Peo v. King

23CA0604 Peo v King 11-06-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0604
El Paso County District Court No. 21CR5521
Honorable Laura N. Findorff, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Shirley Briar Rose King,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Pawar and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 6, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jessica R. Ross, Senior Assistant Attorney
General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kelly A. Corcoran, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Shirley Briar Rose King, appeals her convictions of

pimping, keeping a place of prostitution, prostitution, and

pandering. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2021, after receiving tips from the community, the Colorado

Springs Police Department started investigating King and her

massage parlor, Sutra Healing Center, for suspected prostitution

and pimping.

¶3 After discovering an online advertisement for Sutra Healing

Center on a commercial sex related website that referenced “sexual

things,” the Human Trafficking Division planned an undercover

operation.

¶4 Detective Tremaine White, an undercover police officer,

contacted King1 using an alias. After texting back and forth about

scheduling an appointment, White met with King at Sutra Healing

Center. While King gave White a tour, White inquired about King

providing women for an “adult entertainment” party. When White

asked King if she could dance nude at the party, she responded

1 The phone number listed on the online advertisement matched the

phone number King later provided to police.

1
that, while she performs all her other services nude, she does not

dance nude. However, King said she could provide other women

who would dance nude. After briefly discussing other details, White

paid King a one-hundred-dollar deposit for the party. King asked

White to place the money on the donation table.2

¶5 A few weeks later, White returned to Sutra Healing Center for

a tantra session with King. King explained that she received a

percentage of the payments made to her employees. King said that

she was aware her employees were having sex at Sutra Healing

Center because she would find condoms.

¶6 During White’s tantra session, King performed a body slide3

while they discussed details about the upcoming party. King said

that she and the other women would have sex in exchange for

money. White and King talked about the specific sexual acts that

would be performed and their estimated prices. They scheduled the

2 Detective Tyler Weems, who was qualified as an expert in

commercial sex trafficking and pimping investigation, later testified
that a “donation” is synonymous with payment being received for an
illegal sex related service.
3 King laid on top of White, completely nude, and rubbed her body

back and forth on his.

2
party for September 22, 2021. White paid King four hundred

dollars for the tantra session.

¶7 Over the next few days, King sent White photographs of the

women she recruited to participate in the party, and they finalized

the remaining details. King agreed to provide five to seven women

for White’s four to six friends.

¶8 On the night of September 22, 2021, King arrived at the house

and called all the women to an upstairs room. There, White paid

King in cash and King distributed the cash to each of the women.

¶9 Later that night, White told the women that his friends were

there to pay for sexual acts that had been previously agreed upon.

White asked each of the women whether they were willing to have

sex in exchange for money and the amount they were asking for.

Except for one woman, the women confirmed they were willing to

exchange sex for money. Police officers then raided the party.

¶ 10 Along with evidence from the party, the jury also heard

testimony from other individuals, including King’s ex-boyfriend

Richard Heizer. Heizer testified that King told him about the body

slides and having clients turn over during massages.

3
¶ 11 Chelsie Chambers, a former employee of King, also testified.

Chambers started working for King in October 2020. Chambers

testified that she would collect payments from her clients and then

place the cash payments in a safe that she accessed through a slot

at the top. King then paid Chambers through a cash app.

Chambers received less money from King than she was paid by her

clients. While Chambers denied providing sexual acts, Jerry Allin

testified that when he was Chambers’ client at Sutra Healing

Center, he paid Chambers for several sexual acts, including

intercourse. Allin also testified that he received the VIP treatment

at Sutra Healing Center, which included sexual acts in exchange for

money.

¶ 12 King did not testify, but her interview with Detective Tyler

Weems, the lead investigator, was introduced through his

testimony. During this interview, King gave Weems her phone

number and email. King agreed that her tantra services could be

mistaken for prostitution and acknowledged that people might

think she was pimping.

¶ 13 King was charged with pimping, keeping a place of

prostitution, prostitution, and pandering. A jury convicted King as

4
charged. The trial court sentenced her to four years of supervised

probation.

¶ 14 On appeal, King contends that (1) her pimping conviction was

barred by the statute of limitations; (2) insufficient evidence

supported her pimping conviction; and (3) a prejudicial variance in

the prostitution and pandering charges requires reversal. King also

contends that the trial court reversibly erred by (4) allowing the

prosecution to introduce parts of an out-of-court interview over her

rule-of-completeness objection; (5) admitting Facebook, cell phone

extraction, and backpage.com data; and (6) admitting women’s

statements from a party who did not testify, under the

co-conspirator hearsay exception. She also asserts cumulative

error. We reject King’s arguments and affirm the judgment.

II. Statute of Limitations

¶ 15 King contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over her

pimping charge because the earliest date in the complaint was

outside the statute of limitations. We disagree and conclude,

consistent with the holding in People v. Grosko, 2021 COA 28, that

pimping is a continuing offense.

5
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 16 “We review de novo issues concerning the application of a

statute of limitations.” People v. Johnson, 2013 COA 122, ¶ 7.

¶ 17 In Colorado, the statute of limitations operates as a

jurisdictional bar to criminal prosecution. People v. Butler, 2017

COA 117, ¶ 16; People v. Ware, 39 P.3d 1277, 1279 (Colo. App.

