Peo v. Stock

24CA1144 Peo v Stock 03-26-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1144
Mesa County District Court No. 22CR695
Honorable Valerie J. Robinson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Matthew Stock,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE BROWN
Freyre and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 26, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Cata A. Cuneo, Assistant Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Robert W. Kiesnowski, Jr., Alternate Defense Counsel, Commerce City,
Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Matthew Stock, appeals his judgment of conviction

and sentence following a jury verdict finding him guilty of sexual

assault on a child (SAOC). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Based on allegations that Stock sexually assaulted two

children, the prosecution charged Stock with one count of SAOC

and a crime of violence sentence enhancer (related to alleged victim

V.S.) and one count of SAOC — use of force (related to alleged

victim D.M.). The prosecution also alleged that Stock was a

habitual sex offender against children. After a six-day trial, a jury

acquitted Stock of the charges related to V.S. but convicted him of

SAOC without use of force for his conduct related to D.M. At the

sentencing hearing, the district court adjudicated Stock a habitual

sex offender against children and sentenced him to eighteen years

to life in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC).

II. Analysis

¶3 Stock contends that the district court erred by (1) admitting a

recording of D.M.’s forensic interview under the child hearsay

statute, section 13-25-129, C.R.S. 2025; (2) allowing the

prosecution to present the forensic interview to the jury before D.M.

1
testified; (3) permitting an expert witness to bolster the credibility of

other witnesses; and (4) imposing a sentence that was grossly

disproportionate to the crime charged. We perceive no basis to

reverse.

A. Child Hearsay Evidence

¶4 Stock’s first two contentions are interrelated. He contends

that the district court (1) erred by admitting D.M.’s recorded

forensic interview under the child hearsay statute because it may

have been admissible under another statute or rule of evidence; and

(2) improperly permitted the prosecution to publish the forensic

interview to the jury before D.M. testified, bolstering her credibility

and giving the prosecution an unfair advantage. We discern no

reversible error.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶5 Hearsay is “a statement other than one made by the declarant

while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove

the truth of the matter asserted.” CRE 801(c). Generally, hearsay

statements are presumptively inadmissible, absent a relevant court

rule or statute providing an exception. CRE 802.

2
¶6 The child hearsay statute provides one such exception for

statements made by a child sexual assault victim. As relevant,

section 13-25-129(2), (5), provides that an out-of-court statement

made by a child describing all or part of an offense of unlawful

sexual behavior as defined by section 16-22-102(9), C.R.S. 2025, is

admissible in a criminal proceeding if (1) the statement “is not

otherwise admissible by statute or court rule that provides an

exception to the hearsay objection”; (2) the court conducts a pretrial

hearing and finds “that the time, content, and circumstances of the

statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability”; and (3) the

child testifies, or the child is unavailable and there is corroborative

evidence of the act that is the subject of the hearsay statement. See

People v. Dist. Ct., 776 P.2d 1083, 1089 (Colo. 1989).

¶7 To determine the reliability of a child’s out-of-court statement,

the court should consider the following nonexhaustive factors:

(1) whether the statement was made spontaneously;

(2) whether the statement was made while the child was still

upset or in pain from the alleged abuse;

(3) whether the language of the statement was likely to have

been used by a child the age of the declarant;

3
(4) whether the allegation was made in response to a leading

question;

(5) whether either the child or the hearsay witness had any

bias against the defendant or any motive for lying;

(6) whether any other event occurred between the time of the

abuse and the time of the statement which could account

for the contents of the statement;

(7) whether more than one person heard the statement; and

(8) the general character of the child.

Id. at 1089-90.

¶8 No single factor is mandatory or dispositive. See People v.

Phillips, 2012 COA 176, ¶ 88. On the contrary, the factors “provide

assistance and guidance to the trial judge and provide a basis for

analysis, but [they] should not be used to foreclose admissibility on

the basis that one factor has not been satisfied.” People v. Dist. Ct.,

773 P.2d at 1090; see People v. Cernazanu, 2015 COA 122, ¶ 30

(the district court’s reliance on six out of eight factors was sufficient

to support its conclusion that the child hearsay was reliable).

¶9 We review a trial court’s decision to admit child hearsay under

the child hearsay statute for an abuse of discretion. People v.

