Peo in Interest of BR

25CA1469 Peo in Interest of BR 04-02-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1469
Arapahoe County District Court No. 19JV898
Honorable Shay Whitaker, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of B.R. and A.R., Children,

and

Concerning C.R.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE LUM
J. Jones and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 2, 2026

Ron Carl, County Attorney, Writer Mott, Deputy County Attorney, Rebecca M.
Taylor, Senior Assistant County Attorney, Jordan Lewis, Assistant County
Attorney, Littleton, Colorado; Tamra White, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora,
Colorado, for Appellee

Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, C.R. (mother)

appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal

relationships with B.R. and A.R. (the children). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In November 2019, the Arapahoe County Department of

Human Services (the Department) received a referral alleging that

mother had threatened the children’s lives. The Department

sought, and the court granted, temporary custody of the children

for placement in foster care. The Department then filed a petition

in dependency or neglect based on concerns of physical abuse and

mother’s mental health.

¶3 Two months later, the juvenile court adjudicated the children

dependent and neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother.

Among other things, mother’s treatment plan required her to

(1) complete a neuropsychological evaluation and follow all

treatment recommendations; (2) provide a safe and stable residence

for the children; (3) maintain income sufficient to meet the

children’s needs and budget to meet financial obligations; (4) attend

family time; (5) complete a mental health evaluation and follow all

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treatment recommendations; and (6) participate in in-home

parenting education.

¶4 A few months later, mother completed a neuropsychological

evaluation resulting in a diagnosis of adjustment disorder with

depressed mood and a provisional diagnosis of mild intellectual

development disorder. Mother did not request any accommodations

or modifications to her treatment plan related to those diagnoses at

that time.

¶5 The Department then moved to terminate mother’s parental

rights. Fourteen months after the filing of the petition, the juvenile

court terminated mother’s legal relationships with the children.

Mother appealed, and a division of this court remanded the case for

the limited purpose of considering a C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion

regarding the public censure of the judicial officer who presided

over the termination hearing. Following the parties’ stipulation, the

juvenile court vacated the termination judgment.

¶6 The Department filed a subsequent motion to terminate

mother’s parental rights, which the juvenile court denied in order to

give mother additional time to work on her treatment plan. The

juvenile court then adopted an amended treatment plan for mother,

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which removed the prior neuropsychological evaluation and family

time objectives and added an objective to complete reintegration

therapy with the children.

¶7 Four months later, in July 2023, mother’s counsel filed a

notice asserting that the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

(ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, applied to mother based on the

diagnoses from her neuropsychological evaluation. The juvenile

court granted mother’s motion to require the Department to provide

her with reasonable accommodations for her disability, including

(1) communicating in clear, basic language; (2) relaying information

frequently, in different mediums, and at a lower reading level;

(3) supplying printed copies of all important documents or reports;

(4) providing hands-on parenting education; (5) texting appointment

reminders before all non-regular appointments; and (6) allowing

mother’s guardian ad litem, advocate, or attorney to participate in

all meetings.

¶8 In February 2024, mother’s counsel filed an adaptive

parenting assessment completed by her retained expert, which

recommended additional accommodations to allow mother “to learn

and demonstrate skills necessary for adequate parenting.” Mother

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did not request additional court-ordered accommodations based on

this evaluation. But mother, the children’s guardian ad litem, and

the Department agreed to an amended treatment plan, which the

juvenile court adopted, requiring mother to engage in therapeutic

family time instead of reintegration therapy, supportive services

through a community center board program, life skills, and

parenting education, in addition to her previous treatment plan

objectives. For certain objectives, the amended treatment plan also

detailed accommodations that the Department agreed to provide

mother to assist her in completing the particular objective.

¶9 Shortly thereafter, the Department again moved to terminate

mother’s parental rights. After a fourteen-day hearing spanning

seven months, the juvenile court terminated mother’s parental

rights.

II. Statutory Criteria and Standard of Review

¶ 10 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not

been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct

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or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 11 The question of whether a juvenile court properly terminated

parental rights is a mixed question of fact and law. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the juvenile

court’s findings of evidentiary fact for clear error and accept them if

they have record support. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA

12, ¶ 10. But determining the proper legal standard to apply in a

case and applying that standard to the particular facts of the case

are questions of law that we review de novo. M.A.W. v. People in

Interest of A.L.W., 2020 CO 11, ¶ 31. The credibility of witnesses;

sufficiency, probative value, and weight of the evidence; and the

inferences and conclusions drawn therefrom are within the juvenile

court’s province. A.M., ¶ 15.