2001). Accordingly, once the statute of limitations period has

expired, there is no longer a risk of prosecution for that particular

offense. See Butler, ¶ 16.

¶ 18 Statutes of limitation normally begin to run once a crime is

completed. Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114 (1970). But

in certain circumstances, “a crime continues beyond the first

moment when all its substantive elements are satisfied.” People v.

Thoro Prods. Co., 70 P.3d 1188, 1192 (Colo. 2003). Such crimes are

known as continuing offenses. Id. A continuing offense “continues

(and the statute of limitations does not begin to run) so long as the

illegal conduct continues.” Id. at 1193; see also § 16-5-401(4),

C.R.S. 2025 (“When an offense . . . is based on a series of acts

performed at different times, the period of limitation prescribed by

6
this code . . . starts at the time when the last act in the series of

acts is committed.”).

¶ 19 We interpret statutes de novo. People v. Smith, 254 P.3d 1158,

1161 (Colo. 2011). Our goal is to give effect to the intent of the

legislature. Sigala v. Atencio’s Mkt., 184 P.3d 40, 42 (Colo. 2008).

We give words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning.

Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter, 255 P.3d 1083, 1089 (Colo. 2011).

¶ 20 A person commits the offense of pimping when she “knowingly

lives on or is supported or maintained in whole or in part by money

or other thing of value earned, received, procured, or realized by

any other person through prostitution.” § 18-7-206, C.R.S. 2025.

As a class 3 felony, pimping has a three-year statute of limitations.

§§ 16-5-401(1)(a), 18-7-206.

¶ 21 In Grosko, a division of this court held that pimping is a

continuing offense. Grosko, ¶ 21. The prosecution initially charged

Grosko with attempted pimping of a victim in 2015. Id. at ¶ 14. In

April 2016, the prosecution amended the information to include

alleged pimping between January and December 2013. Id. at ¶ 15.

After Grosko was convicted, he moved to dismiss the pimping

charge because the prosecutor’s amendment fell outside the

7
three-year statute of limitations. Id. The trial court found that the

plain language of the pimping statute indicates that pimping is a

continuing offense, and therefore, the statute of limitations did not

run until December 2016, three years after the last act. Id. at ¶ 16.

The division affirmed the trial court’s decision and held that the

plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase “lives on or is supported

or maintained” defines a criminal act that takes place over time

because the dictionary definitions of “living,” “support,” and

“maintain” each “contemplate an ongoing period of time.” Id. at

¶ 19.

¶ 22 The division relied on precedents from California courts

interpreting a substantially similar pimping statute. In People v.

Lewis, 143 Cal. Rptr. 587, 591 (Ct. App. 1978), the California

appellate court held that the “[r]easonable interpretation of the

statutory definition [of pimping] leads to but one conclusion that

the legislative intent was that living or deriving support or

maintenance from the earnings of a prostitute . . . is an ongoing

continuing offense that occurs over a period of time.” See also

People v. Culuko, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789, 801 (Ct. App. 2000) (“Typical

8
continuous course of conduct crimes include . . . pimping . . . .”);

People v. Dell, 283 Cal. Rptr. 361, 372 (Ct. App. 1991).

B. Analysis

¶ 23 King urges us not to follow the Grosko holding for two reasons.

She first argues that the Grosko division did not specify when the

crime of pimping ends and, thus, when the statute of limitations

period is triggered. Second, she argues that the California

authorities on which Grosko relies are distinguishable because they

did not contemplate the statute of limitations. We are

unpersuaded.

¶ 24 The crime of pimping ends when the defendant is no longer

living on or supported or maintained by proceeds from another’s

prostitution. See § 18-7-206. Therefore, the last charged instance

in which the defendant is living on or supported or maintained by

proceeds from another’s prostitution triggers the statute of

limitations. See Grosko, ¶ 21.

¶ 25 Moreover, we reject King’s argument that the California cases

lack persuasive authority. Determining whether an offense is

continuing is a matter of statutory interpretation. Id. at ¶ 11.

Therefore, the California cases provide persuasive support because

9
they interpret “identical statutory language” that establishes

pimping as a continuing offense. The cases did not need to

consider the statute of limitations to provide support for the Grosko

division’s conclusion.

¶ 26 In this case, King was charged with pimping on October 5,

2021. King’s last charged act of pimping others occurred on

September 22, 2021. Therefore, it took place within the statute of

limitations. Accordingly, we conclude that King’s pimping

conviction is not barred by the statute of limitations.

III. Sufficiency

¶ 27 King next contends the prosecution presented insufficient

evidence that she “knowingly live[d] on or [was] supported or

maintained . . . by money . . . earned . . . by any other person

through prostitution.” § 18-7-206. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 28 “[W]e review the record de novo to determine whether the

evidence before the jury was sufficient both in quantity and quality

to sustain the convictions.” Dempsey v. People, 117 P.3d 800, 807

(Colo. 2005). We view the evidence as a whole and in the light most

favorable to the prosecution to determine whether the evidence was

10
“sufficient to support the conclusion by a reasonable mind that the

defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Griego,

2018 CO 5, ¶ 24. In doing so, we give the prosecution “the benefit

of every reasonable inference which might be fairly drawn from the

evidence.” People v. Perez, 2016 CO 12, ¶ 25 (quoting People v.