4
Whitman, 205 P.3d 371, 381 (Colo. App. 2007). A court abuses its

discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair, or if it misconstrues or misapplies the law. People v. Liggett,

2021 COA 51, ¶ 16, aff’d, 2023 CO 22. However, “[t]he court’s

findings regarding the reliability of a child witness’s out-of-court

statements will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by the

record.” Whitman, 205 P.3d at 381.

¶ 10 If the defendant objected to the admission of the evidence at

trial, we review any error under the harmless error standard.

People v. Hard, 2014 COA 132, ¶ 23. But if the defendant failed to

object, we review for plain error. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63,

¶ 14. Plain error is error that is both obvious and substantial, such

that it so undermines the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as

to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of

conviction. Id. The defendant bears the burden of establishing that

plain error occurred. People v. Conyac, 2014 COA 8M, ¶ 54.

2. Additional Background

¶ 11 D.M. participated in a forensic interview conducted by Mesa

County Investigator Jenna Reed. Before trial, the prosecution filed

a motion and notice of intent to admit a recording of D.M.’s forensic

5
interview under the child hearsay statute. Stock requested an

evidentiary hearing.

¶ 12 At the hearing, Investigator Reed testified to her training and

qualifications, as well as the circumstances of D.M.’s forensic

interview. The prosecution argued that the time, content, and

circumstances of D.M.’s statements provided sufficient safeguards

of reliability in light of the investigator’s training, her lack of

familiarity with D.M., and her use of open-ended questions during

the interview. Defense counsel argued that the statements were not

reliable given that D.M. made them in a forensic interview that took

place more than a year after the alleged criminal conduct.

¶ 13 Following the hearing, the district court issued a detailed

written order. It found that D.M. was thirteen years old at the time

of the forensic interview and that she intended to testify at trial.

The court also made findings as to each of the reliability factors and

concluded that “the time, content, and circumstances of each of the

statements made to Investigator Reed during the interview

provide[d] sufficient safeguards of reliability to make them

admissible.”

6
¶ 14 At trial, Investigator Reed testified three separate times.

During opening statement, the prosecutor explained to the jury

that, because there were two alleged victims, the prosecution

planned to present its evidence in “chapters” — the first chapter

would relate to V.S., and the second chapter would relate to D.M.

During a break, defense counsel noted her understanding from the

prosecutor’s opening statement that Investigator Reed would testify

twice and asked the district court for permission to cross-examine

her “all at once the second time.” The court agreed.

¶ 15 The first time the prosecution called Investigator Reed, she

testified about her experience and training, acknowledged that she

investigated allegations relating to both V.S. and D.M., and

explained the protocols for conducting forensic interviews. She

then testified exclusively about her investigation of the allegations

relating to V.S. and laid the foundation for admission of V.S.’s

forensic interview.

¶ 16 The second time Investigator Reed took the stand, the

prosecutor began by noting some scheduling issues that would

require Investigator Reed to return to testify again later during the

trial. The prosecutor had Investigator Reed lay the foundation for

7
admission of D.M.’s forensic interview. The prosecutor then moved

to admit the forensic interview, and defense counsel reasserted “the

same objection as previously raised” but did not “have anything

additional.” “[B]ased on the earlier ruling,” the court admitted the

forensic interview. The recording was then played for the jury.

¶ 17 After the jury watched the forensic interview, D.M. testified.

Defense counsel did not object to the sequencing of the evidence.

As Stock concedes, D.M.’s in-court testimony “mirrored what she

recounted in her forensic interview.”

¶ 18 On the final trial day, the prosecution recalled Investigator

Reed. This time, Investigator Reed testified about the details of her

investigation of the allegations related to D.M., including reiterating

some of the statements D.M. made during the forensic interview.

Defense counsel then cross-examined Investigator Reed regarding

both alleged victims.

3. Stock’s Contentions Are Unpreserved

¶ 19 Before we reach the merits of Stock’s contentions, we must

first consider whether they are preserved. See Forgette v. People,

2023 CO 4, ¶ 15 (appellate courts have an independent, affirmative

duty to determine whether a claim is preserved). To preserve an

8
issue for appeal, the defendant must raise the issue and provide the

trial court with “an adequate opportunity to make findings of fact

and conclusions of law.” People v. Melendez, 102 P.3d 315, 322

(Colo. 2004); see CRE 103(a)(1). A timely, specific objection “allows

the trial court a meaningful chance to prevent or correct the error

and creates a record for appellate review.” Martinez v. People, 2015

CO 16, ¶ 14.

