Brauweiler v. National Jewish

25CA0167 Brauweiler v National Jewish 12-18-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0167
City and County of Denver District Court No. 23CV31536
Honorable Andrew J. Luxen, Judge

Dr. Anne Brauweiler,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

National Jewish Health,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
Freyre, J., concurs
Yun, J., specially concurs

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 18, 2025

Miller & Law, P.C., David J. Meretta, Littleton, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Littler Mendelson, P.C., Grace L. McGuire, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellee
¶1 Plaintiff, Dr. Anne Brauweiler, appeals the district court’s

grant of summary judgment to defendant, National Jewish Health

(NJH). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 NJH hired Brauweiler to work as a researcher. In November

2021, two months after she started, NJH placed her on unpaid

suspension. Brauweiler was ultimately fired several months later in

February 2022.

¶3 Brauweiler then filed this action against NJH and her

supervisor, but the only claims at issue in this appeal are those

against NJH. Brauweiler alleged that NJH breached her

employment contract by firing her and that NJH violated various

provisions of the Colorado Wage Claim Act, § 8-4-101 to -127,

C.R.S. 2025.

¶4 NJH moved for summary judgment on these claims and the

district court granted the motion. The court held that NJH did not

breach the employment contract because Brauweiler was an at-will

employee whom NJH could fire at any time without cause. The

court further held that the Wage Claim Act claims failed based on

the undisputed facts.

1
¶5 Brauweiler challenges these rulings on appeal. We address

each argument in turn and affirm.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

¶6 We review an order granting summary judgment de novo.

Univ. of Denv. v. Doe, 2024 CO 27, ¶ 7. Summary judgment is

appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. We

give the party opposing summary judgment the benefit of all

favorable and reasonable inferences from the facts. Id. at ¶ 8. And

we resolve all doubts in favor of the party opposing summary

judgment. Id.

III. Breach of Contract

¶7 As relevant here, Brauweiler’s breach of contract claim alleged

that her contract provided for a three-year term and that NJH

breached the contract by firing her before that term expired. The

district court granted summary judgment on this claim because it

determined that Brauweiler’s employment was at will, meaning NJH

could fire her at any time.

¶8 Reviewing this ruling requires us to interpret the contract.

Our primary goal when interpreting a contract is to ascertain and

2
give effect to the parties’ intent. Gagne v. Gagne, 2014 COA 127,

¶ 51. We start with the “language of the instrument itself.” Id. If

the written instrument is “complete and free from ambiguity, we will

conclude that it expresses the intentions of the parties and enforce

it according to its plain language.” Id. Absent ambiguity in the

written instrument itself, “we will not look beyond the four corners

of the agreement to determine the meaning intended by the parties.”

Ad Two, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 9 P.3d 373, 376-77 (Colo.

2000).1

¶9 In conducting this review, we are also bound by the party

presentation principle. In both criminal and civil cases, regardless

of what arguments an appellant might have advanced below and

therefore preserved for appellate review, we will address only those

arguments the appellant properly raises on appeal. See Compos v.

People, 2021 CO 19, ¶ 35 (citing Greenlaw v. United States, 554

U.S. 237, 243-44 (2008)). The parties, not us, “are responsible for

1 The principle that we will not look beyond the four corners of a

complete and unambiguous agreement is sometimes referred to as
the parol evidence rule. But it is not a rule of evidence. Instead, it
is a substantive principle of contract interpretation, much like the
canons of statutory interpretation. See Glover v. Innis, 252 P.3d
1204, 1208 (Colo. App. 2011).

3
advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to relief.”

Greenlaw, 554 U.S. at 244 (quoting Castro v. United States, 540

U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring

in the judgment)). Consequently, we do not address arguments

presented without citation to authority or substantial argument.

See Vickery v. Evelyn V. Trumble Living Tr., 277 P.3d 864, 870 (Colo.

App. 2011). And we do not consider arguments beyond those

properly presented by the appellant. See Compos, ¶ 35.

¶ 10 Neither party disputes that there is a single written

instrument that both Brauweiler and NJH signed: the offer letter. It

contained many specific terms of her employment, including her

title, compensation, job responsibilities, supervisors, and leave,

among other things. It also said, “This contract is automatically

renewed on July 1 of each year unless it is terminated in writing.”