Gonzales, 666 P.2d 123, 128 (Colo. 1983)). It is the role of the jury

to weigh the credibility of witnesses and to resolve conflicting

testimony. People v. Poe, 2012 COA 166, ¶ 14. We may not

substitute our judgment for that of the jury or reweigh conflicting

evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Id.

¶ 29 To prove pimping, the prosecution had to prove that King

“knowingly live[d] on or [was] supported or maintained in whole or

in part by money or other thing of value earned, received, procured,

or realized by any other person through prostitution.” § 18-7-206.

Specifically, “where the people’s evidence establishes that a person

knowingly applies a thing of value received through another’s act of

prostitution to his own benefit, whether it be a business or personal

benefit, a prima facie case for proof of the crime of pimping has

been made.” People v. Ganatta, 638 P.2d 268, 271 (Colo. 1981).

11
B. Analysis

¶ 30 Sufficient evidence supported King’s pimping conviction.

¶ 31 The trial evidence showed the following:

• Allin testified that he had sex with Chambers for three

hundred dollars at Sutra Healing Center.

• Chambers testified that her clients paid her in cash,

which she deposited into a safe at Sutra Healing Center.

King then paid Chambers through a cash app — an

amount less than what Chambers received from her

client. Only King had access to the safe.

• In a text message exchange between King and Chambers,

King asked Chambers, “What did [Allin] get?” After

telling King that Allin received a body slide and that she

paid King two hundred dollars, King responded that she

owed Chambers one hundred sixty dollars. King added,

“He normally always gets a VIP when he gets a [body

slide].”

• Allin testified that the VIP services he received at Sutra

Healing Center included sexual acts, specifically a hand

job from Chambers.

12
• Chambers testified that King used the money she

received from her employees to cover Sutra Healing

Center’s administrative costs, rent, and advertising.

¶ 32 We conclude that this evidence is sufficient to support King’s

pimping conviction.

¶ 33 Nevertheless, King contends that the prosecution failed to

establish beyond a reasonable doubt that King was supported or

maintained by money obtained from prostitution. However, in

Ganatta, 638 P.2d at 271-72, our supreme court addressed “the

question of what degree of proof is necessary to establish that one

‘lives on’ money from prostitution” and concluded that “[t]he scope

of proof does not necessitate a showing that the money earned from

prostitution was actually spent to provide support and maintenance

if it may reasonably be inferred that the accused has spent the

money or applied it to his benefit.” (Emphasis added.) Here, the

evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, supports a reasonable inference that King used the

funds to support her business. See People v. Vanderpauye, 2021

COA 121, ¶ 49 (the determination of the credibility of witnesses is

solely within the province of the jury), aff’d, 2023 CO 42.

13
¶ 34 Accordingly, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports

King’s pimping conviction.

IV. Variance

¶ 35 King next contends that reversal is required because the trial

court allowed an impermissible variance when it extended the date

range for the misdemeanor prostitution and pandering charges in

the jury instructions. While we agree that an error occurred, we

conclude that reversal is not required.

A. Additional Facts

¶ 36 The prosecution charged King with committing prostitution

and pandering “on or about September 22, 2021.” At trial, the

court instructed the jury:

The defendant is charged with committing the
crimes of Pimping, Keeping a Place of
Prostitution, Prostitution, and Pandering in El
Paso County, Colorado, between and including
January 1, 2016, and September 22, 2021.

¶ 37 In closing argument, the prosecutor stated:

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I want to
start here with the overall big picture. The
dates of alleged crime are charged between
January 1, 2016, and the date of the party
that occurred with Undercover Detective White
on September 22, 2021. You can consider
anything that happened inside of that time

14
frame for either the crime that Ms. King is
alleged – the crimes that Ms. King is alleged to
have committed, and you can consider all of
the evidence from that time period for any of
those individual crimes. So that’s the scope of
the big picture that we’re looking at.

....

The elements of the crime of Prostitution. This
one is simple . . . . In this case we know from
[Allin’s] testimony that he had sex with Shirley
King and then paid her money for that. And
that constitutes the crime of Prostitution.

Finally, we have the elements for the crime of
Pandering . . . [a]nd in this case we have the
specific incident of the party on September 22,
which Shirley King arranged for knowing,
based on the circumstantial evidence and your
logic and common sense, that prostitution
would be taking place at that party. And that
constitutes the crime of Pandering.

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 38 A defendant has a constitutional right to notice of the charges

against her. Hoggard v. People, 2020 CO 54, ¶ 22. In Colorado,

that notice is generally provided through the filing of a complaint or

information. Id. at ¶ 23. A complaint or information is sufficient

when it advises the accused of the charges so that she has a “fair

and adequate opportunity to prepare [her] defense” and is “not

15
taken by surprise” by the evidence offered at trial. People v.

Martinez, 2024 COA 34, ¶ 21 (citation omitted).

