Peo v. Lee

24CA1199 Peo v Lee 01-29-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1199
El Paso County District Court No. 17CR2427
Honorable Erin Sokol, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Teral Stafin Lee,

Defendant-Appellee.

SENTENCE REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
Grove and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 29, 2026

Michael J. Allen, District Attorney, Doyle Baker, Senior Deputy District
Attorney, Ben Hostetter, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Tanya A. Karimi,
Deputy District Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Suzan Trinh Almony, Alternate Defense Counsel, Broomfield, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellee
¶1 The People appeal the district court’s decision to resentence

Teral Stafin Lee to a shorter term than mandated by Colorado’s

habitual criminal statute (HCS). See § 18-1.3-801(1.5), C.R.S.

2025. The court resentenced Lee after finding his forty-eight-year

sentence unconstitutionally disproportionate. On appeal, the

People contend that the court erroneously conducted its

abbreviated and extended proportionality reviews. We reverse the

sentence because we agree the court erroneously conducted its

abbreviated proportionality review.

I. Background

¶2 In April 2017, Lee shot and killed A.S., who was attempting to

recover his girlfriend’s belongings from Lee’s car. Lee was charged

with, among other crimes, second degree murder and tampering

with evidence, as well as two habitual criminal counts.

¶3 A jury found Lee guilty of second degree murder (heat of

passion), a class 3 felony, and tampering with evidence, a class 6

felony. At the habitual criminal proceeding, the prosecution proved

1
beyond a reasonable doubt that Lee satisfied the elements of the

HCS, section 18-1.3-801(1.5)1:

(1) Lee was convicted of a qualifying triggering offense —

second degree murder (heat of passion), a class 3 felony;

(2) Lee had been previously convicted of two qualifying

predicate offenses — robbery, a class 4 felony, and

possession of a controlled substance, a class 6 felony at

the time; and

(3) Lee’s predicate convictions — robbery in 2008 and

possession in 2009 — occurred within ten years of his

commission of second degree murder (heat of passion) in

2017.

Additionally, Lee’s predicate conviction for possession was still

classified as a felony when he committed second degree murder

(heat of passion) in 2017. See § 18-1.3-801(3).

1 Under section 18-1.3-801(1.5), C.R.S. 2025, any person convicted

of a class 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 felony who, within ten years of the
commission of the offense, has been convicted of two other felonies
separately brought and tried and arising out of distinct and
separate criminal episodes, either in this state or elsewhere, is
adjudged a habitual criminal and must be sentenced to the custody
of the Department of Corrections for a term three times the
maximum of the triggering offense’s presumptive range.

2
¶4 As mandated by the HCS, the district court imposed a

controlling prison sentence of forty-eight years for the second

degree murder (heat of passion) conviction, with 544 days of credit

for time served.2 The court imposed this sentence after conducting

an abbreviated proportionality review and finding the sentence

constitutional. Lee appealed his sentence, among other things.

¶5 While Lee’s appeal was pending, the supreme court announced

Wells-Yates v. People, 2019 CO 90M (Wells-Yates I). A division of

this court subsequently affirmed Lee’s convictions but remanded

the case to the district court with instructions to conduct an

abbreviated proportionality review consistent with Wells-Yates I.

People v. Lee, (Colo. App. No. 19CA0024, Oct. 28, 2021) (not

published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). Specifically, the division

remanded for three reasons: (1) “the district court determined that

Lee’s predicate offense of possession of a schedule II controlled

2 The base presumptive range for a class 3 felony is four to twelve

years. See § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A), C.R.S. 2025. But second degree
murder (heat of passion) is a “crime of violence, as defined in
section 18-1.3-406,” so “the maximum sentence in the presumptive
range is increased by four years.” § 18-1.3-401(10)(a), (b)(XII).
Thus, the maximum of the presumptive range for Lee’s triggering
offense of second degree murder (heat of passion) is sixteen years,
and three times the maximum yields forty-eight years.