III. Reasonable Efforts and ADA Accommodations

¶ 12 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

the Department made reasonable efforts to reunify the family

because the Department failed to make reasonable accommodations

for her disability as required by the ADA. We are not persuaded.

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A. Applicable Law

¶ 13 In deciding whether to terminate parental rights under section

19-3-604(1)(c), the juvenile court must consider whether the county

department of human services made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family. §§ 19-1-103(114),

19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025. “Reasonable

efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and care” for children who

are in out-of-home placement. § 19-1-103(114). Services provided

in accordance with section 19-3-208 satisfy the reasonable efforts

standard. § 19-1-103(114).

¶ 14 Additionally, the ADA requires a public entity, such as a

county department of human services, to make reasonable

accommodations for qualified individuals with disabilities. See

People in Interest of C.Z., 2015 COA 87, ¶¶ 11-12. But the ADA

does not restrict the juvenile court’s authority to terminate parental

rights when the parent, even on the basis of a disability, is unable

to meet a child’s needs. Id. at ¶ 17. Rather, the ADA requires that,

as part of the reasonable efforts determination, the court consider

whether the department provided a parent with reasonable

accommodations. People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 34.

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¶ 15 Whether a parent is a qualified individual with a disability

under the ADA requires a case-by-case determination. Id. at ¶ 21.

Before a department can be required to provide reasonable

accommodations under the ADA, it must know that the individual

has a qualifying disability, either because that disability is obvious

or because someone has informed the department of the disability.

Id. at ¶ 22. Thus, while a department must provide appropriate

screenings and assessments of a parent, the parent is responsible

for disclosing information regarding her disability. Id. at ¶ 21. And

a parent should also identify any modifications that she believes are

necessary to accommodate her disability. Id.

¶ 16 In considering whether reasonable accommodations can be

made for a parent’s disability, the juvenile court’s paramount

concerns must always be the children’s health and safety. Id. at

¶ 36. Thus, what constitutes a reasonable accommodation will vary

from case to case based on the children’s needs, the nature of the

parent’s disability, and the available resources. Id. at ¶ 39.

¶ 17 A parent is ultimately responsible for using the services

provided by a department to obtain the assistance needed to comply

with the treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279,

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1284 (Colo. App. 2011). In determining whether a department

made reasonable efforts, a juvenile court should consider the

totality of the circumstances and account for all services and

resources provided to a parent, measuring them holistically rather

than in isolation with respect to specific treatment plan objectives.

See People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶¶ 33, 35.

B. Analysis

¶ 18 The juvenile court concluded that the Department made

reasonable efforts and provided reasonable accommodations for

mother’s disability as required by the ADA, including referrals for

treatment, treatment plan amendments, the use of written

communication, and the creation of a checklist for mother’s use.

¶ 19 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. Mother’s

first ongoing caseworker testified that she referred mother to the

community center board program for Arapahoe County and the

hands-on parenting education (HOPE) initiative. The HOPE

initiative works specifically with individuals with disabilities to

provide parenting education and can also help a parent apply for

jobs, sign leases, create budgets, and build safety in their home. In

addition, the caseworker engaged in meetings with mother’s

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support team, checked in frequently, and communicated with

mother in a variety of formats — such as text messages followed by

clarification phone calls and written materials followed by in-person

reviews.

¶ 20 The second ongoing caseworker also described the

accommodations she made for mother, including (1) providing a

simplified treatment plan to mother; (2) creating a checklist for the

first treatment plan objective as recommended by mother’s expert;

(3) using clear, simple, and plain language; (4) providing written

copies of documents; (5) allowing mother’s legal team to be present

during home visits and conversations with the Department;

(6) providing reminders for non-regularly scheduled appointments;

(7) repeatedly relaying important information to mother in a variety

of ways and at a lower reading level; (8) referring mother to service

providers for hands-on parenting education; and (9) informing

mother’s service providers about her disability and necessary

accommodations.

