Wright v. United Services

24CA1373 Wright v United Services 08-21-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1373
El Paso County District Court No. 23CV31825
Honorable David Shakes, Judge

Bruce M. Wright,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

United States Services Automobile Association, a/k/a USAA, a Texas
corporation and a Colorado authorized insurance company,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE
J. Jones and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 21, 2025

J. Gregory Walta, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Spencer Fane LLP, Jeremy A. Moseley, Hannah S. McCalla, Denver, Colorado,
for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, United Services Automobile Association (USAA),

appeals the judgment entered in favor of plaintiff, Bruce M. Wright.

We reverse and remand the case to the district court.

I. Background

¶2 In May 2023, an underinsured motorist hit and seriously

injured Wright while he was riding his bicycle. Wright was insured

at the time of the accident, having maintained automobile

insurance through USAA for decades. From at least 2002 until

Wright’s accident in 2023, Wright’s policy included uninsured

motorist and underinsured motorist coverage (UM/UIM coverage)

and bodily injury coverage (BI coverage). His policy included BI

coverage in the amount of $300,000 per person and $500,000 per

accident ($300,000/$500,000).

¶3 Wright’s injury-related expenses exceeded the underinsured

driver’s BI coverage policy limits, so Wright sought to use his own

UM/UIM coverage, which he believed to be equal to his BI coverage

at the time of the accident: $300,000/$500,000.

¶4 Shortly after the accident, Wright informed USAA that he had

been injured by an underinsured driver and that his injuries totaled

more than the $300,000/$500,000 of UM/UIM coverage provided

1
by his policy. Wright asserted that he was entitled to

$300,000/$500,000 of UM/UIM coverage based on a 2008 policy

notice he received saying his UM/UIM coverage limits would equal

his BI coverage limits unless he returned to USAA a

“Rejection/Selection Form” (rejection/selection form) rejecting the

UM/UIM coverage limits, which he didn’t do.

¶5 USAA rejected Wright’s assertion that his UM/UIM coverage

limits were $300,000/$500,000. Instead, USAA told Wright his

UM/UIM coverage limits were $25,000 per person and $50,000 per

accident ($25,000/$50,000) and had been since at least 2002.

¶6 Wright filed a complaint against USAA in district court that, as

relevant here, asserted a claim for declaratory judgment. Wright

asked the court to declare that he was entitled to UM/UIM coverage

in the amount of $300,000/$500,000 because (1) USAA’s 2008

notice was defective under section 10-4-609, C.R.S. 2024; “and/or”

(2) he chose UM/UIM coverage of $300,000/$500,000 by not

“completing, signing[,] and returning the [rejection/selection form].”

¶7 Wright filed a motion (the motion) in support of his request for

declaratory judgment. Included as an exhibit to the motion was a

form from Wright’s 2008 policy renewal documents generally

2
explaining what UM/UIM coverage entails (2008 summary

disclosure form). The 2008 summary disclosure form included the

following language (the increased coverage language):

Uninsured Motorists (UM) Coverage:

....

Is issued with UM Coverage limits equal to
your BI [coverage] limits unless you reject UM
Coverage or select lower UM Coverage limits by
completing, signing, and returning the
Rejection/Selection Form by mail or at
usaa.com.

As he alleged in his complaint, Wright argued that the increased

coverage language was an offer from USAA for UM/UIM coverage

equal to his BI coverage limits that he accepted by not completing

the rejection/selection form.

¶8 He also argued that because section 10-4-609(2) required

USAA to notify him of his coverage options in a manner reasonably

calculated to enable him to make an informed decision about

whether to obtain UM/UIM coverage limits equal to his BI coverage

limits, any ambiguities resulting from the increased coverage

language should be resolved in his favor to require reformation of

the terms of his policy.

