Estate of Heidel

25CA0029 Estate of Heidel 12-11-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0029
Mesa County District Court No. 24PR30187
Honorable Gretchen B. Larson, Judge

In re the Estate of Gary Kaye Heidel, deceased.

Desda Daniell Casey,

Appellant,

v.

Michele Aschbacher, Kersten Heidel, Camille Rowell, and Michael Rowell,

Appellees.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE
Tow and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 11, 2025

Desda Daniell Casey, Pro Se

Killian, Davis, & Richter, P.C., J. Keith Killian, Damon Davis, Grand Junction,
Colorado, for Appellees
¶1 In this probate case, Desda Daniell Casey1 appeals the district

court’s order concluding that the estate of her deceased father, Gary

Kaye Heidel, had no legal interest in a settlement arising out of a

wrongful death suit concerning the death of his longtime significant

other, Catherine Rowell. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Catherine and Gary (the couple) began their relationship in

1992 and lived together off and on until 2016, when Catherine died

while incarcerated at the Rio Blanco County Jail. After Catherine’s

death, Gary asserted that he was Catherine’s common law husband

and filed a wrongful death action against the Rio Blanco County

Sheriff’s Office, the appointed sheriff, and individual sheriff’s

deputies (collectively, RBSO), in federal district court asserting

federal and state claims based on alleged violations of Catherine’s

constitutional rights (the federal case). See Heidel v. Mazzola, 851

F. App’x 837 (10th Cir. 2021). Catherine’s children — Michele

Aschbacher, Camille Rowell, Kersten Heidel, and Michael Rowell

1 To avoid confusion between those who share a last name, we refer

to parties in this opinion by their first names. We intend no
disrespect in doing so.

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(collectively, Catherine’s children) — and her estate joined the

federal case as plaintiffs. See id. The federal district court entered

summary judgment in favor of the RBSO on Catherine’s children

and Gary’s federal claims but dismissed the state law claims

without prejudice. See id. at 839-40.

¶3 Catherine’s children and Gary then filed a wrongful death

action against the RBSO in Adams County Case No. 20CV30602,

which was later transferred to Rio Blanco County Case No. 20CV1

(the state case).2 Gary also asserted that he was Catherine’s

common law husband in the state case.

¶4 Gary died during the pendency of the state case. About a year

after Gary’s death, Catherine’s children — who were the remaining

plaintiffs in the state case — reached a settlement agreement with

the RBSO. As part of the settlement agreement, Catherine’s

children agreed to initiate a probate case for Gary’s estate to have

the district court determine whether Gary’s estate had any rights to

2 We take judicial notice of the court records in the Adams County

and Rio Blanco County cases. See Harriman v. Cabela’s Inc., 2016
COA 43, ¶ 64 (noting that appellate courts “can ‘take judicial notice
of the contents of court records in a related proceeding’” (quoting
People v. Sa’ra, 117 P.3d 51, 56 (Colo. App. 2004))).

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the settlement funds. Catherine’s children thus commenced the

underlying probate proceeding by filing a petition to determine

heirship and interests in property. In the petition, Catherine’s

children asserted in relevant part that Gary’s estate didn’t have an

interest in the settlement funds because the couple wasn’t common

law married.

¶5 Desda, who is Gary’s child, was named as an interested party

in the probate case. Catherine’s children notified her of the probate

proceedings as required by section 15-12-1303, C.R.S. 2025.

Desda filed a responsive pleading disputing Catherine’s children’s

claim that the couple wasn’t common law married. Desda asserted

that, because the federal case and state case had already

determined that the couple was common law married, Catherine’s

children’s assertion otherwise was barred by issue preclusion and

claim preclusion.

¶6 The court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition. During

the hearing, the court received evidence regarding whether (1) there

was a prior determination that the couple was common law

married, such that Catherine’s children were precluded from

arguing otherwise; and (2) the couple’s past actions and

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representations could support a finding that the couple was

common law married if there was no such prior determination. At

the conclusion of the hearing, the court took the matter under

advisement and subsequently issued a written order (the judgment).

¶7 The court concluded that, because there wasn’t a prior final

judgment on Gary’s claim of a common law marriage, Catherine’s

children’s challenge to the existence of a common law marriage

between the couple wasn’t barred by issue or claim preclusion. The

court also determined that Desda hadn’t proved by a preponderance

of the evidence that the couple was common law married. And

because the couple wasn’t common law married, the court

concluded that Gary’s estate had no interest in the settlement

agreement.

