Parental Resp Conc CJR

24CA1875 Parental Resp Conc CJR 09-18-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1875
City and County of Denver District Court No. 19DR30638
Honorable Jennifer B. Torrington, Judge
Honorable Angela Boykins, Magistrate

In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning C.J.R. and E.J.R., Children,

and Concerning Andria Lundquist,

Appellant,

and

Jeremy Raile,

Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY
Dunn and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced September 18, 2025

The Demkowicz Law Firm, LLC, Danielle L. Demkowicz, Centennial, Colorado,
for Appellant

Jeremy Raile, Pro Se
¶1 Andria Lundquist (mother) appeals the district court’s order

adopting the magistrate’s decision that mother interfered with

Jeremy Raile’s (father) parenting time and sanctioning her for that

interference. We affirm the order in part, reverse it in part, and

remand the case to the district court.

I. Background

¶2 The parties have two children, C.J.R. and E.J.R. In December

2019, the district court allocated parental responsibilities in

accordance with the parties’ agreement that mother and father

would have equal parenting time. In April 2022, mother filed a

verified motion regarding parenting time disputes in which she

alleged that the children had been missing school during father’s

parenting time. Mother later moved to restrict father’s parenting

time because of father’s ongoing alcohol use.

¶3 Following a child and family investigator’s report, the parties

entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) providing that

both parents would submit to sobriety testing before and after their

respective parenting time. The court adopted the MOU as a court

order in May 2023.

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¶4 In June 2023, mother told father that she would not allow him

to have further parenting time with the children because he had

violated the MOU by missing a sobriety test. Mother, however, did

not file a motion to restrict father’s parenting time under section

14-10-129(4), C.R.S. 2025.

¶5 About six weeks later, father, who did not have an attorney at

the time, filed a verified motion concerning parenting time disputes

under section 14-10-129.5, C.R.S. 2025, and a motion for

contempt. A magistrate denied father’s motion for contempt and

referred his parenting time motion for mediation. Father filed a

second motion concerning parenting time disputes in October 2023.

¶6 The magistrate conducted a hearing on father’s parenting time

motions in May 2024 and, after hearing the parties’ evidence, found

that mother had interfered with father’s parenting time. The

magistrate concluded that, under the MOU, mother initially had

reason to restrict father’s parenting time because of his missed

sobriety test, but that the court was unable to conduct an expedited

hearing on the matter because mother had not filed a motion to

restrict, as section 14-10-129(4) requires. Noting that, as a

consequence of mother’s actions, father had no contact with the

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children for nearly a year, the magistrate ordered a ramp-up of

father’s parenting time, immediate phone and video calls between

father and the children, and family therapy for father and the

children at mother’s expense. The magistrate also provided a

procedure for choosing the family therapist: the parties would

confer regarding a family therapist within seven days and, if they

could not agree, father would select the therapist. The magistrate

further ordered makeup parenting time for father.

¶7 Mother petitioned for review of the magistrate’s decision. The

district court denied mother’s petition and adopted the magistrate’s

order.

II. Standard of Review

¶8 When, as here, we review a district court’s order reviewing a

magistrate’s order, we must accept the magistrate’s factual findings

unless they are clearly erroneous. See In re Parental

Responsibilities Concerning G.E.R., 264 P.3d 637, 639 (Colo. App.

2011); see also C.R.M. 7(a)(9) (a magistrate’s findings of fact may

not be altered unless clearly erroneous). Our review of the district

court’s decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review; we

apply the same clearly erroneous standard to the magistrate’s

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findings as does a district court. G.E.R., 264 P.3d at 638-39.

Factual findings are not clearly erroneous unless there is no

support for them in the record. Van Gundy v. Van Gundy, 2012

COA 194, ¶ 12, 292 P.3d 1201, 1204.