¶ 20 Stock concedes he did not preserve his contention that the

district court erred by admitting D.M.’s forensic interview under the

child hearsay statute based on his argument that it was admissible

under other hearsay exceptions. But with respect to his contention

that the court erred by allowing the prosecution to present the

forensic interview to the jury before D.M. testified, Stock argues

that the claim is preserved because defense counsel objected to

admission of the forensic interview. We conclude that neither

contention is preserved.

¶ 21 The prosecution moved pretrial to admit D.M.’s forensic

interview into evidence under the child hearsay statute. Defense

counsel did not argue that the forensic interview was inadmissible

under the child hearsay statute because it may have been

9
admissible under other exceptions to the hearsay rule. See People

v. Ujaama, 2012 COA 36, ¶ 37 (an issue is unpreserved for review

when an objection or request was made in the trial court, but on

grounds different from those raised on appeal).

¶ 22 When the prosecution moved to admit the forensic interview

before D.M. testified at trial, the district court asked whether

defense counsel had any objection. Defense counsel stated that she

“[did not] have anything additional” beyond the objection she had

previously raised. Critically, defense counsel’s prior objection did

not alert the court to either the admissibility or sequencing issues

Stock argues on appeal. Because Stock’s contentions were not

raised in or decided by the district court, they are unpreserved, and

we will reverse only for plain error. See Hagos, ¶ 14; Melendez, 102

P.3d at 322.

4. The District Court Did Not Plainly Err by Admitting D.M.’s
Forensic Interview Under the Child Hearsay Statute or by
Allowing the Prosecution to Present It Before D.M. Testified

¶ 23 Because Stock’s contentions related to the district court’s

admission of D.M.’s forensic interview are interrelated, we address

them together. Stock contends that the court erred by admitting

D.M.’s forensic interview under the child hearsay statute because

10
her statements may have been admissible under other exceptions to

the general hearsay rule. See § 13-25-129(2) (authorizing

admission of a statement satisfying the statutory criteria “that is

not otherwise admissible by a statute or court rule that provides an

exception to the hearsay objection”).1 He contends that applying

another hearsay exception would have required the prosecution to

wait until after D.M. was impeached to admit the forensic interview.

Thus, as best we understand, Stock contends that the prejudice

resulting from the court’s alleged error in admitting the forensic

interview under the child hearsay statute was that the court

allowed the prosecution to publish the forensic interview to the jury

before D.M. testified. He also argues that allowing the prosecution

to present the evidence in this way constituted a separate error.

¶ 24 Even assuming the court erred by admitting D.M.’s forensic

interview under the child hearsay statute before D.M. testified and

without first considering its admission under other hearsay

exceptions, we nonetheless conclude that Stock has failed to

establish that these alleged errors were substantially prejudicial

1 Stock does not otherwise contend that D.M.’s forensic interview

was not admissible under section 13-25-129(2), C.R.S. 2025.

11
under the plain error standard. See Hagos, ¶ 14; see also Conyac,

¶ 54 (“The defendant must . . . establish that the error was so grave

that it undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial itself so as

to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the conviction.”).

¶ 25 Stock argues that by allowing the prosecution to publish the

forensic interview to the jury before D.M. testified, the court

“erringly sanctioned a procedure that impermissibly bolstered

[D.M.’s] trial testimony” and “fundamentally and unfairly tilted the

playing field in the prosecution’s favor.” He argues that the

allegedly erroneous procedure was “compounded when Investigator

Reed testified for a third time and was permitted to reiterate to the

jury what [D.M.] had stated in her forensic interview.” But aside

from generally asserting that the alleged errors “more than likely

substantially influenced the jury’s verdict and . . . fundamentally

affected the fairness of [his] trial proceedings,” Stock has not

explained how the errors resulted in substantial prejudice.

¶ 26 As Stock concedes, the statements D.M. made in her forensic

interview mirrored the testimony she provided in court. Stock fails

to explain how the bolstering effect of the forensic interview would

have been different had it been admitted after, rather than before,

12
D.M. testified. For example, Stock has not identified an

inconsistency between D.M.’s forensic interview and her in-court

testimony that he would have been able to explore had she testified

first and had the video been played second. Nor does he claim that

D.M. was present in the courtroom when the forensic interview was

played such that she could have tailored her testimony to track

what she said in the interview.

