Wyss v. Campbell

24CA1352 & 24CA1845 Wyss v Campbell 02-12-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals Nos. 24CA1352 & 24CA1845
Boulder County District Court No. 22CV30810
Honorable Elizabeth Beebe Volz, Judge

Daniel Wyss and Wendy Wyss,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

Timothy J. Campbell and Farmers Insurance Exchange,

Defendants-Appellees.

JUDGMENT AND ORDER AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK
J. Jones and Taubman*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 12, 2026

Levin Sitcoff PC, Bradley A. Levin, Jeremy A. Sitcoff, Susan Minamizono, Robyn
Levin, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP, Robert J. Zavaglia, Jr., Chayla A. Witherspoon,
Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee Timothy J. Campbell

White and Steele, PC, Matthew A. Ralston, E. Catlynne Shadakofsky, Denver,
Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee Farmers Insurance Exchange

Western Slope Law, Nelson A. Waneka, Glenwood Springs, Colorado, for
Amicus Curiae Colorado Trial Lawyers Association

Sutton Booker P.C., Erica O. Payne, Katie B. Johnson, Denver, Colorado, for
Amicus Curiae Colorado Defense Lawyers Association
Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP, Kendra N. Beckwith, Elizabeth Michaels, for
Amici Curiae National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies and
American Property Casualty Insurance Association

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 In this case, seeking greater insurance payments after the

December 2021 Marshall Fire1 burned down their home, plaintiffs,

Daniel and Wendy Wyss, appeal the district court’s summary

judgment in favor of defendants, Timothy Campbell and Farmers

Insurance Exchange (Farmers). The Wysses also appeal the court’s

order granting Farmers’ request for an award of costs. We affirm.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

¶2 The Wysses purchased their home in March 2021. They

reached out to Campbell, a Farmers’ insurance agent who had

helped procure insurance coverage on their prior home, to procure

insurance coverage for their new home. Campbell and the Wysses

knew each other socially; they attended the same high school and

events like Super Bowl parties, and the Wysses’ daughter babysat

for Campbell.

1 The December 2021 Marshall Fire was the most destructive

wildfire in Colorado history. It caused 37,500 people to evacuate
and destroyed more than 1,000 structures in Boulder County.
Olivia Prentzel, David Gilbert & Thy Vo, Marshall Fire Officially
Becomes Colorado’s Most Destructive, with 991 Homes & Businesses
Burned, Officials Confirm, Colo. Sun, https://perma.cc/68TX-
2GGF.

1
¶3 Campbell visited the Wysses’ new home to prepare an

insurance application for their review. He input information —

including information publicly available from the county assessor’s

office — into Farmers’ computer system to calculate coverage limits

and premiums. The assessor showed the house as having 1,724

square feet, which Campbell input into the insurance application.

The system required Campbell to differentiate between finished

square footage and basement square footage. The software

calculated the limit values and their corresponding premiums for

the available coverages within the policy. Campbell sent the

application to the Wysses for their review.

¶4 The application included information identifying the policy’s

coverage limits and extended coverage limits as follows:

Coverage2 Coverage Limits

Coverage A – Dwelling $698,000

2 Only Coverages A and D are at issue in this case. Coverage A
represents the estimated cost to rebuild, and Coverage D applies to
the costs of hotels, meals, and other incidentals if the Wysses were
unable to live in their home after a covered loss. And, though not at
issue, Coverage B applies to detached structures, and Coverage C
would cover the cost of personal property losses like furniture and
clothing.

2
Coverage2 Coverage Limits

Extended Replacement Cost $174,500 (25%)

Coverage B – Separate Structure $34,900

Coverage C – Personal Property $279,200

Coverage D – Loss of Use $139,600 (24 months)

It also advised the Wysses:

• Farmers used an “estimating program to calculate a

reconstruction cost estimate” for the home and that the

estimate was “not a guarantee of reconstruction costs.”

• The policy did “not provide Guaranteed Replacement Cost

and coverage.”

• The total square footage figure included all floors of the

home but it noted, “IMPORTANT: The total square footage

does NOT include . . . [the] basement (even if fully

finished).”

• The Wysses must notify Farmers within sixty days of

“any inaccuracy or change in any information” that they

provided Farmers or that Farmers provided them

“regarding the physical characteristics of the dwelling.”