3
¶9 For purposes of Wright’s request for declaratory judgment,

USAA didn’t dispute that Wright was injured by an underinsured

driver or that he had maintained a policy with UM/UIM coverage for

decades. However, in its response to the motion, USAA argued that

Wright’s references to his insurance policy documents were

incomplete. USAA submitted to the court Wright’s complete

automobile policy packets for the years 2002, 2008, 2014, 2020,

2022, and 2023 (collectively, the policy packets). USAA argued that

(1) the plain language of the policies limited Wright’s UM/UIM

coverage to $25,000/$50,000, and (2) it had complied with section

10-4-609(2) by offering Wright higher UM/UIM coverage, as

demonstrated in the policy packets, so reformation of the 2008

policy or any subsequent policies was precluded. USAA also noted

that Wright’s $25,000/$50,000 UM/UIM coverage limit had

remained in place, unchanged through every renewal period since

2002, despite USAA’s repeated notice to Wright that higher coverage

limits were available. USAA asked the court to deny Wright’s

request for declaratory judgment.

¶ 10 The court treated the motion as a C.R.C.P. 56(h) motion for a

determination of a question of law and granted it.

4
¶ 11 In its ruling, the court relied on Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. v.

Mid-Century Insurance Co., 246 P.3d 651 (Colo. 2011), for its

analysis of an insurer’s responsibility to adequately notify a

policyholder of a reduction in coverage during the policy renewal

period. The court also relied on Bailey v. Lincoln General Insurance

Co., 255 P.3d 1039 (Colo. 2011), for guidance in interpreting

exclusionary language1 in insurance contracts and applying the

doctrine of reasonable expectations.

¶ 12 The court reasoned as follows:

• While the issue in this case “[was] not precisely a renewal

reduction situation,” it found the analysis and legal

principles in Shelter and Bailey persuasive.

• Shelter and Bailey advise that insurance policy renewal

contracts are subject to heightened scrutiny and the

doctrine of “reasonable expectations,” which requires

insurers to adequately relay to policyholders any

coverage-limiting provisions.

1 “An exclusion” is a provision of an insurance policy “that excepts

certain events or conditions from coverage. Dupre v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 62 P.3d 1024, 1029 (Colo. App. 2002).

5
• The reasonable expectations doctrine has two prongs:

first, whether an ordinary, objectively reasonable person

would fail to understand that he is not entitled to the

coverage at issue based on the language of the policy and

second, whether, because of circumstances attributable

to an insurer, an ordinary, objectively reasonable person

would be deceived into believing that he is entitled to

coverage despite the insurer’s contention otherwise.

• Wright, as an accomplished commercial attorney, wasn’t

subject to an ordinary layperson standard under the first

prong of the reasonable expectations standard.

• The second prong of the reasonable expectations doctrine

applied because the 2008 summary disclosure form

“would lead any reasonable person to believe that he had

UM/UIM coverage in the same amount as his [BI]

coverage [of] $300,000-$500,000 and that said coverage

would continue in place until he took some affirmative

action to make a change.”

6
¶ 13 The court concluded that USAA

offered no evidence that Wright was fully and
fairly notified that the UM/UIM coverage was
anything other than the amount of Wright’s
[BI] coverage — $300,000-$500,000. Simply
directing Wright to read the terms of his policy
is insufficient when USAA made the
representation in the 2008 notice that
UM/UIM coverage would be in the amount of
Wright’s [BI] coverage —
$300,000-$500,000 — and would remain in
effect unless he requested otherwise in writing.

¶ 14 The court thus ruled that Wright’s UM/UIM coverage at the

time of his 2023 accident was $300,000/$500,000.

¶ 15 USAA asked the court to certify the judgment under C.R.C.P.

54(b) and stay the litigation pending resolution of its appeal to this

court. The court granted USAA’s request to certify the judgment.

¶ 16 On appeal, USAA asserts that the 2008 summary disclosure

form satisfied its statutory duty under section 10-4-609(2) to

provide Wright with adequate notice of his right to purchase

UM/UIM coverage equal to his BI coverage limits. USAA also

asserts that the principles set forth in Shelter and Bailey are

inapplicable to this case, and the court’s application of those cases

resulted in an erroneous determination that Wright is entitled to

UM/UIM coverage in the amount of $300,000/$500,000.

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¶ 17 For reasons discussed below, we don’t need to address USAA’s

first assertion. But we agree with USAA that the court reversibly

erred by applying the principles of Shelter and Bailey to the facts of

this case to conclude that Wright is entitled to UM/UIM coverage in

the amount of $300,000/$500,000.

