added a third.

¶3 First, N.H. reported that A.H-A. pointed near her chest and

asked, “Can I touch?” She felt uncomfortable; replied, “No. You’re

weird”; and walked away. The prosecution didn’t charge A.H-A. in

relation to this first incident.

¶4 Second, following the first incident, N.H. said that, while at

A.H-A.’s house, he told her that they needed to go grab something

for his parents from his mother’s bedroom. When they were alone

1
in the bedroom, A.H-A. came up behind her and put his hands

under her bra. She tried to elbow him and left the room. The

prosecution charged A.H-A. with unlawful sexual contact in relation

to this incident.

¶5 Third, after the second incident, when N.H. was at A.H-A.’s

house again, she went to get a charger from A.H-A.’s bedroom.

Once there, he put his hands on her waist and pulled her towards

his body. She then ran out of A.H-A.’s bedroom. The prosecution

charged A.H-A. with harassment in relation to this third incident.

¶6 The case proceeded to a one-day bench trial. A.H-A.’s defense

at trial was that N.H. had falsely accused him and that he didn’t

commit the alleged offenses. Specifically, he argued that N.H. made

up the allegations to get out of trouble after she was caught vaping.

Five witnesses testified for the prosecution — Kidane, Harris,

Nuanes, N.H., and the investigating detective. A.H-A.’s sister and

mother testified for the defense. The juvenile court adjudicated

A.H-A. delinquent on both counts.

II. Issues on Appeal

¶7 A.H-A. raises three issues on appeal. First, he contends that

the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a

2
reasonable doubt that he acted with the required mens rea for both

offenses. Second, he contends that the juvenile court violated his

statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial when it

continued the trial over his objection. Third, he contends that the

juvenile court reversibly erred by admitting child hearsay through

three witnesses at trial. For the reasons set forth below, we reject

all three contentions and therefore affirm.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶8 A.H-A. first contends that the prosecution didn’t present

sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had

the required mens rea for the two offenses. As for the sexual

contact offense, he contends that there wasn’t sufficient evidence

presented at trial to prove that he touched N.H. for the purpose of

sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse. As for the harassment

offense, he contends that there wasn’t sufficient evidence at trial to

prove that he intended to harass, annoy, or alarm N.H.

1. Additional Facts

¶9 The prosecution presented the following evidence at trial in

support of the sexual contact charge:

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• N.H. testified that she and A.H-A.

were at his house and since his dad sells corn
and they have all their supplies in his mom’s
room, he told me that we had to go grab some
chips, I think. And that’s when we went, and
he came up behind me and put his hands in
my shirt, and I felt uncomfortable. So I tried
to, like, elbow him, and then I left the room.

• N.H. testified that A.H-A. put his hands under her bra.

• N.H. testified that only she and A.H-A. were in his mother’s

room when the incident occurred.

• Kidane testified that N.H. told him that A.H-A. fondled her

by touching her breast area under her shirt.

• Nuanes testified that N.H. told her that A.H-A.’s hands

touched her breasts underneath her shirt.

¶ 10 The prosecution presented the following evidence regarding

the harassment charge:

• N.H. testified that A.H-A. made her uncomfortable three

times.

• First, N.H. testified that A.H-A. pointed at her shirt, near

her chest, and asked, “Can I touch?” N.H. responded, “No,

you’re weird.” N.H. then left the room.

4
• Second, as mentioned above, N.H. testified that A.H-A. put

his hands under her bra. She said she tried to elbow him

and then left the room.

• Third, N.H. testified that, after she went into A.H-A.’s

bedroom to get a charger, he put his hands on her waist.

Kidane also testified that N.H. told him that A.H-A.

approached her from behind and pulled her waist closer to

his waist.

• N.H. testified that she never told A.H-A. “it was okay for him

to touch [her] the way that he did.”

• Kidane testified that, based on his conversation with N.H.,

he concluded the touching was nonconsensual,

unwarranted, and unwanted.

• Nuanes testified that N.H. told her that A.H-A. touched her

breasts under her bra and grabbed her waist.

2. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 11 “We review the record de novo to determine whether the

evidence presented was sufficient in both quantity and quality to

sustain a defendant’s conviction.” McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44,

¶ 63; see also People in Interest of J.R., 216 P.3d 1220, 1221 (Colo.