3
By signing, the applicant acknowledged “that the selected options

and limits indicated in [the] application accurately reflect[ed] the

coverage and limits options” and that the information entered in the

application was true, correct, and complete to the best of the

applicant’s knowledge.

¶5 Daniel Wyss electronically signed the application, affirming

that he had read the policy and understood its limitations. During

his deposition, however, he stated that he had never read the

materials provided to him before signing the application. Farmers

issued the requested policy and sent it to Campbell who forwarded

it to the Wysses, with instructions to direct any questions or

corrections to Campbell. The Wysses did not ask Campbell any

questions about the policy or ask him to make any changes. They

also didn’t contact Farmers to make any changes.

¶6 In December 2021, after the Marshall Fire burned down the

Wysses’ home, they submitted a claim to Farmers. Farmers paid

the Wysses 100% of the coverage available under the policy, which

4
included $698,000 in dwelling coverage and twenty-four months of

additional living expenses (ALE).3

¶7 In August 2022, Wendy Wyss emailed Farmers indicating that

the Wysses had “revisited [their] policy and found a mistake in the

square footage used to calculate [their] coverage,” which might be

why Farmer’s “calculation of the price per square foot for rebuild

seem[ed] above market.” The Wysses explained that their policy

incorrectly listed the home as having 1,724 square feet instead of

2,740 square feet — the higher number being consistent with an

appraisal the Wysses had commissioned before they purchased

their home and before they obtained the Farmers policy. They

asked Farmers to reform the policy to reflect an increased square

footage calculation “based on the actual square footage of [their]

home,” but Farmers declined because it was unable to identify any

agency or underwriting errors in the policy. And “without evidence

of a binding error taking place, [Farmers was] unable to

retroactively alter [the] policy contract.”

3 Farmers didn’t pay the Wysses the extended replacement cost

coverage, but that’s not at issue.

5
B. Procedural History

¶8 The Wysses sued Campbell in November 2022 for negligence

and breach of fiduciary duty. They also sued Farmers for

reformation of policy; statutory denial of coverage in violation of

sections 10-3-1115 and 10-3-1116, C.R.S. 2025; and breach of the

duty of good faith and fair dealing. Among other things, they

alleged that they had obtained an estimate to rebuild their home for

more than $1.75 million. Campbell and Farmers separately moved

for summary judgment.

¶9 In a thorough, combined order, the court granted summary

judgment in favor of Campbell and Farmers. The court concluded

that Campbell was not negligent and that he did not breach any

fiduciary duty. With respect to Farmers, the court concluded that

(1) the policy did not guarantee full replacement coverage and the

Wysses were aware of the policy’s limits; (2) there was no mutual

mistake upon which reformation could be based; and (3) the Wysses

could not sustain their claims for breach of the duty of good faith

and fair dealing or their statutory bad faith claim because Farmers

had timely paid 100% of the policy’s benefits.

6
¶ 10 As the prevailing party, Farmers filed a bill of costs. The

Wysses opposed, arguing that the charges of Farmers’ construction

cost estimating expert, Vertex Companies, LLC (Vertex), were

unreasonable. The Wysses did not request a hearing. The district

court awarded Farmers all requested costs, finding them

reasonable.

¶ 11 The Wysses appealed the summary judgment and the costs

order, and we later consolidated the appeals.

II. Analysis

¶ 12 The Wysses appeal the court’s summary judgment in favor of

Campbell and Farmers. They also appeal the court’s award of costs

to Farmers.

¶ 13 We review the district court’s summary judgment de novo.

Gibbons v. Ludlow, 2013 CO 49, ¶ 11. Summary judgment is

proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” C.R.C.P.

56(c); Riccatone v. Colo. Choice Health Plans, 2013 COA 133, ¶ 9.

7
A. The Court Did Not Err by Granting Summary Judgment in
Campbell’s Favor

¶ 14 The Wysses first argue that Kaercher v. Sater, 155 P.3d 437

(Colo. App. 2006), which discusses an insurance agent’s duty of

care, was wrongly decided. Even if we disagree that Kaercher was

incorrectly decided, the Wysses, nevertheless, contend that

Campbell was negligent and breached his fiduciary duty because

(1) he agreed to advise, guide, and direct the Wysses to insure their

home and assumed a duty to procure sufficient coverage; (2) he

held himself out as an insurance expert, thereby assuming

additional duties to the Wysses; and (3) it was factually disputed

whether he and the Wysses had a special relationship. We decline

to depart from Kaercher’s holding and disagree with the Wysses’

remaining contentions.