II. Applicable Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶ 18 In 2008, the General Assembly overhauled section 10-4-609,

which included rewriting subsection (2). See Ch. 413, sec. 2,

§ 10-4-609(2), 2007 Colo. Sess. Laws 1921-22; Airth v. Zurich Am.

Ins. Co., 2018 COA 9, ¶ 17 n.5. Compare § 10-4-609(2), C.R.S.

2007, with § 10-4-609(2), C.R.S. 2024. By its amendment of

subsection (2), the General Assembly required insurers to offer

policyholders “the right to obtain uninsured motorist coverage in an

amount equal to the [policyholder’s] bodily injury liability limits”

before a policy is issued or renewed. § 10-4-609(2). The legislative

purpose of section 10-4-609 is to provide drivers “with an

opportunity to make an informed decision on an appropriate level of

UM/UIM coverage,” Mullen v. Metro. Cas. Ins. Co., 2021 COA 149,

¶ 20 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Parfrey, 830 P.2d 905, 912 (Colo.

1992)), and insurers must provide policyholders with UM/UIM

8
coverage of at least $25,000/$50,000 unless the policyholder

objects to UM/UIM coverage in writing, id. at ¶ 17. See Massingill

v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 176 P.3d 816, 820 (Colo. App.

2007) (“An insurer must offer UM/UIM coverage in an automobile

policy, but the insured may reject such coverage in writing.”).

¶ 19 We interpret an insurance policy de novo, construing it

according to the principles of contract interpretation. Hoang v.

Assurance Co. of Am., 149 P.3d 798, 801 (Colo. 2007). We read the

provisions of the policy as a whole, Sachs v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co.,

251 P.3d 543, 546 (Colo. App. 2010), and enforce it as written if it

is unambiguous, Dupre v. Allstate Ins. Co., 62 P.3d 1024, 1027

(Colo. App. 2002). “[A]n insurance policy” is “ambiguous if it is

susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id. And

while we liberally construe ambiguous provisions in favor of the

policyholder, we neither delete coverage nor extend coverage beyond

that for which the insured contracted. Sachs, 251 P.3d at 546.

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¶ 20 We also review de novo a court’s grant of partial summary

judgment.2 See In re Estate of McCreath, 240 P.3d 413, 417 (Colo.

App. 2009) (treating an order issued under C.R.C.P. 56(h) that had

a “final, dispositive effect” on pending claims as a partial summary

judgment, subject to de novo review); see also Ryser v. Shelter Mut.

Ins. Co., 2021 CO 11, ¶ 13 (summary judgment is reviewed de

novo), superseded by statute, Ch. 169, sec. 1, § 15-5-602(3), 2018

Colo. Sess. Laws 1166, as recognized in In re Thomas E. Hunn Living

Tr., 2024 COA 51. When, as here, “the material facts are

undisputed, summary judgment is appropriate only when the

pleadings and supporting documents show that the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ryser, ¶ 13. We grant the

nonmoving party the benefit of all favorable inferences reasonably

2 We acknowledge that the court treated Wright’s motion as a

C.R.C.P. 56(h) motion for a determination of a question of law. But
because the court’s order resolved in its entirety the claim from
Wright’s complaint that had a dispositive effect on his remaining
claims — namely, the amount of UM/UIM coverage to which Wright
was entitled — the order operated as a partial summary judgment
under C.R.C.P. 56(c). See In re Estate of McCreath, 240 P.3d 413,
417 (Colo. App. 2009), superseded by statute, Ch. 169, sec. 1,
§ 15-5-602(3), 2018 Colo. Sess. Laws 1166, as recognized in In re
Thomas E. Hunn Living Tr., 2024 COA 51. We therefore review the
order under the legal principles applicable to review of summary
judgments.

10
drawn from the undisputed facts and resolve all doubts against the

moving party. Hardegger v. Clark, 2017 CO 96, ¶ 13.

III. Analysis

A. We Need Not Address Whether USAA Satisfied Its Statutory
Duty of Notice under Section 10-4-609

¶ 21 As noted, Wright’s first asserted premise for declaratory

judgment was USAA’s alleged violation of section 10-4-609.