¶9 We review questions of law de novo, including whether the

court applied the proper legal standard and correctly interpreted

the MOU. See In re Marriage of Young, 2021 COA 96, ¶ 9, 497 P.3d

524, 528; Neher v. Neher, 2015 COA 103, ¶ 33, 402 P.3d 1030,

1035. The court’s discretion over parenting issues is broad and we

exercise every presumption in favor of its decision. In re Marriage of

Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App. 2007).

III. Interference with Parenting Time

¶ 10 Mother first argues that the district court (and before it, the

magistrate) erred when it found that she interfered with father’s

parenting time. Specifically, she asserts that the MOU allowed her

to immediately restrict father’s parenting time for a violation of the

MOU and did not require her to file a motion before doing so. We

hold that mother was required to file a motion to restrict under

section 14-10-129(4) and, thus, the district court did not err.

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A. The Court’s Findings

¶ 11 The MOU outlined several specific ways that father and

mother were to establish their sobriety before and after parenting

time. The MOU defined a “positive sobriety test” as one that is

“positive, missed, dilute, adulterated, or delayed.” The MOU also

contained the following provision:

The parties agree that in the event of a positive
sobriety test (as defined in the testing
protocol . . .), the positive test shall constitute
the basis for an immediate emergency
restriction of parenting time pending an
evidentiary hearing by the Court as provided
under [section] 14-10-129(4).

¶ 12 The magistrate found that, on more than one occasion from

the end of May to early June 2023, father did not precisely conform

to the testing protocol outlined in the MOU and, thus, had a

positive sobriety test under the MOU each time. The magistrate

further found that, in response, mother informed father that she

would not allow him to exercise any parenting time. Moreover,

mother’s counsel had advised her to call law enforcement if father

attempted to exercise parenting time. (We note that mother’s

refusal to allow father to speak with the children by telephone also

violated section 7 of the MOU.) The magistrate also found that,

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although the MOU provided that a positive test constituted the

basis for an emergency restriction of parenting time, mother later

interfered with father’s parenting time by not filing a motion to

restrict under section 14-10-129(4).

¶ 13 Further, the magistrate found it was not up to father to

schedule his own evidentiary hearing, as mother contended. The

magistrate rejected mother’s assertion that the court should have

set a hearing sua sponte, reasoning that it was not “going to be

involved in the parties’ life” and “wouldn’t have known” about

mother’s actions absent the filing of a motion. Accordingly, the

magistrate determined that mother was required to file a motion if

she wished to restrict father’s parenting time and that she

interfered with father’s parenting time when she did not do so.

B. Discussion

¶ 14 On appeal, mother asserts that the district court erred

because, other than finding that mother failed to file a motion to

restrict under section 14-10-129(4), its order, like the magistrate’s

order, lacks specific findings about how mother interfered with

father’s parenting time. But it is not clear to us, nor does mother

explain, what further facts the district court needed to find.

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¶ 15 The district court noted that the MOU contemplated mother’s

initial restriction and provided the basis for an emergency

restriction of parenting time pending a hearing. However, it

concluded that mother did not take the next step of moving to

restrict father’s parenting time so the court could hold the hearing.

For nearly a year, mother continued to tell father that he was not

allowed to see the children and that she would call law enforcement

if he tried to do so. It is undisputed that father did not have any

contact with the children after June 2023. Accordingly, no

additional facts were necessary to support the court’s determination

that mother interfered with father’s parenting time. See

§ 14-10-129(4) (requiring a parent who believes that his or her

children are in imminent danger due to parenting time to file a

motion to restrict that time).

¶ 16 To the extent mother asserts that father’s filing of a verified

motion regarding parenting time disputes under section

14-10-129.5 remedied her failure to file a motion to restrict under

section 14-10-129(4), we disagree. Motions to restrict parenting

time filed under section 14-10-129(4) are decided in an expedited

manner; they “shall be heard and ruled upon by the court not later

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than fourteen days” after filing. However, a court has more time —

thirty-five days — to take action on a section 14-10-129.5 motion

and is not required to set a hearing on the motion. Rather, it may

deny such a motion, refer the matter for mediation, or hold a

hearing. Indeed, the magistrate referred father’s section

14-10-129.5 motion for mediation and, when that proved

unsuccessful, set a hearing on it. The magistrate did not hear and

rule on father’s motion under section 14-10-129.5 for nearly a year.