1. Kaercher

¶ 15 In Kaercher, another division of our court held that “insurance

agents or brokers are not personal financial counselors and risk

managers” and that they have “no continuing duty to advise, guide,

or direct a client to obtain additional coverage.” 155 P.3d at 441.

Instead, “[t]he general duty of the insurer’s agent to the insured is

8
to refrain from affirmative fraud, not to watch out for all rights of

the insured and inform the latter of them.” Id. (citation omitted).

Kaercher held that an insurance agent does not have a common law

duty to ensure complete protection to the policyholder or

recommend higher policy limits but must only exercise a reasonable

duty of care. Id. at 440-41. Even when an agent represents that

they are knowledgeable about insurance coverage and regularly

during their business informs, counsels, and advises insureds

about their insurance needs, the agent does not incur duties

beyond those of the standard policyholder-insurance agent

relationship. Apodaca v. Allstate Ins. Co., 232 P.3d 253, 259 (Colo.

App. 2009), aff’d, 255 P.3d 1099 (Colo. 2011).

¶ 16 The Wysses argue that the district court improperly relied on

Kaercher and urge us not to follow it. While the district court

recognized that agents owe customers a duty to “act with

reasonable care,” the Wysses contend that it did not address how

Campbell met that standard. Instead of assessing Campbell’s

specific conduct, the court simply used Kaercher to conclude that

Campbell did not have a continuing duty to advise, guide, or direct

the Wysses to obtain additional coverage.

9
¶ 17 In addition to asserting that Kaercher was wrongly decided,

the Wysses ask us to view insurance agents in the way some other

courts do — as professionals with superior knowledge of business

and insurance who must “exercise the skill and diligence fairly to be

expected from one in his profession.” Butler v. Scott, 417 F.2d 471,

473 (10th Cir. 1969) (applying New Mexico law); see also Golden

Rule Ins. Corp. v. Greenfield, 786 F. Supp. 914, 916 (D. Colo. 1992)

(“Where, as here, an insurance agent assists a person in completing

an application, it is reasonably foreseeable that the applicant will

rely on the agent’s special knowledge and experience.”).4

¶ 18 Next, the Wysses contend that, as a policy matter, Kaercher

doesn’t align with the expectations insureds have of licensed

insurance agents who are more than just “data entry professionals.”

Specifically, they contend that agents who give insurance advice

voluntarily assume a duty to procure sufficient coverage for the

insured and should be responsible for the veracity and sufficiency

of the advice. Kaercher, they argue, does not hold agents

4 The Wysses rely on this case, which applies Colorado law, but it

was decided before Kaercher v. Sater, 155 P.3d 437 (Colo. App.
2006).

10
accountable even “if their advice is faulty or the coverage is woefully

insufficient.”

¶ 19 The Wysses make an interesting argument, but it is based on

case law from other courts and considerations of policy. Kaercher is

well reasoned, and we decline to depart from it. See Ryser v. Shelter

Mut. Ins. Co., 2019 COA 88, ¶ 12 (“Although earlier decisions from

divisions of this court are not binding on another division, ‘the later

division should give the prior decision some deference.’” (citation

omitted)), aff’d on other grounds, 2021 CO 11. In doing so, we

follow the lead of other divisions of this court that have followed

Kaercher. See, e.g., DC-10 Ent., LLC v. Manor Ins. Agency, Inc.,

2013 COA 14, ¶ 20; Apodaca, 232 P.3d at 259. We note that

several other jurisdictions have also held that insurance agents do

not have a common law duty to ensure complete protection to the

policyholder or recommend higher policy limits. See, e.g., Webb v.

Gittlen, 174 P.3d 275, 279 (Ariz. 2008) (“[I]nsurance agents

generally are not fiduciaries, but instead owe only a duty of

‘reasonable care, skill, and diligence’ in dealing with clients.”