3
substance was grave and serious,” a finding inconsistent with the

holding in Wells-Yates I; (2) “there is no evidence in the record that

the district court considered relevant statutory amendments as

evidence of whether the offenses were grave or serious”; and (3) “it

is unclear from the record the extent to which the district court

analyzed the harshness of Lee’s sentence.” Id. at ¶¶ 48-50.

¶6 On remand, the district court conducted an abbreviated

proportionality review, finding that Lee’s forty-eight-year sentence

raised an inference of gross disproportionality. As relevant here,

the district court concluded:

[T]he Court must find here that there is an
inference of gross disproportionality in this
sentence. The sentence, 48 years under the
little habitual offender statute, yet [the HCS]
depends on finding that the Defendant
committed two felonies within ten years prior
to the triggering offense. And the Defendant’s
two prior felonies were committed almost ten
years prior to the murder 2 (heat of passion)
offense. And convictions for possession of a
controlled substance are no longer grave and
serious. And one of the prior felonies is now
classified merely as a drug misdemeanor and it
is not grave and serious. If the Defendant
were charged and sentenced . . . on his murder
2 (heat of passion) today, he would not be
eligible to be classified as a habitual criminal
and his maximum sentence would be 32 years.
And if today the Defendant were not charged

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as a habitual criminal, he may be parole
eligible more likely during his lifetime.

And given this, the Court finds the existence of
an inference the 48-year sentence is overly
harsh and grossly disproportionate. And
having made this finding, I do find it is
necessary to conduct an extended
proportionality review at this time.

The district court then conducted an extended proportionality

review, concluding that the forty-eight-year sentence was grossly

disproportionate and ultimately resentencing Lee to twenty-one

years and nine months.

¶7 The People now appeal.

II. Jurisdiction

¶8 As an initial matter, Lee contends that we lack subject matter

jurisdiction to review the People’s appeal under section

16-12-102(1), C.R.S. 2025, because the district court’s

proportionality review involved factual questions rather than legal

questions and the People failed to allege egregious or injurious

error. We disagree.

¶9 Section 16-12-102(1) authorizes the prosecution to “appeal any

decision of a court in a criminal case upon any question of law.”

“Whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate in violation of the

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Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article II, section

20 of the Colorado Constitution is a question of law, not a

sentencing decision requiring deference to the trial court.”

Wells-Yates I, ¶ 35; People v. McRae, 2019 CO 91, ¶ 11.

Consequently, a division of this court has reviewed a prosecutorial

appeal challenging a district court’s proportionality review.

People v. Gaskins, 923 P.2d 292, 293-94 (Colo. App. 1996).

¶ 10 Lee correctly asserts that proportionality review entails

analyzing facts and circumstances surrounding the triggering and

predicate offenses, Wells-Yates I, ¶ 75, but our supreme court has

held that this analysis is a legal question that appellate courts

review de novo. Id. at ¶ 35; McRae, ¶ 11. We may, in our

discretion, remand a case for the district court to conduct a

proportionality review. People v. Gaskins, 825 P.2d 30, 31 (Colo.

1992), abrogated on other grounds by, Wells-Yates I, ¶¶ 16-17. But

if the analysis — as in this case — does not require an inquiry into

facts outside the appellate record, then we are “as well positioned as

a trial court to conduct a proportionality review.” People v. Loris,

2018 COA 101, ¶ 10 (citation omitted).

6
¶ 11 Here, the People challenge the district court’s finding of gross

disproportionality, contending that the court misapplied the law

and reached erroneous legal conclusions. Because those challenges

involve questions of law, the People’s appeal is proper under section

16-12-102(1).

