Garcia v. ICAO

25CA1045 Garcia v ICAO 01-15-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1045
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado
DD No. 27609-2024

Danielle Garcia,

Petitioner,

v.

Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado and JF & G
Investments LP,

Respondents.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES
Grove and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 15, 2026

Danielle Garcia, Pro Se

No Appearance for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office

Campbell Killin Brittan & Ray LLC, Phillip A. Parrott, Lara W. Gabrys, Denver,
Colorado, for Respondent JF & G Investments LP
¶1 Danielle Garcia appeals the denial of her claim for

unemployment benefits. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Garcia waited tables at Great Scott’s Eatery 2 (Employer) for

approximately two years until Employer terminated her

employment. Shortly thereafter, a deputy for the Division of

Unemployment Insurance (Division) denied Garcia’s claim for

unemployment benefits. Garcia appealed that decision, and the

Division scheduled the matter for an evidentiary hearing regarding

the reasons for Garcia’s job separation.

¶3 Upon reviewing the evidence introduced at the hearing, the

hearing officer found that Employer terminated Garcia for

“performance and attendance concerns,” failing “to follow

[Employer’s] policies and procedures relating to reports of alleged

harassment,” and failing to obey a reasonable instruction.

¶4 The hearing officer ruled that Garcia was disqualified from

receiving benefits pursuant to section 8-73-108(5)(e)(VI), C.R.S.

2025 (disqualifying claimants terminated for deliberate

disobedience of a reasonable instruction). When Garcia reported

sexual harassment, the hearing officer determined, she deliberately

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refused a reasonable instruction to provide details regarding the

allegations.

¶5 The hearing officer also ruled that Garcia was disqualified

from receiving unemployment benefits pursuant to section 8-73-

108(5)(e)(VII) (disqualifying claimants terminated for violating a

company rule, where such violation could have resulted in serious

damage to the employer’s interests). Specifically, the hearing officer

found that Employer’s “policies require all employees . . . to

immediately report any incident of harassment including sexual

harassment,” and Garcia deferred reporting alleged harassment for

seven months. The hearing officer found that Garcia’s delay in

reporting “could have caused damage to [Employer’s] interests.”

Lastly, because the hearing officer determined that Garcia was at

fault for her job termination, she wasn’t otherwise entitled to receive

benefits.

¶6 Garcia appealed the hearing officer’s decision to the Panel,

which affirmed.

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II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review and Legal Principles

¶7 Under section 8-74-107, C.R.S. 2025, we may not disturb

factual findings “supported by substantial evidence” and may only

set aside the Panel’s decision if (1) the Panel acted without or in

excess of its powers; (2) the decision was procured by fraud; (3) the

factual findings don’t support its decision; or (4) the decision is

erroneous as a matter of law. Substantial evidence is “probative,

credible, and competent, of a character which would warrant a

reasonable belief in the existence of facts supporting a particular

finding.” Rathburn v. Indus. Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App.

1977).

¶8 Section 8-73-108(5)(e) provides that a claimant shall be

disqualified from receiving benefits if her employment separation

occurred for “any” of several specifically enumerated reasons. See

M&A Acquisition Corp. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2019 COA 173,

¶ 21. It is well established that “the statute contemplates that

hearing officers and the Panel will consider all potentially applicable

. . . disqualifying provisions.” Id. at ¶ 14. To determine what

caused a claimant’s job termination, the hearing officer considers

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the totality of the evidence. Eckart v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 775

P.2d 97, 99 (Colo. App. 1989).

¶9 Section 8-73-108(5)(e)’s disqualification provisions “must be

read in light of the express legislative intent . . . to provide benefits

to those who become unemployed through ‘no fault’ of their own.”

Cole v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 964 P.2d 617, 618 (Colo. App.

1998) (quoting § 8-73-108(1)(a)). Thus, even if the hearing officer’s

findings may support a conclusion that the employee engaged in

conduct described in section 8-73-108(5)(e), a claimant may still be

entitled to benefits if the totality of the circumstances establishes

that her job separation occurred through no fault of her own. Id.

In this context, “fault” requires a volitional act or “the exercise of

some control or choice by the claimant in the circumstances

resulting in the separation such that the claimant can be said to be

responsible for the separation.” Id. A claimant’s responsibility or

“fault” for her job separation is an ultimate legal conclusion to be

based on the established findings of evidentiary fact. Id. at 618-19.