¶ 39 A variance occurs when a charge contained in the charging

document differs from the charge for which a defendant is

convicted. See People v. Gallegos, 260 P.3d 15, 25 (Colo. App.

2010). There are two types of variances, but King alleges only one

— a simple variance — occurred here. A simple variance occurs

when the charging terms are unchanged, but the evidence at trial

proves facts materially different from those alleged in the charging

document. People v. Deutsch, 2020 COA 114, ¶ 25. A simple

variance requires reversal only if it prejudices the defendant’s

substantial rights. People v. Rail, 2016 COA 24, ¶ 51, aff’d, 2019

CO 99. Thus, we will not disturb the judgment for a simple

variance “as long as the proof upon which the conviction is based

corresponds to an offense that was clearly set out in the charging

instrument.” Campbell v. People, 2020 CO 49, ¶ 45.

¶ 40 We review de novo whether a variance occurred, see People v.

Carter, 2021 COA 29, ¶ 35, but because King did not preserve this

claim, the plain error standard of reversal applies. See Hagos v.

People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14. That standard requires an error to be

16
obvious and substantial. Id. We reverse only when the error so

undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial that it casts

serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction. Id.

C. Analysis

¶ 41 The parties dispute preservation. The People contend King

invited the error by tendering the following statement of the case:

The defendant is charged with committing the
crimes of Pimping, Keeping a Place of
Prostitution, Prostitution, and Pandering, in El
Paso County, Colorado, between and including
January 1, 2016 and September 22, 2021.

¶ 42 We are not convinced. The doctrine of invited error prevents a

party from complaining on appeal about an error that she injected

into the case. People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 34. When a jury

instruction error is due to inadvertence or attorney incompetence

rather than trial strategy, an appellate court should review for plain

error instead of treating the contention as waived under the invited

error doctrine. See People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107, 120 (Colo.

2002). Here, we can discern no reasonably strategic reason for

King’s error and conclude it resulted from inadvertence or

incompetence and not strategy. Therefore, we address the merits of

her contention.

17
¶ 43 A variance between the specific date of the offense as alleged

in the information and the date proved at trial is considered

reversible error if the defendant shows that her ability to defend

against the charge was impaired. People v. Adler, 629 P.2d 569,

571 (Colo. 1981).

¶ 44 King alleges that if the prosecution had charged her with the

prostitution and pandering offenses “between and including

January 1, 2016, and September 22, 2021,” she could have

defended on the basis that those charges deprived the trial court of

jurisdiction because of the expired statute of limitations.4

¶ 45 While we agree that the error was obvious, the error was not

substantial for two reasons.

¶ 46 First, the variance did not impair King’s ability to defend

against the charges. King’s reliance on People v. Lopez, 140 P.3d

106 (Colo. App. 2005), is misplaced. In Lopez, the pro se defendant

was charged with failing to register as a sex offender on a specific

date. Id. at 110. Lopez argued that he could not physically register

4 At the time of the alleged offenses, prostitution and pandering

were both misdemeanors, subject to an eighteen-month statute of
limitations. See §§ 18-7-201(3), -203(2)(b), C.R.S. 2021. The
prosecution brought charges on October 5, 2021.

18
on that specific date because he was in jail and jail officials did not

allow him to do so. Id. In closing, the prosecutor presented

additional dates on which Lopez did not register. Id. The court of

appeals found that the variance impaired Lopez’s ability to defend

against the charge because his defense was specific to the charged

date, not the additional dates the prosecutor argued in closing. Id.

¶ 47 Here, King’s defense was that she did not engage in the crimes

of prostitution or pandering. She did not provide a specific defense

related to the date charged. Therefore, her theory of defense was

unaffected by any variance between the date in the information and

the date range presented at trial. See Rail, ¶ 54. Further, King

does not assert that she was surprised by the evidence presented at

trial or that she would have produced different evidence in her

defense. See id.; People v. Pahl, 169 P.3d 169, 178 (Colo. App.

2006).

¶ 48 Second, the evidence that King committed prostitution and

pandering on or about September 22, 2021, the date in the

charging document, was overwhelming. Prostitution requires a

person who “performs or offers or agrees to perform any act of

sexual intercourse . . . with any person not his spouse in exchange

19
for money or other thing of value.” § 18-7-201(1), C.R.S. 2025. At

the party, King agreed to have sex in exchange for money. Further,

pandering includes “[k]nowingly arranging or offering to arrange a

situation in which a person may practice prostitution.”

§ 18-7-203(1)(b), C.R.S. 2025. White’s testimony provided extensive

evidence that King agreed to provide women who would have sex in

exchange for money at the party, selected the women to attend,

arranged their arrival — including transportation — and discussed

the sexual acts the women would perform at the party along with

the payment they would require. Therefore, the evidence supported

King’s prostitution and pandering convictions on or around the date

charged and within the statute of limitations.

¶ 49 Accordingly, we conclude that any error caused by the simple

variance did not undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial.

V. Rule of Completeness

¶ 50 King next contends that the trial court erred by allowing the

prosecution to introduce portions of Chambers’ out-of-court

interview over her rule-of-completeness objection. Even assuming,

without deciding, that an error occurred, we conclude it was

harmless.