5
App. 2009) (“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting an adjudication of juvenile delinquency, the standards

are the same as those used in a criminal case.”).

¶ 12 We employ a “substantial evidence test,” in which we ask if the

evidence, “when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support a

conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of the

charge beyond a reasonable doubt.” Clark v. People, 232 P.3d

1287, 1291 (Colo. 2010) (quoting People v. Bennett, 515 P.2d 466,

469 (Colo. 1973)). “[I]t is the fact finder’s function in a criminal

case to consider and determine what weight should be given to all

parts of the evidence and to resolve conflicts, testimonial

inconsistencies, and disputes in the evidence.” People v. McIntier,

134 P.3d 467, 471 (Colo. App. 2005). It doesn’t matter if we would

have reached a different conclusion as the trier of fact; we must

“give the prosecution the benefit of every reasonable inference

which might be fairly drawn from the evidence.” Gorostieta v.

People, 2022 CO 41, ¶ 17 (quoting People v. Harrison, 2020 CO 57,

¶ 32).

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¶ 13 Section 18-3-404(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025, provides that a person

can commit unlawful sexual contact by (1) knowingly subjecting a

victim to any sexual contact (2) if the person knows that the victim

doesn’t consent. As relevant here, sexual contact means “[t]he

knowing touching of the victim’s intimate parts by the actor . . . if

that sexual contact is for the purposes of sexual arousal,

gratification, or abuse.” § 18-3-401(4)(a), C.R.S. 2025 (emphasis

added). “Intimate parts” includes the “buttocks . . . or the breast of

any person.” § 18-3-401(2).

¶ 14 And “[a] person commits harassment if, with intent to harass,

annoy, or alarm another person, the person . . . [s]trikes, shoves,

kicks, or otherwise touches a person or subjects [them] to physical

contact.” § 18-9-111(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025 (emphasis added).

3. Unlawful Sexual Contact

¶ 15 A.H-A. contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove

that he acted with the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or

abuse when he touched N.H. on her breasts underneath her bra.

We disagree.

¶ 16 To prove unlawful sexual contact, “there must be other

evidence of the juvenile’s sexual purpose beyond the sexual contact

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itself.” People in Interest of J.O., 2022 COA 65M, ¶ 29. Here, there

was such evidence. Specifically, the prosecution presented evidence

that A.H-A. brought N.H. to his mother’s room where they were

alone. A reasonable fact finder could infer that, by doing so, A.H-A.

was trying to isolate her and was thereby “attempting to avoid

detection.” Id. This fact, in combination with the evidence that

A.H-A. placed his hands up N.H.’s shirt and under her bra is

substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion that A.H-A. acted

with the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse. See id.

at ¶ 20 (“[W]hether a defendant acted with the requisite mental

state to sustain a conviction for unlawful sexual contact can be

inferred from the nature of and the circumstances surrounding the

sexual touching.”).

¶ 17 Notwithstanding this evidence, A.H-A. contends that this case

is similar to J.O., when a division of this court held that the

evidence wasn’t sufficient to prove that a juvenile had the requisite

intent for his unlawful sexual contact adjudication. But the facts in

J.O. are readily distinguishable. J.O. involved an eleven-year-old

boy who “touched the clothing covering the intimate parts of

an eleven-year-old girl in a classroom and in a crowded school

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hallway in front of classmates and at least one teacher.” Id. at ¶ 33.

The division concluded that this evidence was insufficient to

establish that the juvenile acted for the purpose of sexual arousal,

gratification, or abuse. Id.

¶ 18 The circumstances surrounding A.H-A.’s conduct were

materially different from those in J.O. The prosecution presented

other evidence beyond the contact itself that wasn’t present in

J.O. — namely, that A.H-A. touched N.H. when they were isolated in

A.H-A.’s mother’s room and that he touched her breast under her

clothing. This evidence was sufficient to prove the requisite mental

state beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 19 Finally, A.H-A. contends that the juvenile court didn’t

sufficiently explain its findings on the intent element and

improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defense. But “[o]n

review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, . . . we are

not bound by what the juvenile court articulated as the basis for its

finding.” Id. at ¶ 19. Instead, “we must consider all the evidence to

determine whether any rational trier of fact might accept it as

sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

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Id. As explained above, there was sufficient evidence to support

A.H-A.’s adjudication for unlawful sexual contact.