¶8 Desda now appeals, arguing that the court erred by

concluding that claim preclusion doesn’t apply and that the couple

wasn’t common law married. Although Desda labeled her argument

as one of “claim preclusion,” whether Gary and Catherine were

common law married is not a claim but, rather, an issue integral to

the claims in the federal case. Because she is self-represented, we

broadly construe her argument as invoking the doctrine of issue

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preclusion to ensure that she isn’t denied review of her argument.

See Jones v. Williams, 2019 CO 61, ¶ 5. She also asserts the court

abused its discretion by not considering or giving “legal weight” to

certain evidence. For the reasons discussed below, we disagree and

therefore affirm the judgment.

II. Catherine’s Children’s Challenge to the Existence of a
Common Law Marriage Isn’t Barred by Issue Preclusion

A. Issue Preclusion Legal Principles

¶9 Issue preclusion “prevents the re-litigation of discrete issues,

rather than causes of action,” meaning “once a particular issue is

finally determined in one proceeding, parties to this proceeding are

barred from re-litigating that particular issue again in a second

proceeding, even when the actual claims for relief in the two

proceedings are different.” Foster v. Plock, 2017 CO 39, ¶ 13.

¶ 10 To bar litigation of an issue in a subsequent judicial

proceeding, the party asserting issue preclusion must prove four

elements, including the existence of a final judgment on the merits

from a prior proceeding. See id. A judgment is “final” when it “ends

the particular action in which it is entered, leaving nothing further

for the court pronouncing it to do in order to completely determine

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the rights of the parties involved in the proceeding.” BDG Int’l, Inc.

v. Bowers, 2013 COA 52, ¶ 24 (quoting Stillings v. Davis, 406 P.2d

337, 338 (Colo. 1965)). If a party fails to prove one of the elements,

their argument for issue preclusion necessarily fails. See Wolfe v.

Sedalia Water & Sanitation Dist., 2015 CO 8, ¶ 16 (noting that all

four elements must be proved for issue preclusion to apply).

¶ 11 Issue preclusion is a question of law that we review de novo.

Bristol Bay Prods., LLC v. Lampack, 2013 CO 60, ¶ 17.

B. Analysis

¶ 12 Desda asserts that the issue of whether the couple was

common law married was already “decided” by the courts in the

federal case and the state case. We aren’t persuaded.

¶ 13 To support her argument, Desda asserts that the issue was

previously litigated in the federal case because Catherine’s children

acknowledged and signed responses to interrogatories that affirmed

Gary was Catherine’s common law husband. She asserts that

Catherine’s children’s acknowledgment in the federal case “formed

the basis” for the state case. Thus, she argues that the district

court erred when it treated as not yet resolved the question of

whether the couple was common law married. However, Desda’s

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arguments about the effect of the federal and state cases are

misplaced.

¶ 14 While Catherine’s children may have affirmed that Gary was

Catherine’s common law husband during the discovery phase of the

federal case, the federal court dismissed that case and never issued

a final judgment. See Heidel, 851 F. App’x at 839-40. Said

differently, Catherine’s children’s acknowledgment during discovery

doesn’t constitute a final judgment. See Bowers, ¶ 24. Thus, the

legal question of whether the couple was common law married was

never decided in the federal case and, therefore, lacked a final

judgment as required under issue preclusion. See id.; Foster, ¶ 13.

¶ 15 Gary died during the pendency of the state case and his estate

wasn’t substituted as a party. Catherine’s children later reached a

settlement with the RBSO after Gary’s death. The court then stayed

proceedings in the state case pending the outcome of the probate

case underlying this appeal, so there hasn’t been a final judgment

in the state case that determined the couple was common law

married.

¶ 16 The court’s judgment in the probate case was the first time

that any court had entered a final judgment determining whether

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the couple was common law married. Thus, the proceedings in the

state case didn’t bar Catherine’s children’s challenge to Desda’s

contention that the couple was common law married. Accordingly,

Desda’s assertion that issue preclusion bars Catherine’s children’s

challenge necessarily fails. See Wolfe, ¶ 16.

