Peo v. Lincoln

25CA0075 Peo v Lincoln 04-02-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0075
Mineral County District Court No. 24CR40
Honorable Michael A. Gonzales, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Kenneth Lincoln,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK
J. Jones and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 2, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Trina K. Kissel, Senior Assistant Attorney
General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Kenneth Lincoln, Pro Se
¶1 After pleading guilty to sexual exploitation of a child,

defendant, Kenneth Lincoln, appeals his conviction. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In July 2024, fifteen-year-old A.O. met thirty-six-year-old

Lincoln while sitting in a park on a break from work. He asked her

for her phone number. She told him that she was a minor but gave

it to him anyway. Lincoln sent her five texts that night, including a

photo of himself shirtless. The two agreed to meet two days later.

That day, Lincoln picked up A.O. in his car while she was on a work

break. He asked her to kiss him, and A.O. responded “um” and

scooted away. Lincoln then grabbed the back of A.O.’s head, leaned

in, and began kissing her. Lincoln also rubbed his hand over A.O.’s

thigh and crotch over her clothing. Lincoln then asked her if she

wanted to move to the back seat. She declined, saying she was only

fifteen, and he drove her back to work. Later that day, A.O. texted

him that their age gap was too large and that she didn’t want to see

him again. Lincoln responded that he was disappointed but he had

had a good time, he wanted to hang out again, and the age gap

wasn’t an issue for him. A.O. texted Lincoln back, calling him a

1
pedophile, and blocked his phone number. A.O. reported the

incident to police the next day.

¶3 Lincoln was charged with unlawful sexual contact (inducing or

coercing a child) under section 18-3-404(1.5), C.R.S. 2025, a class

4 felony. The prosecution amended the complaint to add a count of

sexual exploitation of a child under section 18-6-403(3)(b.5), C.R.S.

2025, a class 5 felony. Lincoln pleaded guilty to the added count of

sexual exploitation of a child on the condition that the prosecution

dismiss the charge of unlawful sexual contact and a separate

pending case not at issue here.

¶4 After entering his guilty plea — but before sentencing —

Lincoln filed a pro se motion asking the court to dismiss the case or

to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor. He observed that fifteen-

and sixteen-year-olds “could lawfully engage in sex with someone

less than [ten] years older.” He then asserted that if a twenty-four-

year-old could legally have sex with a fifteen-year-old, “What’s the

difference between a [twenty-four-year-old] and a [thirty-six-year-

old] as we are both consenting adults?” Lincoln also argued,

without citing any authority, that it is a class 1 misdemeanor for

someone to have sex with a minor between the ages of fifteen and

2
seventeen if they are at least ten years older than the minor. The

trial court denied the motion, finding that it lacked merit. The

court subsequently sentenced Lincoln, as stipulated in the plea

agreement, to six years of sex offender intensive supervision

program probation and fifty hours of useful public service. This pro

se appeal followed.

II. Discussion

¶5 Lincoln makes multiple arguments on appeal. As we

understand his briefing, he argues that (1) section 18-3-402, C.R.S.

2025, doesn’t specify that age difference is a means by which a

child can be coerced into sexual contact; (2) because the age of

consent is seventeen, but section 18-3-404(1.5) defines a “child” as

“any person under the age of eighteen,” a child can consent to

sexual contact; and (3) the district attorney indicated that there was

no touching, which cast doubt on the statements A.O. made in the

police report. Lincoln’s claims fail because by entering a voluntary

guilty plea, he waived the right to appellate review of those claims.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶6 Interpretation of a plea agreement is a question of law that we

review de novo. People v. Propst, 2021 COA 13, ¶ 11.

3
¶7 A defendant who enters a guilty plea waives nonjurisdictional

claims. See People v. Wilson, 251 P.3d 507, 508 (Colo. App. 2010);

People v. Carroll, 939 P.2d 452, 453-55 (Colo. App. 1996). A guilty

plea is an admission of all the elements of a criminal charge and

“represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in

the criminal process,” after which a defendant may not raise

independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional

rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. Neuhaus v.

People, 2012 CO 65, ¶ 8 (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S.

258, 266-67 (1973)). Once a charge is dismissed, a defendant can

neither be found guilty of, nor plead guilty to, that charge and

cannot, therefore, be an “offender” as to that charge. People v.

Roddy, 2021 CO 74, ¶ 28.

