Rask Living Trust v. Rydz

24CA2022 Rask Living Trust v Rydz 01-08-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2022
La Plata County District Court No. 23CV30010
Honorable Kim S. Shropshire, Judge
Honorable Douglas S. Walker, Judge

Rask Living Trust, and its trustee, Ronald A. Keller,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Mark Rydz,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AND ORDERS AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
Gomez and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 8, 2026

Dugan & Associates, P.C., Thomas P. Dugan, Durango, Colorado, for Plaintiff-
Appellee

Mark Rydz, Pro Se
¶1 Plaintiffs, Rask Living Trust (Trust) and its sole trustee,

Ronald A. Keller, brought a quiet title claim against defendant,

Mark Rydz, to clarify their property rights on an access easement

and establish an easement by estoppel. Rydz appeals the trial

court’s partial summary judgment ruling in favor of the plaintiffs on

his counterclaim, the judgment on the easements following trial,

and the trial court’s orders awarding attorney fees. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Trust is an Arizona revocable living trust that holds title to

real property located on Ute Canyon Road in Durango, Colorado —

legally described as Lot 1, Booker Minor Exemption Subdivision

(Booker subdivision). Rydz holds title to a different parcel of real

property also located on Ute Canyon Road — legally described as

Lot 2 of the Hotter Minor Exemption Subdivision (Hotter

subdivision). Rydz acquired his property in 2013. The Booker

subdivision and Hotter subdivision share a border.

¶3 In 1992, when the Booker and Hotter subdivisions were under

common ownership, the owner of the properties at the time

recorded a sixty-foot-wide access easement in favor of the Booker

subdivision, as the dominant estate, over a swath of land on the

1
Hotter subdivision, as the servient estate. We will refer to this as

the access easement. The plan was to build a joint driveway on the

easement. But due to terrain and grade constraints, a portion of

the driveway was constructed outside of the recorded easement,

further encroaching on the Hotter subdivision. This created a

segment of the access easement that didn’t have a driveway (the not

used segment) and a segment outside of the access easement that

had a driveway (the actually used segment). Construction of this

driveway was completed sometime in the 1990s.

¶4 A separate utility easement exists within the not used segment

of the access easement. This utility easement belongs to La Plata

Electric Association, Inc. (LPEA), as the dominant estate, with the

Hotter subdivision as the servient estate. The purpose of the utility

easement is to construct, operate, maintain, and replace utility

lines on the land. The utility lines within the utility easement are

owned and managed by LPEA — not the plaintiffs.

¶5 After conflicts between the parties over the use of the access

easement — and the actually used segment — the Trust filed this

quiet title action. The lawsuit aimed to (1) clarify property rights

with respect to the already established access easement and

2
(2) establish property rights through a new easement by estoppel

with respect to the actually used segment.

¶6 After Rydz filed a motion to dismiss, the complaint was

amended to include the Trust’s trustee, Keller, as a plaintiff. Rydz

later filed counterclaims asking the court to limit the usage of the

access easement, to order the plaintiffs to move the entirety of the

driveway into the parameters of the recorded access easement, and

to order the plaintiffs to move the LPEA utility lines, among other

things. In support of his requested relief, Rydz argued that (1) the

plaintiffs improperly used their residential property for commercial

purposes — using it as a short-term vacation rental (STVR) — in

violation of a Booker subdivision restrictive covenant; and (2) the

LPEA utility easement is too close to his house and should be

relocated.

A. Pretrial Motions

¶7 Pretrial procedures were presided over by Judge Shropshire.

Among the flurry of pretrial motions, the plaintiffs filed two motions

for partial summary judgment.

¶8 In their first motion for partial summary judgment, the

plaintiffs argued that Rydz didn’t have standing to assert his STVR

3
counterclaim because the Hotter subdivision and Booker

subdivision are subject to different covenants. The plaintiffs further

argued that the use of the home as an STVR isn’t an improper

commercial use. Rydz filed a cross-motion for partial summary

judgment, arguing that the trial court should rule, as a matter of

law, that the use of the home as an STVR was barred by the Booker

subdivision covenant because it was an improper commercial use.

¶9 In their second motion for partial summary judgment, the

plaintiffs asked the trial court to rule that Rydz’s LPEA utility

easement argument failed to state a legally cognizable claim. The

plaintiffs argued that because Rydz took title of the Hotter

subdivision with actual and/or constructive knowledge of the utility

easement, he is financially responsible for any request to move the

utility easement. The plaintiffs further argued that any such

request should be directed to the dominant estate of the utility

easement (i.e., LPEA), not the plaintiffs.

¶ 10 Judge Shropshire granted both of the plaintiffs’ motions for

partial summary judgment. Thus, Rydz’s counterclaims related to

STVRs and the utility easement were dismissed and not to be

considered at trial.