¶ 11 The district court determined that this written instrument

unambiguously created an at-will employment relationship, thereby

obviating any need to look elsewhere to ascertain the parties’ intent.

(“[A]s a matter of law, the [c]ourt concludes that, pursuant to the

terms of the [offer] [l]etter, [Brauweiler]’s employment was at-will,

and [NJH] possessed discretion to terminate her employment.”) We

4
agree with the district court. The unambiguous practical effect of

the offer letter’s language was that Brauweiler’s term of employment

was indefinite and that either she or NJH could terminate her

employment in writing at any time for any or no reason. This fits

the definition of at-will employment. See Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v.

Keenan, 731 P.2d 708, 711 (Colo. 1987) (explaining that an at-will

employee is one who is hired for an indefinite period of time and

whose employment can be terminated by either party without cause

and without notice).

¶ 12 Nevertheless, Brauweiler argues that the district court erred

by failing to consider materials beyond the offer letter, including

NJH’s “Faculty Appointment, Promotion, and Periodic Evaluation

Policy” (FAPPE) and various communications and conduct by NJH

staff. Again, the offer letter was the only document that both she

and NJH signed. And the offer letter neither includes nor refers to

the FAPPE or any other evidence Brauweiler urges us to rely on.

Under the well-established contract law principles discussed above,

we might have expected Brauweiler to argue that we can look

beyond the offer letter because it either does not express the full

5
and complete intent of the parties or because it is somehow

ambiguous. But she argues neither of these points.

¶ 13 Instead of arguing that the offer letter is ambiguous in and of

itself, she argues that there is ambiguity when the offer letter and

the FAPPE are considered together. But the first step of our

analysis must be assessing whether we can look beyond the four

corners of the offer letter (again, the only mutually signed document

in this case) to the FAPPE in the first place. Brauweiler contends

we can, based on a provision in the FAPPE itself, which purports to

incorporate the FAPPE into all offer letters.2 Problematically,

Brauweiler fails to explain why a document unilaterally created by

an employer automatically becomes part of an employment contract

only because the document says so. Nor does she cite any

authority for this proposition. We therefore reject this argument as

conclusory and unsupported by citation to authority. See Taylor v.

Taylor, 2016 COA 100, ¶ 13 (“It is not the function of this [c]ourt on

appeal to advocate a party’s position, to develop arguments[,] or to

2 The FAPPE provides that it “will be deemed to be a part of each

letter of offer hereinafter entered into by NJH with any member of
the faculty, unless otherwise specified in such letter of offer.”

6
locate and cite supporting or opposing authority.” (quoting Topco,

Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Highways, 912 P.2d 805, 812 (Mont. 1996)));

Vickery, 277 P.3d at 870 (declining to address an argument made

“in only a conclusory fashion, without citation to authority, in [the]

opening appeal brief”).3

¶ 14 Despite the analysis above, we recognize that a generous

reading of Brauweiler’s appellate argument might be that the

district court should have gone beyond the four corners of the offer

letter not because it was ambiguous, but to determine whether it

was ambiguous in the first instance. See Pepcol Mfg. Co. v. Denv.

Union Corp., 687 P.2d 1310, 1314 n.3 (Colo. 1984) (“In determining

whether a contract is ambiguous, the court may conditionally admit

extrinsic evidence on this issue.”); Magnetic Copy Servs., Inc. v.

Seismic Specialists, Inc., 805 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Colo. App. 1990)

3 We are also aware of a line of cases addressing the circumstances

under which an employer’s unilaterally created policy might become
enforceable to alter an at-will employment relationship. See, e.g.,
Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708, 711-12 (Colo. 1987).
But Brauweiler neither cites these cases nor urges us to apply their
holdings. Consequently, these arguments are not properly before
us and we do not address them. See Compos v. People, 2021 CO
19, ¶ 35 (citing Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243-44
(2008)).

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(“[P]arol evidence may be considered by the trial court to determine

if a contract is ambiguous . . . .” (citing Pepcol Mfg., 687 P.2d at

1314 n.3)). But she does not say this explicitly, nor does she cite

any authority supporting this approach. We therefore come to the

same conclusion as above — to the extent that Brauweiler sought to

raise this argument on appeal, she has not done so in a way that

triggers our review. See Taylor, ¶ 13; Vickery, 277 P.3d at 870.

