Peo v. Arnett

24CA0689 Peo v Arnett 12-24-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0689
Jefferson County District Court No. 23CR2450
Honorable Christopher C. Zenisek, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Stephen Patrick Arnett,

Defendant-Appellant.

SENTENCE AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON
Harris and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 24, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jacob R. Lofgren, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Andrea R. Gammell, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Stephen Patrick Arnett (Arnett), appeals his six-

year prison sentence for second degree assault. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Arnett was charged with multiple offenses stemming from

allegations that he assaulted and strangled his girlfriend, Melinda

Dingle (Dingle). Dingle alleged that during the altercation, Arnett

grabbed her hair, slammed her head onto a stone floor, and

strangled her to the point that she lost consciousness. Dingle

sustained injuries to her face and neck, as well as a fractured

scapula and a close-head trauma brain bleed.

¶3 Arnett pled guilty to second degree assault (strangulation).

The remaining counts were dismissed. As part of the plea

agreement, the parties agreed to leave sentencing open to the

district court — with probation and community corrections

available as alternatives to the Department of Corrections (DOC).

The court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Arnett to six

years in the custody of the DOC.

II. Standard of Review

¶4 We review a district court’s sentencing discretion for an abuse

of discretion. People v. Dominguez, 2021 COA 76, ¶ 9. A court

1
abuses its discretion if “it fails to consider the nature of the offense,

the character and rehabilitative potential of the offender, the

development of respect for the law and the deterrence of crime, and

the protection of the public.” People v. Linares-Guzman, 195 P.3d

1130, 1137 (Colo. App. 2008). Likewise, a court abuses its

discretion if its decision is based on an erroneous understanding or

application of the law. Margerum v. People, 2019 CO 100, ¶ 9.

III. Analysis

¶5 Arnett contends that the district court abused its sentencing

discretion because the court based his sentence on unfounded

concerns for Dingle’s safety and failed to consider his rehabilitative

needs and potential. We disagree.

A. Plea Proviso

¶6 As an initial matter, we reject the Attorney General’s assertion

that section 18-1-409(1), C.R.S. 2025, bars Arnett’s appeal of his

sentence.

¶7 As now relevant, section 18-1-409(1) provides that any person

convicted of a non-class 1 felony “shall have the right to one

appellate review of the propriety of the sentence.” But in what is

referred to as the plea proviso in the statute, see Sullivan v. People,

2
2020 CO 58, ¶ 1, appellate review of the propriety of a sentence is

barred “if the sentence is within a range agreed upon by the parties

pursuant to a plea agreement.” § 18-1-409(1); see also

C.A.R. 4(b)(5)(C) (same). And under People v. Scofield, a defendant

cannot appeal the propriety of their sentence that was imposed

within the aggravated range agreed upon in a plea agreement, when

the parties “expressly agreed that [the] defendant would be

sentenced within the aggravated sentencing range.” 74 P.3d 385,

387 (Colo. App. 2002).

¶8 Contrary to the Attorney General’s argument, Arnett’s plea

agreement did not contain a sentence range agreed upon by the

parties. Rather, the plea agreement informed Arnett that second

degree assault was a class 4 felony and an extraordinary risk

offense that carried a presumptive sentencing range of two to eight

years in the DOC. See § 18-3-203(1)(i), (2)(b), C.R.S. 2025; § 18-

1.3-401(10)(b)(XVIII), C.R.S. 2025. Scofield is distinguishable

because the defendant in that case expressly agreed as part of his

plea agreement to be sentenced within the aggravated range, which

“alter[ed] the presumptive sentencing range.” 74 P.3d at 387.

3
Arnett, however, did not stipulate to, nor was he sentenced to, a

sentence within the aggravated range.

¶9 Thus, the plea proviso portion of section 18-1-409(1) does not

bar our review of the propriety of Arnett’s sentence. See People v.

O’Dell, 53 P.3d 655, 657 (Colo. App. 2001) (The plea proviso in

section 18-1-409(1) did not apply because its plain language

“requires an agreement by the parties to a sentencing range,” and,

“although [the] defendant was advised of the penalties applicable to

the offenses to which he was pleading guilty, there is no indication

in the record that his plea agreement included any type of agreed

sentencing range or cap.”).

B. Propriety of the Sentence

¶ 10 A district court is given “wide latitude in its sentencing

decisions.” People v. Tresco, 2019 COA 61, ¶ 30 (citation omitted).

