Marriage of Bates

24CA1628 Marriage of Bates 01-22-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1628
Arapahoe County District Court No. 19DR30703
Honorable Michelle Jones, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Silke Bates,

Appellee,

and

Kevin Bates,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
J. Jones and Grove, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 22, 2026

Anne Whalen Gill, LLC, Anne Whalen Gill, Castle Rock, Colorado, for Appellee

Belzer Law, Aaron B. Belzer, Ashlee N. Hoffmann, Boulder, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case involving Kevin Bates

(husband) and Silke Bates (wife), husband appeals the property

distribution entered on remand from In re Marriage of Bates, (Colo.

App. No. 22CA0086, Dec. 15, 2022) (not published pursuant to

C.A.R. 35(e)) (Bates I). We affirm the judgment.

I. Relevant Facts

¶2 The parties married in 2005 and have two children, a son born

in 2005 and a daughter born in 2008.

¶3 In 2021, the district court dissolved the marriage and entered

permanent orders. At that time, husband had retired and was

receiving a monthly pension of $4,528. The parties agreed that

41% of the pension was marital property to be split equally. The

premarital portion, valued at $633,136, was set aside to husband

as his separate property. The court valued the marital portion of

husband’s 401(k) at $976,069 and the marital residence at

$550,000.

¶4 The district court ordered (1) wife to receive $921 per month

from husband’s monthly pension payment for a total monthly

income of $2,863; (2) the 401(k) to be divided 55% to husband and

45% to wife; (3) the marital residence and its mortgage to be

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allocated to wife; (4) a disproportionate property distribution

favoring wife; (5) equal parenting time for their daughter, then

nearly thirteen years old; and (6) their then sixteen-year-old son to

remain with husband. The court explained the unequal property

distribution by emphasizing wife’s financial needs and husband’s

substantial separate property, including $633,136 of his pension.

¶5 Husband appealed that decision. He contended that the

district court improperly double-counted his separate property,

once by dividing the marital portion of his pension and again by

factoring it into the overall property distribution. A division of this

court agreed, reversed the entire property distribution, and

remanded to the district court for reconsideration of that issue.

¶6 In 2024, the district court held a two-day hearing. The court

first made findings on the parties’ present economic circumstances,

including the following:

• Husband, age sixty-two, continued to receive the same

monthly pension amount and would soon qualify for Social

Security benefits.

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• Wife, nearly fifty-nine, had slightly increased her

employment earnings, and with her share of husband’s

pension, was outearning him by $500 per month.

• Wife “expect[ed] to retire in the near future,” at which time

her employment income would be replaced by a “smaller

amount” of Public Employees’ Retirement Association

(PERA) benefits. In addition, she would receive her $921

monthly share of husband’s pension, a modest monthly

pension from Germany, plus half of husband’s forthcoming

Social Security benefits.

• Once wife retired and husband began receiving Social

Security benefits, his combined retirement income would

surpass hers.

• Husband had $370,062 in total separate property; wife had

none.

• After the 2021 permanent orders, the parties continued

paying marital expenses from the 401(k), which had

dropped to $688,819 by year’s end, largely because their

combined monthly expenses exceeded their incomes.

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Husband held a $262,000 separate property interest in the

account.

• The marital residence had appreciated $116,000 since the

divorce decree. Wife used funds from a Vanguard account,

which was awarded to her in the original permanent orders,

to pay off the mortgage.

• The following table summarizes the district court’s overall

property distribution:

Asset Wife’s Award Husband’s Award Husband’s
Separate Property
Marital Residence $550,000
Vehicles $23,000 $30,700
Bank Accounts $14,717 $11,117
Investment $297,951 $147,573 $89,136
Accounts
Husband’s 401(k) $688,819 $262,000
Pension and $71,028 $174,364 $10,926
Retirement
Accounts
Wife’s Survivor $215,062
Benefit for
Husband’s
Pension
Misc. $1,000 $1,248 $8,000
Debts ($16,703) ($16,703)
TOTAL $1,156,055 $1,037,118 $370,062

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In the end, wife received approximately 53% of the marital estate

and husband 47%.

