Peo v. Crespin

22CA2212 Peo v Crespin 08-07-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA2212
Boulder County District Court No. 21CR2153
Honorable Norma A. Sierra, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Samuel Leo Paul Crespin,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
Tow and Graham*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 7, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Alejandro Sorg Gonzalez, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, John Plimpton, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 Samuel Leo Paul Crespin appeals his convictions for

possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, possession

with intent to distribute fentanyl, and possession with intent to

distribute cocaine. His only contention on appeal is that the district

court reversibly erred by denying his motion to suppress a

statement he made to the police. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 One night, a police officer caught a person in the act of

shoplifting. The officer detained the shoplifter, issued him a

summons, and then allowed him to leave. However, the shoplifter

did not return to his car in the parking lot and instead left the area

on foot. This led the officer to suspect that the car might be stolen,

so he went to investigate it.1

¶3 Three people were in the car, including Crespin who was in the

front passenger seat. As the officer approached, the person in the

driver’s seat opened his door, and the officer noticed foil covered in

drug residue and other drug paraphernalia near the door handle.

After explaining what had happened with the shoplifter and getting

1 The officer’s body camera recorded his encounter with the

occupants of the car.

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each of the vehicle occupants to identify themselves, the officer told

them,

I do see paraphernalia. I have seen it, okay? I
will get a dog over here to run it, too. Just if,
again, if you guys are just honest, upfront with
me, we can work on it, alright? If you’re not
honest, then we’re going to have bigger issues.

The vehicle occupants denied having any drugs.

¶4 The officer had each person exit the car one at a time to stand

by a curb, where another police officer who had just arrived could

keep an eye on them. But when it was Crespin’s turn to leave the

car, he tried to take a backpack with him and repeatedly refused

the officer’s command to either allow the officer to search the

backpack right then or else leave it behind, leading the officer to

twice ask, “Do you need to go in cuffs?” Eventually, Crespin agreed

to leave the bag behind, and the officer thereafter asked if he would

consent to a pat-down search, telling him, “You have the right to

refuse that.” Crespin refused and went to stand by the other

occupants.

¶5 The officer then radioed for a drug-detection dog and provided

dispatch with the vehicle’s identification number. Dispatch

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informed him that, though the vehicle and its license plates were

both registered to the shoplifter, the plates were for a different car.

¶6 While waiting for the police dog to arrive, Crespin asked to

speak with the officer. At the officer’s suggestion, they moved away

from everybody else to talk one-on-one. Crespin asked why he was

being detained, and the officer told him that he was “not free to go”

because the car had the wrong license plate on it and that he was

“even more . . . not free to go” because of the drug paraphernalia

found in car. The officer then asked Crespin, “Is there something in

there you want to tell me about?” and Crespin admitted to the

officer that there was a handgun in the backpack.

¶7 Once the drug-detection dog arrived and alerted its handler to

the scent of drugs from the car, the officer searched the vehicle and

the backpack. Inside the backpack, he found a handgun,

methamphetamine, fentanyl, and cocaine.

¶8 The People charged Crespin with several offenses, including,

as relevant here, possession with intent to distribute

methamphetamine, possession with intent to distribute fentanyl,

and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Before trial,

Crespin moved to suppress the statements he made to the officer

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before the shoplifter’s vehicle was searched.2 The district court

denied Crespin’s motion.

¶9 The case went to trial. Crespin’s theory of defense was that

the backpack belonged to the shoplifter. However, the prosecution

used Crespin’s statement to the officer that there was a gun in the

bag, along with other evidence, to link the backpack to Crespin.

Ultimately, the jury found Crespin guilty of each of the possession

charges.

II. Analysis

¶ 10 Crespin contends that the district court erred by not

suppressing his statement that there was a gun in the backpack.

He claims that he made this statement during a custodial

interrogation without first being informed of his rights under

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 11 In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we ordinarily

defer to the district court’s factual findings if they are supported by

2 Crespin’s motion argued that all the statements he made after the

officer told him to leave the car should be suppressed. But on
appeal, Crespin contends only that his statement about the
handgun should have been suppressed.

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the record and review the court’s application of law de novo.

People v. Willoughby, 2023 CO 10, ¶ 18. But when, as here, the

challenged incident is video recorded and there are no relevant

disputed facts outside of the recording, we are in a position similar

to the district court to resolve the issues. People v. Taylor, 2018 CO

35, ¶ 7. Therefore, we may conduct an independent review of the

officer’s body camera footage to determine whether Crespin’s

statement should have been suppressed under controlling law. See

id.

¶ 12 Under Miranda, the prosecution may not introduce in its

case-in-chief statements made during custodial interrogation,

unless the police preceded the interrogation with certain warnings.

People v. Davis, 2019 CO 84, ¶ 16. Miranda warnings are only

required when a suspect is subject to both interrogation and

custody. Id. Because we conclude that Crespin was not in custody,

we need not address whether he was under interrogation.

