Peo v. Randolph

23CA0865 Peo v Randolph 08-21-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0865
Adams County District Court No. 22CR3322
Honorable Sharon Holbrook, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Ralph Edward Randolph,

Defendant-Appellant.

SENTENCE AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE LUM
Lipinsky and Pawar, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 21, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jessica E. Ross, Senior Assistant Attorney
General & Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Christina Van Wagenen,
Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Ralph Edward Randolph, was convicted of third

degree assault with a sentence enhancer under the habitual

domestic violence offender (HDVO) statute, section 18-6-801(7),

C.R.S. 2024. He appeals the aggravation of his sentence beyond

the enhanced sentencing range. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 This appeal arises from an incident in which Randolph

assaulted his girlfriend after she refused to perform oral sex on him.

Randolph pleaded guilty, admitting that he (1) committed an act of

domestic violence constituting third degree assault and (2) had

eight prior domestic violence convictions, which elevated the third

degree assault from a misdemeanor to a class 5 felony. §§ 18-6-

801(7)(a), 18-3-204(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024. As part of his plea,

Randolph waived the right to have a factual basis established for

his offenses. The plea agreement didn’t mention the sexual nature

of the act underlying the third degree assault. Sentencing was left

open to the court.

¶3 The People filed a presentence report listing Randolph’s eight

prior domestic violence convictions (of which three were felonies),

three additional felony convictions for menacing and theft, and

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numerous other nonfelony convictions for various crimes. The

district court imposed an aggravated sentence of five years.1 The

court based its decision to aggravate the sentence on Randolph’s

lengthy criminal history — specifically, his six felony convictions

and repeated acts of domestic violence — and, Randoph alleges, on

the case’s “sexual aspect.” Randolph appeals.

II. Apprendi-Blakely Error

¶4 Randolph argues that the district court violated his

constitutional rights to due process and trial by jury, as articulated

in the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.

296 (2004). Specifically, he contends that the district court

improperly aggravated his sentence based on (1) prior convictions

that constituted an element of the HDVO sentence enhancer and (2)

impermissible judicial factfinding regarding the assault. We

perceive no reversible error.

1 The court imposed the five-year sentence for the HDVO “count”

and a concurrent six-month jail sentence for the third degree
assault. Randolph doesn’t raise any argument related to the court’s
entry of two sentences. Rather, he challenges only the five-year
sentence.

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A. Standard of Review

¶5 We review a constitutional challenge to a sentence de novo.

Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713, 720 (Colo. 2005); People v. Elie, 148

P.3d 359, 365 (Colo. App. 2006). Because Randolph didn’t object at

sentencing, we review his contention for plain error. Elie, 148 P.3d

at 365. Plain error is error that is obvious and substantial. People

v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743, 750 (Colo. 2005). An error is substantial if

it so undermines the fundamental fairness of the trial that it casts

serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction. Id.

B. Applicable Law

¶6 Third degree assault is ordinarily a misdemeanor. § 18-3-

204(1)(a). However, under the HDVO statute, a conviction for third

degree assault can be elevated to a class 5 felony if the assault

“include[s] an act of domestic violence” and the defendant has three

prior convictions that also included acts of domestic violence. § 18-

6-801(7)(a); see also People v. Jaso, 2014 COA 131, ¶ 14; People v.

Vigil, 2013 COA 102, ¶ 19. A class 5 felony carries a presumptive

sentencing range of one to three years; however, a court may

impose a sentence of up to six years if it finds extraordinary

aggravating circumstances. §§ 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V.5)(A) (providing

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sentencing range for class 5 felony), 18-1.3-401(6), C.R.S. 2024

(providing for a sentence of up to twice the statutory maximum

term if the court finds extraordinary aggravating factors).

¶7 “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that

increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory

maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301 (quoting Apprendi, 530

U.S. at 490); see also Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821, 831

(2024); U.S. Const. amends. V, VI; Colo. Const. art. II, §§ 16, 23.

¶8 Therefore, to constitutionally aggravate a sentence beyond the

presumptive range, the aggravating factors must fall into one of the

following four categories: “(1) facts found by a jury beyond a

reasonable doubt, (2) facts admitted by the defendant, (3) facts

found by a judge after the defendant stipulates to judicial fact-

finding for sentencing purposes, or (4) the fact of a prior conviction.”

Mountjoy v. People, 2018 CO 92M, ¶ 15. Facts that fall into the first

three categories are “Blakely-compliant,” while facts in the fourth

category are “Blakely-exempt.” Lopez, 113 P.3d at 723.

¶9 In addition, “the trial court must rely on facts outside of the

elements of the crime itself.” Mountjoy, ¶ 13. In other words, the

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court can’t aggravate a sentence “without finding some facts to

support it beyond the bare elements of the offense.” Lopez, 113

P.3d at 722 (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305 n.8).

C. Analysis

¶ 10 Randolph first argues that the district court erred by

aggravating his sentence based on his prior domestic violence

convictions because those convictions are an element of an HDVO

offense.

¶ 11 We agree that the district court’s decision to aggravate

Randolph’s sentence must be supported by Blakely-compliant or

Blakely-exempt facts “beyond the bare elements of the offense.” See

id. (We assume, without deciding, that this also applies to the

elements of a sentence enhancer.) But contrary to Randolph’s

argument, the record reflects that the district court complied with

this directive. The court said that Randolph’s “prior felony

convictions . . . all qualify as aggravation in this case.” Three of

Randolph’s six prior felonies were domestic violence convictions

that were part of Randolph’s plea to an HDVO offense, but three

were not. Prior criminal convictions are Blakely-exempt facts, and

the court acted within its discretion by aggravating Randolph’s

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sentence based on the convictions that didn’t form the elements of

the HDVO sentence enhancer. See id. at 730 (“Whether prior

convictions are extraordinary aggravating circumstances is a

determination made by the judge alone.”); see also DeHerrera v.

People, 122 P.3d 992, 994 (Colo. 2005) (noting that a trial court’s

decision to impose an aggravated sentence may be informed by the

defendant’s past conduct and past convictions).

¶ 12 Furthermore, although Randolph admitted to eight prior

domestic violence convictions, only three were necessary to subject

him to the HDVO sentence enhancer. § 18-6-801(7)(a). To the

extent the court aggravated Randolph’s sentence based on the

excessive convictions, we perceive no error. That Randolph had

nearly three times the number of domestic violence convictions

required for the HDVO sentence enhancer goes beyond the “bare

elements” of his offense and is therefore an appropriate aggravating

consideration. Lopez, 113 P.3d at 722.

¶ 13 Next, Randolph argues that the court erred by aggravating his

sentence based on unadmitted facts regarding the “sexual aspect”

of the assault. But even if the court did so, we need not address

this argument. “One Blakely-compliant or Blakely-exempt factor is

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sufficient to support an aggravated sentence.” Id. at 731

(concluding that prior convictions adequately supported the trial

court’s decision to aggravate and declining to address aggravation

based on the defendant’s uncharged conduct). Because the district

court properly relied on the prior convictions to aggravate

Randolph’s sentence, “[n]othing more is constitutionally required.”

DeHerrera, 122 P.3d at 994.

¶ 14 For all the above reasons, we uphold Randolph’s sentence.

III. Disposition

¶ 15 The sentence is affirmed.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE PAWAR concur.

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