¶ 15 In sum, Brauweiler fails to identify any lack of completeness or

ambiguity in the offer letter — the only document both she and NJH

signed. And she fails to properly present any appellate argument

that would justify looking beyond the four corners of the offer letter

to interpret that written agreement. She has therefore failed to

persuade us that the district court erred by ignoring all evidence

extrinsic to the offer letter and concluding that she was an at-will

employee based on the offer letter’s unambiguous language.

IV. Unpaid Wages

¶ 16 Brauweiler next argues that the district court erred by

granting NJH summary judgment on her Wage Claim Act claim for

unpaid wages allegedly earned during her unpaid suspension. She

argues that she is entitled to her salary for this period of time

8
(1) because she performed work while suspended and (2) even if she

performed no work while suspended. We agree with NJH that

Brauweiler failed to raise the first argument in her summary

judgment filings below. We therefore address only her second

argument: that she was entitled to her salary under the Wage Claim

Act even if she did no work while suspended. See White v.

Progressive Mountain Ins. Co., 62 P.3d 1074, 1077 (Colo. App. 2002)

(declining to address argument raised on appeal but not raised in

response to summary judgment motion).

¶ 17 We interpret statutes de novo, seeking to give effect to the

legislature’s intent. Est. of Ross v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 2025 COA

31, ¶¶ 13-14 (cert. granted Nov. 17, 2025). We do this by reading

the statutory language in the context of the statute as a whole and

the statutory scheme. Id. at ¶ 15. If the statutory language is

unambiguous when read in context, we apply that unambiguous

meaning. Id. at ¶¶ 14-15.

¶ 18 We take Brauweiler’s point that under the terms of the offer

letter, she was entitled to her salary unless and until she was

terminated. But the claim at issue here seeks unpaid wages or

compensation under the Wage Claim Act (it is not a breach of

9
contract claim). Specifically, Brauweiler seeks unpaid wages under

section 8-4-109(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025, which addresses the payment of

wages or compensation upon termination. The Wage Claim Act

defines “[w]ages” or “compensation” as money “for labor or service

performed by employees.” § 8-4-101(14)(a)(I). The compensation

Brauweiler seeks does not fit this definition because it is

compensation Brauweiler performed no work for. Accordingly,

Brauweiler is not entitled to wages or compensation as defined by

the Wage Claim Act and this challenge to the court’s summary

judgment ruling fails.

V. Retaliation

¶ 19 Brauweiler also argues that the court erred by granting NJH

summary judgment on her Wage Claim Act retaliation claim. This

claim alleged that NJH violated section 8-4-120(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025,

which says an employer “shall not intimidate, threaten, restrain,

coerce, blacklist, discharge, or in any manner discriminate or

retaliate against an employee or worker who has . . . [f]iled a

complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted a proceeding

under this article 4 or any other law or rule related to wages.”

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¶ 20 As we understand it, Brauweiler argued in the district court

that NJH violated this statute in three ways: (1) by marking her

ineligible for rehire; (2) by sending her a letter from outside counsel

asking her to direct communication about her wages to outside

counsel instead of NJH; and (3) by preventing her from

communicating with her former colleagues about matters unrelated

to her wages. We conclude that the district court properly rejected

all of these arguments in granting summary judgment.

¶ 21 First, the undisputed facts showed that NJH marked

Brauweiler as ineligible for rehire before she demanded any unpaid

wages. Consequently, NJH’s action could not have been

retaliatory — NJH could not have retaliated against something that

had not happened yet. On appeal, Brauweiler contends that “the

date on which NJH marked [her] as ineligible for rehire was in

dispute.” But she fails to identify any evidence establishing that

dispute. We therefore reject this argument.