4
¶ 11 For the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on the

STVR counterclaim, Judge Shropshire determined that because the

two subdivisions had two separate controlling covenants, Rydz

didn’t have a legally protected interest — and thus he lacked

standing to enforce the Booker subdivision covenant. For the

plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment concerning the

utility easement counterclaim, Judge Shropshire determined that

because the plaintiffs couldn’t modify the placement of the

easement, Rydz couldn’t prevail on his utility easement

counterclaim as a matter of law.

¶ 12 In addition to his cross-motion for summary judgment, Rydz

also filed a motion for partial summary judgment regarding

driveway routing, a motion for summary judgment in support of his

counterclaims (global motion for summary judgment), and three

motions in limine. Judge Shropshire granted Rydz’s motion for

partial summary judgment regarding driveway routing. Judge

Shropshire denied Rydz’s global motion for summary judgment,

finding that it was duplicative of a few of Rydz’s previous filings.

5
B. Attorney Fees

¶ 13 The plaintiffs requested attorney fees on several of Rydz’s

pretrial motions. Judge Shropshire denied the plaintiffs’ initial

wave of requests for attorney fees, notwithstanding that the motions

lacked merit, finding that Rydz filed the subject motions in good

faith. Despite denying attorney fees on these motions, Judge

Shropshire warned Rydz that as a pro se litigant, he was still bound

by the same rules as licensed attorneys.

¶ 14 Later, Judge Shropshire granted the plaintiffs’ request for an

award of attorney fees incurred in defending against five different

motions filed by Rydz. Judge Shropshire issued the award under

section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2025. Section 13-17-102(6) allows an

award of attorney fees against a pro se party where the court makes

findings that the pro se party “clearly knew or reasonably should

have known that the party’s action or defense . . . was substantially

frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious.”

Judge Shropshire also granted the plaintiffs’ request for attorney

fees incurred by the plaintiffs in preparing for the attorney fee

hearing. In granting this request, Judge Shropshire found that

6
despite being warned of his duty to abide by court rules, Rydz

continued to file duplicative and groundless motions.

C. Trial

¶ 15 Trial was set for a two-day court trial in June 2024. At the

pretrial conference, Judge Shropshire advised the parties that a

“visiting judge” would preside over the trial. In June 2024, Judge

Walker presided over the two-day trial, which included a site visit to

see the access easement.

¶ 16 Following trial, Judge Walker issued a written order setting

forth his findings of fact and conclusions of law. In that order,

Judge Walker found that an easement by estoppel existed for the

plaintiffs’ driveway on the actually used segment. Judge Walker

also vacated the not used segment of the access easement in its

entirety. Judge Walker’s order didn’t mention the utility easement.

Judge Walker ordered the plaintiffs to submit a proposed order to

record a description of the easements — including the easement by

estoppel addition of the actually used segment and the vacatur of

the not used segment.

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D. Post-Trial

¶ 17 After trial, Judge Shropshire resumed presiding over the case,

including addressing post-trial matters.

¶ 18 In line with Judge Walker’s order, the plaintiffs submitted a

motion for approval of a proposed order, along with the proposed

order. In their motion and proposed order, the plaintiffs requested

to modify Judge Walker’s order by changing the point where the

driveway splits, moving where the address signs are placed, and

moving Rydz’s “no trespass” sign. Rydz objected to the plaintiffs’

motion and proposed order, arguing that it significantly changed

the effect of Judge Walker’s order.

¶ 19 Following briefing by the parties, Judge Shropshire issued two

orders regarding the proposed order. First, Judge Shropshire

approved the plaintiffs’ proposed order but included some

amendments. Judge Shropshire refused to change the point of the

driveway split or move where the address signs were placed, noting

that she wouldn’t “issue an order contrary to express provisions of

[Judge Walker’s] order following trial.” Judge Shropshire didn’t find

a reference to the “no trespassing” sign in Judge Walker’s order. To

“not conflict with a prior ruling,” Judge Shropshire ordered the “no

8
trespassing” sign to be placed where Judge Walker ordered the

address signs be placed.

¶ 20 Second, Judge Shropshire issued an order regarding the

recording of the easement. The order reiterated that the actually

used segment was now part of the access easement — thus

establishing an easement by estoppel. The order further clarified

that the vacated portion of the access easement — the not used

segment — didn’t vacate LPEA’s utility easement located in that

same area.

II. Analysis

¶ 21 On appeal, Rydz contends that (1) the trial court erred when it

entered partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs

regarding the use of their property as an STVR; (2) Judge

Shropshire didn’t have authority to “overrule” Judge Walker, and,

therefore, her order regarding the easements should be vacated;

and (3) the award of attorney fees was improper. We reject all three

contentions.