¶ 17 Because of the expedited nature of motions to restrict

parenting time under section 14-10-129(4), and the MOU’s explicit

mention of that statute, we cannot agree that father’s separate

motion under 14-10-129.5 absolved mother of the requirement to

file a section 14-10-129(4) motion after she restricted father’s

parenting time following his positive sobriety test.

¶ 18 We are also unpersuaded by mother’s assertion that she could

not ask for an evidentiary hearing on father’s behalf because her

counsel does not represent father. Neither the MOU nor the statute

contemplates that a party’s counsel will file a motion on another

party’s behalf. Under mother’s interpretation, a parent could never

file a motion to restrict under section 14-10-129(4) because it would

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be “on the other parent’s behalf.” We decline to interpret the

statute or the MOU in this way. See In re Marriage of Roosa, 89

P.3d 524, 528 (Colo. App. 2004) (“We presume that the legislature

intends a just and reasonable result when it enacts a statute, and

we will not read a statute to provide an unreasonable or absurd

result.”).

¶ 19 Nor are we persuaded by mother’s assertion that the court,

and not the moving parties, must set an evidentiary hearing on

restricting parenting time. Mother’s interference with father’s

parenting time did not stem from her failure to “set” an evidentiary

hearing under section 14-10-129(4), but, rather, from her failure to

file anything with the court after mother restricted father’s

parenting time. As the district court aptly noted, without a motion

first being filed, the court would not know if a restriction was

occurring or “get involved” in the parties’ lives and set a hearing on

the restriction.

IV. Sanctions

A. Applicable Law

¶ 20 Section 14-10-129.5 governs disputes over parenting time. If,

after a hearing, the district court finds that a parent has not

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complied with a parenting time order or schedule, the court shall

enter an order sanctioning the noncompliant parent.

§ 14-10-129.5(2). Such sanctions may include, as relevant here, an

order requiring that makeup parenting time be provided to the

aggrieved parent, or any other order promoting the children’s best

interests. § 14-10-129.5(2)(d); In re Parental Responsibilities

Concerning W.F-L., 2018 COA 164, ¶ 12, 433 P.3d 168, 170. And

the court may make “[a]ny other order that may promote the best

interests of the . . . children involved.” § 14-10-129.5(2)(h).

B. Makeup Parenting Time

¶ 21 Mother argues that the magistrate (and, later, the district

court) erred by ordering makeup parenting time for father.

Although we hold that the magistrate did not err by ordering

makeup parenting time in general, the order is unclear regarding

the number of days of makeup parenting time. For this reason, we

reverse the makeup parenting time order and remand the case for

clarification of this point.

¶ 22 Mother first asserts that father waived any request for makeup

parenting time because he did not ask for it in his section

14-10-129.5 parenting time disputes motion. Although true, father

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was acting pro se at the time and filed a contemporaneous

contempt motion in which he sought makeup parenting time.

Moreover, father requested makeup parenting time in his trial

management certificate. And mother does not claim she was

unaware that father was seeking makeup parenting time, or that

she was surprised or unable to present evidence on this issue at the

hearing. Thus, we cannot agree that father waived any request for

makeup parenting time or that his failure to request it in his motion

prejudiced mother.

¶ 23 To the extent that mother asserts that the magistrate did not

have the general authority to order makeup parenting time, we

disagree. See § 14-10-129.5(2)(b), (d), (f), (h). However, we agree

that the magistrate’s order regarding the amount of makeup

parenting time is unclear, and the magistrate must clarify this

amount on remand.

¶ 24 The magistrate’s written order contained the following

provision:

Father shall have makeup Parenting Time from
June 12, 2023 – May 20, 2024, or 34 days.
Parenting Time was 50-50, so father’s make up
time shall be 172 days. Father’s make up
Parenting Time shall be taken at no more than

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3 days each week, shall not include a holiday
unless missed between June 12, 2023 – May
20, 2024, and shall not begin until Parenting
Time returns to week on/week off.

