Peo v. Walker

23CA0297 Peo v Walker 10-23-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0297
El Paso County District Court No. 22CR66
Honorable Laura N. Findorff, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Rahkaela Walker,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS
Johnson and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 23, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Joshua J. Luna, Assistant Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Lisa Weisz, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Rahkaela Walker, appeals the restitution order

entered after she pleaded guilty to stalking her former therapist.

She contends that the order was entered after the statutory

deadline and improperly requires her to pay restitution for losses

caused by uncharged conduct. We reject both contentions and

therefore affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Walker began her stalking conduct in September 2021, when

the victim terminated their therapist-patient relationship. On

receiving the news, Walker showed up at the victim’s office and

refused to leave until the victim called the police.

¶3 For the next two months, Walker repeatedly called, texted, and

emailed the victim. During one weekend in November, Walker

called the victim forty-five times and left twenty-three voicemail

messages. She told the victim that she “won’t stop, she will keep

calling, she’ll keep changing her number.” The victim felt that

“there was no stopping [Walker’s] behavior.”

¶4 In November, the victim obtained a temporary protection

order. A few weeks later, Walker attempted to contact the victim at

the victim’s church; when she could not find the victim, she left a

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handwritten note for her. Walker also messaged the victim over

Venmo and contacted the victim’s colleagues.

¶5 In January 2022, the district attorney charged Walker with

two counts of stalking and one count of violation of a protection

order. The criminal complaint alleged that the unlawful conduct

occurred between September 28 and December 14, 2021.

¶6 Despite the protection order, Walker continued to call and text

the victim. In February, the prosecution filed a second case,

charging Walker with violating the protection order on January 25,

2022.

¶7 Walker pleaded guilty under a plea agreement to one count of

stalking causing serious emotional distress; in exchange, the

prosecution dismissed the remaining charges in both cases and

stipulated to a deferred judgment and sentence. The plea

agreement required Walker to “pay restitution for all counts and

cases governed by th[e] plea agreement, including [dismissed]

counts and/or cases” and to “stipulate to causation for restitution

purposes.”

¶8 At the restitution hearing, the victim testified that Walker’s

stalking conduct caused her to experience anxiety, panic attacks,

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difficulty concentrating, difficulty managing her time, nightmares,

and flashbacks. She said that she had missed work due to the

emotional distress, and she requested restitution for the lost

income. The evidence showed that the victim missed forty-eight

hours of work between September 2021 and January 25, 2022, the

period of the charged conduct, and missed another twenty-three

hours of work between January 26 and May 12, 2022.

¶9 Defense counsel argued that because the trial court could not

order restitution for uncharged conduct, Walker was not liable for

the victim’s lost income after January 25, the last date of charged

conduct. The court rejected that argument and ordered Walker to

pay restitution to the victim in the amount of $77 per hour of

missed work.

II. Challenges to the Restitution Order

A. Timeliness of the Order

¶ 10 Walker argues that the restitution order must be vacated

because the court lacked authority to enter it after the statutory

deadline passed. We conclude that Walker waived her right to a

timely order.

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¶ 11 Every judgment of conviction in a felony case, including a

deferred judgment, see § 18-1.3-602(2), C.R.S. 2025, must include

an order resolving liability for restitution, § 18-1.3-603(1), C.R.S.

2025. The court may defer fixing the amount of restitution, but a

final order must ordinarily be entered within ninety-one days of the

sentencing date. See § 18-1.3-603(1)(b), C.R.S. 2022;1 People v.

Weeks, 2021 CO 75, ¶ 39.

¶ 12 Because the statutory deadline is not jurisdictional, however,

it can be waived. Babcock v. People, 2025 CO 26, ¶ 27. One way a

defendant can waive her right to a timely determination of

restitution is by requesting “that a restitution hearing be set after

the ninety-one-day deadline would expire.” Id. at ¶ 30.

¶ 13 Walker’s sentencing hearing occurred on July 13, 2022,

meaning that, under section 18-1.3-603(1)(b), C.R.S. 2022, the

court had to enter an order fixing the amount of restitution by

October 12, 2022. In August, the prosecution submitted a

proposed restitution order, and Walker objected and requested a

1 The restitution statute’s deadlines were amended in 2025, but

those amendments apply to “defendants sentenced on or after” May
30, 2025. See Ch. 307, sec. 1, § 18-1.3-603, 2025 Colo. Sess. Laws
1606-07.

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hearing. On September 21, the parties appeared for a scheduling

conference. Walker’s lawyer requested that the restitution hearing

be scheduled for October 19 at the earliest — a week after the

statutory deadline. The court and parties ultimately settled on

November 16.

¶ 14 At the November 16 hearing, the prosecutor raised the fact

that the statutory deadline had expired. The court noted that the

restitution hearing was set “by agreement of the parties” and asked

defense counsel if she “want[ed] to make a further record.” Defense

counsel replied, “I do not.”