¶ 22 But Wright conceded in his answer brief and in oral argument

that USAA didn’t violate section 10-4-609. Moreover, the district

court didn’t analyze USAA’s compliance with section 10-4-609.

Thus, the parties’ dispute doesn’t concern whether the 2008

summary disclosure form provided Wright with adequate notice

regarding his ability to purchase increased UM/UIM coverage;

rather, the parties’ dispute concerns the effect of the increased

coverage language in USAA’s 2008 summary disclosure form.

¶ 23 Wright contends that the (statutorily compliant) 2008

summary disclosure form informed him that he had UM/UIM

coverage equal to his BI coverage unless he selected a lower amount

of coverage by signing and returning the rejection/selection form.

He asserts that, because he didn’t return the rejection/selection

11
form or otherwise notify USAA in writing that he was rejecting the

UM/UIM coverage offered in the increased coverage language,

“USAA should be bound by the clear language of [the 2008

summary disclosure form],” or he should have “all ambiguities”

resolved in his favor as required by Shelter. As we discuss next, we

aren’t persuaded.

B. Shelter and Bailey Aren’t Applicable to This Case

¶ 24 USAA contends that, because it never reduced or otherwise

changed Wright’s coverage, the court erred by relying on Shelter’s

coverage reduction principles. USAA also contends the court erred

by applying the second prong of the reasonable expectations

doctrine set forth in Bailey because that prong only applies when

“procedural or substantive deception attributable to the insurer”

leads an ordinary, objectively reasonable policyholder to believe that

he is entitled to coverage later denied by the insurer.3 We agree

with both contentions.

3 USAA also contends that Wright’s claim is time barred by a three-

year statute of limitations. Given our disposition of USAA’s other
assertions in its favor, we need not reach this alternative argument.

12
¶ 25 In Shelter, the insurer made a change to the policyholder’s

coverage: It added a “step-down” provision limiting the insurer’s

liability for permissive drivers to the minimum coverage amounts

mandated by law. Id. at 656. This change resulted in coverage

amounts for permissive drivers that were less than what the

policyholder had previously selected. Id. The insurer sent the

policyholder a packet of policy renewal forms, but the renewal forms

didn’t tell the policyholder about the coverage reduction, nor did the

insurer highlight the change in the policy. Id.

¶ 26 The Shelter court concluded that, because the policyholder

didn’t receive adequate notice of the reduction in coverage, the

step-down provision was unenforceable. Id. at 657. In reaching

this conclusion, the supreme court reasoned that “[i]nsurers

seeking to avoid liability ‘must do so in clear and unequivocal

language and must call such limiting conditions to the attention of

the insured.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Cyprus Amax Mins. Co.

v. Lexington Ins. Co., 74 P.3d 294, 307 (Colo. 2003)). The Shelter

court also reasoned that when “insureds have not been adequately

notified of a reduction in coverage, they have ‘an objectively

reasonable expectation’ that their coverage has not been reduced.”

13
Id. at 658 (emphasis added) (quoting Tepe v. Rocky Mountain Hosp.

& Med. Servs., 893 P.2d 1323, 1328 (Colo. App. 1994)).

¶ 27 In Bailey, the supreme court explained that Colorado’s

doctrine of reasonable expectations renders exclusionary language

unenforceable when, as relevant here, “an ordinary, objectively

reasonable insured would be deceived into believing that he or she

is entitled to coverage, while the insurer would maintain he or she

is not,” because of circumstances attributable to an insurer. 255

P.3d at 1043.

¶ 28 Yet, despite noting that “this case is not precisely a renewal

reduction situation,” the district court concluded that the rationale

of Shelter and Bailey required the court to “analyze the ‘totality of

the circumstances involved in the transaction from the point of view

of an ordinary layperson.’” See Sanchez v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co.,

681 P.2d 974, 977 (Colo. App. 1984).

¶ 29 The court erred by analyzing this claim through the lens of

Shelter and Bailey, for two reasons.

¶ 30 First, unlike in Shelter, USAA didn’t reduce Wright’s coverage.