¶ 12 We are not persuaded otherwise by Lee’s argument that the

People must allege egregious or injurious error as an additional

requirement under section 16-12-102(1). That statute contains no

such requirement. And we can find no case law imposing such a

requirement as a jurisdictional prerequisite. While some older

cases express disfavor toward prosecutorial appeals lacking

egregious or injurious error, none hold that such a showing is

jurisdictionally required. See, e.g., People v. Kirkland, 483 P.2d

1349, 1350 (Colo. 1971) (expressing disfavor toward the district

attorney’s “sufficiency of the evidence” appeal as a “completely

non-productive exercise” but acknowledging that the issue “as

postured here involves a question of law, and as such, the district

attorney is given authority to appeal”); People v. Samora, 532 P.2d

946, 948 (Colo. 1975) (discouraging prosecutorial appeals

challenging sufficiency of the evidence while acknowledging that

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“section 16-12-102 . . . gives the district attorney the right to appeal

a judgment of a trial court in a criminal case upon any question of

law”); People v. Tharp, 746 P.2d 1337, 1339 (Colo. 1987) (expressing

disfavor toward prosecutorial appeals “with little precedential value”

and, alternatively, no “egregious errors,” but dismissing the appeal

because it “merely raises factual and evidentiary questions well

within the discretion of the district court”). Indeed, our supreme

court has allowed prosecutorial appeals involving legal issues

without requiring such a showing. See, e.g., Hunsaker v. People,

2015 CO 46, ¶ 26 (stating only that appeals under section

16-12-102(1) are limited to purely legal questions).

¶ 13 Egregious or injurious error is therefore not a jurisdictional

requirement for prosecutorial appeals under section 16-12-102(1).

Even if it were, the district court’s ruling prejudiced the People by

substantially reducing Lee’s sentence. Accordingly, we have subject

matter jurisdiction to consider the People’s appeal.

III. Proportionality Review

¶ 14 The People argue the district court’s finding of gross

disproportionality was improper because the court erroneously

conducted both the abbreviated and extended proportionality

8
reviews. As to the abbreviated proportionality review, the People

contend that the district court (1) “misapplied the law by failing to

adequately examine the crimes in combination,” in violation of

People v. Wells-Yates, 2023 COA 120 (Wells-Yates II); (2) “improperly

applied amendatory sentencing changes retroactively,” in violation

of People v. McRae, 2019 CO 91; and (3) wrongly evaluated Lee’s

“age with respect to parole.” As to the extended proportionality

review, the People contend that the district court “refused to

consider the seriousness of different offenses in comparing different

crimes.”

¶ 15 Because we agree with the first contention, we decline to

address the remaining contentions. We begin by outlining the

proportionality framework, focusing on the abbreviated

proportionality review. We then apply the abbreviated

proportionality review to Lee’s sentence.

A. Standard of Review and Governing Law

¶ 16 We review a district court’s proportionality determination de

novo because “[w]hether a sentence is grossly disproportionate . . .

is a question of law.” Wells-Yates I, ¶ 35.

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¶ 17 The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and

article II, section 20 of the Colorado Constitution prohibit the

imposition of a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the

severity of the crime committed. Wells-Yates I, ¶¶ 7, 10. But this

proscription “does not require strict proportionality between crime

and sentence.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)

(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)

(citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983)); see Close v.

People, 48 P.3d 528, 536 (Colo. 2002), abrogated on other grounds

by, Wells-Yates I, ¶¶ 16-17. Rather, it forbids only extreme

sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime. Close,

48 P.3d at 536.

¶ 18 Colorado courts conduct a two-step analysis when considering

a proportionality challenge to a habitual criminal sentence.

Wells-Yates I, ¶ 10. In step one — the abbreviated proportionality

review — the court compares the gravity and seriousness of the

triggering and predicate offenses with the harshness of the penalty.

Id. at ¶¶ 7-14. In step two — the extended proportionality review —

the court compares the challenged sentence to sentences for other

crimes in the same jurisdiction and the same crime in other

10
jurisdictions. Id. at ¶¶ 15-17. The court should proceed to step two

only in the “rare situation” where the “abbreviated proportionality

review gives rise to an inference of gross disproportionality.” Id. at

¶ 15.

¶ 19 The abbreviated proportionality review of a habitual criminal

sentence entails “two subparts”: (1) an analysis of “the gravity or

seriousness of all the offenses in question — the triggering offense

and the predicate offenses”; and (2) an analysis of “the harshness of

the sentence imposed on the triggering offense.” Id. at ¶ 23.