A. Partial Summary Judgment

¶ 22 Rydz contends that the trial court erroneously granted the

plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment regarding the

9
plaintiffs’ use of their property as an STVR. Because Rydz lacks

standing to bring this claim, we disagree and conclude that the trial

court’s grant of partial summary judgment was proper.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 23 We review a trial court’s ruling on summary judgment de novo,

“recognizing that summary judgment is appropriate only where

there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Beeftu v. Creekside

Ventures LLC, 37 P.3d 526, 528 (Colo. App. 2001).

¶ 24 “Standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite that can be raised at

any time during the proceedings; if there is no standing, the court

must dismiss the case.” People v. Shank, 2018 CO 51, ¶ 9. There

is a two-prong test for standing: Did the party suffer (1) an injury in

fact (2) to a legally protected interest. Ainscough v. Owens, 90 P.3d

851, 855 (Colo. 2004). For a legally protected interest, the question

is whether the party “has a claim for relief under the constitution,

the common law, a statute, or a rule or regulation.” Id. at 856.

¶ 25 In order to have a legally protected interest from a covenant,

the party “must be a resident of a subdivision to which a restrictive

covenant applies in order to enforce the covenant against other

10
residents of that subdivision.” Conestoga Pines Homeowners’ Ass’n

v. Black, 689 P.2d 1176, 1177 (Colo. App. 1984).

2. Application

¶ 26 On appeal, Rydz argues that he has standing to assert his

claim because he “raised plentiful allegations of harm in his

previous pleadings.” This, however, only addresses the first prong

of the test for standing. Rydz never argues that he has a legally

protected interest under the Booker subdivision’s restrictive

covenant — the second prong of the test for standing.

¶ 27 Rydz brings his counterclaim, and subsequent request for

summary judgment on the STVR issue, under a restrictive covenant

of the Booker subdivision. Without being a resident of the Booker

subdivision himself, Rydz can’t enforce the Booker subdivision’s

restrictive covenant. Thus, he lacks a legally protected interest to

bring a claim under the Booker subdivision’s covenant, and

therefore he lacks standing.

¶ 28 We conclude that because Rydz had no standing to bring a

claim about STVRs in the Booker subdivision, the trial court didn’t

err by granting the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment

regarding STVRs.

11
B. Successor Judge Orders

¶ 29 Rydz next contends that Judge Shropshire — as the successor

judge — didn’t have authority to issue an order “overruling” Judge

Walker’s order following trial. Rydz argues that Judge Shropshire

erroneously modified Judge Walker’s order by changing a

completely vacated section of the easement into a partially vacated

section. We conclude that Rydz failed to preserve the general

argument about the successor judge’s authority, and thus we won’t

address that contention. As for his partially vacated easement

argument, we disagree.

1. Preservation

¶ 30 While we don’t require parties to use “talismanic language” to

preserve issues on appeal, trial courts must be afforded an

“adequate opportunity to make findings of fact and conclusions of

law on any issue before we will review it.” People v. Melendez, 102

P.3d 315, 322 (Colo. 2004). “To properly preserve an issue for

appeal, a party’s objection or request must be specific enough to

(1) draw the court’s attention to the asserted error; (2) provide the

court with a meaningful opportunity to focus on the issue; and

12
(3) prevent or correct the error.” People v. Anderson, 2020 COA 56,

¶ 11 (citations omitted).

¶ 31 Rydz contends that he preserved his argument that Judge

Shropshire didn’t have authority to overrule Judge Walker’s order

in his response to the plaintiffs’ proposed order following trial.

Rydz, however, never questioned Judge Shropshire’s authority in

this response. To the contrary, Rydz asked Judge Shropshire to

exercise her authority to reconsider certain portions of Judge

Walker’s order following trial.

¶ 32 Rydz doesn’t identify — and we can’t find — anywhere in the

record where Rydz questioned Judge Shropshire’s authority or

otherwise raised the issue he advances on appeal.1 We conclude

Rydz failed to preserve this argument, so we won’t address it.

¶ 33 Beyond his general argument on appeal that Judge Shropshire

didn’t have authority, Rydz also argues that the utility easement

1 Rydz’s argument doesn’t fall into an exception to the general rule

of preservation either. Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction can
be raised for the first time on appeal. Paine, Webber, Jackson &
Curtis, Inc. v. Adams, 718 P.2d 508, 513 (Colo. 1986). Rydz,
however, didn’t argue that Judge Shropshire lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. Indeed, such an argument would have been unavailing
because “[c]ourts, not judges, are vested with jurisdiction.” People
v. Jachnik, 116 P.3d 1276, 1277 (Colo. App. 2005).

13
should have been vacated. Rydz did preserve this issue in the trial

court, so we address it below.