4. Harassment

¶ 20 A.H-A. next contends that the evidence was insufficient to

prove that he intended to harass, annoy, or alarm N.H. during the

third incident. Again, we disagree.

¶ 21 The evidence showed that A.H-A. had previously pointed at

N.H.’s chest area and asked, “Can I touch?” and that she said no

and walked away. On a separate occasion, A.H-A. touched N.H.

underneath her bra; N.H. elbowed him and left the room. So, when

A.H-A. later grabbed N.H.’s waist and pulled her towards his own

waist, a reasonable fact finder could infer that A.H-A. intended to

harass, annoy, or alarm N.H. given her prior rejections of his

physical contact. Indeed, N.H. had made it clear on two prior

occasions that A.H-A. wasn’t welcome to touch her in these ways.

Therefore, given N.H.’s repeated rebuffing of A.H-A., a reasonable

fact finder could infer the requisite mental state of intending to

harass, annoy, or alarm when A.H-A. again touched her by

grabbing her waist.

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B. Speedy Trial

¶ 22 A.H-A. next contends that the juvenile court violated his

statutory and constitutional right to a speedy trial when it

erroneously found good cause to continue the trial at the People’s

request and over his objection. We conclude that he waived his

statutory speedy trial claim and reject his constitutional speedy

trial claim on the merits.

1. Additional Facts

¶ 23 The People formally filed charges against A.H-A. via summons

on November 18, 2022. On April 13, 2023, A.H-A. entered a not

guilty plea, and the juvenile court set the case for a bench trial on

June 26, 2023. Because his statutory speedy trial right deadline

would have expired on June 13, 2023, he waived this right to

accommodate the June 26 trial date. The court accepted this

waiver and recalculated A.H-A.’s new speedy trial deadline to be

June 27, 2023.

¶ 24 On June 15, 2023, the People filed a motion to continue the

trial, explaining that Nuanes, the physician associate — an

essential witness — would be out of town on June 26. They also

requested a continuance because they hadn’t been able to contact

11
N.H. or her family, leaving them unable to effectively prepare for

trial. A.H-A. objected to the continuance, arguing that there wasn’t

good cause under the applicable statutes to continue the trial past

the speedy trial deadline of June 27, 2023. He also argued that a

continuance would violate his constitutional speedy trial right

under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).

¶ 25 On June 26, the juvenile court heard argument on the People’s

motion to continue. The People reiterated their request for a

continuance under the good cause exception because Nuanes was

out of town. The juvenile court found good cause to continue the

trial over A.H-A.’s objection and rescheduled it for August 7, 2023.

The case went to trial on that date.

2. Statutory Speedy Trial Right

¶ 26 A juvenile’s right to a speedy trial is governed by section

18-1-405, C.R.S. 2025, and Crim. P. 48(b). § 19-2.5-904(1), C.R.S.

2025. Although section 18-1-405(1) guarantees a defendant the

right to a speedy trial, to obtain relief based on a violation of this

statute, a defendant must move for dismissal of the case before trial

commences. § 18-1-405(5); see People v. McMurtry, 122 P.3d 237,

242 (Colo. 2005). “Failure to so move is a waiver of the defendant’s

12
rights under [the speedy trial statute].” § 18-1-405(5). A.H-A.

didn’t move to dismiss his case on speedy trial grounds before his

trial began. He filed only an objection to the continuance of the

trial. But he didn’t — either in the objection, at the hearing where

the juvenile court granted the People’s request for a continuance, or

at any other time before trial — move to dismiss the case based on

a violation of his statutory speedy trial right. Therefore, A.H-A.

waived his statutory speedy trial claim, and we decline to address it

on the merits.1 See Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355, 1362

(Colo. 1993).

3. Constitutional Speedy Trial Right

¶ 27 Second, A.H-A. contends that the juvenile court violated his

constitutional right to a speedy trial. The People respond that

A.H-A. failed to preserve this claim, so we should review it for plain

error. We assume, without deciding, that by objecting to the

1 To the extent that A.H-A. suggests for the first time in a footnote

in his reply brief that we should review the juvenile court’s decision
to grant the prosecution’s request for a continuance over his
objection as the error (as opposed to the violation of the speedy trial
statute), we decline to address this newly reframed argument. See
People v. Czemerynski, 786 P.2d 1100, 1107 (Colo. 1990), abrogated
on other grounds by, Rojas v. People, 2022 CO 8.