¶ 20 For subpart one, a court must first determine whether each

offense is regarded as “per se” grave or serious. Id. at ¶ 13. If the

offense is per se grave or serious, “the gravity or seriousness

analysis ends,” McRae, ¶ 17, meaning the district court “may skip

the first subpart of [the abbreviated proportionality review] — the

determination regarding the gravity or seriousness of the crimes —

and ‘proceed directly to the second subpart’ of that step — the

assessment related to the harshness of the penalty.” Wells-Yates I,

¶ 13 (citation omitted).

¶ 21 If the offense is not per se grave or serious, the court must

make “an individualized determination” that “turn[s] on the facts

11
and circumstances surrounding the specific crime committed.” Id.

at ¶ 69. To determine if an offense is grave or serious, courts

assess “the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society” and

“the culpability of the offender” by considering the following

nonexhaustive factors:

“[t]he absolute magnitude of the crime” . . . ;
whether the crime is a lesser-included offense
or the greater-inclusive offense; whether the
crime involves a completed act or an attempt
to commit an act; and whether the defendant
was a principal or an accessory after the fact
in the criminal episode.

Id. at ¶ 12 (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 292-93). Motive and the

defendant’s mental state — i.e., whether the defendant committed

the act negligently, recklessly, knowingly, intentionally, or

maliciously — are relevant to analyzing culpability. Id.

¶ 22 When evaluating the gravity or seriousness of a defendant’s

offenses, courts should consider relevant legislative amendments

enacted after the date of the offenses, even if they do not apply

retroactively, because these amendments, while not dispositive, are

“the best evidence of our evolving standards of decency.”

Wells-Yates I, ¶ 49.

12
¶ 23 For subpart two, the court evaluates the harshness of the

penalty imposed for the triggering offense, which includes

consideration of parole eligibility. Wells-Yates I, ¶ 14. “[W]hether a

sentence is parole eligible is relevant during an abbreviated

proportionality review because parole can reduce the actual period

of confinement and render the penalty less harsh.” Id. When

considering the harshness of the penalty, “a great deal of deference

is due to legislative determinations regarding sentencing.” People v.

Deroulet, 48 P.3d 520, 523 (Colo. 2002), abrogated on other grounds

by Wells-Yates I, ¶¶ 16-17. “[I]n almost every case, the abbreviated

proportionality review will result in a finding that the sentence is

constitutionally proportionate, thereby preserving the primacy of

the General Assembly in crafting sentencing schemes.” Id. at 526;

see Wells-Yates I, ¶ 21.

B. Abbreviated Proportionality Review

¶ 24 Against this backdrop, we examine de novo the district court’s

abbreviated proportionality review of Lee’s sentence. We disagree

with the district court’s legal conclusion that Lee’s forty-eight-year

sentence raises an inference of gross disproportionality. In doing

so, we emphasize that this is not one of those rare cases in which

13
the legislature’s habitual criminal sentencing determination raises

such an inference. See Wells-Yates I, ¶ 21.

1. Gravity or Seriousness of Offenses

¶ 25 Lee’s offenses include the triggering offense of second degree

murder (heat of passion) and the predicate offenses of robbery and

possession of a controlled substance. We address the gravity or

seriousness of each in turn.

a. Triggering Offense

¶ 26 The district court and the previous division concluded — and

the parties agree — that Lee’s 2017 conviction for second degree

murder (heat of passion) is per se grave and serious. Lee, No.

19CA0024, slip op. at ¶ 52. This conclusion is supported by case

law holding that “second degree murder” is per se grave and serious

because it “always involves knowing conduct and grave harm — the

death of a person.” People v. Crawley, 2024 COA 49, ¶ 21. That

Lee committed second degree murder in the heat of passion does

not change this conclusion because “heat of passion is a sentence

mitigating factor” that does not reduce Lee’s mental state from

knowing or negate the grave harm caused to his victim and society.