2. Standard of Review

¶ 34 A successor judge’s decision regarding post-trial motions for a

trial they didn’t preside over is reviewed under an abuse of

discretion standard to determine if their actions were manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Craig v. Carlson, 161 P.3d 648,

654 (Colo. 2007).

3. Application

¶ 35 Rydz contends that Judge Shropshire improperly “overturned”

Judge Walker’s order by creating another easement. Rydz’s

argument is based on a misunderstanding of the easements and to

whom they belong.

¶ 36 As previously discussed, the not used segment contained two

easements before the initiation of this lawsuit: (1) the plaintiffs’

access easement and (2) LPEA’s utility easement. Because Judge

Shropshire granted the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary

judgment regarding LPEA’s utility easement, it wasn’t to be

considered at trial. Therefore, when Judge Walker vacated the not

used portion of the access easement in its entirety in his order

14
following trial, he didn’t mention the utility easement. Thus, Judge

Walker’s order didn’t affect the utility easement.

¶ 37 Judge Shropshire’s order approving the plaintiffs’ proposed

order didn’t change any of this. In line with Judge Walker’s order

following trial, Judge Shropshire’s order also vacated the not used

segment of the access easement. Judge Shropshire’s order further

clarified that the utility easement within the not used segment

remained in place. This was also in line with Judge Walker’s order,

even if it wasn’t explicitly stated in Judge Walker’s ruling.

¶ 38 Simply put, Judge Shropshire’s order didn’t overrule Judge

Walker’s order. Instead, her order pointed out that the utility

easement — which wasn’t being adjudicated by the court during

trial — was still valid.

¶ 39 There’s nothing in the record showing that Judge Shropshire

did anything to modify or contravene Judge Walker’s original order

following trial. Accordingly, we conclude that Judge Shropshire’s

clarification on what portions of the not used segment were vacated

and what portions remained intact wasn’t manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair, and thus wasn’t an abuse of discretion.

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C. Trial Court’s Award of Attorney Fees

¶ 40 Rydz next contends that the trial court erred in its award of

attorney fees against him under section 13-17-102(2) and (6) for five

motions. We disagree.

1. Additional Facts

¶ 41 Because the trial court awarded fees against a pro se party,

our analysis begins with the warnings the trial court gave to Rydz

about adherence to court rules. We then turn to the plaintiffs’

various requests for attorney fees, Rydz’s motions practice that led

to attorney fees, the trial court’s reasoning for the award, the

plaintiffs’ attorney fee affidavits, and Judge Shropshire’s findings

that Rydz clearly knew or reasonably should have known that his

motions were substantially groundless — pursuant to section 13-

17-102(6) — at the attorney fee hearing.

a. Notice of Duty to Adhere to Rules and Denials of Attorney Fees

¶ 42 Citing Cornelius v. River Ridge Ranch Landowners Ass’n, 202

P.3d 564, 572 (Colo. 2009), the trial court warned Rydz several

times that even though he was a pro se party, he was “bound by the

same rules of civil procedure as attorneys licensed to practice law.”

Id. (quoting Negron v. Golder, 111 P.3d 538, 540 (Colo. App. 2004)).

16
In many of their motions, the plaintiffs similarly argued that Rydz

was bound by the rules of civil procedure and evidence despite

being a pro se party. At least three of the trial court’s warnings and

one of the plaintiffs’ admonitions occurred before Rydz filed his first

motion for which the court awarded attorney fees.

¶ 43 As previously discussed, the plaintiffs requested attorney fees

on several of Rydz’s pretrial filings and in many of their own

filings — including the complaint. Twelve of these requests came

before Rydz filed his first motion for which the court awarded

attorney fees. Twice the court denied fees for potentially groundless

motions because it found that even though the motions lacked

merit, they were filed in good faith.

b. Trial Court Findings in Support of Awarding Attorney Fees

¶ 44 Eventually, the trial court did award attorney fees to the

plaintiffs in connection with five of Rydz’s motions. These motions

were: (1) Rydz’s global motion for summary judgment; (2) Rydz’s

motion in limine regarding driveway grade; (3) Rydz’s motion in

limine to strike the plaintiffs’ reply; (4) Rydz’s motion in limine

pertaining to witness testimony; and (5) Rydz’s motion to

17
reconsider. Additionally, the trial court awarded the plaintiffs

attorney fees incurred in preparation for the attorney fee hearing.

¶ 45 For the first two motions, the trial court found that these

motions were duplicative of motions previously filed by Rydz. For

the latter three motions, the trial court found that the arguments in

these motions failed to meet the basic requirements of the rules of

civil procedure or the rules of evidence. We will discuss each, in

turn, below.

i. Duplicative Motions

(1) Global Motion for Summary Judgment

¶ 46 The trial court found Rydz’s global motion for summary

judgment to be a “general re-recitation” of his counterclaims and

duplicative of two individual motions for partial summary judgment.

