Peo v. Solazzo

24CA1345 Peo v Solazzo 11-26-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1345
Custer County District Court No. 03CR10
Honorable Lynette M. Wenner, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Andrew Solazzo,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE GROVE
J. Jones and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 26, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, John T. Lee, First Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Andrew Solazzo, Pro Se
¶1 Defendant, Andrew Solazzo, appeals the district court’s order

denying his motion for DNA testing. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2005, Solazzo pleaded guilty to sexual assault. The district

court sentenced him to an indeterminate term of six years to life in

prison. Since then, Solazzo has filed multiple postconviction

motions attacking his conviction and sentence. See People v.

Solazzo, (Colo. App. No. 06CA0977, July 31, 2008) (not published

pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)); People v. Solazzo, (Colo. App. No.

11CA1710, Aug. 8, 2013) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f));

People v. Solazzo, (Colo. App. No. 14CA2370, Mar. 10, 2016) (not

published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)); People v. Solazzo, (Colo. App.

No. 19CA1383, Feb. 10, 2022) (not published pursuant to C.A.R.

35(e)).

¶3 Most recently, Solazzo filed a motion for DNA testing.

Specifically, Solazzo claimed that while the DNA evidence in the

case was tested in 2003, today, the “[t]echnology is much more

sensitive,” the “Colorado Bureau of Investigation (CBI) may have

deviated from standard operating procedures” or “manipulated DNA

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results in [his] case to get a conviction,” and “cutting corners and

false reports by the CBI are extremely concerning.”

¶4 The district court denied Solazzo’s motion, concluding that he

had failed to sufficiently allege two of the factual criteria required by

section 18-1-413, C.R.S. 2025. First, he failed to adequately allege

that he would not have been convicted if favorable results had been

obtained through DNA testing at the time of the original

prosecution. And second, he failed to allege that DNA testing was

not available before his conviction. Instead, the court pointed out

that defense counsel had successfully suppressed all non-

testimonial evidence before trial and, based on Solazzo’s 2004 letter

to the Attorney General, he had admitted having sex with victim but

asserted that the encounter was consensual.

II. Discussion

¶5 On appeal, Solazzo provides a portion of (1) a 2005 hearing

transcript in which defense counsel discussed defense testing that

was done to a “carpet remnant,” which Solazzo said would have

supported his assertion that he previously had sex with the victim

and thereby indirectly bolstered his “consent defense”; (2) a defense

motion to continue in which counsel referenced sending two “carpet

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remnants” for DNA analysis; and (3) the petition for nontestimonial

identification requesting that Solazzo’s hair, blood, and saliva

samples be submitted for DNA analysis.

¶6 Salozzo also makes various ineffective assistance of trial

counsel claims relating to his attorney’s alleged failure to (1) test the

carpet remnants; (2) advise him concerning the terms of the plea

agreement; and (3) adequately investigate the case. And he

requests photographs that were taken of the victim during the

SANE exam and polygraphs to substantiate his claims made on

appeal.

¶7 Despite all of this, Salozzo makes no argument concerning the

district court’s denial of his motion for DNA testing. We recognize

that “[p]leadings by pro se litigants must be broadly construed to

ensure that they are not denied review of important issues because

of their inability to articulate their argument like a lawyer.” Jones

v. Williams, 2019 CO 61, ¶ 5. But because Salozzo does not seek

relief based on the same specific facts he raised in his motion, see

section 18-1-412(2), C.R.S. 2025, we decline to address the new

arguments he asserts on appeal. See People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20,

¶ 34 (“[A]lthough we will broadly construe a pro se litigant’s

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pleadings to effectuate the substance, rather than the form, of those

pleadings, we will not consider issues not raised before the district

court in a motion for postconviction relief.”); People v. Huggins,

2019 COA 116, ¶ 17 (“When a defendant does not raise an issue in

a postconviction motion . . ., and the postconviction court therefore

does not have an opportunity to rule on the issue, as a general rule,

the issue is not properly preserved for appeal and we will not

consider it.”); see also People v. Salazar, 964 P.2d 502, 507 (Colo.

1998) (“[I]ssues not raised in or decided by a lower court will not be

addressed for the first time on appeal.”).

¶8 Having so concluded, we do not address the People’s

alternative arguments that Solazzo’s requests for relief are untimely,

successive, or otherwise fail on the merits.

III. Disposition

¶9 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and J. SCHUTZ concur.

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