Peo v. Cummins

24CA2099 Peo v Cummins 02-12-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2099
City and County of Denver District Court No. 22CR7108
Honorable Demetria E. Trujillo, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Antonio A. Cummins,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
Grove and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 12, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Claire V. Collins, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Antonio A. Cummins, Pro Se
¶1 Antonio A. Cummins appeals the district court’s order denying

his request for presentence confinement credit (PSCC). We reverse

the order and remand for the court to correct the mittimus.

¶2 Cummins pleaded guilty to felony domestic violence —

habitual offender (count two), misdemeanor third degree assault

(count three), and felony attempted second degree assault (count

fourteen). In exchange, the prosecution agreed to dismiss the

remaining counts and stipulated to a four-year aggregate sentence

in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC). The

agreement was silent as to PSCC.

¶3 At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel informed the

district court that Cummins had spent 182 days in presentence

confinement. The court then made the following oral ruling:

In agreement with the parties and imposing
the stipulated sentence as follows. As to . . .
count two, the Court imposes four years in the
[DOC] plus two years mandatory period of
parole running concurrently to count three
and count fourteen . . . . [A]s to count three,
I’m going to sentence you to one hundred
eighty days in the Denver County Jail. That
will run concurrently to count two and count
fourteen . . . . [A]s to count fourteen, I will
sentence you to four years in the [DOC] plus
two years mandatory period of parole. That
shall run concurrently to count three and

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count two . . . . The Court will not order
restitution as the victim has not come forth
with a pecuniary loss. The Court will award
one hundred and eighty-two days [PSCC].

The mittimus reflects this sentencing order but lists the award of

182 days of PSCC in relation to count three only.

¶4 Over a year later, Cummins sent a letter to the court, stating

that he had inquired into his mandatory prison release date and

learned that the DOC was not properly applying his PSCC to his

sentence because of how the credit was listed on the mittimus. He

asked the court to correct the issue to ensure that he received his

PSCC. The court construed the letter as a Crim. P. 35(a) motion to

correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner and denied it. The

court found that it had “ordered 182 days PSCC . . . specifically be

allocated to Count [three] only” and that “[t]he issued mittimus

accurately reflects the Court’s order.” The court thus determined

that Cummins was not entitled to additional PSCC and, regardless,

his Crim. P. 35(a) challenge was untimely.

¶5 We conclude that the record does not support the court’s

finding that the 182 days of PSCC was allocated to count three

only. While the mittimus reflects such an allocation, the court’s

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oral ruling was an unconditional “award [of] one hundred and

eighty-two days [PSCC].” When such a discrepancy exists, a court’s

oral pronouncement of sentence takes precedence over the

mittimus. See People v. Tennyson, 2023 COA 2, ¶ 37, aff’d, 2025

CO 31.

¶6 We are thus persuaded that Cummins’s letter should have

been construed as a Crim. P. 36 request to correct the mittimus to

accurately reflect the court’s oral PSCC ruling. See People v. Baker,

2019 CO 97M, ¶ 21; People v. Wood, 2019 CO 7, ¶¶ 39-40; People v.

Glover, 893 P.2d 1311, 1316 (Colo. 1995); see also People v. Cali,

2020 CO 20, ¶ 34 (“[W]e will broadly construe a pro se litigant’s

pleadings to effectuate the substance, rather than the form, of those

pleadings.”).

¶7 So construed, we conclude that the mittimus must be

corrected to reflect the court’s oral award of PSCC against each of

the concurrent sentences imposed in this case. See Schubert v.

People, 698 P.2d 788, 795 (Colo. 1985) (For “concurrent sentences,

the period of presentence confinement should be credited against

each sentence” because “concurrent sentences obviously commence

at the same time and in functional effect result in one term of

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imprisonment represented by the longest of the concurrent

sentences imposed” and “[o]nly by giving credit against each

concurrent sentence will the defendant be assured of receiving

credit for the full period of presentence confinement against the

total term of imprisonment.”).

¶8 Accordingly, the order is reversed, and the case is remanded

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

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