¶ 47 In his counterclaims, among other arguments, Rydz argued

that (1) there was no evidence of when the driveway was built to

support an implied easement; and (2) the plaintiffs’ use of their

property as an STVR is improper and overly burdens the access

easement. Rydz subsequently filed two motions for partial

summary judgment on these issues. In his September 26, 2023,

motion for partial summary judgment concerning driveway routing,

18
Rydz asked the trial court to rule on the driveway evidence portion

of his counterclaims. In his October 4, 2023, motion for partial

summary judgment regarding STVRs, Rydz asked the trial court to

rule on the STVR portion of his counterclaims.

¶ 48 On October 5, 2023, Rydz filed his global motion for summary

judgment. Rydz argued that the plaintiffs’ response to his

counterclaims was procedurally deficient. He asked the trial court

to strike the plaintiffs’ response to his counterclaims and grant

summary judgment on the entirety of his counterclaims.

¶ 49 The trial court ultimately denied Rydz’s global motion for

summary judgment, determining that Rydz had failed to meet his

burden to establish that there was no issue of triable fact because

his allegations were conclusory and without any legal or

documentary support. In deciding to award attorney fees, the trial

court noted, “While the [trial] [c]ourt has not awarded Plaintiff[s] the

requested attorney fees for the motions it has so far ruled on, the

[trial] [c]ourt finds this motion to be different than [those] separate

motions for summary judgment.” The trial court explained that the

global motion was duplicative of Rydz’s individual motions for

partial summary judgment regarding the driveway and STVRs.

19
Finally, the order ended by reminding Rydz that despite being a pro

se party, he must still follow the rules of civil procedure.

(2) Motion in Limine Regarding Driveway Grade

¶ 50 On October 4, 2023, Rydz filed a motion requesting that the

trial court preclude any evidence or argument about the grade of

the driveway on the plaintiffs’ land. On December 20, 2023, Rydz

filed a motion in limine requesting to bar any evidence related to the

grade of the driveway on the access easement.

¶ 51 The trial court ruled on these motions simultaneously, noting

that they were essentially the same request. The trial court granted

Rydz’s motion to preclude the evidence of driveway grade.

Notwithstanding its ruling, the trial court found it appropriate to

award attorney fees on the motion in limine because it was

duplicative of the already filed motion to preclude.

ii. Motions That Failed to Meet the Basic Requirements of the
Rules

(1) “Motion in Limine” to Strike the Plaintiffs’ Reply

¶ 52 Rydz filed yet another “motion in limine,” this time requesting

to strike the plaintiffs’ reply in support of their own motion for

partial summary judgment. Rydz argued that the reply was

20
“extremely lengthy” and thus the plaintiffs were “willfully wasting

the [trial] [c]ourt’s time.” The plaintiffs’ reply in question was ten

pages without counting the case caption, signature block, and

certificate of service.

¶ 53 The trial court found that Rydz’s argument was meritless

because the plaintiffs’ reply conformed to the length requirements of

C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-15, which limits reply briefs to ten pages,

“not including the case caption, signature block, certificate of

service and attachments.” The trial court found that an award of

attorney fees was appropriate because “a quick review of the

guiding rules for motions practice would let the defendant know

that [the] plaintiff[s’] reply was procedurally accurate.”

(2) Motion in Limine Pertaining to Witness Testimony

¶ 54 Rydz’s final motion in limine for which the court awarded

attorney fees argued that several of the plaintiffs’ witnesses should

be barred from testifying at trial. First, he argued that a few lay

witnesses should be barred from testifying at trial because he

disagreed with their anticipated testimony, he questioned their

motivation, and he believed they lacked credibility. Rydz also

argued that the lay witnesses’ testimony was either in conflict with

21
other evidence or already in the record through other documentary

evidence disclosed by the plaintiffs. Rydz further argued that

Keller’s former attorney couldn’t testify because of attorney-client

privilege. Rydz didn’t argue that any of the witnesses were

incompetent to testify or that their testimony was irrelevant,

pursuant to the Colorado Rules of Evidence.

¶ 55 The trial court denied Rydz’s motion, finding that all the

testimony was relevant and all the witnesses were competent

pursuant to CRE 401, 601, and 602. The trial court addressed

Rydz’s arguments, noting that the credibility of the witnesses was

for the trier of fact to decide, not Rydz. The trial court also noted

that just because the plaintiffs disclosed evidence didn’t mean that

evidence was admitted. Finally, the trial court observed that the

attorney-client privilege belonged to Keller, not Rydz, and thus Rydz

couldn’t use that as a basis to limit Keller’s former attorney’s

testimony.