¶ 13 A suspect is in custody if “a reasonable person in the suspect’s

position would believe himself to be deprived of his freedom of

action to the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Id. at ¶ 17

(quoting People v. Hankins, 201 P.3d 1215, 1218 (Colo. 2009)). In

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making this determination, we consider the totality of the

circumstances, including such factors as

(1) the time, place, and purpose of the
encounter; (2) the persons present during the
interrogation; (3) the words spoken by the
officer to the defendant; (4) the officer’s tone of
voice and general demeanor; (5) the length and
mood of the interrogation; (6) whether any
limitation of movement or other form of
restraint was placed on the defendant during
the interrogation; (7) the officer’s response to
any questions asked by the defendant;
(8) whether directions were given to the
defendant during the interrogation; and (9) the
defendant’s verbal or nonverbal response to
such directions.

People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 465-66 (Colo. 2002) (quoting

People v. Trujillo, 938 P.2d 117, 124 (Colo. 1997)). This list is not

exhaustive, and no single factor is determinative. Davis, ¶ 19.

B. Discussion

¶ 14 Applying the Matheny factors under the totality of the

circumstances, we conclude that Crespin was not deprived of his

freedom of action to the degree associated with a formal arrest and

therefore was not in custody. The following facts weigh against

finding custody:

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• Although the encounter took place at night and in the

cold, it occurred in a public parking lot for a business

that was still open. See People v. Pleshakov, 2013 CO 18,

¶ 30 (A “conversation [that] took place in public view so

that passersby could have witnessed the interaction”

weighed against custody.).

• Although another officer arrived on scene to keep an eye

on the vehicle occupants once they were asked to stand

by the curb, the record shows that only the initial officer

spoke with Crespin. Indeed, when Crespin made the

challenged statement, he was in a one-on-one

conversation with the initial officer, away from everybody

else at the officer’s suggestion. See id. (a single officer

conversing alone with the defendant while the “remaining

officers engaged in other tasks” weighs against custody);

People v. Clark, 2020 CO 36, ¶ 33 (“We have previously

relied on the fact that only a single officer spoke with a

suspect in concluding that the suspect was not in

custody during the encounter at issue.”).

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• The officer’s words and tone generally remained

conversational and nonconfrontational. See Pleshakov,

¶ 31 (“[T]here [wa]s no showing that [the police officer]

informed [the defendant] he would be charged with an

arrestable offense or that [the officer] presented [him]

with the evidence against him in a threatening or

confrontational manner.”); People v. Cowart, 244 P.3d

1199, 1204 (Colo. 2010) (holding that the defendant was

not in custody in part because the officer spoke with him

in a conversational tone). The officer told Crespin and

another occupant that they had the right to refuse a

pat-down search, and Crespin did refuse to be searched

without issue.3

• Crespin made the challenged statement less than fifteen

minutes into the encounter, and, for much of that time,

the officer was not directly interacting with Crespin. See

People v. Begay, 2014 CO 41, ¶ 27 (concluding the

defendant was not in custody in part because the

3 The third occupant had told the officer that he had a knife on him

and was not given the option to refuse a pat-down search.

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encounter lasted less than twenty minutes). The overall

mood of the encounter remained calm and

nonconfrontational throughout. See People v. Theander,

2013 CO 15, ¶ 33 (factor weighing against custody was

the pleasant and nonconfrontational mood of the

encounter). The officer’s “few pointed questions and [his]

exhortations to be honest did not render the overall mood

of the interrogation aggressive or accusatory.” Davis,

¶ 34.

• During the encounter, the officer did not handcuff or

physically restrain Crespin or the other vehicle

occupants. See Pleshakov, ¶ 21 (noting that cases have

“focused on the degree of physical restraint employed by

officers in determining whether a suspect was in

custody”); Cowart, 244 P.3d at 1204 (“[T]he lack of

physical restraint suggests to us that [the defendant] was

not in custody.”). Moreover, Crespin was able to take his

vape pen with him and smoke while standing by the

curb. Cf. Willoughby, ¶ 36 (“No one who had their

freedom of movement restrained to the degree associated

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with a formal arrest would reasonably feel like they could

smoke a cigar, let alone without asking for permission.”).

• Overall, Crespin appeared calm during the encounter.

See People v. Garcia, 2017 CO 106, ¶ 23 (“A calm

emotional state suggests a person does not feel the

pressures associated with custody.”). He repeatedly

denied having anything to do with the drug

paraphernalia in the car and repeatedly expressed

confusion as to why he was being detained and why his

backpack could be searched. Cf. Clark, ¶ 34 (“[The

defendant] generally deflected questions from [a detective]

while repeatedly asking what items the police were

seeking and expressing his lack of understanding as to

why the police were there and how ‘insane’ it all was. . . .

[T]his conduct . . . does not suggest a person who

believed that he was in custody or who had in any way

succumbed to any sort of coercive police interrogation.”).

Notably, Crespin initiated the conversation with the

officer that led to his admission about the handgun.

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¶ 15 These facts merely show that Crespin was being detained

while the officer investigated the vehicle. They do not demonstrate

that he was in custody for Miranda purposes. See People v. Hughes,

252 P.3d 1118, 1122 (Colo. 2011) (“[J]ust because a defendant is

detained in an investigatory stop does not mean he or she is in

custody for purposes of Miranda.”).