¶ 15 On January 5, 2023, the court entered a restitution order

requiring Walker to pay $5,965.24 in restitution, including

$3,869.34 to the victim.2

¶ 16 We conclude that Walker waived any claim concerning the

timeliness of the restitution order when her counsel requested a

hearing date after the ninety-one-day deadline, see Babcock, ¶ 30,

and then confirmed her acquiescence to the delay on the first day of

2 The court awarded the victim $5,467 for seventy-one hours of

missed work, plus approximately $156 in interest, minus $1,754.23
that the Victim’s Compensation Board had already paid the victim.

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the hearing. See People v. Roberson, 2025 CO 30, ¶ 17 (counsel’s

acceptance of a restitution hearing date after the deadline

constituted a waiver); see also People v. Yakas, 2019 COA 117, ¶ 35

(“[C]ounsel may waive a defendant’s statutory rights and such a

waiver must only be voluntary, not knowing or intelligent.”);

Babcock, ¶ 30 (same).

B. Amount of Restitution

¶ 17 Walker also challenges the imposition of restitution that she

says is attributable to uncharged conduct.

¶ 18 As noted, the victim missed twenty-three hours of work after

the date of the last charged conduct:

• On January 26, 2022, Walker called the victim from a

hospital, in violation of the protection order, and demanded

that the victim effectuate her release. The calls left the victim

feeling traumatized and anxious, and she canceled her client

sessions for the day.

• On February 22, March 14, and April 25, 2022, Walker texted

the victim in violation of the protection order. The victim

viewed the texts as an indication that Walker did not intend to

stop contacting her despite the protection order. She worried

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that Walker might come to her office. On each of those days,

the victim canceled four hours of client sessions.

• On May 12, 2022, a different therapist called the victim to

request Walker’s mental health records. The victim was

fearful that Walker would retaliate against her for sending the

records. She canceled four hours of client sessions that day.

¶ 19 Walker says that because she was not charged with any

criminal conduct on those dates, she cannot be ordered to pay the

victim’s lost wages for those canceled appointments. We disagree.

¶ 20 A trial court must order restitution for “any pecuniary loss

suffered by a victim . . . proximately caused by an offender’s

conduct.” § 18-1.3-602(3)(a); § 18-1.3-603, C.R.S. 2025. An

“offender” is “a person who committed the crime charged.” Cowen

v. People, 2018 CO 96, ¶ 21. Thus, unless the defendant agrees

otherwise, a trial court may not award restitution for damages

arising from criminal conduct for which the defendant was never

criminally charged. People v. Sosa, 2019 COA 182, ¶¶ 26, 29.

¶ 21 But the fact that Walker is not an offender for purposes of the

conduct that occurred after January 25 is irrelevant in this case.

Restitution was not ordered based on the uncharged conduct.

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Rather, the trial court found that Walker’s stalking conduct during

the time period charged in the two cases proximately caused the

victim’s post-January 25 pecuniary losses.

¶ 22 “Proximate cause is any ‘cause which in natural and probable

sequence produced the claimed injury.’” Martinez v. People, 2024

CO 6M, ¶ 13 (quoting People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107, 116 (Colo.

2002)). If the defendant’s conduct is the proximate cause of the

victim’s lost wages, the defendant can be ordered to pay restitution

in the amount of “wages not received by the victim from the date the

crime was committed to the date restitution is imposed.” People v.

Bryant, 122 P.3d 1026, 1029 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 23 Whether the defendant proximately caused the victim’s loss is

a question of fact, and, therefore, we review the court’s

determination of proximate cause under the highly deferential clear

error standard. Martinez, ¶ 32. Under that standard, “we must

affirm the [trial] court’s findings unless they are without ‘support in

the record.’” Id. at ¶ 34 (quoting People v. Turner, 2022 CO 50,

¶ 19).

¶ 24 The trial court acknowledged that “uncharged conduct cannot

be a basis for restitution.” But it found that Walker’s “ongoing

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actions,” including her “stalking behaviors” during the period of the

charged conduct, resulted in the canceled appointments and

therefore proximately caused the victim’s pecuniary loss. That

finding is supported by the evidence.

¶ 25 Walker admitted that her charged conduct caused serious

emotional distress to the victim. The victim confirmed this during

her testimony. She testified that Walker’s stalking conduct

“affected every aspect of [her] life.” The victim explained that

because Walker’s behavior was unpredictable and frightening, she

was “constantly hypervigilant,” anxious, and “destabilize[d].” She

said that at certain times she was unable to work with her clients

because she was “activated” and “overwhelmed.”

¶ 26 The victim specifically attributed her inability to work during

the listed hours in 2022 to Walker’s entire “course of conduct.” She

affirmed that, “absent [Walker’s] conduct in 2021,” she would not

have “had the responses that [she] had in 2022” and would not

have “made the decisions that [she] did with regard to client hours.”

¶ 27 Walker does not argue that the victim’s post-January 25,

2022, losses are too attenuated from the 2021 criminal conduct.

For good reason, in our view — not only did Walker stipulate to

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proximate cause but, as the trial court noted, Walker’s theory that

after five months of unpredictable stalking behavior, the victim’s

severe emotional distress would end abruptly on January 25 is

unrealistic and somewhat disingenuous.

¶ 28 Because the trial court’s proximate cause findings are

supported by the record, we discern no error in the restitution

order.

III. Disposition

¶ 29 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

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