¶ 56 In awarding attorney fees on this motion, the trial court said,

A quick review of the guiding rules of evidence
regarding who is competent to testify . . .
would have revealed that the witnesses
referred in [Rydz’s] motions are appropriate to
testify. Further, disagreements with

22
statements made by witnesses or assertions of
bias or bad motive are not proper grounds for
exclusion. Therefore, pursuant to [the
plaintiffs’] request, the [trial] [c]ourt will grant
the request for attorney’s fees.

(3) Motion to Reconsider

¶ 57 In Rydz’s motion to reconsider, he argued that the trial court’s

finding that he didn’t have standing to challenge the plaintiffs’ use

of their property as an STVR ignored the use of the access easement

on his land by the STVR guests. Rydz didn’t state the legal

authority for bringing his motion to reconsider. In the motion to

reconsider, Rydz simply reargued that the plaintiffs’ use of their

property as an STVR overburdens the access easement.

¶ 58 The trial court denied Rydz’s motion to reconsider, finding it

untimely and without merit. Despite Rydz’s failure to state what

his legal basis was for reconsideration, the trial court considered it

under every rule that Rydz could have possibly brought the motion

pursuant to. The court observed that if the motion was brought

under C.R.C.P. 59 or C.R.C.P. 121, Rydz had fourteen days to file

his motion to reconsider. Because Rydz filed his motion to

reconsider well beyond the fourteen day deadline, the trial court

23
found that a motion to reconsider under C.R.C.P. 59 or

C.R.C.P. 121 was untimely.

¶ 59 The court next noted that if the motion was brought under

C.R.C.P. 60, although it would have been timely because Rydz filed

the motion within the applicable six-month window permitted

under Rule 60, it still wasn’t a proper Rule 60 motion because Rydz

wasn’t seeking any relief permitted by Rule 60. The trial court

explained the possible grounds for filing a motion to reconsider

under Rule 60(b) were (1) mistake; (2) fraud; (3) the judgment is

void; (4) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; or

(5) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.

C.R.C.P. 60(b). The trial court found that Rydz didn’t make any of

these arguments in his motion to reconsider. Therefore, the trial

court found that Rydz’s motion wasn’t proper under Rule 60.

¶ 60 Finding that the motion to reconsider was either untimely or

improper (or both) under the rules, the trial court found that

attorney fees were appropriate. The trial court again noted that

Rydz was bound by the same rules of civil procedure as a licensed

attorney and that he had been warned to familiarize himself with

those rules.

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c. Attorney Fee Hearing

¶ 61 After the trial court awarded attorney fees, the plaintiffs filed

two affidavits accounting for the attorney fees incurred while

working on responses to the five motions. Upon Rydz’s objection to

the reasonableness of the requested attorney fees, the trial court

ordered the parties to set a hearing on the matter, which was set on

August 13, 2024. Ahead of the attorney fee hearing, the plaintiffs

submitted a third affidavit requesting attorney fees incurred while

preparing for the attorney fee hearing. The total amount of

requested attorney fees was $25,980.2

¶ 62 The affidavits explained the attorneys’ rates and how the work

was distributed on each of the motions for which attorney fees were

found appropriate. Attached to the affidavits were itemized invoices

for the work completed on the motion responses for which attorney

fees were awarded. Any item that wasn’t related to the motion

2 The plaintiffs’ first attorney fee affidavit calculated $10,612.50 in

attorney fees for work on Rydz’s global motion for summary
judgment and three motions in limine. The plaintiffs’ second
attorney fee affidavit calculated $7,392.50 in attorney fees for work
on Rydz’s motion to reconsider. The plaintiffs asserted they
incurred $7,975 in attorney fees to prepare for the attorney fee
hearing on August 13, 2024.

25
responses for which attorney fees were awarded was redacted with

a black box.

¶ 63 At the outset of the August 13, 2024, hearing, the plaintiffs

called three witnesses — Keller and both of the plaintiffs’ attorneys.

The attorneys testified about their billable rates, the amount of time

spent on Rydz’s motions, and the total amount of fees charged. The

attorneys also testified that despite Rydz not challenging the

reasonableness of the fees, their rates, the time they spent on each

motion, and the measures they took to lower the fees were

reasonable.

¶ 64 Rydz acted as his own and sole witness. Instead of testifying

that the attorney fee rates were unreasonable, Rydz argued that the

award of attorney fees was improper because Judge Walker denied

any award of attorney fees following trial, Rydz didn’t request the

attorney fee hearing so he shouldn’t be responsible for any fees

relating to it, the plaintiffs are responsible for their own attorney

fees under the American Rule, and fees were awarded against him

without warning.