¶ 21 Several of mother’s service providers — including her

therapist, HOPE initiative coach, and therapeutic family time

supervisor — confirmed that the Department informed them of

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mother’s disability and associated accommodations, including using

simplified language, repeatedly discussing important information,

and providing appointment reminders. Mother’s HOPE initiative

coach also went through the simplified treatment plan and the

court-ordered treatment plan with mother, helped her with the

vocabulary, connected higher-level words to lower-level synonyms,

and used the teach-back method to confirm mother’s

understanding of the plan.

¶ 22 Nevertheless, mother asserts that the Department failed to

accommodate her disability by not (1) providing her with a simple

and accessible treatment plan including clear objectives and

measurable goals; (2) using plain language; (3) referring her to

treatment providers well-versed in working with individuals with

developmental disabilities; and (4) liberalizing her family time to

home and community environments.1

1 While mother asserts that the Department “admittedly” failed to

provide these recommended accommodations, she provides no
record cites to support this contention. And we do not see any such
admission in the record. See Cikraji v. Snowberger, 2015 COA 66,
¶ 10 (an appellate court is not required to “comb the record” for
facts supporting a party’s argument that are not cited in the briefs).

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¶ 23 But, as detailed above, the record shows that the Department

provided mother with the first three accommodations. True, due to

instability in mother’s housing and concerns about the emotional

impact on the children, family time did not expand to visits in

mother’s home. See S.K., ¶ 36. But mother’s family time increased

in duration, expanded to community visits, and provided hands-on

opportunities for her to practice her parenting skills. And yet,

mother often chose to exercise her family time in the supervision

facility offices. See J.C.R., 259 P.3d at 1285.

¶ 24 Next, mother asserts that she required “a strong and trusting

relationship with her treatment providers.” The Department

provided mother with referrals to mental health therapists,

hands-on parenting and life-skills coaches, a therapeutic family

time supervisor, and endeavored to connect her to the community

center board program. Even so, mother’s inconsistent engagement

with her treatment providers, emotional dysregulation during

meetings, and vacillating positions on her willingness to work with

various providers impacted her relationship with the providers. The

second ongoing caseworker testified that mother’s communication

style during periods of emotional dysregulation, including yelling,

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cursing, and ending phone calls prematurely, made it difficult for

service providers to work with her. Even assuming that mother’s

struggle to emotionally regulate herself was a symptom of her

disability, mother admitted that her prescribed mental health

medication helped. But mother did not consistently take her

medication or engage in mental health treatment and refused

reminders to do so, often becoming escalated if a provider gave her

reminders. See id. At the time of the termination order, mother

had not been consistently involved in therapy for at least eight

months and reported she had not been taking her medication.

Mother does not explain what other accommodations the

Department could have provided to help her establish relationships

with her treatment providers. See S.K., ¶ 21.

¶ 25 Last, mother asserts that she “required inclusion into the

children’s educational and therapeutic decisions.” But mother does

not explain how this would have accommodated her disability. See

id. at ¶ 34 (“[W]hen a parent involved in a dependency and neglect

proceeding has a disability under the ADA, the Department and the

juvenile court must account for and, if possible, make reasonable

accommodations for the parent’s disability when devising a

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treatment plan and providing rehabilitative services to the parent.”)

(emphasis added). Moreover, mother does not explain what

educational or therapeutic decisions were made during the case or

how her involvement in such decisions would have affected the

outcome of the case. See C.A.R. 35(c) (we may disregard any error

not affecting a party’s substantial rights); People in Interest of R.J.,

2019 COA 109, ¶ 22 (an error affects a substantial right if it can be

said with fair assurance that it substantially influenced the case’s

outcome or impaired the basic fairness of the proceeding). Instead,

mother’s argument focuses largely on the testimony of her retained

expert, including her recommended accommodations. But the

court considered this evidence and still concluded that the

Department made reasonable efforts and accommodated mother’s

disability. And we cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute our

judgment for that of the juvenile court. People in Interest of S.Z.S.,

2022 COA 133, ¶ 29.

¶ 26 In sum, because the juvenile court’s determination that the

Department made reasonable efforts and provided ADA

accommodations for mother is supported by the record, we discern

no basis for reversal.