The policy declarations in each of the policy packets Wright received

from 2002 until his accident in 2023 show that Wright’s UM/UIM

14
coverage limits were $25,000/$50,000. And nearly all of the policy

packets Wright received contained a notice similar to the 2008

summary disclosure form notifying him of his ability to increase his

UM/UIM coverage or reject coverage altogether. While Shelter

recognizes that “it is insufficient for an insurer merely to provide a

new policy and instruct ‘the insured to carefully read’ it,” that

sentiment only applies in the context of an insurer’s reduction of

coverage. Shelter, 246 P.3d at 658 (quoting Gov’t Emp. Ins. Co. v.

United States, 400 F.2d 172, 175 (10th Cir. 1968)). Nothing in the

record supports the conclusion that USAA reduced Wright’s

coverage at any point between 2002 and 2023; thus, the legal

principles driving the court’s decision in Shelter are inapplicable.

¶ 31 Second, as explained in Bailey, the doctrine of reasonable

expectations renders exclusionary language in an insurance policy

unenforceable if certain conditions are met. 255 P.3d at 1043,

1048. But we fail to see — and Wright doesn’t explain — how the

increased coverage language from the 2008 summary disclosure is

exclusionary. See Dupre, 62 P.3d at 1029 (“An exclusion” is a

provision of an insurance policy “that excepts certain events or

conditions from coverage.”) (citation omitted).

15
¶ 32 Indeed, Wright asserts that the language from the 2008

summary disclosure entitles him to additional coverage. But the

Bailey court made clear that “the doctrine of reasonable

expectations ‘does not contemplate the expansion of coverage on a

general equitable basis.’” 255 P.3d at 1054 (quoting Johnson v.

Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 533 N.W.2d 203, 206 (Iowa 1995)). And

“[t]he ‘bare allegations’ of policyholders that they expected certain

coverage are insufficient to establish grounds for relief sounding in

reasonable expectations.” Id. (citation omitted).

¶ 33 Rather, for the increased coverage language to be construed

against USAA, Wright must demonstrate that USAA engaged in

“procedural or substantive deception” that would lead “an

objectively reasonable” policyholder to believe that he possessed the

increased coverage. Id.; see Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985,

991 (Colo. 1986) (discussing the factors courts consider to

determine whether a contract is procedurally or substantively

unconscionable); see also Tillman v. Com. Credit Loans, Inc., 655

S.E.2d 362, 370 (N.C. 2008) (defining procedural unconscionability

as defects in the bargaining process such as unfair surprise, lack of

meaningful choice, or inequality of bargaining power and

16
substantive unconscionability as harsh, one-sided, or oppressive

contract terms).

¶ 34 Wright didn’t present evidence supporting his motion

demonstrating that the increased coverage language was deceptive

when considered in the context of the entire 2008 policy packet and

the circumstances under which the policy itself was entered into,

such that an objectively reasonable policyholder would believe that

he had been given UM/UIM coverage in limits ten to twelve times

higher than his existing policy without having to pay an increased

premium. See Allen v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 907 F.3d 1230,

1235-36 (10th Cir. 2018) (concluding that USAA’s summary

disclosure form wasn’t deceptive because an objectively reasonable

person would not have been deceived into believing the disclosure

form created a promise of indefinite medical-payments coverage).

¶ 35 Even assuming the increased coverage language was somehow

deceptive, Wright also didn’t present evidence explaining why it was

objectively reasonable for him to believe he was entitled to increased

UM/UIM coverage in 2023 based on the 2008 summary disclosure

form, despite being informed in several later policy packets —

17
including his 2023 packet — that his UM/UIM coverage limits were

$25,000/$50,000.

C. Wright’s UM/UIM Coverage Is Limited to $25,000/$50,000

¶ 36 For three reasons, we also reject Wright’s alternative

arguments that (1) the “clear” language of the 2008 summary

disclosure entitled him to UM/UIM coverage limits of

$300,000/$500,000, and (2) the 2008 summary disclosure was

ambiguous and should be construed against USAA.