¶ 27 Although Stock claims that the presentation order allowed

Investigator Reed to testify three times and reiterate D.M.’s account,

he does not argue that any part of Investigator Reed’s testimony

was inadmissible or explain why the prosecution could not have

called Investigator Reed to the stand three separate times even if

the forensic interview had been admitted after D.M. testified. As

noted, Investigator Reed testified multiple times partly because the

prosecution wanted to present the evidence relating to V.S.

separately from the evidence relating to D.M. and partly because of

scheduling issues. She testified substantively about the allegations

related to D.M. only one time.

¶ 28 Stock has failed to meet his burden to demonstrate how the

order in which the evidence was presented impacted the

13
fundamental fairness of his trial. See Conyac, ¶ 54. Consequently,

we conclude that his contentions related to the admission and

presentation of D.M.’s forensic interview do not require reversal

under the plain error standard. See Hagos, ¶ 14.

B. Expert Testimony

¶ 29 Stock contends that the district court erred by permitting a

prosecution expert witness, Cheryl Young, to (1) opine on D.M.’s

credibility and (2) improperly bolster Investigator Reed’s credibility.

We disagree.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 30 CRE 702 allows for the admission of qualified expert opinion

testimony if it will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence

or to determine a fact in issue. To that end, “[a]n expert may testify

as to the typical demeanor and behavioral traits displayed by a

sexually abused child.” People v. Mintz, 165 P.3d 829, 831 (Colo.

App. 2007). Testimony that provides relevant insights into the

“puzzling aspects of the child’s conduct and demeanor . . . is helpful

and appropriate in cases of sexual abuse of children.” Whitman,

205 P.3d at 383 (citation omitted). But “[a]n expert may not opine

on a witness’s credibility or that a witness was telling the truth on a

14
specific occasion.” People v. Collins, 2021 COA 18, ¶ 58; see People

v. Wittrein, 221 P.3d 1076, 1081 (Colo. 2009) (“[E]xperts may not

offer their direct opinion on a child victim’s truthfulness or their

opinion on whether children tend to fabricate sexual abuse

allegations.”).

¶ 31 We review a trial court’s admission of expert testimony for an

abuse of discretion. People v. Rector, 248 P.3d 1196, 1200 (Colo.

2011). A trial court abuses its discretion if its ruling is manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or if it misconstrues or

misapplies the law. Id.; People v. Gee, 2015 COA 151, ¶ 23.

¶ 32 Stock concedes, and we agree, that defense counsel “neither

objected to the prosecution’s expert witness’s qualifications nor

objected to the expert’s trial testimony.” Thus, we review Stock’s

expert-related contentions for plain error. See Ujaama, ¶¶ 37-38

(an issue is unpreserved if the objection is made on different or

unspecified grounds that would not have alerted the trial court to

the issue on review).

2. Additional Background

¶ 33 At trial, the prosecution offered, and the district court

qualified, Young — a licensed therapist — as an expert in “all

15
aspects of child sexual assault and abuse,” “the patterns of

disclosure and outcry statements of child sexual assault and abuse

victims,” “forensic protocol of child sexual abuse interviews,” “the

process of memory,” and “research and experience in the area of

suggestibility.” As a generalized expert, Young explained that she

“underst[ood] her role to be jury education.” She clarified that she

“[did not] really know anything at all about this case” and that she

did not “intend[] to influence the jury or make any opinions about

anybody being credible.” She said, “That’s not my role.”

¶ 34 On direct examination, the prosecutor asked Young whether

there had been any research done on “fabrication” or “children

lying.” Defense counsel objected to “bolstering,” and the court

sustained the objection. In response, the prosecutor said she

thought “it actually help[ed] the [d]efense,” but her comment was

cut off by Young’s answer to the question:

So fabricating in children, there are reasons
that kids fabricate. The most common reason
that kids fabricate to us as parents and
[caregivers] is to avoid our disappointment and
disapproval. They also will lie to avoid
consequences. They’ll lie to continue a game,
because there’s plenty of games out there
where you have to sort of lie in order to
continue the game.

16
When we look at kids lying maliciously or
intentionally to get another person into
trouble, less common. Certainly can be
siblings fabricating that they didn’t do
something, the brother did it. Not uncommon.
In a calculated, intentional way, lying to get an
adult into trouble, the least common of all.