(citation omitted)); Gemini Ins. Co. v. Meyer Jabara Hotels LLC, 231

A.3d 839, 853 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2020) (“[T]he general law is that

11
brokers do not have a duty to advise clients about their insurance

needs.”); Go Wireless, LLC v. Md. Cas. Co., 2013 WI App 41, ¶ 38

(an insurance agent has a duty to exercise reasonable care, skill,

and diligence in procuring coverage but does not have a duty to

inform or recommend policy limits higher than those selected by the

insured).

¶ 20 Likewise, it is “not up to the court[s] to make policy or to weigh

policy.” Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d

30, 38 (Colo. 2000). If a heightened professional duty for insurance

agents is desirable as a matter of public policy, the General

Assembly may impose it. But absent legislative action creating

such an obligation, we decline to expand the common law duty of

insurance agents beyond the parameters established in Kaercher.

2. Campbell Did Not Assume a Heightened Professional Duty nor
Was There a Special Relationship Between Campbell and the
Wysses

¶ 21 Even if we agree with Kaercher’s holding, the Wysses argue

that Campbell voluntarily assumed a heightened duty by holding

himself out as an insurance expert. And because he chose to

advise the Wysses, they contend that Campbell must be responsible

for the veracity and sufficiency of his professional advice. They also

12
claim that summary judgment was inappropriate because the court

never resolved whether they had a special relationship with

Campbell. We disagree.5

a. Applicable Law

¶ 22 Insurance agents have a duty to act with reasonable care

toward their insureds, but absent a special relationship between the

insured and the agent, the agent has no affirmative duty to advise

the insured of possible additional coverage or provisions contained

in the insurance policy. Kaercher, 155 P.3d at 441. Whether a

special relationship has been formed turns on whether there is

“entrustment” — that is, whether the agent or broker assumes

additional responsibilities beyond those which attach to an

ordinary, reasonable agent possessing normal competencies and

skills. Id.

b. Analysis

¶ 23 First, the Wysses contend that because Campbell — a licensed

professional — voluntarily assumed a duty to advise and procure

sufficient coverage, his actions should give rise to a heightened,

5 Although the Wysses discuss these arguments separately in their

briefs, because they are interrelated, we address them together.

13
legally enforceable professional duty. See P.W. v. Child.’s Hosp.

Colo., 2016 CO 6, ¶ 21 (“In general, a party assumes another’s duty

of care and may be subject to liability for breaching that duty when

the party voluntarily undertakes to render a service.”). Campbell

assumed the responsibility of procuring insurance coverage for

them by visiting the property to gather information; speaking to the

Wysses about their expectations; reassuring them that “they would

be covered for a total loss”; and knowing that the Wysses were

“relatively uninformed about their insurance needs” and would rely

extensively on Campbell to obtain proper coverage.

¶ 24 But the Wysses don’t cite cases supporting their theory that

an insurance agent’s duty is heightened when that agent holds

himself out as an expert and assumes an advisory role. Indeed, our

case law holds otherwise: “Even when an agent represents that he

or she is knowledgeable about insurance coverages, and regularly

in the course of . . . business, informs, counsels, and advises

customers about their insurance needs, the agent does not incur

duties beyond those of the standard policyholder-insurance agent

relationship.” Apodaca, 232 P.3d at 259. Simply put, in most

circumstances, an insurance agent “does not have a duty to advise

14
of additional and available insurance coverages suitable for the

customer’s needs.” Id. Thus, even if Campbell held himself out as

an insurance expert, visited the Wysses at their home, and

prepared an insurance application knowing that the Wysses would

rely on his expertise, these allegations don’t trigger a heightened

professional duty.

¶ 25 Second, the Wysses contend that, based on their special

relationship, Campbell owed them a heightened duty of care and

that the court erred by granting summary judgment when factual

disputes existed about such a relationship. As previously

discussed, a special relationship is predicated on “entrustment,”

meaning whether the agent assumes additional responsibilities

beyond those attached to an ordinary reasonable agent possessing

normal competencies and skills. Kaercher, 155 P.3d at 441. The

Kaercher division didn’t list factors creating entrustment, but it

cited some cases in which courts have discussed factors relevant to

establishing entrustment. One such case identified the following

factors:

• exercising broad discretion to service the insured’s needs;

15
• counseling the insured concerning specialized insurance

coverage;

• holding oneself out as a highly skilled insurance expert,

coupled with the insured’s reliance upon their expertise;

and

• receiving compensation, above the customary premium

paid, for expert advice provided.