In exercising its sentencing discretion, the court need not “explicitly

refer to each of the factors it considered,” People v. Koehler, 30 P.3d

694, 698 (Colo. App. 2000), and need only state the primary factual

considerations bearing on its decision, see People v. Watkins, 613

P.2d 633, 637 (Colo. 1980). A record is sufficient to affirm a

sentencing decision if it contains evidence to support the reasons

4
for the sentence, a reasonable explanation of the sentence imposed,

and information that permits the conclusion that the court

considered all essential factors. Linares-Guzman, 195 P.3d at 1137.

“If the sentence is within the range required by law, is based on

appropriate considerations as reflected in the record, and is

factually supported by the circumstances of the case,” we must

uphold it. People v. Fuller, 791 P.2d 702, 708 (Colo. 1990).

¶ 11 Arnett raises two claims of error, both of which we reject.

¶ 12 First, Arnett asserts that the district court’s sentencing

determination was based on unfounded and speculative concerns

for Dingle’s safety — namely, that a lengthy sentence was necessary

to protect her from future harm.

¶ 13 Sentencing determinations must be based on reliable

evidence, not speculation or unfounded allegations. People v. Tuffo,

209 P.3d 1226, 1231 (Colo. App. 2009). But we discern ample

evidence in the record to support the challenged finding. At the

sentencing hearing, the prosecutor read a letter from the filing

investigator assigned to the case, in which the investigator

described the injuries inflicted on Dingle as “barbaric” and “some of

the worst [he had] seen on a living victim.” The district court

5
observed photographs of Dingle’s injuries and found them

“striking,” “impactful,” and depictive of “dramatic, extreme, violen[t]

injuries.” The court also considered the Presentence Investigation

Report (PSIR) completed by the probation department, whose

assessments considered Arnett “a high risk to reoffend in the

community.” The filing investigator agreed, noting in his letter that

“based on the extremely violent nature of his actions, [Arnett]

pose[d] a continued violent risk to the community.”

¶ 14 Notwithstanding Arnett’s assertion to the contrary, there is no

evidence in the record suggesting that this evidence was materially

untrue. And to the extent Arnett suggests that the district court

relied on prior “unsubstantiated” allegations of abuse by the victim,

we disagree. The court, referencing these prior allegations,

specifically indicated that its “focus” and “duty is, of course, to

sentence on the facts of this case, and this case alone. This is the

conviction. The others have not been proved.” We presume the

court did so and the record does not reflect otherwise. See People v.

White, 870 P.2d 424, 440 (Colo. 1994) (courts are presumed to

know the law and apply it in making their sentencing decisions).

6
¶ 15 Second, we reject Arnett’s assertion that the district court

failed to properly consider his rehabilitative needs and potential.

¶ 16 In sentencing Arnett, the district court acknowledged that

Arnett had “some levels of success while under [c]ommunity

[s]upervision” in the past, and “[t]hat’s a positive.” The court also

recognized the work that Arnett did while in custody in the

Behavioral Health Unit. And the court acknowledged Arnett’s

acceptance into a sober living facility, his “willing[ness] to complete

treatment,” and his moderate range LSI score indicating that he

was a candidate for structured supervision, such as probation.

¶ 17 But the district court also reflected on the serious nature of

the crime and the “significant danger to [Dingle] if [Arnett was] not

in custody.” The court further considered, but ultimately rejected,

the imposition of a community-based sentence given the severity of

Dingle’s injuries, Arnett’s high risk to reoffend, and Arnett’s

comments to the PSIR evaluator that the victim was “lying,” which

raised questions about his amenability to treatment and victim

safety. Although Arnett argues on appeal that his comments

quoted in the PSIR were shortly after his arrest, there is no evidence

in the record that he disavowed those statements. In balancing

7
these considerations, as well as Arnett’s limited criminal history,

the court arrived at a six-year DOC sentence (one year less than the

sentence term requested by the prosecution).

¶ 18 Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the district

court abused its sentencing discretion. The court expressly

considered all evidence presented at the sentencing hearing,

including mitigating information about Arnett and his rehabilitative

potential. That the court found “aggravating factors to be more

compelling than any arguably mitigating factors does not constitute

an abuse of discretion or indicate that the [district] court failed to

consider evidence of mitigation.” Linares-Guzman, 195 P.3d at

1137.

IV. Conclusion

¶ 19 The sentence is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

8