¶ 17 Desda makes two additional arguments in support of her

assertion that the court erred by not giving preclusive effect to the

prior litigation. First, she asserts that Catherine’s children could’ve

challenged the common law marriage while Gary was alive and that

their challenge after his death is “procedurally improper.” However,

Desda never raised this argument during the probate proceeding, so

we don’t consider it further. See Colo. Div. of Ins. v. Statewide

Bonding, Inc., 2022 COA 67, ¶ 73 (“Arguments never presented to,

considered by, or ruled upon by a trial court may not be raised for

the first time on appeal.”).

¶ 18 Second, she asserts that the designation of “widower” on

Gary’s death certificate3 is “legally significant” because section

3 Desda didn’t submit Gary’s or Catherine’s death certificates as

part of the record on appeal. However, we take judicial notice of the
court file in Mesa County Case No. 24PR30187, which contains
both death certificates. See Harriman, ¶ 64.

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25-2-110, C.R.S. 2025, requires that a decedent’s marital status be

“properly established” and accurately reflected on the decedent’s

death certificate. But section 25-2-110 doesn’t require that a

decedent’s marital status must be “properly established.” Rather,

that section simply requires that the personal data for a death

certificate — including a decedent’s marital status — be provided by

“the next of kin or the best qualified person or source available.”

§ 25-2-110(3)(a); see also Dep’t of Pub. Health & Env’t Reg. 2.1(J), 5

Code Colo. Regs. 1006-1 (recognizing marriage as a “vital event”

that must be incorporated into official records, including death

certificates).

¶ 19 Furthermore, a death certificate doesn’t “end[] the particular

action” or “completely determine the rights of the parties involved.”

Bowers, ¶ 24 (quoting Stillings, 406 P.2d at 338). Thus, a death

certificate isn’t a final judgment, and we reject Desda’s argument

that the marital status on Gary’s death certificate conclusively

established that the couple was common law married.

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III. The Court Didn’t Abuse Its Discretion in Determining Whether
the Couple Was Common Law Married

A. Common Law Marriage Legal Principles

¶ 20 A couple may establish a common law marriage by their

mutual consent or agreement “to enter the legal and social

institution of marriage, followed by conduct manifesting that

mutual agreement.” Hogsett v. Neale, 2021 CO 1, ¶ 49. The key

inquiry in determining whether a common law marriage has been

established is whether “the parties mutually intended to enter a

marital relationship,” meaning they intended “to share a life

together as spouses in a committed, intimate relationship of mutual

support and mutual obligation.” Id.

¶ 21 To determine whether a couple mutually consented to

establish a common law marriage, the court considers the totality of

the circumstances. See id. at ¶ 50. As part of the court’s totality of

the circumstances analysis, it looks to a nonexhaustive list of

factors evidencing their mutual intent to enter into a marital

relationship, including whether the couple has (1) cohabitated; (2) a

reputation in the community as spouses; (3) shared financial

responsibility; (4) shared symbols of commitment; (5) adopted each

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other’s surnames; and (6) referenced each other as spouses. See id.

at ¶¶ 55-56.

¶ 22 A person seeking to have a court recognize a common law

marriage must prove the mutual intent of the parties to the

purported marriage by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. at

¶ 17; see also § 13-25-127, C.R.S. 2025 (“[T]he burden of proof in

any civil action shall be by a preponderance of the evidence.”).

¶ 23 We review the court’s factual findings for clear error, meaning

we must accept the court’s factual findings unless the findings have

no record support. In re Estate of Yudkin, 2021 CO 2, ¶ 16; Parocha

v. Parocha, 2018 CO 41, ¶ 11. We then review the court’s

conclusion based on those findings that no common law marriage

existed for an abuse of discretion. Yudkin, ¶ 16; Rains v. Barber,

2018 CO 61, ¶ 8 (noting that a court abuses its discretion when its

ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it

misapplies the law).

B. Additional Background

¶ 24 The court concluded that Desda failed to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the couple agreed to enter into

the legal contract of marriage or engaged in conduct manifesting the

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intent to be married. Specifically, the court found that Desda failed

to introduce any evidence that the couple

• celebrated a certain day as their anniversary;

• wore wedding rings;

• held themselves out to the community as husband and

wife; and

• had shared financial responsibilities, such as joint bank

or credit accounts, joint property ownership, or joint tax

returns.