¶7 Husband moved for post-trial relief, which the district court

denied.

¶8 Husband appeals, principally contending that the property

distribution was inequitable because he ended up with the

diminished 401(k) while wife received the appreciated marital

residence.

II. Property Distribution

A. Standard of Review

¶9 A district court has great latitude in making an equitable

property distribution based on the facts and circumstances of each

case, and we will not disturb its decision unless it has abused its

discretion. See § 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2025; In re Marriage of

Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 19. A court abuses its discretion when

its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or

when it misapplies the law. In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA

42M, ¶ 28.

¶ 10 We review questions of law de novo. See id.

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B. Discussion

1. Present Economic Circumstances

¶ 11 To begin, husband argues that the property distribution was

unfair because the district court erred in assessing the parties’

present economic circumstances on remand. We disagree.

¶ 12 The date of the dissolution decree fixes both character and

value of property, and those determinations are unaffected by later

depreciation, appreciation, or reclassification. See In re Marriage of

Wells, 850 P.2d 694, 697 n.6 (Colo. 1993). But the court on

remand must reallocate the marital estate based on the parties’

current economic circumstances under section 14-10-113(1)(c) and

evidence from the previous hearing and the hearing on remand.

See Wells, 850 P.2d at 697 n.6; see also In re Marriage of Joel, 2012

COA 128, ¶ 28 (“[W]hen deciding how to equitably distribute

property, the [district] court must consider the parties’ economic

circumstances at the time property is to be distributed, the court

remains obligated to value property as of the date of the decree.”); In

re Marriage of Lee, 781 P.2d 102, 104 (Colo. App. 1989) (a district

court on remand may exercise discretion in determining whether

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additional evidence is necessary or whether it may rely on evidence

from the prior hearing).

¶ 13 Here, the district court heard testimony about the parties’

current and prospective retirement income. Wife, a school bus

driver, testified that she was actively contemplating retirement.

Although not sure about the exact timing, she was clear that

retirement was nearing, saying that it might occur “soon[er] or

later,” depending on the outcome of the hearing and what assets

she would be awarded. Both parties acknowledged that wife would

receive $561 per month from her German pension, roughly $830

per month in PERA benefits if she retired at sixty-five, and half the

amount of husband’s monthly Social Security payment.

¶ 14 As for husband, an expert at the original permanent orders

hearing said that he would surely receive Social Security benefits.

At the remand hearing, wife testified that he could begin collecting

them now. And husband conceded that he would eventually draw

them. Husband was also receiving retirement income from his past

employment at Raytheon in the total amount of $4,527 monthly,

which was divided between him ($3,606) and wife ($921).

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¶ 15 In assessing the parties’ present economic circumstances, the

district court found that while wife currently earns $500 more per

month than husband, her income will be reduced significantly in

retirement. By contrast, the combination of husband’s pension and

future Social Security benefits will ultimately surpass wife’s income.

¶ 16 Husband insists that the district court improperly speculated

about the future instead of focusing solely on the parties’ present

economic reality. The court, however, did not engage in conjecture.

It merely relied on the evidence and argument the parties

presented. And considering likely retirement income as part of the

parties’ economic circumstances is appropriate. See § 14-10-

113(1)(c) (in making distribution of marital property the court shall

consider the “economic circumstances of each spouse at the time of

the division of property is to become effective”); see also In re

Marriage of Morehouse, 121 P.3d 264, 266 (Colo. App. 2005)

(district court can consider likely Social Security benefits as part of

the parties’ relevant economic circumstance and can justify an

uneven property distribution).