¶ 22 Brauweiler’s second and third retaliation theories involve a

letter NJH’s outside counsel sent to Brauweiler’s home after she

first demanded unpaid wages following her termination. As above,

the undisputed facts established that the letter did not prevent

11
Brauweiler from contacting her former colleagues at NJH about

unrelated matters. The letter’s subject line was “Re: Demand for

Payment of Wages.” In it, outside counsel wrote, “I am formally

requesting that you immediately cease and desist from contacting

NJH directly regarding this matter. Please direct all further

correspondence to me. Any further attempts to contact NJH or its

employees regarding this matter will be viewed as harassment.” It

was clear that the direction applied only to “this matter,” which was

Brauweiler’s “Demand for Payment of Wages.” This left Brauweiler

free to contact her former colleagues about anything unrelated to

the wage dispute.

¶ 23 Finally, Brauweiler argues that the mere fact that NJH’s

outside counsel made this request by sending a letter to her home

constituted retaliation. In her opening brief, she states in

conclusory fashion that sending the letter, in and of itself, might

have dissuaded a reasonable worker from pursuing unpaid wages.

She does not explain why or how. Without more, we deem this

contention unsupported by substantial argument and do not

address it. See Taylor, ¶ 13 (declining to address conclusory

contentions unsupported by substantial argument).

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VI. Appellate Fees and Costs

¶ 24 NJH requests its reasonable appellate attorney fees and costs

as a sanction under C.A.R. 38(b) because Brauweiler’s appeal was

frivolous as filed. An appeal is frivolous as filed if “there are no

legitimately appealable issues because the judgment below ‘was so

plainly correct and the legal authority contrary to the appellant’s

position so clear.’” Calvert v. Mayberry, 2019 CO 23, ¶ 45 (quoting

Castillo v. Koppes-Conway, 148 P.3d 289, 292 (Colo. App. 2006)).

Although we have disagreed with Brauweiler’s arguments, we do not

view the appeal as so egregious that it warrants appellate attorney

fees and costs as a sanction. See Mission Denv. Co. v. Pierson, 674

P.2d 363, 365-66 (Colo. 1984) (explaining that C.A.R. 38 sanctions

should be imposed “only in clear cases” and be “directed toward

penalizing egregious conduct without deterring a lawyer from

vigorously asserting his client’s rights.”).

VII. Disposition

¶ 25 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE concurs.

JUDGE YUN specially concurs.

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JUDGE YUN, specially concurring.

¶ 26 I concur in the result reached by the majority and with much

of its analysis. But I part ways with the majority’s approach to

determining whether Dr. Anne Brauweiler is an at-will employee.

The majority relied exclusively on the four corners of the offer letter

and declined to consider the employment policies of the National

Jewish Hospital (NJH). See supra, ¶ 15. In my view, Brauweiler’s

offer letter and NJH’s policies should be considered together when

analyzing her status as an at-will employee.

¶ 27 On September 20, 2021, NJH offered Brauweiler — a longtime

employee of NJH — a faculty appointment as Instructor in Dr. Mari

Nakamura’s laboratory. This offer was formalized in a letter signed

by both parties, which stated: “Your appointment will be Instructor,

Research, Non-Tenure Track,” and “This contract is automatically

renewed on July 1 of each year4 unless it is terminated in writing.”

Though the offer letter did not specify a duration of employment, it

4 NJH operates on an academic calendar spanning July 1 to June

30 of the following year. Faculty appointments are customarily
aligned with this calendar, ensuring that any changes to job duties,
titles, or compensation take effect at the beginning of an academic
year.

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did state that “[c]ontinued employment is contingent on your . . .

adherence to institutional policies and bylaws (which may

periodically change).”

¶ 28 NJH maintains a “Faculty Appointment, Promotion, and

Periodic Evaluation Policy” (FAPPE), which states that it is

incorporated into all faculty offer letters. The FAPPE defines two

types of faculty at NJH: “Special Category Faculty” and “Academic

Faculty.” According to the policy, “Special Category Faculty

members are not governed by the FAPPE Policy and their periodic

reviews are not conducted by the FAPPE Committee.” An

Instructor, such as Brauweiler, falls within the Special Category

Faculty. However, the FAPPE also states, “Instructors are normally

appointed for renewable terms of three years; exceptions can be

made at the request of their Department Chair with the approval of

the Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs.” It further

provides:

The Chair of the Department within which the
person will serve will initiate and recommend
the appointment of a person to the rank of
Instructor. This appointment is for a term of
three years and is renewable.