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IV. Fitness Within a Reasonable Time

¶ 27 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by finding that she

could not become a fit parent within a reasonable amount of time.

We disagree.

A. Applicable Law

¶ 28 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders the

parent unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.

S.K., ¶ 74. Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that

the parent provide nurturing and safe parenting adequate to meet

the child’s physical, emotional, and mental needs and conditions.

Id.

¶ 29 In determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change within a reasonable time, the court may consider

whether any change has occurred during the proceeding, the

parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the

parent’s conduct or condition. Id. at ¶ 75. When a parent has

made little to no progress on a treatment plan, the juvenile court

need not give the parent additional time to comply. See People in

Interest of A.N-B., 2019 COA 46, ¶¶ 37-38.

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¶ 30 A reasonable time is not an indefinite time, and it must be

determined by considering the children’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs. Id. at ¶ 34. What constitutes a

reasonable time is fact specific and varies from case to case. Id. at

¶ 40. However, where, as here, the child is under the age of six

years old, the court must also consider the expedited permanency

planning (EPP) provisions, which require the court to place the child

in a permanent home as expeditiously as possible.

§§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, C.R.S. 2025.

B. Analysis

¶ 31 The juvenile court found that mother was unfit, had not

reasonably complied with her court-ordered treatment plan, and

exhibited the same problems addressed in her treatment plan

without adequate improvement, and that her conduct or condition

was unlikely to change within a reasonable time.

¶ 32 The record supports the court’s findings. The second ongoing

caseworker testified that, despite the nearly six-year duration of the

case, mother had not demonstrated sustained progress on any of

the treatment plan objectives. She acknowledged that mother

received disability income and had a housing voucher, which

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provided some rental assistance. But due to mother’s

demonstrated inability throughout the case to develop and follow a

budget to consistently manage and pay her bills, the caseworker

expressed concern about mother’s ability to pay her portion of the

rent and utilities even with the voucher.

¶ 33 Moreover, as detailed above, the caseworker described

mother’s lack of consistent and recent mental health treatment and

opined that mother did not “take the mental health piece of this

case seriously.” And while mother consistently attended family

time, it continued to be therapeutically supervised due to ongoing

concerns about mother’s inability to refrain from discussing adult

topics with the children, remain emotionally regulated during family

time, and consistently accept and implement feedback from the

supervisor.

¶ 34 The case was opened, in part, due to concerns with mother’s

emotional dysregulation and anger, and these concerns remained at

the time of the termination. In addition to the outbursts detailed

above toward the caseworkers and treatment providers, the

children’s foster mother described a family time visit, about five

months before the termination order, that ended with mother

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driving erratically through the parking lot while “screaming” and

“cussing” at her in front of the children. Overall, the caseworker

acknowledged that while mother had been “partially compliant”

with some of the treatment plan objectives, she had not been

“successful” or “shown sustained behavioral changes or . . . that

she ha[d] the skills necessary to provide stability” for the children.

¶ 35 Above all, the caseworker testified that, considering the

children’s overall emotional and mental health, she did not believe

it was appropriate for them to have to wait any longer because the

EPP case had been open for nearly six years and the children

needed immediate permanency. See A.N-B., ¶ 34.

¶ 36 Even so, mother argues that because she “engaged with every

aspect of [her] treatment plan” and made “consistent, significant

changes” the juvenile court erred by finding that she could not

become fit within a reasonable time. The court acknowledged

mother’s efforts to engage in her treatment plan, and “progress at

times throughout this case,” before ultimately finding that mother

had not made sufficient progress to mitigate the concerns that led

to the Department’s involvement. And, considering mother’s

minimal progress during the six-year-long case, the court found

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that mother was unlikely to become fit within a reasonable time.

Mother essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence and substitute

our judgment for that of the juvenile court, which we cannot do.

S.Z.S., ¶ 29.

¶ 37 Mother also asserts that with an appropriate treatment plan,

incorporating the accommodations recommended by her retained

expert, she would be capable of reunifying with the children in a

short period of time. We decline to address that assertion again as

we have addressed it in-depth above.

¶ 38 In sum, because the juvenile court’s findings are supported by

the record, we discern no error.

V. Disposition

¶ 39 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

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