¶ 25 Conversely, the court considered the evidence and determined

that it didn’t weigh strongly in favor of — or weighed against — the

conclusion that the couple manifested a mutual intent to be

married. For example, the court found that the couple lived

together on and off during their relationship but that “mere

cohabitation does not trigger marital rights or show an intent to be

married.” And while Catherine’s last name was listed as “Heidel” in

certain documents, the court noted that the decision to take a

partner’s last name isn’t necessarily indicative of a common law

marriage, and the court didn’t receive any evidence that Catherine

had legally changed her last name. Similarly, the court found that,

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while the couple may have shared a child — Kersten — “in today’s

society, having a child . . . is not indicative of an intent to enter into

a marriage contract.” Furthermore, the court received evidence that

Gary had previously referred to Catherine as his “girlfriend” or “live

in girlfriend” in legal documents and that Catherine’s obituary

referred to Gary as her “life partner,” rather than her husband.

¶ 26 The court found that Gary signed an affidavit of common law

marriage (the affidavit) after Catherine’s death, but placed little

weight on it because, at the time he signed it, Gary had a financial

incentive to indicate that Catherine was his wife.

C. Analysis

¶ 27 Desda asserts that the court misapplied the standard set forth

in Hogsett when it determined that the couple wasn’t common law

married. We see no abuse of discretion.

¶ 28 The court considered the totality of the couple’s circumstances

to determine whether the couple had mutually consented to

establish a common law marriage, as evidenced by its consideration

of approximately eleven of the nonexhaustive factors set forth in

Hogsett, ¶¶ 55-56. The court considered several factors that could

indicate the couple’s intent to be common law married, including

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Catherine’s use of Gary’s last name, the couple’s cohabitation, and

their shared child. But it weighed those factors against other

evidence and determined that the evidence as a whole didn’t

demonstrate the couple’s mutual intent to be married. While it is

true that Gary signed the affidavit and affirmed that he was

Catherine’s common law husband, such evidence is only indicative

of Gary’s intent and doesn’t establish the couple’s mutual consent

or agreement. Thus, as required by Hogsett, ¶ 49, the court

appropriately considered the evidence presented to it to determine

whether the couple’s conduct manifested their mutual agreement to

establish a common law marriage.

¶ 29 Notably, Desda failed to include transcripts from the

evidentiary hearing, so we must presume that the record supports

the judgment. See In re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 13

(noting that if an appellant asserts that a trial court’s findings or

conclusions are unsupported or contrary to the evidence, “the

appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence

relevant to such finding or conclusion,” and, if the appellant fails to

provide the transcript, then we must presume the record supports

the judgment (citation omitted)). And, in any event, the record

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before us supports the court’s judgment, so we won’t disturb it.

See In re Estate of Owens, 2017 COA 53, ¶ 22 (noting an appellate

court won’t reweigh evidence).

IV. The Court Didn’t Abuse Its Discretion When It Weighed the
Evidence

A. Applicable Legal Principles

¶ 30 The Colorado Rules of Evidence guide a court’s determination

of the admissibility of evidence. See CRE 401 (defining relevant

evidence); CRE 402 (stating that relevant evidence is generally

admissible unless certain exceptions apply). Hearsay statements

aren’t admissible unless they fall under an applicable exception.

See CRE 801(c) (defining “hearsay” statements); CRE 802 (noting

general inadmissibility of hearsay statements); CRE 803 (outlining

hearsay exceptions regardless of the availability of the declarant);

CRE 804 (outlining hearsay exceptions when the declarant is

unavailable).

¶ 31 “It is the trial court’s duty to determine the relevance and

admissibility of evidence.” Curry v. Brewer, 2025 COA 28, ¶ 30.

And in a common law marriage case, the court is the fact finder, so

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it determines whether evidence is credible and what weight to afford

the evidence. See Hogsett, ¶ 50.

¶ 32 We review a court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Crossgrove, 2012 CO 31, ¶ 7.