¶ 17 Husband also argues that the district court erred by

considering his potential income without accounting for his

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projected expenses. But he offers no legal analysis, so we decline to

address the issue. See In re Marriage of Zander, 2019 COA 149,

¶ 27 (an appellate court may decline to consider an argument not

supported by legal authority or any meaningful legal analysis),

aff’d, 2021 CO 12; see also Vallagio at Inverness Residential Condo.

Ass’n v. Metro. Homes, Inc., 2017 CO 69, ¶ 40 (an appellate court

will “decline to assume the mantle” when parties offer no

supporting arguments for their claims). Insofar as husband

expands his argument in the reply brief, we do not address those

arguments. See In re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 31.

¶ 18 Next, husband challenges the district court’s findings that he

was in a stronger financial position than wife and that he

excessively spent funds between the date of final orders and the

hearing on remand.

¶ 19 The record shows that husband had a steady pension, could

collect Social Security in the near future, and held $370,062 in total

separate property. Wife, on the other hand, testified that her

income fluctuated and often did not meet her expenses, forcing her

to use money from her investment accounts she had been awarded

in the original permanent orders.

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¶ 20 The record also reveals that husband’s higher monthly

expenses were due in part to his choice to enroll the children in

private parochial school and pay the associated tuition.1 Wife

reported that her income was insufficient to contribute toward the

children’s tuition. Husband testified that wife had no interest in

contributing toward tuition and that even if wife had significant

financial resources she would never help. At times, the tuition

would exceed husband’s income. To bridge that gap, husband drew

down the marital portion of the 401(k) to cover the shortfall, thereby

preserving his separate property portion of the 401(k).

¶ 21 Wife admitted that around $45,000 of the 401(k) was

withdrawn to cover her expenses in late 2021 but maintained that

she did not have control over the account and never personally

1 Husband repeatedly characterizes the private school tuition

payments as “court ordered.” But the court’s order is not so broad.
At the permanent orders hearing, wife testified she could not afford
to pay for private tuition, but father indicated that continuing the
children’s private school education was vital to him and the
children and that he was willing to make the full amount of those
payments. The permanent orders did not require the children to
continue to attend private schools, but noted that if they did, father
would be responsible for payment of their tuition. Despite his
economic limitations, father has continued to pay for the private
school tuition.

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“received a penny” from it. She added that she lived “frugally.”

Moreover, husband incurred substantial litigation expenses,

spending $129,087 in attorney fees, anticipating another $15,000

from the remand hearing, and reporting that he spent $63,280 in

fees related to the Bates I appeal.

¶ 22 As a consequence of father’s spending on attorney fees, tuition

payments, and personal expenses, which totaled approximately

$250,000, and wife’s $45,000 in personal expenses, the marital

value of the 401(k) had been reduced by approximately $300,000

between the entry of final orders and the remand hearing.

¶ 23 Because the record supports the district court’s findings, we

will not disturb them. See Van Gundy v. Van Gundy, 2012 COA

194, ¶ 12 (the appellate court generally reviews the district court’s

factual findings for clear error, meaning that we will not disturb

them if they are supported by the record). To the extent that

husband asks us to reweigh the evidence, we decline. See In re

Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 49 (it is for the district court

to determine witness credibility and the weight, probative force, and

sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn therefrom); In re Marriage of Amich, 192

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P.3d 422, 424 (Colo. App. 2007) (the district court can believe all,

part, or none of a witness’s testimony).

¶ 24 Husband’s claim that the district court penalized him for

paying for parochial school in violation of his First Amendment

rights is unpreserved. Because he never raised this issue below

and the court did not rule on it, we decline to address it. See In re

Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 38 (declining to review as

unpreserved an issue that was never raised before or decided by the

district court); see also In re Marriage of Ensminger, 209 P.3d 1163,

1167 (Colo. App. 2008) (an issue not preserved may not be raised

for the first time on appeal).

2. Marital Residence

¶ 25 Husband contends that the district court improperly relied on

the original award of the marital residence to wife rather than

reevaluating it in light of the parties’ present economic

circumstances. We are not persuaded.