15
Finally, the FAPPE states, “In the event of a conflict between this

FAPPE policy and NJH policies, NJH policies will control.”

¶ 29 NJH maintains a “Faculty Recruitment and Hiring Policy” that

applies to all faculty members and provides as follows:

Employment with [NJH] is at-will. Employees
have the right to end their work relationship
with the company, with or without advance
notice for any reason. [NJH] has the same
right. The language used in this policy and
any verbal statements made by management
are not intended to constitute a contract of
employment, either express or implied, nor are
they [a] guarantee of employment for a specific
duration. No representative of [NJH], other
than the President or Provost has the authority
to enter into an agreement of employment for
any specified period. All faculty offers must be
documented in writing on a faculty
appointment letter as discussed above, signed
by the President or Provost and the faculty
member. All changes to faculty appointment
letters must be in writing and approved by all
original signatories.

¶ 30 Additionally, NJH’s “Employee Handbook” includes the

following under the heading “IMPORTANT NOTICE”:

AT [NJH], NEITHER THE EMPLOYEE NOR
[NJH] IS COMMITTED TO AN EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP FOR A FIXED PERIOD OF
TIME. EMPLOYMENT WITH [NJH] IS AT-WILL.
EITHER THE EMPLOYEE OR MANAGEMENT
HAS THE RIGHT TO TERMINATE THE
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP AT ANY TIME,

16
FOR ANY REASON. THE LANGUAGE USED IN
THIS HANDBOOK AND ANY VERBAL
STATEMENTS BY MANAGEMENT ARE NOT
INTENDED TO CONSTITUTE A CONTRACT OF
EMPLOYMENT, EITHER EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, NOR IS THERE A GUARANTEE OF
EMPLOYMENT FOR ANY SPECIFIC
DURATION. NO REPRESENTATIVE OF [NJH],
OTHER THAN THE PRESIDENT, HAS THE
AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO AN AGREEMENT
OF EMPLOYMENT FOR ANY SPECIFIED
PERIOD AND SUCH AGREEMENT MUST BE
IN WRITING, SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT
AND THE EMPLOYEE.

¶ 31 In Colorado, an employee hired for an indefinite period is

considered an “at will employee.” Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v. Keenan,

731 P.2d 708, 711 (Colo. 1987). Such employment may be

terminated by either party at any time, without cause or notice, and

termination does not give rise to a cause of action. Id. However,

the presumption of at-will employment is not absolute and may be

rebutted under certain circumstances. Id.

¶ 32 Although employment for an indefinite period is presumed to

be “at will,” Colorado courts have recognized that an employer’s

policies — including employee handbooks — may be enforceable as

a unilateral contract, thereby altering the terms of employment.

See Cronk v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n, 765 P.2d 619, 622

17
(Colo. App. 1988); Gomez v. Martin Marietta Corp., 50 F.3d 1511,

1515 (10th Cir. 1995). If an employer distributes handbooks or

policy manuals that restrict its right to discharge employees, and an

employee relies on those documents in exchange for initial or

continued service, the employer may become contractually bound

by those policies. Cronk, 765 P.2d at 623; see also Keenan,

731 P.2d at 711; Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336,

1348-49 (Colo. 1988).

¶ 33 However, if the policy manual or handbook contains a clear

and conspicuous disclaimer, then the policy or handbook will not

be construed as a contract limiting the employer’s right to discharge

its employees. George v. Ute Water Conservancy Dist., 950 P.2d

1195, 1198 (Colo. App. 1997); see Cummings v. Arapahoe Cnty.

Sheriff’s Dep’t, 2018 COA 136, ¶¶ 45-61; Jaynes v. Centura Health

Corp., 148 P.3d 241, 248 (Colo. App. 2006).

¶ 34 The majority declines to look beyond the offer letter to

determine Brauweiler’s employment status, reasoning that she did

not argue on appeal that the letter was ambiguous or failed to

capture the parties’ full and complete intent. See supra, ¶ 15. In

my view, such an argument is unnecessary for us to consider NJH’s

18
employment policies. What matters is whether Brauweiler was

aware of or relied on those policies in accepting or continuing her

employment. Cronk, 765 P.2d at 623; Keenan, 731 P.2d at 711;

Churchey, 759 P.2d at 1348-49. And her affidavit confirms that she

was aware of and relied on the FAPPE when she accepted the

faculty position as Instructor. Therefore, I believe we must consider

not only the offer letter but also the FAPPE and other NJH policies

referenced therein.5 See People v. Backus, 952 P.2d 846, 850 (Colo.