¶8 By pleading guilty, “a defendant waives a number of important

constitutional rights.” Patton v. People, 35 P.3d 124, 128 (Colo.

2001). This waiver extends even to claims that may otherwise

implicate constitutional error, except those going to the validity of

the plea itself or the trial court’s jurisdiction. See People v. Stovall,

2012 COA 7M, ¶ 16.

4
B. Analysis

¶9 As best we can discern, Lincoln argues that section 18-3-

404(1.5) cross-references section 18-3-402, and because the

statutes conflict, his conviction must be dismissed. Lincoln

contends that, in relevant part, section 18-3-404(1.5) provides that

“[a]ny person who knowingly, with or without sexual contact,

induces or coerces a child by any of the means set forth in section

18-3-402 to . . . engage in any sexual contact . . . with another

person, for the purpose of the actor’s own sexual gratification,

commits unlawful sexual contact.” (Emphasis added.) First, he

claims that age difference is not a “means” but a “circumstance”

and that age can’t be considered under the definition of means.

Lincoln doesn’t develop this argument, however, so we need not

consider it. People v. Thompson, 2017 COA 56, ¶ 199 (We will not

review “contentions that have not been ‘sufficiently developed.’”).1

1 While we broadly construe the pleadings of a self-represented

litigant to ensure they are not denied review of important issues for
lack of ability to articulate arguments like a lawyer, we will not
rewrite pleadings or act as an advocate for a self-represented
litigant. People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 34 (citing Jones v. Williams,
2019 CO 61, ¶ 5).

5
¶ 10 Second, Lincoln contends that section 18-3-404(1.5) specifies

that a child means anyone under the age of eighteen, but that the

age of consent is seventeen. Because seventeen is still considered a

“child” under the statute, Lincoln reasons that children can consent

to sexual contact with an adult. Specifically, Lincoln asserts that

under section 18-3-402(1)(e), a fifteen-year-old can consent to

sexual contact with a twenty-four-year-old, given proximity in age,

but a fifteen-year-old can’t consent to sexual contact with someone

ten years older, which, he argues, is a nonsensical distinction. We

note that this is the same argument he made in the pro se motion

he filed before sentencing, which the court denied as meritless.

¶ 11 Lincoln’s arguments are misplaced because the statutes

Lincoln challenges don’t apply and can’t form the basis of an

appeal. In exchange for pleading guilty to sexual exploitation of a

child under section 18-6-403(3)(b.5), the People dismissed Lincoln’s

charge of unlawful sexual contact under section 18-3-404(1.5).

Because unlawful sexual contact didn’t serve as a basis for

Lincoln’s conviction, there’s no judgment of conviction for unlawful

sexual contact for him to appeal. Likewise, he wasn’t charged with

6
sexual assault under section 18-3-402, so there’s no sexual assault

conviction for him to appeal.

¶ 12 Next, Lincoln’s argument concerning discrepancies between

the information contained in the police report and the district

attorney “stating there was no touching” similarly fails. By pleading

guilty to sexual exploitation, Lincoln admitted that sufficient facts

existed that could be presented at trial to result in a finding of guilt,

and he gave up all possible defenses to that charge. In doing so, he

relinquished the right to contest evidentiary discrepancies and to

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence against him. Because

Lincoln does not contest the validity of his plea or the trial court’s

jurisdiction — the only issues appealable after a guilty plea — no

cognizable claims are before this division, and his arguments are

waived. See Patton, 35 P.3d at 128.

¶ 13 Finally, to the extent that Lincoln suggests in his reply brief

that he signed the plea agreement “because [he] needed to get out of

jail,” his assertion is unavailing. We don’t consider arguments

raised for the first time in a reply brief. See People v. Grant, 174

P.3d 798, 803 (Colo. App. 2007) (declining to consider arguments

raised for the first time in a reply brief). Even if we were to consider

7
Lincoln’s argument on the merits, however, a defendant’s desire to

be free from pretrial confinement doesn’t, without more, render a

plea unknowing or involuntary. See, e.g., People v. Kyler, 991 P.2d

810, 818-19 (Colo. 1999) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that

he was coerced into pleading guilty and that his plea was

involuntary because he was restrained during the period of time

leading up to the entry of his plea); People v. Finley, 141 P.3d 911,

914 (Colo. App. 2006) (holding that being held in solitary

confinement for an extended period didn’t affect whether the

defendant voluntarily entered a guilty plea).

III. Disposition

¶ 14 We affirm.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE LUM concur.

8