¶ 16 Crespin emphasizes several aspects of the interaction that

could weigh in favor of finding custody. For example, he asserts

that the officer twice asking him, “Do you need to go in handcuffs?”

suggests that he was in custody. However, these questions were

posed after Crespin repeatedly refused to either allow the officer to

search the backpack or else leave it behind in the car. Thus, the

officer was suggesting that Crespin would be restrained if he

attempted to take the backpack, not that Crespin needed to be

restrained because he was in custody. Similarly, the officer’s

statements that “the fact that you’re in the car [that has the wrong

plates on it], you’re not free to go”; that “once I saw the

paraphernalia, that’s even more of you’re not free to go”; and that

the paraphernalia “could’ve easily came from you” were made in

response to Crespin’s inquiries about why he was being detained,

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not to suggest that Crespin was going to be arrested. Viewing the

officer’s words in context, “we cannot conclude that a reasonable

person in [Crespin’s] position would believe that he was restrained

to a degree tantamount to a formal arrest, regardless of the

questions and statements made by” the officer. People v.

Stephenson, 159 P.3d 617, 623 (Colo. 2007).

¶ 17 We are not swayed by Crespin’s reliance on People v. Null,

233 P.3d 670, 677 (Colo. 2010); People v. Polander, 41 P.3d 698,

705 (Colo. 2001); People v. Taylor, 41 P.3d 681, 692-93 (Colo.

2002); People v. Thomas, 839 P.2d 1174, 1178-79 (Colo. 1992); and

People v. Verigan, 2015 COA 132, ¶¶ 21-27, aff’d on other grounds,

2018 CO 53. At the time of interrogation in each of these cases,

either the defendant was physically restrained, or it was apparent

that an arrest was imminent, or both. See Null, 233 P.3d at 677

(The defendant was “‘surrounded’ by the patrol car and the officers

on either side of him” when he was questioned and had already

“failed two sobriety tests and the preliminary breath test before the

interrogation began.”); Polander, 41 P.3d at 705 (“[T]he defendant

had every reason to believe she would not be briefly detained and

then released as in the case of an investigatory stop or a stop for a

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minor offense.”); Taylor, 41 P.3d at 692-93 (The defendant “was

surrounded by armed uniformed police officers and their patrol cars

and was ‘essentially encircled next to the pickup truck while the

interrogation occurred.’”); Thomas, 839 P.2d at 1178 (Drug

paraphernalia was found on the defendant’s person, and he “was

told that he was being detained and, at the very least, would receive

a ticket.”); Verigan, ¶ 26 (The defendant owned the car that the

police saw drug paraphernalia in, she was escorted to the car for

questioning by a police officer, and police officers told her that “they

had called a female officer to the scene to conduct a more thorough

search of [the defendant’s] person.”).

¶ 18 In contrast, the facts of this case are more similar to those in

Stephenson, 159 P.3d at 623. In Stephenson, a police officer asked

the defendant and his passenger to exit the car and stand nearby

while the officer performed a consensual search of the vehicle. Id.

at 619-20. After the search, the officer — without giving a Miranda

advisement — confronted the defendant with a small baggie of

methamphetamine found in the driver’s seat, and the defendant

ultimately admitted that the baggie belonged to him. Id. at 620.

The supreme court held that the defendant’s admission should not

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have been suppressed. Id. at 623. The court concluded that having

the defendant exit and stand behind the vehicle was “for his own

safety and to facilitate the search of the vehicle” and was not a

restraint on freedom of action tantamount to a formal arrest. Id. at

623. And even though the officer had already found drugs in the

seat where the defendant had been sitting before the defendant

made the inculpatory statement, the court concluded that it was

not apparent that the defendant would be arrested because he had

“repeatedly denied owning the vehicle that he was driving, and [the

police officer’s] records check confirmed that [the defendant] did not

own the vehicle where the drugs were found.” Id.

¶ 19 Like in Stephenson, Crespin was not physically restrained in

any way nor surrounded by police officers after he was told to stand

by the curb to facilitate the officer’s search. See id. Also like in

Stephenson, and unlike most of the cases Crespin relies on, “it was

not ‘apparent to all’ that there were grounds to arrest [Crespin] or

that he would be arrested.” Id. Although possession of drug

paraphernalia is an arrestable offense, see People v. Johnson, 2024

CO 47, ¶¶ 42-43, Crespin (1) did not own the car in which the

paraphernalia was found; (2) was one of four people (including the

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shoplifter) who had been in the car; and (3) repeatedly disclaimed

any involvement with the paraphernalia the officer spotted, which

was across the car from where Crespin was sitting, cf. Stephenson,

159 P.3d at 623.

¶ 20 In summary, we conclude that the totality of the

circumstances demonstrates that Crespin was not in custody when

he told the officer that there was a gun in the backpack, and, thus,

the district court did not err by denying his suppression motion.

III. Disposition

¶ 21 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE GRAHAM concur.

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