Parker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 630 N.E.2d 567, 570 (Ind.

Ct. App. 1994). Unlike the circumstances here, those courts found

entrustment when the insurance agent breached a professional

standard of conduct; the agent agreed to obtain a specific type of

coverage for the insured, but didn’t; or the agent received a

commission from the insured. See, e.g., Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v.

Pete’s Satire, Inc., 739 P.2d 239, 244 (Colo. 1987) (insurance agent

acted negligently by failing to procure a particular type of available

insurance coverage specifically requested by the insured and telling

the insured that he was covered); see also Bell v. O’Leary, 744 F.2d

1370, 1372 (8th Cir. 1984) (“When an insurance broker agrees to

obtain insurance for a client, with a view to earning a commission,

16
the broker becomes the client’s agent and owes a duty to the client

to act with reasonable care, skill, and diligence.”).

¶ 26 The Wysses claim that their relationship with Campbell had

the following “hallmarks” of entrustment:

• Campbell exercised broad discretion to serve the Wysses’

needs by contacting their realtor to conduct a walkthrough of

the property.

• Campbell had counseled the Wysses about their specific

insurance needs for eight years, including insurance for

classic cars and substantial past renovations.

• Because Campbell held himself out as a highly skilled

insurance expert, the Wysses never questioned their policy or

coverage.

• Campbell testified that he was a “kitchen table” agent who

purposefully cultivated a relationship with his clients that

went beyond the attention other agents would give their

clients.

• The Wysses and Campbells knew each other personally; the

Wysses’ daughter babysat for Campbell; and the families

17
attended several of the same social events, including Super

Bowl parties.

¶ 27 As noted, under Kaercher, holding oneself out as an insurance

expert doesn’t create a heightened standard. Likewise, familiarity

does not transform an ordinary agent-insured relationship into a

“special relationship” giving rise to enhanced obligations. Casual

social contact, even if friendly or frequent, doesn’t establish that

Campbell undertook responsibilities beyond those inherent in the

standard professional relationship.

¶ 28 The district court correctly determined that the question of a

special relationship between the Wysses and Campbell didn’t need

to be submitted to a jury because nothing in his interactions with

the Wysses suggested that Campbell had assumed responsibilities

sufficient to create additional obligations. See Karcher, 155 P.3d at

441 (Whether a special relationship has been formed turns on

whether the agent “assumes additional responsibilities beyond

those which attach to an ordinary, reasonable agent.”). When the

Wysses purchased their home, Campbell acted like a normal

insurance agent would — he visited the property to gather

information and generate an insurance quote; used software that

18
calculated the appropriate coverage limits and corresponding

premiums based on the property characteristics; and presented the

application to the Wysses, explaining the proposed coverage and

premiums. Because the district court correctly concluded, as a

matter of law that, even considered in the light most favorable to

the Wysses, insufficient evidence existed to demonstrate a special

relationship, the district court properly resolved the issue on

summary judgment.

B. The Court Did Not Err by Granting Farmers’ Summary
Judgment Motion

1. Standard of Review

¶ 29 As discussed above, we review a trial court’s entry of summary

judgment de novo. Gibbons, ¶ 11.

2. Analysis

¶ 30 The Wysses argue that (1) the district court erred by requiring

mutual mistake as a precondition to reform their insurance policy;

(2) the prevalence of underinsurance is an industry-wide issue and

Farmers cannot plead ignorance; and (3) the question whether

Farmers acted in bad faith was a factual question for the jury. We

address and reject each contention in turn.

19
a. Reformation of Policy and Mutual Mistake

¶ 31 The Wysses argue that the court erred by requiring mutual

mistake as a precondition for contract reformation. We disagree.

¶ 32 Reformation is an “equitable remedy by which a court will

modify a written agreement to reflect the actual intent of the

parties.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1535 (12th ed. 2024). Reformation

is generally permitted when (1) both parties made a mutual

mistake, or (2) one party made a unilateral mistake and the other

engaged in fraud or inequitable conduct. Poly Trucking, Inc. v.

Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 93 P.3d 561, 563 (Colo. App. 2004). If

a party’s unilateral mistake is not the result of fraud or inequitable

conduct but its own failure to use due diligence when reading the

contract before signing it, however, that party will be held to the

contract’s terms. Id. Thus, contract reformation “is appropriate

only when the instrument does not represent the true agreement of

the parties and the purpose of reformation is to give effect to the

parties’ actual intentions.” Md. Cas. Co. v. Buckeye Gas Prods. Co.,

797 P.2d 11, 13 (Colo. 1990). “The evidence must clearly and

unequivocally show that reformation is appropriate under the

circumstances.” Id.

20
¶ 33 After consulting with Campbell, the Wysses submitted a

signed application certifying that the information provided therein

was true and accurate. Farmers then issued the policy. Even

though the Wysses now assert that the policy contained mistakes

and inaccuracies, the application specifically indicated that the

policy did not provide guaranteed replacement cost coverage, the

total square footage of the home did not include the basement (even

if fully finished), the coverage amounts were estimates, and that the

Wysses bore responsibility for ensuring the accuracy of the

information submitted. The Wysses also stated that they did not

review the application with Campbell, nor did they examine the

policy before signing the contract. Our review of the record reflects

that Farmers issued the policy based on the information that

Campbell supplied and that the Wysses verified. The Wysses’

belated realization of an alleged error in the policy, standing alone,

does not support reformation.

b. Prevalence of Underinsurance

¶ 34 The Wysses argue that the prevalence of underinsurance,

based on the notion that insurance carriers are aware their policies

21
will not cover the cost to replace a home, is an industry-wide issue

and that Farmers cannot plead ignorance.

¶ 35 To the extent that the Wysses contend that this entitles them

to retroactively alter the terms of their policy, their argument

implicates a broader policy determination that we decline to

consider. See Town of Telluride, 3 P.3d at 38 (recognizing that it’s

“not up to the court[s] to make policy or to weigh policy”).

c. Bad Faith Claim

¶ 36 The Wysses argue that the court improperly concluded that

their claims were precluded because Farmers paid 100% of their

policy limits. We disagree.

¶ 37 An insurer must deal in good faith with its insured. Am. Fam.

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Allen, 102 P.3d 333, 342 (Colo. 2004). In assessing

a bad faith claim, the reasonableness of an insurer’s conduct is

measured objectively based on industry standards. Id. However,

an insurance company does not have a duty to “ensure complete

protection to the policyholder or to recommend higher policy limits,

but only . . . to exercise a reasonable duty of care.” Apodaca, 232

P.3d at 259.

22
¶ 38 Here, the Wysses argue that Farmers failed to reasonably

investigate its own internal practices and whether its own conduct

caused the Wysses’ underinsurance. The Wysses also maintain

that Farmers refused to extend ALE benefits beyond twenty-four

months, “despite a bulletin from Colorado legislators urging

insurers to provide an additional 36 months of benefits,” which

violated section 10-3-1104(1)(h)(XIV), C.R.S. 2025. We are not

persuaded.

¶ 39 First, the policy established a coverage limit and didn’t

guarantee full replacement cost. The policy’s declarations clarified

that Farmers’ obligations extended only to the stated limit. The

Wysses had the opportunity to review the policy on multiple

occasions but didn’t. They signed the relevant documents detailing

their policy limits and acknowledged that they retained copies of

those documents prior to the fire. Thus, the Wysses were on notice

of both the extent of and the limitations of the coverage they

purchased.

¶ 40 Likewise, the Wysses also had the opportunity to evaluate and

correct any discrepancy with the policy’s estimated square footage,

including the basement’s omission. The policy indicated that the

23
property’s total square footage was 1,724, the square footage was

an estimate and didn’t include the basement (even if fully finished),

and the Wysses should contact Farmers if they thought the

estimates were inaccurate. The policy also advised that the

estimate was a guide and didn’t guarantee that the Wysses’ home

could be rebuilt for the estimated amount. The policy also noted

that they could “insure [their] home for the estimated amount,” or

they could “select a different amount.”

¶ 41 Further, after the fire, Farmers paid the Wysses their full

policy limit within days of the total loss. Because Farmers promptly

tendered the maximum reconstruction cost available under

Coverage A of the policy and because the Wysses received the

coverage for which they contracted, they have no basis to conclude

that Farmers failed to honor its obligations.