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continuance on constitutional speedy trial grounds, A.H-A.

preserved this contention. So we address it on the merits.

¶ 28 A defendant in a criminal case has a right to a speedy trial

under the United States and Colorado Constitutions, U.S. Const.

amend. VI; Colo. Const. art. II, § 16, and a juvenile charged with

committing a delinquent act is entitled to the same constitutional

speedy trial protections as an adult charged with committing a

criminal offense, P.V. v. Dist. Ct., 609 P.2d 110, 111 (Colo. 1980).

Whether a juvenile’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was

denied is determined by an ad hoc balancing of four factors: (1) the

length of the trial delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the

defendant asserted their right to a speedy trial; and (4) any

prejudice to the defendant from the delay. See Barker, 407 U.S. at

530. “Although these factors must be considered in combination,

the length of the delay must be at least presumptively prejudicial

before further inquiry into the other factors is warranted.” People v.

Glaser, 250 P.3d 632, 635 (Colo. App. 2010).

¶ 29 We review de novo the juvenile court’s analysis of the

constitutional right to a speedy trial. People v. West, 2019 COA

14
131, ¶ 7. But we review the juvenile court’s findings of fact for clear

error. Id.

¶ 30 Based on our review of the relevant factors, we conclude that

A.H-A.’s constitutional right to a speedy trial wasn’t abridged. As a

threshold matter, we consider whether the delay was presumptively

prejudicial. A.H-A. was brought to trial within nine months of being

charged.2 See Glaser, 250 P.3d at 635 (explaining that the

constitutional speedy trial right attaches at the time of arrest or

filing of a formal charge). The length of delay becomes

presumptively prejudicial as it approaches one year. West, ¶ 14.

So the delay in bringing A.H-A. to trial wasn’t presumptively

prejudicial. See id. (concluding that a delay of eight months and six

days wasn’t presumptively prejudicial). But even if we assume,

again without deciding, that the nearly nine-month delay A.H-A.

experienced was presumptively prejudicial, the other Barker factors

support our conclusion that A.H-A. wasn’t denied his constitutional

right to a speedy trial.

2 A.H-A. was charged on November 18, 2022, and he went to trial

on August 7, 2023, a delay of eight months and twenty days.

15
¶ 31 With respect to the second Barker factor, although the reason

for the delay was attributable to the prosecution, it was justified

due to the unavailability of a critical witness. See People v. Jompp,

2018 COA 128, ¶ 31; see also Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 (“[A] valid

reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify

appropriate delay.”).

¶ 32 The third Barker factor weighs in A.H-A.’s favor because he

objected to the prosecution’s request to continue the trial. Indeed,

in his written objection, he cited Barker to argue that his

constitutional speedy trial right would be violated if the juvenile

court continued his trial.

¶ 33 The fourth Barker factor decidedly weighs against finding a

constitutional speedy trial violation, as we can discern no prejudice.

A.H-A. asserts that he was prejudiced due to the delay because it

impaired his defense, and, given his age, he suffered “continued

anxiety.” But his trial was continued only from June 26 to August

7, a delay of just six weeks. A.H-A. has failed to show how such a

short delay materially impaired his defense. He contends that

further delay increased the risk of witnesses “forgetting” the

incidents, but he points to nothing in the record that supports this

16
contention. Indeed, N.H.’s allegations remained consistent

throughout the case and trial. And while we recognize that A.H-A.

may have been anxious about the pending trial, we conclude that

this alone wasn’t sufficient prejudice attributable to the six-week

delay. Having reviewed these factors, we conclude that, on balance,

they weigh against finding a constitutional speedy trial violation.

Accordingly, we conclude that the court didn’t violate A.H-A.’s

constitutional right to a speedy trial by granting the continuance.

C. Child Hearsay

¶ 34 Last, A.H-A. contends that the juvenile court reversibly erred

by admitting child hearsay from three witnesses. We discern no

error.

1. Additional Facts

¶ 35 Although the juvenile court set the pretrial motions deadline

for April 28, 2023, on May 12, the People filed a notice of intent to

introduce child hearsay statements under section 13-25-129,

C.R.S. 2025, together with a request for leave to file that motion

late. In their motion, the People said they intended to introduce at

trial statements that N.H. made to three witnesses: Harris, Kidane,

and Nuanes. The People explained that the delay in filing the notice

17
was the result of a miscommunication due to a switch in

prosecutors. A.H-A. then filed his objection to the introduction of

child hearsay. After the juvenile court continued the trial, the court

scheduled a motions hearing for July 24, 2023, to address the

People’s child hearsay request.