People v. Darbe, 62 P.3d 1006, 1015 (Colo. App. 2002). Because we

14
agree with the division and the district court that Lee’s 2017

conviction for second degree murder (heat of passion) is per se

grave and serious, we need not analyze the facts and circumstances

surrounding its commission. McRae, ¶ 17.

b. Predicate Offenses

¶ 27 The district court and the previous division also concluded —

and the parties agree — that Lee’s 2008 conviction for robbery is

per se grave and serious. Lee, No. 19CA0024, slip op. at ¶ 41. And

Colorado law is clear that “[a] conviction for robbery is per se grave

or serious because it will always involve knowing conduct and grave

harm (or the threat of grave harm) to the victim or society (or both).”

Wells-Yates I, ¶ 64. Because robbery is per se grave and serious,

here too, we need not analyze the facts and circumstances

surrounding its commission.

¶ 28 Lee’s 2009 conviction for possession of a controlled substance

requires “an individualized determination” because mere possession

of narcotics is not per se grave or serious. Id. at ¶ 69. Applying the

nonexhaustive factors, we agree with the district court that the

crime is not grave or serious. The facts surrounding this crime

were that Lee unlawfully possessed four and a half Oxycodone pills.

15
The staleness of this eight-year-old offense lessens his “history of

felony recidivism.” Id. at ¶ 23. Lee acted knowingly as the principal

to complete this offense, but both the resulting harm and absolute

magnitude of his offense were minimal. As the district court noted,

the offense “did not even involve any allegation of distribution.”

¶ 29 Additionally, Lee’s possession offense was a class 6 felony

when committed, but two subsequent legislative amendments

suggest “evolving standards of decency.” Id. at ¶ 46 (quoting

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 58 (2010)). First, in 2013, the

legislature amended the HCS so that small possession convictions,

like Lee’s, could no longer trigger habitual sentencing under

section 18-1.3-801(2) of the HCS.3 See Ch. 333, sec. 36,

§ 18-1.3-801(2)(b), 2013 Colo. Sess. Laws 1928. Second, in 2019,

the legislature prospectively reclassified small possession offenses

such that Lee’s offense would be a level 1 drug misdemeanor if

3 In 2013, the legislature replaced class-based drug felonies with a

drug-level classification scheme. See Ch. 333, sec. 4,
§ 18-1.3-401.5, 2013 Colo. Sess. Laws 1903-04. Under that
scheme, offenses that were formerly class 6 drug felonies were
converted into level 4 drug felonies, the least serious category of
drug felonies.

16
committed today. See Ch. 291, sec. 1, § 18-18-403.5(2)(c), 2019

Colo. Sess. Laws 2676.

¶ 30 To be clear, Lee still qualifies as a habitual criminal under

section 18-1.3-801(1.5) of the HCS, but these amendments are

“objective indicia of the evolving standards of decency” relevant “to

determin[ing] the gravity or seriousness” of an offense. Wells-Yates,

¶ 47. Given these legislative changes and the facts surrounding

Lee’s possession conviction, we conclude this offense was not grave

or serious.

2. Harshness of Penalty

¶ 31 Having found the triggering offense and one predicate offense

to be per se grave and serious and one predicate offense not to be

grave or serious, we must now consider the harshness of the

forty-eight-year sentence imposed for the triggering offense of

second degree murder. See Wells-Yates I, ¶ 23. As part of this

analysis, we must consider Lee’s parole eligibility. Id.

¶ 32 Lee will be eligible for parole after serving seventy-five percent

of his sentence, see § 17-22.5-403(2.5)(a), C.R.S. 2025, potentially

reducing his actual period of confinement to thirty-six years. Even

so, considering the gravity of the second degree murder, in

17
combination with his predicate offenses, we cannot conclude that

this is one of the rare cases in which the legislature’s habitual

criminal sentencing determination raises an inference of gross

disproportionality. See Wells-Yates, ¶ 21.

¶ 33 In reaching this conclusion, we find Wells-Yates II persuasive.