¶ 26 In Bates I, the division told the district court to reconsider its

allocation of the marital residence to wife. It specifically instructed

the court to assess the parties’ current economic circumstances,

including whether it would be desirable to allocate the residence to

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the parent with whom the children primarily live. See § 14-10-

113(1)(c).

¶ 27 On remand, the district court did exactly that. The court

found that there was no primary parent because the son was

already an adult and the daughter was sharing equal time with

both parties. The court also found, with record support, that wife

had (1) continued to live in the residence since the original

permanent orders; (2) maintained the property and made it into her

home; and (3) paid off the mortgage with her own funds, triggering

tax consequences. Given these circumstances, the court

determined that it would be unjust to disturb the original award.

¶ 28 On this record, we cannot say that the district court’s decision

was manifestly unreasonable or unfair. See Collins, ¶ 19.

¶ 29 Nor are we persuaded by husband’s related argument that the

district court improperly speculated that it would have awarded the

residence to wife in the original permanent orders. The court

clearly understood that it could have awarded the residence to

either party.

¶ 30 Finally, given our earlier disposition, we reject husband’s

assertion that the district court erred by relying on its finding that

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he would be in a stronger financial position when awarding the

marital residence.

3. Overall Property Distribution

¶ 31 Husband argues the district court’s overall property

distribution was inequitable because he was left with the

diminished 401(k) while wife received the marital residence that had

increased in value. We discern no error.

¶ 32 Initially, we note that we do not look at particular assets in

isolation. Instead, the critical question is whether the overall

property distribution was equitable. See In re Marriage of Hunt, 909

P.2d 525, 537-38 (Colo. 1995) (an allocation of pension benefits is

only a part of the district court’s equitable distribution of the overall

marital property, and an appellate court should not disturb the

balance achieved by the distribution absent a clear abuse of

discretion). And an equitable property distribution does not

necessarily mean equal. See In re Marriage of Capparelli, 2024 COA

103M, ¶ 9.

¶ 33 The district court explained that while wife currently earned

$500 more per month, husband’s pension and Social Security

would ultimately exceed her retirement income. The court found

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that although she received $118,937 more in marital property, that

amount included a $215,062 survivor benefit that she could only

collect if she outlived husband, and its value decreased every year.

And without that benefit, he would receive around $96,000 more

than her. Again, he had $370,062 in separate property, whereas

she had none.

¶ 34 We also note that husband’s percentage of the total marital

estate was diminished by the decreased value of the marital 401(k),

which was allocated to him, and the increased value of the marital

home, which was allocated to wife. But recall that husband chose

to spend approximately $300,000 from the marital portion of the

401(k) between final orders and remand, and only $45,000 of that

sum was attributed to wife’s expenses. Thus, he personally

benefited from the vast majority of the expenditures that reduced

the marital portion of the 401(k).

¶ 35 Given these circumstances, we cannot say that the district

court abused its broad discretion in allocating wife 53% and

husband 47% of the marital estate. See Collins, ¶ 19.

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III. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 36 Husband asks for his appellate attorney fees under section 14-

10-119, C.R.S. 2025, based on an asserted disparity in the parties’

financial resources. See In re Marriage of Gutfreund, 148 P.3d 136,

141 (Colo. 2006) (“Section 14-10-119 empowers the [district] court

to equitably apportion costs and fees between parties based on

relative ability to pay.”). Given the parties’ similar economic

circumstances, and husband’s demonstrated capacity to spend

extraordinary amounts on attorney fees, we deny his request. See

C.A.R. 39.1.

¶ 37 Because we affirm the judgment, husband is not entitled to an

award of appellate costs. See C.A.R. 39(a)(2) (“[I]f a judgment is

affirmed, costs are taxed against the appellant.”).

IV. Disposition

¶ 38 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE GROVE concur.

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