¶ 42 Additionally, the Wysses’ contention that Farmers was

required to extend ALE coverage beyond the policy’s express twenty-

four-month limitation is unpersuasive. They rely on a legislative

bulletin to suggest that coverage should have been extended to

thirty-six months, but the bulletin was nonbinding and interpreted

24
a statutory amendment that became effective after the Marshall Fire

and after the Wysses submitted their claim.

¶ 43 The Wysses contend that Farmers violated section 10-4-

110.8(13)(c), C.R.S. 2025, and section 10-3-1104(1)(h)(XIV) by never

explaining its refusal to extend ALE coverage. Neither statute

applies. Section 10-4-110.8(13)(c) is triggered only when a

policyholder experiences delays in obtaining necessary

reconstruction permits and authorizes a policy amendment in that

limited circumstance. Because no evidence shows that the Wysses

encountered any permitting delay, the statute was never triggered.

Section 10-3-1104(1)(h)(XIV) likewise provides no support because

it applies only when an insurer denies a claim or rejects a

compromise settlement. Here, Farmers did neither; it paid the full

policy limits for the total loss and satisfied all obligations under the

policy. Its refusal to retroactively expand coverage after the fire was

not a claim denial but a decision to enforce the policy as written.

C. Costs Awarded to Farmers

¶ 44 Finally, the Wysses argue that the court erred by awarding

Farmers Vertex’s fees for the time it spent investigating and creating

25
an expert report detailing the cost to rebuild the Wysses’ home as it

existed prior to the fire. We disagree.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 45 We generally review an award of costs for an abuse of

discretion and will disturb the award only if it is manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Archer v. Farmer Bros. Co., 90

P.3d 228, 230 (Colo. 2004). Section 13-16-105, C.R.S. 2025,

provides that a prevailing defendant “shall have judgment to recover

his costs against the plaintiff.” Likewise, C.R.C.P. 54(d) provides

that, “[e]xcept when express provision therefor is made either in a

statute of this state or in these rules, reasonable costs shall be

allowed as of course to the prevailing party.”

¶ 46 A trial court must make sufficient findings so that, “when

considered together with the record, this court can determine the

basis for an award of costs.” Foster v. Phillips, 6 P.3d 791, 796

(Colo. App. 1999). While it is best practice to make express

findings, they may be implicit in the trial court’s ruling. Id. “When

the ruling, in the context of the record, is sufficient to determine its

basis, and the record is sufficient to support the award, a failure to

make express findings does not require reversal.” Id.

26
2. Analysis

¶ 47 To support its claim for costs as the prevailing party, Farmers

submitted a bill of costs. The bill of costs also included Vertex’s

invoice detailing the costs incurred during litigation. The Wysses

did not request a hearing to challenge Farmers’ factual assertions

or to present additional evidence. While the Wysses challenged the

validity of Vertex’s charges, their response argued that three of

Vertex’s experts’ charges were excessive and seemingly duplicative.

The Wysses maintained that while there was only one designated

expert, three additional individuals were included in the bill of costs

without explanation. But the Wysses did not provide evidence

supporting their claim, such as industry standards or a

contradicting expert showing how the work was excessive or

duplicative.

¶ 48 The trial court’s order contained only two sentences: “While

[the Wysses] objected to the reasonableness of costs associated with

one of [Farmers’] experts, [the Wysses] did not request a hearing on

the issue. The [c]ourt reviewed the material provided in support of

the Costs and finds that they are reasonable and therefore enters

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this award.” The court then attached Farmers’ proposed order

granting the full $65,956.21 award.

¶ 49 On appeal, the Wysses repeat the argument made to the

district court. Because Farmers’ submissions established the

reasonableness of the charges, the Wysses’ objections, which were

not supported by affidavits, expert testimony, or a request for an

evidentiary hearing, were insufficient to overcome the presumption

that Vertex’s portion of the costs was properly awarded.

¶ 50 Although it would have been better practice for the district

court to make specific findings, the record supports the award. See

Valentine v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 252 P.3d 1182, 1191

(Colo. App. 2011). Farmers submitted detailed invoices and

affidavits documenting its costs. Implicit in the court’s order is its

conclusion that all the costs were necessary and reasonable. See

id. We therefore discern no error with the court’s award.

III. Disposition

¶ 51 We affirm the judgment and the order.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.

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