20
A. Additional Facts

¶ 51 In December 2021, Weems conducted a phone interview with

Chambers. Chambers told Weems that Allin was a regular

customer and confirmed that she had sex with Allin in exchange for

money while working as an independent contractor for King at

Sutra Healing Center. At that time, King took over fifty percent of

Chambers’ pay. During the interview, Chambers expressed that the

phone call was difficult because she was dealing with “past

traumas.”

¶ 52 At trial, Chambers testified that she could not remember what

she told Weems and denied providing sexual services in exchange

for money.

¶ 53 During Weems’ testimony, the prosecution sought to admit the

interview as a prior inconsistent statement by Chambers. King

objected on hearsay grounds. After a lengthy discussion, the trial

court determined that the interview was admissible.

¶ 54 When the interview was introduced, the prosecutor stated

that, in the interest of time, they would not play the full twelve

minutes but would skip through a few portions. The following

discussion ensued:

21
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I think for the sake of
completeness, we should just play the 12
minutes.

THE COURT: The Prosecution can play
whatever portions they believe are relevant. If
you want to, during cross-examination, ask
that the entire thing be presented, you can do
so.

¶ 55 After Weems verified the audio recording reflected a fair and

accurate depiction of his interview with Chambers, the prosecution

played four clips.

¶ 56 During cross-examination, King did not request the full

interview to be played.

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 57 We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of

discretion. People v. McLaughlin, 2023 CO 38, ¶ 22. A trial court

abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law or when its

decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Id. When,

as here, a defendant has preserved her objection to the exclusion,

we evaluate any error for harmlessness and will reverse “only if the

error substantially influenced the jury’s verdict or affected the

fairness of the trial proceedings.” People v. Owens, 2024 CO 10,

¶ 66.

22
¶ 58 The rule of completeness provides that, “[w]hen a statement or

part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require

introduction of any other part or any other statement which ought

in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.” CRE 106.

Its purpose is to “avoid creating a misleading impression by taking

evidence out of context or otherwise creating a distorted picture by

the selective introduction of evidence.” People v. Medina, 72 P.3d

405, 410 (Colo. App. 2003); see also McLaughlin, ¶ 31 (the

touchstone of a completeness inquiry is fairness).

C. Analysis

¶ 59 King argues that the jury was misled because the remaining

portions of the interview revealed Chambers’ state of mind. We are

not persuaded. First, neither trial counsel nor appellate counsel

explained, beyond conclusory representations, how playing only a

portion of the interview created a misleading impression of

Chambers’ state of mind or how greater context was helpful or

fairer.

¶ 60 Second, the entire interview was introduced into evidence.

Therefore, the jury had access to, and could have listened to, the

entire interview. See Owens, ¶ 66 (error deemed harmless when it

23
did not substantially influence the jury’s verdict or affect the

fairness of the trial proceedings).

VI. Authentication of Documentary Evidence and Hearsay
Contentions

¶ 61 King next contends that Facebook records, a digital extraction

from King’s phone, and material from backpage.com (Backpage

advertisements) were improperly admitted as evidence. We

disagree.

A. Additional Facts

¶ 62 Regarding the Facebook records, Weems wrote one Facebook

search warrant for four separate Facebook accounts. Exhibit 72 is

a certificate of authenticity form from Facebook for an account

under the name “Thepriestessinitiationsanctuary.”5 Weems testified

that the identification number of the certificate of authenticity

matched that of the Facebook account that he requested in the

search warrant. King admitted to owning the Facebook account.

The records showed that the creator name was Shirley Briar Rose

5 In response to a record request search warrant, Facebook sends a

certificate of authenticity to verify that records came from Facebook
and that the account information provided matches the requested
information. Each Facebook account contains an identification
number.

24
King. Weems testified that the account listed an email address,

multiple credit cards, and a PayPal account associated with King.

King objected, arguing that the prosecutor had not laid a sufficient

foundation to establish that “The Priestess Initiation Sanctuary”

was King’s Facebook account. The court overruled the objection

and found that Weems’ personal knowledge that Exhibit 72 was

produced in response to a search warrant was sufficient to

authenticate the exhibit under People v. N.T.B., 2019 COA 150.

¶ 63 Exhibits 73-78 are Facebook messages that came from the

Facebook account admitted in Exhibit 72. King objected on

hearsay and authentication grounds, arguing that the messages

contained out-of-court statements from other parties and that the

prosecution failed to establish the messages originated from the

Facebook account in Exhibit 72. The trial court admitted the

exhibits over King’s objection, finding that the messages were not

offered for their truth but to give context for King’s responses and

that Weems’ testimony established their authenticity.

¶ 64 Exhibit 79 is a certificate of authenticity from Facebook for an

account under the name “shirley.king.96.” Again, Weems testified

that the identification number on the certificate of authenticity

25
matched that of the Facebook account he requested in the search

warrant and that King admitted to owning the Facebook account.

Weems said the account listed King’s phone number, email, and

Sutra Healing Center’s address. Exhibits 80-93 consisted of

Facebook posts and messages associated with the Facebook

account. King objected on authentication and hearsay grounds.