¶ 36 At the hearing, after Kidane, Harris, and Nuanes testified, the

juvenile court’s ruling explained why it believed their statements

had sufficient indicia of reliability to be admissible under People v.

District Court, 776 P.2d 1083, 1089-90 (Colo. 1989). It later did the

same in a written order. Both in its oral ruling and order, the

juvenile court found that (1) the statements sought to be introduced

were spontaneous and weren’t the product of leading questions;

(2) N.H. and the witnesses had no motive to lie; and (3) N.H.’s

statements were consistent over time.

¶ 37 With respect to the assertion that N.H. lied because she got

caught vaping, the court found in its written order that “there [wa]s

no evidence to support that [N.H.] lied for the sole purpose of

explaining [her] concerning behavior.” Instead, the court found that

N.H.’s “concerning behavior” was the result of recent trauma. The

court also found that there was “no evidence to support that the

18
behavior or general character of [N.H.] would diminish the reliability

of [her] statements.” Based on these findings, the juvenile court

granted the People’s request to introduce the child hearsay

evidence.

2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 38 Hearsay is a statement other than one made by the declarant

while testifying at a trial or hearing, offered into evidence to prove

the truth of the matter asserted. CRE 801(c). Hearsay isn’t

admissible unless it’s subject to an exception set forth in a rule or

statute. CRE 802.

¶ 39 One such exception is the child hearsay statute, section

13-25-129(1), which “allows certain out-of-court statements made

by child declarants, which would otherwise be hearsay, to be

admitted at trial.” People v. Phillips, 2012 COA 176, ¶ 87. As

relevant here, the child hearsay statute allows out-of-court

statements made by a person under fifteen years of age at the time

the statement was made to be admissible in a delinquency

proceeding when the declarant is alleged to have been a victim of

unlawful sexual behavior, including unlawful sexual contact. § 13-

25-129(2); see also § 16-22-102(9)(c)(I), C.R.S. 2025 (defining

19
unlawful sexual behavior to include unlawful sexual contact);

People v. Gookins, 111 P.3d 525, 528 (Colo. App. 2004) (“If the

legislature had intended to condition the admission of child hearsay

upon the age of the child victim at the time of trial, it could have so

stated.”). “The proponent of the statement shall give the adverse

party reasonable notice of the proponent’s intention to offer the

statement and the particulars of the statement.” § 13-25-129(7).

Such statements, however, are only admissible if the juvenile court,

after conducting a hearing, finds “that the time, content, and

circumstances of the statement[s] provide sufficient safeguards of

reliability.” § 13-25-129(5)(a).

¶ 40 A court may consider several nonexclusive factors to

determine whether the time, content, and circumstances of a

statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability. Dist. Ct., 776

P.2d at 1089-90. Those factors include the following:

(1) whether the statement was made spontaneously;

(2) whether the statement was made while the child was still

upset or in pain from the alleged abuse;

(3) whether the child used age-appropriate language;

(4) whether more than one person heard the statement;

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(5) the general character of the child; and

(6) other factors such as bias against the defendant, the use

of leading questions, or intervening events that may raise

reliability concerns. Id.

¶ 41 We review the juvenile court’s decision to admit child hearsay

under section 13-25-129 for an abuse of discretion. Phillips, ¶ 91.

3. Analysis

¶ 42 Beyond contending that the trial court erred by admitting

unreliable child hearsay under the District Court factors, A.H-A.

separately raises three other contentions regarding the child

hearsay evidence. We address these first before addressing his

reliability contention.