Defense counsel did not object again or move to strike Young’s

response.

¶ 35 The prosecutor also asked Young questions concerning the

protocols for conducting a forensic examination of a child. Young

explained “some key things that are foundational to a forensic

interview,” including that interviews should happen in a neutral

environment, be video-recorded, include a cognitive assessment of

the child, and assess whether the child understands what telling

the truth means. According to Stock, Young’s answers “overlapped”

with Investigator Reed’s testimony concerning the procedures for

forensic interviews. For example, Investigator Reed explained that

forensic interviews should be conducted in a neutral, comfortable,

and safe environment; strive to obtain information using nonleading

questions; be video- and audio-recorded; and assess whether the

child understands the importance of telling the truth.

17
3. The District Court Did Not Plainly Err by Permitting Young’s
Testimony Regarding Fabrication

¶ 36 Stock contends that the district court plainly erred by

permitting Young to opine on D.M.’s credibility. In support of his

argument, Stock cites People v. Relaford, 2016 COA 99, ¶¶ 16-35, a

case in which a division of this court considered whether expert

testimony offered by a licensed therapist improperly opined on the

child victim’s credibility.

¶ 37 There, the expert identified specific circumstances in which a

child victim might fabricate allegations of sexual assault, including

circumstances that involve “system-savvy adolescents” or

“high-conflict custody cases.” Id. at ¶ 19. The prosecutor asked the

expert if they had “ever come across a false allegation of sexual

abuse . . . in any other circumstance, other than what you’ve

already mentioned,” and the expert responded, “[T]hose are the only

ones that I can think of that I have professionally seen in [thirty]

years, or in the people I’ve supervised.” Id. at ¶ 20.

¶ 38 The division concluded that the expert’s testimony “was not an

explanation of the typical demeanor and behavioral traits displayed

by a sexually abused child” and “did not serve any purpose other

18
than to attempt to influence the jurors’ credibility determinations.”

Id. at ¶¶ 32, 34. Specifically, the division determined that because

the expert testified “that she had not encountered any

circumstances other than those she had described in which

children lied about being sexually assaulted, and those

circumstances were not present in this case, the testimony

necessarily constituted an impermissible expert opinion that the

victims were ‘almost certainly telling the truth.’” Id. at ¶ 34 (quoting

People v. Snook, 745 P.2d 647, 649 (Colo. 1987)).

¶ 39 Stock argues that “Young’s testimony here was strikingly

similar to the testimony that [the Relaford] division . . . concluded

should not have been presented to the jury.” We agree that Young’s

testimony that “the least common” lies told by children are those

done “[i]n a calculated, intentional way . . . to get an adult into

trouble” constituted improper bolstering — and it appears that the

district court thought so too, given that it sustained defense

counsel’s objection on that basis. But we are not persuaded that

the error was obvious for three reasons.

¶ 40 First, the record demonstrates that defense counsel was aware

of the potential that Young’s testimony could be bolstering. She

19
objected to the prosecutor’s question, and the court sustained the

objection. Following the prosecutor’s comment that the anticipated

testimony “actually help[ed] the [d]efense,” the witness immediately

answered the question, and defense counsel remained silent. Given

how the issue developed at trial, we cannot fault the court for not

intervening on defense counsel’s behalf. See Ujaama, ¶ 42 (“Plain

error assumes that the [trial] court should have intervened sua

sponte because the error was so obvious.” (citation omitted)); cf.

Forgette, ¶¶ 2, 34 (when counsel is aware of all the pertinent facts

but does not object or ask the court to take any action, the

objection is waived).

¶ 41 Second, Young’s testimony was far more general than the

testimony at issue in Relaford. Rather than identifying the “only”

circumstances in which a child might fabricate sexual abuse

allegations, Relaford, ¶ 20, Young testified generally about various

reasons why children lie. Notably, she did not focus her testimony

on false sexual abuse allegations. Nor did she speak in absolutes

like the expert witness in Relaford. See id. Instead, she gave a

comparative opinion — that intentionally trying to get an adult in

20
trouble was the “least common” motivation for a child to lie —

without even quantifying how frequently children lie overall.

¶ 42 Third, Young specifically said it was not her job to “influence

the jury or make any opinions about anybody being credible.” Cf.

id. at ¶ 34 (the expert’s testimony “did not serve any purpose other

than to attempt to influence the jurors’ credibility determinations”).