¶ 65 At the close of the hearing, the trial court made factual

findings on Rydz’s knowledge of the possibility of attorney fees being

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awarded against him. The trial court first noted that Rydz was on

notice of the possibility that fees would be awarded against him

because the plaintiffs had requested attorney fees in almost every

response to Rydz’s motions. The trial court also noted that it had

told Rydz that he was “entitled to look at the rules, get an attorney,

all of the things that [he] could do.” The trial court then found that

despite repeatedly telling Rydz to review the applicable rules, Rydz

still filed motions that didn’t conform to those rules. Considering

all the above, the trial court found that Rydz knew or reasonably

should have known that the motions for which it awarded attorney

fees were substantially groundless or failed to follow simple rules,

stating as follows:

[T]he [c]ourt finds that Mr. Rydz knew or
should have reasonably known, and by that I
mean letting Mr. Rydz know he’s responsible
for understanding the rules, including for
instance the time lines for motions to
reconsider and then receiving a motion to
reconsider or receiving a trial brief, which is in
essence a motion to reconsider, is I think
support for the argument that he reasonably
should have known.

I feel like this [c]ourt, despite what Mr. Rydz
says, this [c]ourt is for everyone, regardless of
whether you have a law license or not, and the
[c]ourt want[s] pro se litigants to succeed, and

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by succeed I mean get their argument across
to the [c]ourt so the [c]ourt can legitimately
and substantively address the needs of that
party. And everyone has room for
improvement, but I feel like I have done my
best to make sure that Mr. Rydz knew the
procedure and his requirement to know the
rules as such.

¶ 66 The trial court then found the attorney fee rate was

reasonable — noting that Rydz didn’t challenge the reasonableness

of the rate. Assessing the reasonableness of the fees themselves,

the trial court noted that it took substantial time to process and

research Rydz’s motions itself. Additionally, the trial court found

that the requested fees only included work related to the specific

motions. Accordingly, the trial court found the plaintiffs’ request of

$25,980 in attorney fees to be warranted and reasonable.

2. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 67 “Whether a statutory basis for attorney fees exists is a

question of law that we review de novo.” CAW Equities, L.L.C. v.

City of Greenwood Village, 2018 COA 42M, ¶ 38. “We review an

attorney fee award for an abuse of discretion and will not disturb

that award unless it is patently erroneous or unsupported by the

evidence.” Id.

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¶ 68 A trial court can award attorney fees against a party if it finds

that the party “lacked substantial justification” in bringing or

defending a civil action. § 13-17-102(2). There are, however,

limitations on that award when it is assessed against a pro se

litigant:

A party who is appearing without an attorney
or licensed legal paraprofessional shall not be
assessed attorney fees or licensed legal
paraprofessional fees unless the court finds
that the party clearly knew or reasonably
should have known that the party’s action or
defense, or any part of the action or defense,
was substantially frivolous, substantially
groundless, or substantially vexatious . . . .

§ 13-17-102(6).

¶ 69 Additionally, attorney fees incurred in resolving the fee issue

are recoverable. Mau v. E.P.H. Corp., 638 P.2d 777, 781 (Colo.

1981).

¶ 70 The party seeking to recover attorney fees bears the burden of

proving the amount and reasonableness of the fees. Klein v.

Tiburon Dev. LLC, 2017 COA 109, ¶ 30. An affidavit from counsel

with supporting documentation — such as invoices — is generally

sufficient to support an award of attorney fees. Weston v. T & T,

LLC, 271 P.3d 552, 561 (Colo. App. 2011).

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3. Application

¶ 71 Rydz doesn’t challenge the reasonableness of attorney fees

awarded by the trial court. Instead, Rydz argues that award was

improper because (1) it was in violation of the American Rule

regarding attorney fees; (2) the trial court’s grounds for awarding

attorney fees were insufficient; (3) the trial court failed to give him

notice of the possibility of attorney fees; (4) the plaintiffs’ attorney

fees affidavits were insufficient; and (5) Judge Shropshire didn’t

have authority to award attorney fees. As we have addressed above,

Rydz didn’t preserve his argument that Judge Shropshire didn’t

have authority to make rulings, so we won’t address this argument.

We address his remaining arguments in turn.

a. Statutory Basis

¶ 72 Rydz first contends that the award of attorney fees was in

violation of the American Rule, arguing that the plaintiffs are

responsible for their own attorney fees. Under the American Rule,

“the parties in a lawsuit must bear their own legal expenses, absent

statutory authority, a court rule, or an express contractual provision

to the contrary.” Delluomo v. Cedarblade, 2014 COA 43, ¶ 9

(emphasis added). And there is clear statutory authority, which the

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court relied on, that allows an award of attorney fees — namely,

section 13-17-102. Therefore, we reject the contention that the

court’s award of attorney fees violated the American Rule or any

principle of Colorado law.

b. Grounds for Awarding Attorney Fees

¶ 73 Rydz next contends that the trial court had insufficient

grounds to award attorney fees. In line with the statutory

framework of section 13-17-102, the trial court made findings that

Rydz’s motions lacked substantial justification each time it awarded

attorney fees against him. As detailed above, these findings are

supported by the record.