¶ 25 From the face of the order, it is unclear whether the magistrate

ordered 34 or 172 days of makeup parenting time. The district

court did not clarify this provision when it adopted the magistrate’s

order. If the magistrate meant to order 172 days of makeup

parenting time, then it is unclear how father could achieve that

time because the magistrate also ordered that makeup parenting

time could not begin until the ramp-up to 50-50 parenting time was

complete — four months, according to the court’s schedule.

Moreover, the magistrate ordered that father could not take more

than three makeup days each week. Accordingly, it is unclear how

father could make up 172 days, given that makeup parenting time

must occur within a year from the order. See § 14-10-129.5(d)(II).

¶ 26 Mother also asserts that father is not entitled to make up

parenting time because he stopped providing sobriety tests between

June 6, 2023, and April 26, 2024. Although we disagree that this

fact prevented the magistrate from ordering any makeup parenting

time, on remand, the court must determine if father is eligible for

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makeup parenting time for this period or if he missed parenting

time voluntarily by not continuing the testing protocol and,

therefore, is not entitled to makeup parenting time for this period.

C. Family Therapy

¶ 27 To the extent mother generally contends that the magistrate

(and later, the district court) lacked authority to order family

therapy for father and the children and to order her to pay for it, we

disagree. See § 14-10-129(2)(b.3), (b.7) (allowing the court to order

a noncomplying parent to bear the expense of parental education or

family therapy as a sanction for interference with parenting time);

§ 14-10-129.5(2)(h) (providing that the court may enter any other

order promoting the best interests of the children); see also In re

Marriage of Yates, 148 P.3d 304, 317 (Colo. App. 2006) (holding

that it was in the best interests of the children for one party to

participate in anger management counseling).

¶ 28 Mother also argues that father waived family therapy as a

sanction because, in his motion, he did not ask the court to modify

decision-making or the parties’ financial provisions regarding the

children’s expenses. However, father requested family therapy in

his trial management certificate, and again, mother does not assert

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that she was surprised by father’s request for family therapy or was

unable to address it at the hearing.

¶ 29 Nor do we perceive that the magistrate or the district court

generally modified the parties’ agreements regarding

decision-making or financial provisions. Rather, the magistrate

found that parenting time with father was in the children’s best

interests, but that father and the children needed time to get to

know each other again. It therefore ordered family therapy between

father and the children and ordered mother to pay for the family

therapy. It also set forth a procedure for selecting the family

therapist that required the parties to confer on a therapist, but, if

the parties could not agree, provided that father would choose the

therapist. We do not perceive, and mother does not explain, how

this order related to family therapy altered the court’s prior orders

related to decision-making and financial provisions.

¶ 30 Mother also asserts that the court needed to consider section

14-10-131, C.R.S. 2025, when modifying decision-making

responsibility, as section 14-10-129.5(2)(f) requires. But for the

reasons discussed above, we do not agree that the discrete family

therapy order generally modified decision-making responsibilities.

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¶ 31 Lastly, mother contends that the magistrate (and later, the

district court) erred by not following section 13-22-313(1), C.R.S.

2025, which prohibits a court from ordering “any ancillary form of

alternative dispute resolution” when one party claims to be the

victim of physical or psychological abuse. But mother did not

present this argument to the district court in her petition for review

of the magistrate’s decision, and we will not consider it for the first

time on appeal. See People in Interest of K.L-P., 148 P.3d 402, 403

(Colo. App. 2006) (holding that a party appealing a magistrate’s

decision must raise the particular issue in the district court,

thereby allowing the district court to correct any error, before

raising the issue on appeal).

V. Disposition

¶ 32 We reverse the portion of the district court’s order addressing

the amount of makeup parenting time and remand to the district

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion;

otherwise, the judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE KUHN concur.

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