She explained that her role was limited to educating the jurors on

issues that may be outside their scope of knowledge. See People v.

Morrison, 985 P.2d 1, 6 (Colo. App. 1999) (“[S]ubstantially all of

th[e] expert’s testimony was properly received under CRE 702 to aid

the jury in understanding the typicality of reactions by young boys

who have been subjected to sexual abuse.”), aff’d, 19 P.3d 668

(Colo. 2000). And she clarified for the jury that she did not know

anything about the facts of the case.

¶ 43 Under the circumstances, we conclude that it is not obvious

the court should have intervened to strike Young’s testimony in the

absence of an objection by defense counsel. See Ujaama, ¶ 42.

Accordingly, we discern no plain error.

21
4. The District Court Did Not Err by Permitting Young’s
Testimony About Forensic Interviewing Protocols

¶ 44 Stock contends that the district court plainly erred by

permitting Young to provide testimony that “overlapped” with

Investigator Reed’s testimony about the protocols for conducting a

forensic examination. Despite conceding that “this error in itself

may not warrant reversal,” Stock argues that Young’s testimony

improperly bolstered Investigator Reed’s credibility even though her

credibility had not been attacked. We discern no error.

¶ 45 To be sure, Young did not directly opine on Investigator Reed’s

credibility. She did not evaluate the procedures Investigator Reed

utilized to conduct D.M.’s forensic interview or conclude that those

procedures were appropriate. Even if Young’s testimony

incidentally bolstered Investigator Reed’s, we would be hard pressed

to conclude that it was improper. See People v. Cooper, 2021 CO

69, ¶ 97 (the incidental bolstering effect of an expert’s testimony on

the credibility of another witness is acceptable where the testimony

educated the jurors regarding matters about which they likely

lacked knowledge or insight); Relaford, ¶ 30 (the incidental

bolstering effect “alone is insufficient to deny admission of the

22
evidence, because expert testimony generally tends to bolster or

attack the credibility of another witness” (citation omitted)).

¶ 46 Moreover, the proper procedures for conducting a forensic

interview were not a focus of the evidence at trial and were not in

dispute. There would have been no reason for the jury to question

Investigator Reed’s credibility regarding those procedures and no

reason for it to be unduly influenced to credit Investigator Reed

based on Young’s testimony. Against this backdrop, we conclude

that the district court did not err by allowing Young to testify

regarding the procedures for conducting a forensic interview.

C. Proportionality

¶ 47 Stock contends that the district court erred by rejecting his

proportionality challenge and imposing a sentence that was grossly

disproportionate to the severity of his crime in violation of the

Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We disagree.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 48 The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and

article II, section 20, of the Colorado Constitution prohibit cruel and

unusual punishments. Wells-Yates v. People, 2019 CO 90M, ¶¶ 5,

10. Those provisions require a sentence to be proportionate to the

23
crime. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983); Alvarez v. People,

797 P.2d 37, 38 (Colo. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by, Melton

v. People, 2019 CO 89, ¶ 18. We review de novo whether a sentence

is unconstitutional because it is grossly disproportionate.

Wells-Yates, ¶ 35.

¶ 49 To ensure sentences are not grossly disproportionate, a

defendant convicted of being a habitual criminal is “entitled, upon

request, to a proportionality review of his sentence.” People v.

Deroulet, 48 P.3d 520, 522 (Colo. 2002), abrogated on other grounds

by, Wells-Yates, ¶¶ 63-65; see Wells-Yates, ¶ 8. Even so, “in most

instances the General Assembly’s determinations regarding the

sentencing of habitual criminals will result in constitutionally

proportionate sentences.” Deroulet, 49 P.3d at 526.

¶ 50 The initial proportionality review is a two-step abbreviated

review. First, the court must consider the gravity or seriousness of

the triggering offense (the felony conviction for which a defendant

was sentenced) and the predicate offenses (the prior felony

convictions on which a defendant’s habitual criminal adjudication

was based). Wells-Yates, ¶ 23. Second, the court must consider

“the harshness of the sentence imposed on the triggering offense.”

24
Id. The harshness of the penalty includes both the length of the

sentence as well as parole eligibility. Id. at ¶ 14. “The court must

scrutinize the triggering offense and the predicate offenses and

determine whether in combination they are so lacking in gravity or

seriousness so as to suggest that the sentence is unconstitutionally

disproportionate to the crime, taking into account the defendant’s

eligibility for parole.” Id. at ¶ 23.