¶ 37 First, the 2008 summary disclosure form was merely an

overview of the categories of coverage and policy terms generally

applicable to any insurance policy; nothing about the plain

language of that form indicates that it was specific to Wright’s

circumstances or insurance needs. See Black’s Law Dictionary

1742 (12th ed. 2024) (defining the adjective “summary” as “[s]hort;

concise” and “[w]ithout the usual formalities”). A policy summary is

designed to simplify and highlight key information, but it is not

intended to replace the policy itself. See § 10-4-111(1), C.R.S. 2024

(requiring “[e]very insurer issuing policies of . . . automobile

insurance” to create a summary disclosure that explains in simple

terms the major coverages and exclusions of their insurance

18
policies; advises the policyholder to read the policy for complete

details; informs the policyholder that the disclosure form “shall not

be construed to replace any provision of the policy itself”; and states

that, “[i]n the event of any conflict between the policy and the

disclosure form, the provisions of the policy shall prevail”).

Moreover, the 2008 summary disclosure form explicitly says,

This summary disclosure form is a basic guide
to the major coverages and exclusions in your
policy. It is only a general description and not
a statement of contract or a policy of any kind.
All coverage is subject to the terms, conditions,
and exclusions of your policy and all
applicable endorsements.

PLEASE READ YOUR POLICY FOR COMPLETE
DETAILS! THIS SUMMARY DISCLOSURE FORM
SHALL NOT BE CONSTRUED TO REPLACE ANY
PROVISION OF THE POLICY ITSELF.

¶ 38 Second, construing the entirety of the 2008 policy together, we

can’t conclude that its terms are ambiguous. Because the policy

isn’t ambiguous, “we give effect to the intent and reasonable

expectations of the parties” and enforce the policy’s plain language.

Hoang, 149 P.3d at 801.

¶ 39 The plain language of the 2008 policy indicated that Wright’s

UM/UIM coverage was limited to $25,000/$50,000. The UM/UIM

19
coverage limits listed on the policy itself remained unchanged from

2002 to 2023. Additionally, each of the policy packets USAA sent to

Wright contained information about what he was paying for, his

existing UM/UIM coverage limits of $25,000/$50,000 — as

indicated on the policy itself — and what he would pay for UM/UIM

coverage limits of $300,000/$500,000 — as indicated on the

rejection/selection forms through 2022.4 The cost for UM/UIM

coverage limits of $300,000/$500,000 is nearly three times the cost

of UM/UIM coverage in the amount of $25,000/$50,000. Despite

Wright’s assertions that USAA had granted him increased coverage,

his policy documents reflect that the premiums he paid remained

consistent with the price associated with his lower amount of

coverage. Under these circumstances, it was unreasonable for

Wright to expect that USAA would provide significantly higher

UM/UIM coverage limits at the same price he was paying for his

lower coverage limits.

¶ 40 Third, Wright’s assertion that USAA is bound by the terms of

the increased coverage language because it was a contractual offer

4 The record does not contain a rejection/selection form for the

2023 renewal packet.

20
from USAA that he accepted is not supported. He conceded during

oral argument that there is no evidence in the record demonstrating

that he relied on the increased coverage language, and his failure to

pay increased premiums in exchange for increased coverage doesn’t

support the formation of a contract. See Marquardt v. Perry, 200

P.3d 1126, 1129 (Colo. App. 2008) (noting that a valid contract is

formed when there is an offer, acceptance, and consideration that

supports the agreement); § 10-1-102, C.R.S. 2024 (defining

“[i]nsurance” as “a contract whereby one, for consideration,

undertakes to indemnify another or to pay a specified or

ascertainable amount or benefit upon determinable risk

contingencies”); Black’s Law Dictionary 384 (12th ed. 2024)

(defining “consideration” as “[s]omething (such as an act, a

forbearance, or a return promise) bargained for and received by a

promisor from a promisee”).

¶ 41 Thus, because neither Shelter nor Bailey applies to the facts of

this case, and because the plain language of Wright’s policy as a

whole indicates that his UM/UIM coverage limits are

$25,000/$50,000, we enforce the policy as it is written.

21
IV. Disposition

¶ 42 The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the

district court with instructions to declare that Wright’s UM/UIM

coverage under the 2023 policy is limited to $25,000/$50,000,

consistent with this opinion.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE KUHN concur.

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