Thomas v. ICAO

25CA0203 Thomas v ICAO 12-04-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0203
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado
DD No. 31871-2024

Immanuel Thomas,

Petitioner,

v.

Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado,

Respondent.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division A
Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN*
Román, C.J., and Bernard*, J., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 4, 2025

Immanuel Thomas, Pro Se

No Appearance for Respondent

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Immanuel Thomas appeals the denial of his claim for

unemployment compensation benefits. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Thomas worked as a concrete installer for approximately five

months before Thrasher, Inc. (Employer) terminated his

employment. Shortly thereafter, a deputy for the Division of

Unemployment Insurance (Division) denied Thomas’s claim for

unemployment compensation benefits. Thomas appealed that

decision, and the Division scheduled the matter for an evidentiary

hearing regarding the reasons for Thomas’s job separation.

¶3 Upon reviewing the evidence, the hearing officer found that

Employer terminated Thomas “because he failed to report to work”

and did not notify Employer of his absence. As a result, the hearing

officer found, Thomas “failed to meet the established job standard of

calling out if he was not going to report to work.” Thus, Thomas

was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation

benefits under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX), C.R.S. 2025

(disqualifying claimants terminated for failure to meet “established

job performance or other defined standards”). Finally, the hearing

officer found that Thomas was “responsible” for his termination and

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was thus not otherwise entitled to benefits. Thomas appealed to

the Panel, which affirmed the hearing officer’s decision.

II. Discussion

¶4 Thomas argues that the Panel erred in affirming the hearing

officer’s decision because (1) insufficient evidence supports the

hearing officer’s factual findings; (2) the hearing officer erred in

determining the cause of Thomas’s job separation; (3) the hearing

officer mischaracterized Thomas’s reason for missing work; and (4)

the hearing officer did not consider circumstances mitigating

Thomas’s unexcused work absence. We consider, and reject, each

of his arguments in turn.

A. Standard of Review and Legal Principles

¶5 Under section 8-74-107, C.R.S. 2025, we may not disturb

factual findings “supported by substantial evidence” and may only

set aside the Panel’s decision if (1) the Panel acted without or in

excess of its powers; (2) the decision was procured by fraud; (3) the

factual findings don’t support its decision; or (4) the decision is

erroneous as a matter of law. Substantial evidence is “probative,

credible, and competent, of a character which would warrant a

reasonable belief in the existence of facts supporting a particular

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finding.” Rathburn v. Indus. Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App.

1977).

¶6 Section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX) disqualifies a claimant from

receiving benefits if his “failure to meet established job performance

or other defined standards” caused his job separation. To evaluate

cause, the hearing officer considers the totality of the evidence and

determines the motivating factors in the employee’s separation.

Eckart v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 775 P.2d 97, 99 (Colo. App.

1989). “All that is required to establish a disqualification pursuant

to § 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX) is that claimant did not do the job for which

he was hired and which he knew was expected of him.” Pabst v.

Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 833 P.2d 64, 64-65 (Colo. App. 1992).

¶7 The disqualifying provisions of section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX)

“must be read in the light of the express legislative intent . . . to

provide benefits to those who become unemployed through ‘no fault’

of their own.” Cole v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 964 P.2d 617, 618

(Colo. App. 1998) (quoting § 8-73-108(1)(a)). Thus, even if the

hearing officer’s findings may support a disqualification under that

section, a claimant may still be entitled to benefits if the totality of

the circumstances establishes that the job separation occurred

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through no fault of the claimant. Id. at 618. In this context, “fault”

requires a volitional act or “the exercise of some control or choice by

the claimant in the circumstances resulting in the separation such

that the claimant can be said to be responsible for the separation.”

Id. A claimant’s responsibility or “fault” for his job separation is an

ultimate legal conclusion based on the established findings of

evidentiary fact. Id. at 618-19.

B. Application

¶8 The hearing officer found (and the Panel affirmed) that

Employer’s performance standards required that employees notify

Employer before missing a scheduled work shift. Substantial

evidence in the record supports this finding. A copy of Employer’s

Employee Handbook, entered into evidence at the hearing, makes

clear that employees were required to notify the company before

missing work:

If you are going to be late or absent for any reason, you
are required to notify your manager as far in advance as
possible. Any employee who fails to give such
notification will be charged with an unexcused absence
and appropriate discipline will be determined by
[Employer].