¶ 51 If a crime is considered per se grave or serious, the court may

skip the first part of the abbreviated review — considering the

gravity or seriousness of the offenses — and proceed directly to

considering the harshness of the penalty. Id. at ¶ 13 (citing Close v.

People, 48 P.3d 528, 538 (Colo. 2002)). A crime is per se grave or

serious if, “based on [its] statutory elements, [it] necessarily

involve[s] grave or serious conduct” and “would be grave or serious

in every potential factual scenario.” Id. at ¶ 63. For crimes that are

not per se grave or serious, the court should consider the facts and

circumstances underlying the triggering and predicate offenses.

People v. Session, 2020 COA 158, ¶ 36.

¶ 52 If the abbreviated proportionality analysis does not give rise to

an inference of gross disproportionality, no further analysis is

25
required, and the proportionality challenge fails. Wells-Yates, ¶¶ 8,

18. If the analysis gives rise to an inference of gross

disproportionality, then the court must conduct an extended

proportionality review, involving intrajurisdictional and

interjurisdictional comparisons. Id.

2. Additional Background

¶ 53 Before sentencing, defense counsel filed a motion seeking a

proportionality review of Stock’s anticipated sentence. Stock

conceded that, in 2010, he pleaded guilty to class 4 felony SAOC

under section 18-3-405(1), C.R.S. 2006. He explained that, if he

were to be adjudicated a habitual sex offender against children, his

mandatory sentence would be eighteen years to life, which he

argued was unconstitutionally disproportionate to his crime.

¶ 54 The district court conducted a combined proceeding to

determine whether Stock was a habitual offender and to impose

Stock’s sentence. First, the court found that the prosecution had

proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Stock was a habitual sex

offender against children and adjudicated Stock accordingly. The

court then heard sentencing arguments. The prosecution argued

that, as a habitual sex offender against children, Stock’s mandatory

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minimum sentence was eighteen years to life in the custody of the

DOC. In response, defense counsel argued that a sentence of

eighteen years to life was “unconstitutionally disproportionate

under the [Eighth] Amendment” but that, “[i]f the [c]ourt does not

make that finding[,] we would join the [p]rosecution’s request for a

sentence of [eighteen] years to life.”

¶ 55 The court explained that it was required to consider several

factors when sentencing Stock, including “the nature of the offense,

the character and rehabilitation potential of [Stock], development of

respect for the law, the deterrence of crime, [and] the protection of

the public.” The court explained that it was “required to try to

select a sentence, a sentence length, and a level of supervision that

addresses [Stock’s] individual characteristics and reduces the

potential that [he will] engage in criminal conduct at the end of [his]

sentence.” In the end, the court sentenced Stock “under the

habitual statute to [eighteen] years to life” in DOC custody.

¶ 56 As for Stock’s argument that his sentence was grossly

disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment, the court found

that “sex assault on a child is a conviction that is per se grave and

serious” and that “certainly . . . in this case . . . it is so.” Finally,

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after considering the harm caused by Stock’s conduct, the court

concluded that, “[b]ased on the factors set out in the [Wells-Yates]

case, I do not find in this case that the sentence that was imposed

[is] grossly disproportionate.”

3. The District Court Did Not Err by Concluding that Stock’s
Sentence Was Constitutional

¶ 57 Stock contends that the district court erred by denying his

Eighth Amendment claim because it (1) determined that SAOC was

per se grave or serious without considering whether the crime

would be grave or serious in every potential factual scenario;

(2) failed to consider “the facts and circumstances underlying both

his triggering offense and predicate offense”; and (3) failed to

consider the harshness of the sentence imposed and Stock’s

eligibility for parole. We are not persuaded.

¶ 58 We conclude that, based on its statutory elements, SAOC

necessarily involves grave or serious conduct and is a per se grave

or serious offense. See Wells-Yates, ¶ 63. At least one division of

this court has already reached that conclusion in a published

decision, albeit before Wells-Yates was announced. See People v.

Strean, 74 P.3d 387, 396 (Colo. App. 2002). We see no reason to

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depart from Strean, notwithstanding Wells-Yates’ caution to use the

per se grave or serious label “judiciously and deliberately” and only

when a crime “would be grave or serious in every potential factual

scenario.” Wells-Yates, ¶¶ 61, 63.