¶ 74 First, Rydz did file duplicative motions. Rydz filed his global

motion for summary judgment on the entirety of his counterclaims

while his two motions for partial summary judgment on issues

within his counterclaims were still pending. Similarly, his motion

in limine regarding driveway grade made the same argument that

was previously made in his pending motion to preclude evidence

about the driveway grade.

¶ 75 Next, the remaining motions for which the court awarded

attorney fees failed to follow the pertinent court rules. Rydz’s

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request to strike the plaintiffs’ reply because the plaintiffs’ reply was

“extremely lengthy” was plainly inconsistent with C.R.C.P. 121,

section 1-15(1)(a). Further, both his motion in limine pertaining to

witness testimony and his motion to reconsider failed to make any

arguments supported by rules of evidence or rules of civil

procedure, respectively.

¶ 76 For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the trial court

had sound support in the record for its findings that Rydz’s five

motions were substantially groundless and warranted attorney fees.

¶ 77 Finally, attorney fees incurred in “resolving the fee issue” are

recoverable as attorney fees. Mau, 638 P.2d at 781. With that, the

trial court had grounds to award the plaintiffs their attorney fees

incurred in preparing for the attorney fee hearing.

¶ 78 In sum, because there is support for the trial court’s findings,

we won’t disturb its award of attorney fees.

c. Knew or Should Have Known and Notice

¶ 79 Rydz next contends that he had no notice that his motions

were subject to attorney fees. In other words, Rydz argues that, as

a pro se party, he didn’t know or reasonably couldn’t have known

32
that his actions lacked substantial justification — as is required by

section 13-17-102(6). We disagree.

¶ 80 After finding that Rydz’s motions lacked substantial

justification, the trial court made the requisite findings that Rydz,

as a pro se party, knew or reasonably should have known that his

filings were groundless during the August 13, 2024, attorney fee

hearing. These findings were supported by the record because both

the plaintiffs and the trial court had repeatedly warned Rydz that he

was bound by the same rules as licensed attorneys. Many of these

warnings were issued well before Rydz filed the motions for which

the court awarded attorney fees against him.

¶ 81 We conclude that because Rydz was repeatedly warned that he

was bound by the same court rules as a licensed attorney, there

was plenty of support on the record that he was on notice of the

possibility of an attorney fee award against him as a pro se party.

We further conclude that the trial court made the appropriate

findings that Rydz either knew or reasonably should have known

that his motions were substantially groundless. Thus, we decline to

disturb the trial court’s award of attorney fees on these grounds.

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d. Attorney Fee Affidavits

¶ 82 Finally, Rydz contends that the plaintiffs’ attorney fee

affidavits were insufficient, and thus any award based on them was

erroneous. Specifically, he argues that the trial court didn’t require

appropriate discovery on the plaintiffs’ attorney cost affidavits but

instead accepted them at “face value.” Rydz further argues that the

invoices were insufficient because they were “almost totally blacked

out” except for the totals. We disagree.

¶ 83 The plaintiffs’ affidavits were adequate. These affidavits laid

out the attorneys’ rates, explained why those rates were reasonable,

and were supported by invoices detailing the time each attorney or

other professional spent on the specific motion for which the court

awarded attorney fees. Using invoices as support is generally

sufficient for an award of attorney fees. Weston, 271 P.3d at 561.

As Rydz points out, much of the plaintiffs’ supporting invoices is

blacked out. These blacked out sections, however, were for legal

work not related to the award of attorney fees and thus weren’t

relevant to the award of attorney fees.

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¶ 84 Based on the facially sufficient affidavits and the evidence

presented at the attorney fee hearing, we conclude that the record

amply supports the trial court’s award of attorney fees.

D. Plaintiffs’ Request for Attorney Fees on Appeal

¶ 85 The plaintiffs request an award of the attorney fees they

incurred on appeal pursuant to C.A.R. 38, arguing that Rydz’s

arguments on appeal, which “conflict with explicit terms in the

[d]istrict [c]ourt’s orders and findings,” and his failure to comply

with the requirements of C.A.R. 28 render the appeal substantially

frivolous. While we reject Rydz’s arguments on appeal on their

merits and we recognize that his opening brief didn’t strictly comply

with the requirements of C.A.R. 28, we nevertheless conclude that

an award of appellate attorney fees pursuant to C.A.R. 38 isn’t

warranted. Accordingly, we deny the plaintiffs’ request for an

award of attorney fees incurred on appeal.

III. Disposition

¶ 86 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment and orders awarding attorney fees.

JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.

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