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¶9 The handbook later identifies prohibited conduct, including

“unauthorized absence(s)” and “[f]ailure to call in for an absence.”

It warns employees that violating policies set forth therein “may

result in disciplinary action, up to and including termination of

employment.” Additionally, the last page of the handbook included

Thomas’s signature, acknowledging that he had “received and

carefully read” the handbook. Thomas does not dispute that he

was aware of the policies related to work absences.

¶ 10 Substantial evidence also supports the hearing officer’s finding

that Thomas failed to notify Employer that he would miss work on

January 31, 2024. Indeed, Thomas testified to this at the hearing:

Q: Why were you fired?
A: Because I did no-call/no-show to work.
Q: And why weren’t you not [sic] at work that day?
A: I just didn’t show.

And, as the foregoing demonstrates, Thomas also testified that

Employer fired him for this. Documentary evidence from the

Division’s file further supports this finding. Responding to the

Division’s request for the reason Employer fired Thomas, Employer

wrote, “[Thomas] did not show up to appointments on 01/31 and

didn’t show for company kick off.” Further, Employer stated, “We

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have not heard from him after several attempts to contact.” When

asked whether Thomas violated company policy, Employer

answered, “Yes.”

¶ 11 The foregoing all qualifies as “substantial evidence” as a

matter of law. See Rathburn, 566 P.2d at 373. Thus, we reject

Thomas’s argument that because Employer did not participate in

the hearing, the hearing officer was not presented with sufficient

evidence to support a disqualification finding. We also note that

Thomas provides no legal authority supporting his position, and we

are aware of none.

¶ 12 We are similarly unpersuaded that the hearing officer erred in

attributing Thomas’s job separation solely to his unexcused

absence on January 31. As Thomas points out, he also testified

that he was uncomfortable attending a mandatory impending

company kick-off event out of town. He argues that his

“termination was already imminent,” and his termination therefore

cannot be solely attributed to his unexcused absence on January

31. Even if the hearing officer erred in this respect, Thomas does

not explain how such error, if corrected, would mandate reversal,

and it is not apparent to us that it would. We further note that the

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hearing officer had no obligation to address “specific evidence . . .

[that] he or she [did] not find persuasive,” and we thus perceive no

error in the hearing officer’s decision to omit any discussion of the

company kick-off event. Tilley v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 924

P.2d 1173, 1177 (Colo. App. 1996). To the extent that Thomas asks

us to reweigh the evidence, we may not do so. Sanchez v. Indus.

Claim Appeals Off., 2017 COA 71, ¶ 57, 411 P.3d 245, 258.

¶ 13 Thomas also argues that the hearing officer mischaracterized

his reason for missing work on January 31. The hearing officer

found that Thomas missed work to take a needed “mental health

day”; Thomas now contends that “declining work conditions”

prompted his absence. He does not, however, dispute that he chose

to miss work and chose not to notify his supervisor. Again, we

perceive no reason why Thomas’s motivation for missing work bears

on the case’s disposition, and Thomas provides no analysis to guide

us. In any event, like the Panel, we note that substantial evidence

supports the hearing officer’s finding. Indeed, in his written

communications with the Division, entered into evidence, Thomas

expressly stated that he substituted work on January 31 for a

“mental health day.” Accordingly, this argument also fails.

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¶ 14 Finally, Thomas argues that the hearing officer did not

consider several circumstances “mitigating” his failure to notify

Employer regarding his absence. Those circumstances include

Thomas’s (1) supervisor being out of town and habitually failing to

answer or return calls; (2) belief that calling in his absence would

yield more severe disciplinary consequences than an unexcused

absence; and (3) sense of “reduced job stability.” This argument

fares no better. Thomas provides no authority or analysis

demonstrating that any of these circumstances legally warrants

reversing the Panel’s decision. We therefore reject these

contentions. Vallagio at Inverness Residential Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v.

Metro. Homes, Inc., 2017 CO 69, ¶¶ 39-40, 395 P.3d 788, 795 (we

do not consider conclusory propositions devoid of legal citations or

analysis).

III. Disposition

¶ 15 We affirm the Panel’s order.

CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE BERNARD concur.

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