¶ 59 For a defendant to be found guilty of SAOC, a jury must find

beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant knowingly

subjected another person who is not his spouse to any sexual

contact; (2) the victim is less than fifteen years of age; and (3) the

defendant is at least four years older than the victim.

§ 18-3-405(1), C.R.S. 2025. As relevant here, sexual contact means

“[t]he knowing touching of the victim’s intimate parts by the

actor . . . or the knowing touching of the clothing covering the

immediate area of the victim’s . . . intimate parts if that sexual

contact is for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or

abuse.” § 18-3-401(4)(a), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 60 As divisions of this court have explained, “sex offenders have

been convicted of crimes that society regards as particularly

heinous,” and the state has a great interest “in protecting the public

from convicted sex offenders.” People v. Dash, 104 P.3d 286, 291

(Colo. App. 2004); see also Strean, 74 P.3d at 396 (SAOC involves

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“situations in which an adult treats a vulnerable child as a tool for

sexual gratification, often causing a devastating and life-long

effect”). Further, the General Assembly has declared that “sexual

offenses are a matter of grave statewide concern” that involve

“violations of the well-being, privacy, and security of the victims . . .

and result in serious and long-lasting harm to individuals and

society.” § 16-10-301(1), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 61 Given what a conviction for SAOC requires — particularly the

perpetrator’s sexual purpose and the age of the child victim — and

the grave impact it has on both victims and society, we conclude

that SAOC is “grave or serious in every potential factual scenario.”

Wells-Yates, ¶ 63. The district court did not err by so concluding.

And because SAOC is a per se grave or serious offense, it follows

that the court did not err by not separately considering the facts

and circumstances underlying Stock’s triggering and predicate

offenses. See id. at ¶ 13.

¶ 62 Finally, we reject Stock’s contention that the court erred by

not adequately considering whether the harshness of his sentence

was disproportionate to the charged conduct. Stock does not

contest his adjudication as a habitual sex offender against children,

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so the habitual sentencing requirements of section 18-3-412(2),

C.R.S. 2025, apply. Under that statute, the court was required to

“impose a sentence to the [DOC] of not less than three times the

upper limit of the presumptive range for that class felony.”

§ 18-3-412(2). Stock’s SAOC conviction was a class 4 felony, see

§ 18-3-405(2), for which the presumptive sentencing range is two to

six years to life in DOC custody, § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V.5)(A), C.R.S.

2025 (establishing the presumptive sentencing range for felony

offenses); § 18-1.3-1004(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025 (requiring convicted sex

offenders to be sentenced to “an indeterminate term of at least the

minimum of the presumptive range specified in section

18-1.3-401 . . . and a maximum of the sex offender’s natural life”).

¶ 63 Combined, these statutes required the district court to impose

a minimum sentence of eighteen years to life in DOC custody.

When considering the harshness of a penalty, we afford legislative

determinations regarding sentences great deference. People v.

Crawley, 2024 COA 49, ¶ 12; see Wells-Yates, ¶ 21. And Stock is

parole eligible, as the district court noted. See § 18-1.3-1006(1)(b),

C.R.S. 2025 (“The period of parole for any sex offender convicted of

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a class 4 felony shall be an indeterminate term of at least ten years

and a maximum of the remainder of the sex offender’s natural life.”)

¶ 64 The court imposed the minimum sentence the legislature

determined to be appropriate for a habitual sex offender against

children convicted of class 4 felony SAOC, even though Stock was

on parole for the prior SAOC when he engaged in the conduct for

which he was convicted in this case. Considering Stock’s predicate

and triggering offenses in combination, we conclude that they are

not “so lacking in gravity or seriousness” that a sentence of eighteen

years to life for the triggering offense is grossly disproportionate.

Wells-Yates, ¶ 23; see id. at ¶ 5 (“The Eighth Amendment does not

require strict proportionality between crime and sentence . . . .”

(quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy,

J., concurring))); see also Strean, 74 P.3d at 396 (minimum

sentence of forty-eight years to life was not grossly disproportionate

for class 3 felony SAOC). We conclude that Stock’s sentence does

not violate the Eighth Amendment.

III. Disposition

¶ 65 We affirm Stock’s judgment of conviction and sentence.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

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