¶ 43 First, A.H-A. contends that the juvenile court prejudged the

evidence because it presided over the pretrial hearing on the child

hearsay issue and then acted as the fact finder at trial. In support

of his contention that this was improper, A.H-A. cites section 13-

25-129(5)(a), which requires pretrial child hearsay hearings to be

conducted “outside the presence of the jury.” But A.H-A. cites no

cases to support his contention that a court can’t perform both

roles (i.e., gatekeeper and ultimate fact finder). Nor are we aware of

21
any. Furthermore, at the child hearsay hearing, the juvenile court

said that it wasn’t making a credibility determination that day and

was “only trying to determine whether it[ was] appropriate that

these statements bec[a]me part of the record.” See People v. Hall,

2021 CO 71M, ¶ 36 (“In a bench trial . . . ‘there is a presumption

that all incompetent evidence is disregarded by the court in

reaching its conclusions.’” (quoting Liggett v. People, 135 P.3d 725,

733 (Colo. 2006))). Accordingly, we reject this contention.

¶ 44 Second, A.H-A. contends that the prosecution violated the

“reasonable notice” section of the statute by filing its notice of its

intent to introduce child hearsay after the motions deadline had

passed. The court, however, has wide discretion to extend pretrial

deadlines for good cause, and we discern no abuse of that

discretion here. More importantly, A.H-A. doesn’t explain why the

delay of less than three weeks past the motions deadline didn’t

constitute “reasonable notice,” given that it was still more than six

weeks before the then-scheduled trial and nearly three months

before the case ultimately went to trial. Accordingly, we hold that

the juvenile court didn’t abuse its discretion by declining to exclude

22
the evidence based on the prosecution’s failure to give reasonable

notice as required by section 13-25-129(7).

¶ 45 Third, A.H-A. contends that, in admitting the child hearsay,

the juvenile court acted contrary to the purpose of the child hearsay

statute because N.H. was an older child — thirteen at the time of

trial — and she testified at trial. A.H-A. argues that the statute was

meant to protect children of a tender age who are too young to

testify from facing their abusers in court. A.H-A. construes the

statute too narrowly.

¶ 46 If the relevant statute does not define “child” — as is the case

here — the child hearsay statute expressly applies to statements

made by children who are under fifteen. § 13-25-129(2). N.H. was

twelve when she initially made the statements and thirteen when

she testified at trial. Moreover, the statute explicitly applies to both

situations when the child testifies and situations when they don’t.

§ 13-25-129(5)(b)(I). Indeed, the statute imposes additional

safeguards when the child doesn’t testify at trial. § 13-25-

129(5)(b)(II). The plain language of the statute, therefore, refutes

this contention.

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¶ 47 Last, A.H-A. contends that the statements didn’t meet the

requirements for reliability under District Court. Citing the factors

from District Court, he argues that N.H.’s statements weren’t

spontaneous because she made them only after she was caught

vaping at school, and therefore her motivation in making them was

to get out of trouble. He also argues that events that occurred

between the time of the unlawful contact and the time of the

statements rendered the statements unreliable. We conclude that

the juvenile court didn’t abuse its discretion by admitting the

statements under the child hearsay statute.

¶ 48 In both its oral ruling and written order, the juvenile court

carefully weighed the District Court factors to determine that the

statements were reliable. After noting that N.H.’s statements to all

three witnesses were consistent, it found that no evidence

supported the defense’s assertion that N.H. had lied to get out of

trouble. Instead, the court said that the stress of getting in trouble

for vaping led her to spontaneously disclose a secret she had been

maintaining. In other words, the court preliminarily found, based

on the testimony presented at the child hearsay hearing, that the

stress of keeping the abuse secret led to the vaping, not that getting

24
caught vaping provided a motive to fabricate. The court also

explained there was no evidence that N.H.’s general character would

diminish the reliability of the statements.

¶ 49 The testimony at the pretrial hearing supports these

conclusions. Both Harris and Nuanes testified at the hearing that

N.H. never indicated she had any bias or motive to lie about the

allegations. Nuanes also testified that it’s not uncommon for

children who have had traumatic experiences to exhibit behavioral

concerns at school. Given this testimony and the juvenile court’s

findings, the court didn’t abuse its discretion by admitting the child

hearsay.3

III. Disposition

¶ 50 We affirm the juvenile court’s delinquency adjudication.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.

3 Because it’s not necessary to our disposition, we don’t address

A.H-A.’s independent contention that the juvenile court erred by
admitting N.H.’s statements to Nuanes under CRE 803(4), the
medical diagnosis hearsay exception. Cf. Kelly v. Haralampopoulos,
2014 CO 46, ¶ 43 n.9 (explaining that because it found statements
to be admissible under CRE 803(4), it didn’t need to “consider the
district court's alternative rationale for admission under the
residual hearsay exception”).

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