The trial court admitted the exhibits over King’s objection based on

its prior ruling admitting Exhibits 73-78. The trial court then

advised the jury:

[W]ithout going into the details too much of the
law of hearsay, statements that are attributed
to the defendant are not hearsay. These other
statements that are in the – these Facebook
postings are hearsay. They’re effectively
out-of-court statements. I’m allowing them to
come in because they give context to any
response, but they are not – they can’t be
considered as truthful. They’re just giving
context to whatever response that was
attributed to Ms. King, or whoever else the
responder was, the Sutra Healing Center, on
those messages.

¶ 65 Exhibit 94 is a certificate of authenticity from Facebook for an

account under the name of “akira.summers.”6 The creator’s name

6 Akira Summers is King’s known alias.

26
is Akira Summers. The account listed King’s phone number, a

credit card associated with King, and the current city as Colorado

Springs. King renewed her previous objections. After the trial court

asked the prosecutor to lay more foundation, Weems testified that

photographs of King and advertisements for Sutra Healing Center

appeared on the Facebook account. The trial court admitted the

exhibit over King’s objection.

¶ 66 Exhibits 95 and 96 are records corresponding to this account,

including a conversation between “Akira Summers” and another

individual that referenced Sutra Healing Center and VIP treatment.

At King’s request, the trial court again agreed to provide a jury

instruction stating that “any context statements within here are

admitted, although they are out-of-court statements . . . any other

statements are statements that are simply attributed to the account

that the Prosecution is submitting is the account of the defendant.”

¶ 67 Regarding the cell phone extraction data, records extracted

from King’s phone were admitted as Exhibits 97-102 and 104-105.

Exhibits 97-100 comprised of messages between King’s email and

Chambers. Chambers testified that she recognized the messages.

Exhibits 101-102 and 104 contained additional messages extracted

27
from King’s phone. Exhibit 105 was a web search extracted from

King’s phone. King objected to the admission of the exhibits based

on authentication, hearsay, and CRE 403 grounds. The trial court

overruled King’s objection.

¶ 68 When King was arrested, police seized her cell phone.

Detective Bryan Rodgers, a digital forensics detective with the

Colorado Springs Police Department who was qualified as an expert

in digital forensics, used GrayKey and Cellebrite technology to

extract data from King’s phone. He described the technology and

how it is used to extract data from cell phones and how it generates

extraction reports. Specifically, Rodgers explained that once

GrayKey extracts the data, Cellebrite identifies the information in

the data within the parameters of the search warrant, categorizes it,

and makes it easy to view. He confirmed that the cell phone data is

not altered by the technology, and that the process involves no

human input. Weems testified that the printouts were fair and

accurate copies of the messages and web searches he received from

the data extraction report.

¶ 69 Finally, the prosecution presented printouts of Backpage

advertisements posted from 2015 to 2018. King did not object.

28
Backpage was a website used for commercial sex advertisements.

In 2018, Backpage was seized by the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI). As a result, the FBI holds all the data from

Backpage servers. Weems requested the Backpage records from the

FBI and testified that the Backpage advertisements for Sutra

Healing Center included King’s phone number. Additionally, King

admitted to posting advertisements on Backpage.

¶ 70 Finally, Matt Frost, a digital forensic examiner for the FBI,

testified that all the advertisements were posted by King’s email

address.

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 71 As we discussed, supra Part V.B, we review a trial court’s

evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.

¶ 72 CRE 901 through 903 govern the authentication and

identification of objects whose admission into evidence is sought by

a party. People v. Glover, 2015 COA 16, ¶ 11. Authentication

requires “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in

question is what its proponent claims.” CRE 901(a). The standard

of authentication is “minimal — all that’s required is a prima facie

showing that the evidence is what its proponent claims.” Gonzales

29
v. People, 2020 CO 71, ¶ 42. Thus, evidence is admissible if “the

proponent has offered a satisfactory foundation from which the jury

could reasonably find that the evidence is authentic.” Id. at ¶ 27

(citation omitted). Once this burden is met, authenticity is a

question for the jury. Id. at ¶ 6.

¶ 73 “Hearsay” is defined as “a statement other than one made by

the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in

evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” CRE 801(c).

Unless an exception applies, hearsay is generally inadmissible.

CRE 802. But “[u]nder CRE 801(d)(2)(A), a statement made by a

party is not hearsay if it is offered against that party.” Glover, ¶ 40.

“To admit a statement under this rule, the proponent must prove by

a preponderance of the evidence that it was the opposing party who

made the statement.” Id.

C. Analysis

1. Facebook Records

¶ 74 King contends that the Facebook records were inadmissible on

both authentication and hearsay grounds. Specifically, she argues

that insufficient evidence shows that the Facebook accounts

30
belonged to her and that she authored the messages and posts

associated with them. We disagree.

¶ 75 The authentication of Facebook messages requires two

showings: (1) that the records are from Facebook and (2) that the

communications were made by the purported sender. Glover, ¶ 23.