In Wells-Yates II, the defendant received eight habitual sentences

for eight triggering offenses committed in 2012 pursuant to section

18-1.3-801(2) of the HCS. Wells-Yates II, ¶¶ 44-52. Each sentence

rested upon the same three predicate convictions: (1) possession

with intent to distribute methamphetamine in 1996 (class 3 felony);

(2) possession of less than four grams of methamphetamine in 1997

(class 4 felony); and (3) possession of more than four grams of

methamphetamine in 1999 (class 4 felony). Id. at ¶ 37. In later

years, these predicates were subject to a “sea change in our General

Assembly’s philosophy regarding the handling of drug offenses.” Id.

at ¶ 39 (citation omitted). Under current law, the 1996 offense

would be a level 3 drug felony, the 1997 offense a level 1 drug

misdemeanor, and the 1999 offense a level 4 drug felony.

Wells-Yates I, ¶ 42; Wells-Yates II, ¶ 39; see also Thomas v. People,

2021 CO 84, ¶ 63 (holding that “level 4 drug felonies qualify as

18
neither triggering offenses nor predicate offenses for habitual

criminal purposes”).

¶ 34 Still, the division upheld the habitual sentences for seven of

the triggering offenses, including a forty-eight-year sentence for

second degree burglary. After concluding that second degree

burglary was grave and serious, albeit not per se, the division

reasoned:

We acknowledge that this sentence too was
quadrupled based on predicate offenses we
have deemed not especially grave or serious,
including two that would no longer qualify as
predicate offenses under the [HCS]. . . .
Considering the facts and circumstances
surrounding the burglary offense, in
combination with the predicate offenses, we
cannot conclude that this is one of those rare
situations in which the legislature’s habitual
criminal sentencing determination raises an
inference of gross disproportionality.

Wells-Yates II, ¶ 66.

¶ 35 Although Wells-Yates II involved a different provision in the

HCS and a greater number of predicate offenses than in this case, it

remains instructive. In Wells-Yates II, the defendant received a

forty-eight-year sentence for second degree burglary — an offense

that is not per se grave or serious — with three predicate offenses

19
that were not especially grave or serious, including two that would

no longer qualify as predicate offenses under the HCS. By

comparison, Lee received the same sentence for second degree

murder (heat of passion) — an offense that is per se grave and

serious — with one predicate offense that was per se grave and

serious and another predicate offense that was neither grave nor

serious and would no longer qualify as a predicate offense under

the HCS. Given that a forty-eight-year sentence for second degree

burglary passed constitutional muster, we conclude that a

forty-eight-year sentence for the per se grave and serious offense of

second degree murder (heat of passion) is constitutionally

proportionate.

¶ 36 Furthermore, the weight of authority demonstrates that Lee’s

forty-eight-year sentence for second degree murder (heat of passion)

does not raise an inference of gross disproportionality under the

abbreviated proportionality review. See Crawley, ¶¶ 24-26 (a

forty-eight-year sentence for second degree murder, a class 2 felony,

with no prior felonies, did not raise an inference of gross

disproportionality); People v. Strock, 252 P.3d 1148, 1158-59 (Colo.

App. 2010) (a forty-eight-year sentence under the HCS for vehicular

20
homicide while driving under the influence did not raise an

inference of gross disproportionality even though two of four

predicate offenses were not grave or serious), overruled on other

grounds by, People v. Kennedy, 2025 CO 63; People v. Reese,

155 P.3d 477, 480 (Colo. App. 2006) (a forty-eight-year sentence

under the HCS for second degree burglary did not raise an inference

of gross disproportionality even though three of five predicate

offenses were not grave or serious); People v. Martinez, 83 P.3d

1174, 1180-81 (Colo. App. 2003) (a forty-eight-year sentence under

the HCS for solicitation for child prostitution did not raise an

inference of disproportionality when three of the four predicate

offenses were grave or serious).

¶ 37 Where, as here, the “triggering crime in a habitual criminal

case is grave and serious, generally only an abbreviated

proportionality review is required.” Strock, 252 P.3d at 1158. Lee’s

forty-eight-year sentence for the second degree murder (heat of

passion) conviction, when combined with his two predicate offenses

of robbery and possession, did not raise an inference of gross

disproportionality given the gravity and seriousness of this

triggering offense.

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IV. Disposition

¶ 38 The sentence is reversed. The case is remanded for the

district court to reinstate the forty-eight-year sentence.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

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