B. Analysis

¶ 33 As relevant here, Desda asserts that the court erred when it

“wrongfully dismissed critical documentary evidence and sworn

testimony” and didn’t provide “legal weight” to (1) the affidavit;

(2) Gary’s death certificate; (3) evidence of the couple’s public

representations as husband and wife; and (4) a letter to the court

from Desda’s mother, Shawna Casey. Desda also argues that the

court “failed to apply CRE 803(14) and CRE 804.” We reject her

assertions for four reasons.

¶ 34 First, the court expressly considered the affidavit. However, as

noted above in Part III.C, the court concluded that the timing of the

affidavit and Gary’s financial incentive to sign it outweighed any

evidence that the affidavit established a common law marriage. As

the fact finder, it was the court’s duty to determine the credibility

and weight of the affidavit, see Hogsett, ¶ 50, which is exactly what

the court did here.

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¶ 35 Second, the court received into evidence a copy of Gary’s death

certificate. While the court didn’t make written findings about the

weight it afforded to the statement on Gary’s death certificate that

he was a “widower,” it received evidence demonstrating that it was

Desda’s decision to label Gary’s marital status as “widower” on his

death certificate. See § 25-2-110(3)(a). The court also received into

evidence Catherine’s death certificate, which lists Catherine’s

marital status as “divorced” and doesn’t list Gary as her spouse.

The court was thus required to resolve the conflicting evidence by

considering its credibility and determining whether it weighed for or

against the conclusion that the couple was common law married.

See People in Interest of Ramsey, 2023 COA 95, ¶ 23 (resolving

conflicts in the evidence is “solely within the province of the fact

finder”); Hogsett, ¶ 50. And because we don’t have the hearing

transcripts, we presume the record supports the judgment. See

Dean, ¶ 13.

¶ 36 Third, contrary to Desda’s assertion otherwise, the court did

consider documentary evidence related to Catherine’s use of Gary’s

last name. This evidence included a receipt that Catherine signed

as “Cathy Heidel” and a pamphlet from Catherine’s funeral, which

17
listed Catherine’s last name as “Rowell Heidel” and said that Gary

was Catherine’s “life partner.” However, as discussed in Part III.C,

the court appropriately considered the credibility of that evidence

and weighed it against other, conflicting evidence that it received,

which was within the court’s province as the fact finder. See

Ramsey, ¶ 23.

¶ 37 Fourth, Desda argues that Shawna’s letter was “written

testimony” that detailed the couple’s marital behavior. Desda

argues that the court failed to afford the letter “legal weight.” The

court declined to admit Shawna’s letter into evidence because it was

hearsay. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the

truth of the matter asserted. See CRE 801(c); Mullins v. Med. Lien

Mgmt., Inc., 2013 COA 134, ¶ 52. Desda offered Shawna’s letter for

the truth of the statements it contained — i.e., that the couple

behaved as spouses. Shawna’s letter therefore falls squarely within

the definition of hearsay.

¶ 38 Desda appears to assert that the court should have

determined the letter was admissible under CRE 803(14) or CRE

804. CRE 803(14) is an exception to the hearsay rule that allows

records of documents that establish or affect an interest in property

18
to be admitted. Desda doesn’t explain why Shawna’s letter was

admissible under this rule, and we therefore decline to consider this

argument further. See Barnett v. Elite Props. of Am., Inc., 252 P.3d

14, 19 (Colo. App. 2010) (declining to consider a bald legal assertion

presented without argument or development).

¶ 39 Desda doesn’t explain what portion of CRE 804 she believes

Shawna’s letter is admissible under. Regardless, we acknowledge

that CRE 804(b)(4)(B) allows a court to admit hearsay statements of

family history. However, the admissibility of such statements is

limited to factual information like “date[s] of birth, marriage, death,

and the fact and degree of family relationships.” People v. Raffaelli,

701 P.2d 881, 884 (Colo. App. 1985). This rule doesn’t authorize

the admission of hearsay statements purporting to explain the

circumstances or events underlying such family history facts. See

id. at 884-85. Thus, to the extent Desda argues that Shawna’s

letter was admissible under CRE 804(b)(4)(B), we reject that

argument. To the extent Desda argues that Shawna’s letter was

admissible under a different portion of CRE 804, her argument is

undeveloped, and we don’t consider it further. See Barnett, 252

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P.3d at 19. The court thus didn’t abuse its discretion by refusing to

admit Shawna’s letter into evidence.

V. Disposition

¶ 40 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE LUM concur.

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