B. Disqualification Under Section 8-73-108(5)(e)(VI)

¶ 10 Section 8-73-108(5)(e)(VI) disqualifies a claimant from

receiving benefits if her employment was terminated for “[d]eliberate

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disobedience of a reasonable instruction of an employer or an

employer’s duly authorized representative.” In determining the

reasonableness of an employer’s instruction, the hearing officer

applies an objective standard. Rose Med. Ctr. Hosp. Ass’n v. Indus.

Claim Appeals Off., 757 P.2d 1173, 1174 (Colo. App. 1988).

¶ 11 The hearing officer found (and the Panel affirmed) that, in July

2024, Garcia “alluded” to Employer’s accountant, Richard Acker,

that a manager had sexually harassed her. The hearing officer also

found that when the owner and her supervisors followed up and

asked Garcia to provide additional details — including the specific

behavior at issue — she refused. Garcia doesn’t challenge either

finding, and substantial evidence supports both.

¶ 12 At the hearing, Acker testified that, on July 17, 2024, Garcia

mentioned to him multiple “instances” involving the then-general

manager, Wyatt Abrams, behaving inappropriately toward her.

However, Acker explained, Garcia provided him no examples or

other details of that behavior. Also at the hearing, the owner, Carla

Abrams, and managers Areceli Arambula and Patrick Powers, all

testified that they attended a meeting on July 31, 2024, in which

Ms. Abrams attempted to investigate the allegations Garcia reported

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to Acker. All three witnesses testified that Garcia refused to provide

any further account of the alleged harassment — she would not

identify any specific behavior in connection with her general

harassment allegations.

¶ 13 Substantial evidence further supports the hearing officer’s

finding that Employer discharged Garcia, in part, for failing to obey

Abrams’s request for basic details concerning the allegations.

Indeed, Abrams, Arambula, and Powers all testified that Employer

discharged Garcia immediately following her refusal to provide the

requested information.

¶ 14 Finally, Garcia does not challenge — and we perceive no error

in — the hearing officer’s findings that (1) Employer’s request for

details was objectively reasonable; and (2) in refusing to provide the

requested details, Garcia exercised control over the circumstances

surrounding her discharge and was therefore at fault for the same.

C. Additional Issues

¶ 15 Garcia makes multiple arguments relating to her

disqualification under subsection (5)(e)(VII). However, because we

perceive no basis to disturb the disqualification under subsection

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(5)(e)(VI), we need not and do not reach Garcia’s arguments

regarding subsection (5)(e)(VII).1

¶ 16 Garcia also indicates that the hearing officer failed to reference

the hearing transcript in her order. However, Garcia provides no

legal authority for the proposition that the hearing officer erred in

this respect, and we discern no such requirement in the applicable

statutes and regulations. Thus, we reject this argument.

¶ 17 We similarly reject Garcia’s argument that the hearing officer

erred by failing to address all hearing testimony in her order. The

hearing officer didn’t have any obligation to do so. See Tilley v.

Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 924 P.2d 1173, 1177 (Colo. App. 1996) (A

hearing officer need not address “specific evidence . . . [that] he or

she does not find persuasive.”).

1 Though the hearing officer found that Employer fired Garcia for

three infractions (i.e., (1) performance and attendance concerns; (2)
failure to comply with policies regarding reporting sexual
harassment; and (3) failing to obey a reasonable instruction), she
determined that subsection (5)(e)’s disqualification factors covered
only two of those infractions. Nonetheless, the hearing officer ruled
that Garcia was entirely disqualified from receiving benefits, and
the Panel affirmed. Garcia doesn’t challenge this, and we discern
no controlling case law on point. Accordingly, in the context of this
case, we assume, without deciding, that a claimant may be wholly
disqualified from receiving benefits if subsection (5)(e) covers any of
multiple circumstances causing job separation.

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¶ 18 Finally, Garcia argues that the hearing transcript doesn’t

accurately reflect the material in the audio recording. However,

Garcia provides no specific examples of such inaccuracies, nor does

she identify any harm she suffered as a result. Accordingly, we

don’t consider this argument. C.A.R. 35(c) (“The court may

disregard any error or defect not affecting the substantial rights of

the parties.”).

III. Disposition

¶ 19 We affirm the Panel’s order.2

2 To support its contention that the hearing officer properly

assessed evidence and witness credibility, employer’s answer brief
cites an unpublished decision of this court, which violates our
formal policy prohibiting parties from citing such cases (with
exceptions that don’t apply for this citation). See Colo. Jud.
Branch, Court of Appeals Policies, Policy Concerning Citation of
Opinions Not Selected for Official Publication (2025),
https://perma.cc/Z88K-5U7F. We trust that this violation of our
policy won’t be repeated.

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