The first showing can be established through the testimony of a

witness with knowledge or consideration of the distinctive

characteristics of the records. Id. at ¶ 24. Such evidence may

include “testimony regarding how the records were obtained, the

substance of the records themselves, and affidavits or testimony

from employees of the social networking site.” Id. at ¶ 26. The

second showing requires “additional corroborating evidence of

authorship . . . beyond confirmation that the [Facebook] account is

registered to the party purporting to create those messages.” Id. at

¶ 30. This standard is satisfied by testimony establishing any

combination of the following factors:

(1) the account was registered to the purported
sender; (2) corroborative evidence showed that
the account was used by the purported sender;
(3) the substance of the communications was
recognizable as being from the purported
sender; (4) the sender “responded to an
exchange in such a way as to indicate

31
circumstantially that he or she was in fact the
author of the communication”; and (5) any
other confirming evidence under the
circumstances.

People v. Heisler, 2017 COA 58, ¶ 12 (citation omitted).

¶ 76 We conclude that the evidence in this case satisfies these

requirements. First, the evidence was sufficient to show that the

exhibits originated from Facebook. As in Glover, Weems testified

that he received the records from Facebook in response to the

warrant. Glover, ¶ 27. As the trial court found, when a law

enforcement investigator possesses personal knowledge that

proffered evidence was produced in response to a search warrant,

courts have allowed the investigator to authenticate that evidence.

N.T.B., ¶ 18. For Exhibits 72, 79, and 94, Weems testified that the

identification number on the certificate of authenticity matched that

of the Facebook account that he requested in the search warrant

and that the exhibits were a fair and accurate representation of the

records he received from the search warrant.

¶ 77 Second, the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that

the Facebook accounts belonged to King and that King made the

posts and sent the messages. Weems testified that King’s name, or

32
alias, was associated with each Facebook account as well as various

forms of identification, including her phone number, email address,

business address, credit cards, and PayPal account. See Glover,

¶ 32 (court identified various factors showing the defendant was the

author of the messages including that the account was registered to

the defendant’s name and defendant provided his phone number to

Facebook).

¶ 78 Moreover, we reject King’s hearsay argument. The exhibits

contained nonhearsay statements of a party opponent. Weems’

testimony established by a preponderance of the evidence that King

made the statements contained in the Facebook exhibits. To the

extent that King denied making these statements, that was a matter

for the jury to decide. People in Interest of A.C.E-D., 2018 COA 157,

¶ 43.

¶ 79 Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion by admitting the Facebook exhibits.

2. Cell Phone Extraction Data

¶ 80 Again, King contends the court erroneously admitted the cell

phone extraction data on authentication and hearsay grounds.

33
¶ 81 CRE 901 “does not prescribe any exclusive method for

authenticating evidence.” Gonzales, ¶ 30; see also Heisler, ¶ 15

(holding that text messages may be authenticated though “any

other corroborative evidence under the circumstances”). The

exhibits contained King’s phone number, email address, alias, and

business name. Further, Chambers testified that she recognized

some of the messages as her exchanges with King. It is enough that

the evidence, as described above, was such that a jury could

reasonably find that the communications were made by King.

Gonzales, ¶ 27; see also A.C.E-D., ¶ 43 (to the extent defendant

denies making these statements, that was a question for the jury).

¶ 82 Moreover, because the evidence shows the cell phone

extraction report was automatically generated, it is not hearsay

under CRE 801. See People v. Abad, 490 P.3d 1094, 1105 (Colo.

App. 2021).

¶ 83 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting the cell phone extraction data.

3. Backpage Advertisements

¶ 84 King contends that the Backpage advertisements were

erroneously admitted. We disagree.

34
¶ 85 The prosecution established that the FBI seized Backpage’s

servers in 2018 and took control of all its data. Frost, an examiner

from the data holder, then confirmed that the records were

Backpage data. Moreover, King’s phone number and email were

associated with the advertisements and King said in her interview

that she posted on Backpage. This evidence satisfies the

requirement imposed by CRE 901(a) that the evidence is what the

prosecution claimed. See Gonzales, ¶ 27 (evidence is admissible if

“the proponent has offered a satisfactory foundation from which the

jury could reasonably find that the evidence is authentic” (citation

omitted)).

¶ 86 We also reject King’s hearsay argument. King’s reliance on

N.T.B. is misplaced. In N.T.B., another division of this court

determined that the account number, activity log, and IP address

purportedly connecting a Dropbox account to the defendant were

not admissible as business records without testimony or an

affidavit from custodians showing that the records were created in

the regular course of business, inputted accurately within a

reasonable amount of time, and transmitted by a reliable person

with knowledge. N.T.B., ¶ 40. Here, the admission of the Backpage

35
advertisements was accompanied by testimony from Frost, who

testified that the exhibits were Backpage data.

¶ 87 Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting the Backpage advertisements.

VII. Co-Conspirator Statements

¶ 88 King last contends that the trial court erroneously introduced

statements of the women at the party. We disagree.

A. Additional Background Information

¶ 89 As previously described, the women at the party agreed to

have sex in exchange for money. When White testified about his

encounter and conversation with one of the women, King objected

on hearsay grounds. The prosecutor argued that the women’s

statements that they were willing to offer sex in exchange for money

were admissible as co-conspirator statements under CRE

801(d)(2)(E).