App. 1998) (We “rely on [our] own interpretation of the law, even if it

is clearly inconsistent with the representations or arguments of

counsel in briefs or in oral argument, and even if counsel has taken

an internally inconsistent position.”).

5 The majority also contends that Brauweiler “fails to explain why a

document unilaterally created by an employer automatically
becomes part of an employment contract.” Supra, ¶ 13. However,
as discussed above, Colorado law is clear that an employer’s
policies — including employee handbooks — may be enforceable as
a unilateral contract. See Cronk v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n,
765 P.2d 619, 622 (Colo. App. 1988); Gomez v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 50 F.3d 1511, 1515 (10th Cir. 1995). And we rely on our
own interpretation of the law and are not bound by the parties’
arguments. People v. Snelling, 2022 COA 116M, ¶ 50 n.3; see also
Bar 70 Enters., Inc. v. Tosco Corp., 703 P.2d 1297, 1306 (Colo.
1985) (noting that courts are not bound by the parties’ stipulations
on questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact).

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¶ 35 But consideration of those employment policies does not

change Brauweiler’s status as an at-will employee. First, as the

district court observed, the offer letter does not specify a fixed

length of employment. Nor does Brauweiler argue that the offer

letter’s language — stating that “[t]his contract is automatically

renewed on July 1 of each year unless it is terminated in writing” —

creates a definite term of employment. Therefore, either Brauweiler

or NJH could terminate her employment in writing at any time, for

any or no reason. This fits squarely within the definition of at-will

employment. See Keenan, 731 P.2d at 711.

¶ 36 Still, Brauweiler argues that the offer letter and the FAPPE

must be read together. She contends that the FAPPE explicitly

provides it “will be deemed to be a part of each letter of offer” and

supplies a definite term of three years for an Instructor. NJH, on

the other hand, argues Brauweiler’s position is classified as Special

Category Faculty and that the FAPPE states that “Special Category

Faculty members are not governed by the FAPPE Policy.” NJH

therefore reasons that she does not have contractual rights to

enforce the FAPPE. But we do not have to resolve these conflicting

arguments because the FAPPE also expressly states: “In the event of

20
a conflict between this FAPPE policy and NJH policies, NJH policies

will control.”

¶ 37 It is undisputed that NJH maintains at least two at-will

employment policies: the Employee Handbook and the Faculty

Recruitment and Hiring Policy. Brauweiler does not dispute that

she was aware of these policies.6 She simply claims that the parol

evidence rule precludes consideration of other policies. But the

parol evidence rule cannot apply to other policies when the FAPPE

itself references them. See Tangren Fam. Tr. v. Tangren, 2008 UT

20, ¶¶ 11-12 (explaining that the parol evidence rule does not apply

unless there is an integrated agreement, meaning that it is final and

complete); Hatley v. Stafford, 588 P.2d 603, 605 (Or. 1978)

(explaining that the parol evidence rule does not apply when the

writing is not complete and contains only part of the agreement).

These other policies specify that, absent a written agreement to the

contrary signed by the President or Provost of NJH,7 all

6 During her deposition, Brauweiler testified that she was aware of

and had access to the Employee Handbook, and that she signed an
acknowledgment that she received a copy of the handbook in 2020.
7 Brauweiler also contends that under the Faculty Recruitment and

Hiring Policy, she entered into a written agreement, signed by the

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employees — including faculty — are employed on an at-will basis,

and not for a specified term. Because these policies supersede any

contrary provisions in the FAPPE, Brauweiler was an at-will

employee.

¶ 38 Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s order granting

summary judgment in favor of NJH, albeit on grounds different

than the majority and the district court below. Roque v. Allstate

Ins. Co., 2012 COA 10, ¶ 7 (“We can affirm [summary judgment] for

any reason supported by the record, even reasons not decided by

the trial court.”).

NJH Provost, specifying a duration of employment. However, the
offer letter — the only document signed by both parties — does not
provide a length of employment.

22