¶ 90 The prosecutor also argued that there was evidence of a

conspiracy independent of the statements: (1) extensive

communication between White and King about the nature of the

party and organizing it; (2) explicit and implicit communications

from King about the women exchanging sex for money; and (3) the

36
fact that the four women arrived at the house for the party together

after meeting at the Sutra Healing Center.

¶ 91 The trial court overruled King’s objection:

[T]he court doesn’t have to find that a
conspiracy in this case exists beyond a
reasonable doubt. It simply has to find that
there’s a prima facie case of conspiracy. And
based upon the statements from [White]
following his first encounter – or, excuse me, I
guess it would be his second encounter with
King where he engaged in the body slide
activity, that they talk about having a party,
that he talked about her bringing [the women]
to that party to engage in certain type of
activities, similar at least to what they engaged
in at [Sutra Healing Center], the Court finds
that there was a conspiracy.

¶ 92 The court admitted the statements under CRE 801(d)(2)(E).

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 93 As discussed, supra Part V.B, we review a trial court’s

evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.

¶ 94 Although hearsay statements are generally inadmissible, CRE

802, a statement made by a co-conspirator “during the course and

in furtherance of the conspiracy” is not hearsay and, therefore, may

be admissible, CRE 801(d)(2)(E); see People v. Archer, 2022 COA 71,

¶ 35. To admit such a statement, the court must find by a

37
preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy existed and that

the statement was made during the course of and in furtherance of

the conspiracy. Archer, ¶ 36. In deciding whether a conspiracy

existed, the court may consider the statements themselves, “but

there must also be some independent evidence establishing that the

defendant and the declarant were members of the conspiracy.” Id.

(quoting People v. Villano, 181 P.3d 1225, 1229 (Colo. App. 2008)).

“This corroborating evidence may take many forms, including

circumstantial evidence of the conspiracy . . . or the defendant’s

own statements.” People v. Montoya, 753 P.2d 729, 736 (Colo.

1988).

C. Analysis

¶ 95 We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

admission of the evidence under the co-conspirator hearsay

exception. In determining that a conspiracy existed, the court

relied on (1) the women’s agreement to have sex in exchange for

money and (2) White’s testimony that King arranged for the women

to come to the party to perform sexual acts in exchange for money.

This evidence is sufficient to establish, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that a conspiracy existed and allows for the admission of

38
the women’s statements. See People v. Esch, 786 P.2d 462, 464

(Colo. App. 1989).

¶ 96 Moreover, even assuming, without deciding, that the court

erred in failing to make explicit findings on the record that the

women’s statements were made both during the course of and in

furtherance of the conspiracy, we conclude that any error was

harmless because the record shows that the foundational

requirements were met. See People v. Fuller, 788 P.2d 741, 745

(Colo. 1990) (district court’s failure to make requisite findings for

admissibility of hearsay harmless where record supported its

admission). Generally, a statement is made during the course of

the conspiracy if it precedes the conspirators’ attainment of the

object of the conspiracy. See People v. Faussett, 2016 COA 94M,

¶¶ 39-42. Here, the record shows that the women’s statements

were made in the course of the conspiracy because the statements

were made at the party before the police arrested King and the

women.

¶ 97 Alternatively, the “in furtherance” requirement is satisfied by a

statement that encourages the co-conspirator or another person to

advance the conspiracy, or enhances the co-conspirator’s or

39
another person’s usefulness to the conspiracy. Id. at ¶ 45. The

record shows that the statements were also made in furtherance of

the conspiracy because the women said they would have sex in

exchange for money. See id. at ¶ 47 (“Because the conspirators

were not . . . involved in idle chatter or merely a narrative of past

events, but rather, were proposing measures to advance the aims of

the conspiracy, the statements . . . were properly admitted under

CRE 801(d)(2)(E).”).

¶ 98 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting the women’s statements.

VIII. Cumulative Error

¶ 99 King contends that if we determine that the trial court erred

and that none of the errors individually requires reversal of her

conviction, we should nevertheless reverse because of the errors’

cumulative prejudicial impact. “For reversal to occur based on

cumulative error, a reviewing court must identify multiple errors

that collectively prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant,

even if any single error does not.” Howard-Walker v. People, 2019

CO 69, ¶ 25. “Stated simply, cumulative error involves cumulative

prejudice.” Id. The relevant inquiry is “whether, viewed in the

40
aggregate, the errors deprived the defendant of a fair trial.” Id. at

¶ 4; see People v. Vigil, 2024 COA 72, ¶ 48 (explaining that, to

determine whether errors are harmless individually or collectively,

we must conduct a “case specific assessment of the likely impact of

the error[s] in question on the outcome of the litigation as a whole.”

(quoting Pernell v. People, 2018 CO 13, ¶ 22)).

¶ 100 As discussed above, the court made two errors. However,

given the nature of the errors, coupled with the overwhelming

evidence of King’s guilt, “we cannot conclude that the cumulative

effect of the errors substantially prejudiced [her] right to a fair trial.”

People v. Mendenhall, 2015 COA 107M, ¶ 82.

IX. Disposition

¶ 101 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE YUN concur.

41