In Interest of AJF

24CA1429 In Interest of AJF 07-31-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1429
Archuleta County District Court No. 12JV35
Honorable Jeffrey R. Wilson, Judge

In the Interest of A.J.F., a Child,

and Concerning N.F.,

Appellant,

and

L.L.S.,

Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE TOW
Yun and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 31, 2025

Anne Whalen Gill, LLC, Anne Whalen Gill, Castle Rock, Colorado, for Appellant

The Law Firm of Lisa Ward, LLC, Lisa Ward, Durango, Colorado, for Appellee
¶1 In this post-decree paternity case, N.F. (father) appeals the

district court’s decision adopting the magistrate’s award of trial

attorney fees to L.L.S. (mother). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 This case began when father filed a petition to determine that

he was the father of A.J.F. (the child). Later, mother and father,

who were never married, stipulated to a permanent parenting plan

and child support.

¶3 Mother filed a motion to enforce the stipulation and for trial

attorney fees. In her motion, she requested that the court require

father to pay for the child’s extraordinary medical expenses and

school tuition. While the magistrate granted some, but by no

means all, of mother’s requests for reimbursement, the magistrate’s

order was silent as to mother’s fee request. (In fact,

notwithstanding mother’s request for attorney fees in her motion,

when either party attempted to address the attorney fees request

during the hearing, the magistrate inexplicably admonished the

parties that attorney fees were not relevant for the purposes of the

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hearing.) After father petitioned the district court for review, the

district court adopted the magistrate’s order.1

¶4 In the meantime, mother renewed her request for attorney

fees. After a hearing, the magistrate granted mother trial attorney

fees pursuant to section 19-4-117, C.R.S. 2024. Father petitioned

for review of the magistrate’s order, and the district court again

adopted the magistrate’s order. This appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

¶5 Our review of a district court’s order adopting a magistrate’s

decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review. In re

Marriage of Sheehan, 2022 COA 29, ¶ 22. We must accept the

magistrate’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous,

meaning that they have no support in the record. In re Marriage of

Young, 2021 COA 96, ¶ 8.

¶6 Our review of a magistrate’s award of attorney fees in paternity

cases — including the reasonableness of the award — is limited to

determining whether the court abused its discretion. W.C. in

1 Father appealed the district court’s order, and a division of this

court affirmed it. In Interest of A.J.F., (Colo. App. No. 23CA1318,
Aug. 15, 2024) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).

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Interest of A.M.K., 907 P.2d 719, 723 (Colo. App. 1995); see also

Planning Partners Int’l, LLC v. QED, Inc., 2013 CO 43, ¶ 12. A

juvenile court abuses its discretion if its decision misapplies the law

or is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People in

Interest of A.N-B., 2019 COA 46, ¶ 9. However, we review whether a

magistrate applied the correct legal standard de novo. In re

Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 26.

III. Consideration of Financial Resources

¶7 Father argues that the magistrate erred by considering the

disparity in the parties’ financial resources. He argues that, though

consideration of such disparity is required under section 14-10-

119, C.R.S. 2024, that statute does not apply to a fee request under

section 19-4-117. Father also contends that the court erred by

awarding mother all her requested attorney fees. We perceive no

abuse of discretion.

A. Relevant Law

¶8 Before awarding attorney fees in a dissolution of marriage

proceeding, section 14-10-119 requires the court to consider “the

financial resources of both parties.” The court must make findings

concerning the parties’ relative incomes, assets, and liabilities and

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then apportion fees in light of the statute’s equitable purpose. In re

Marriage of Aldrich, 945 P.2d 1370, 1378 (Colo. 1997). Pursuant to

this statute, a court properly considers the disparity between the

parties’ resources because “the primary purpose for awarding

attorney fees in a marriage dissolution case is to equalize the

parties’ financial positions.” In re Marriage of Anthony-Guillar, 207

P.3d 934, 944 (Colo. App. 2009).

¶9 In contrast, in a paternity matter, section 19-4-117 is silent as

to what factors the district court may consider when addressing any

attorney fees request. In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning

N.J.C., 2019 COA 153M, ¶ 44. However, divisions of this court have

concluded that the parties’ finances, the protracted nature of the

litigation, and the high costs of fees resulting from their “ceaseless

arguments” may be relevant considerations. Id. (quoting In Interest

of D.R.V., 885 P.2d 351, 354 (Colo. App. 1994)).

B. Preservation

¶ 10 As an initial matter, mother argues that father did not

preserve his argument. She argues that father improperly relied on

his response to mother’s request for attorney fees to show that he

had preserved the issue. See People in Interest of K.L-P., 148 P.3d

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402, 403 (Colo. App. 2006) (a party must present an issue to the

district court in a petition for review before that issue may be raised

in the court of appeals). Father, in his reply, correctly points out

that he also preserved the issue by raising it in his petition for

review. There, he argued that the magistrate erred when he

awarded fees “based solely on the inequality of income between the

parties.” Father also argued that their income inequality is relevant

to a dissolution case, but not to the case at hand. We thus agree

with father that he has preserved this issue.

C. Analysis

¶ 11 Father contends that the magistrate improperly relied on

section 14-10-119. Father also argues that the court relied solely

on the parties’ finances and made “no other factual or legal findings

supporting a fee award.”

¶ 12 Father’s arguments are belied by the record and by the order

itself. The magistrate’s written order — mirroring its oral findings

after the hearing, which also explicitly considered how long this

case has been litigated — did not invoke section 14-10-119.

Instead, the order discussed factors found in case law interpreting

section 19-4-117. Specifically, in addition to the parties’ finances,

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the court considered the protracted nature of litigation and the high

costs of fees resulting from the parties’ “ceaseless arguments.” It

stated:

[P]ursuant to C.R.S. 19-4-117, based upon the
[c]ourt’s detailed findings on the record on
February 13, 2024, and the evidence presented
at hearing which proved that [father’s]
financial resources are substantially greater
than [m]other’s and . . . in light of the
protracted nature of the litigation as evidenced
by the voluminous number of pleadings and
hearings in this matter, [m]other incurred
reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of
$89,490.00 . . . .

¶ 13 The magistrate’s factual findings have record support.

Mother’s counsel testified regarding the protracted and complicated

litigation in this matter. And she testified father’s litigation was

“ceaseless” in that it involved numerous, similar arguments in

several motions to dismiss, petitions for district court review, and

on appeal. Mother also offered into evidence an itemized exhibit

depicting how this litigation led to the $89,490 in attorney fees.

The magistrate further heard testimony that father had, at least at

one point in the proceeding, a net worth of ten million dollars and

an annual income of three million dollars. And testimony indicated

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that mother had “no resources” and that her income was $1,207

per month excluding child support.

¶ 14 These findings sufficiently support the magistrate’s decision,

pursuant to section 19-4-117, that father pay mother’s attorney

fees. The magistrate did not misapply the law, nor was his decision

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. See N.J.C., ¶ 46.

IV. Reasonableness

¶ 15 Father next contends that the district court did not make

required findings regarding the reasonableness of attorney fees

awarded to mother. Mother counters that father did not preserve

his argument. We agree with mother.

¶ 16 Father points only to evidence in the record that he raised the

issue of reasonableness before the magistrate. He does not identify

where he raised this issue in the petition for review of the

magistrate’s order, as is required to properly preserve an issue for

our review. See K.L.P., 148 P.3d at 403.

¶ 17 We understand father to argue that the order for attorney fees

should not be subject to this restriction because it was made by a

district court judge. It was not. Although the judicial officer is a

part-time county court judge and a part-time magistrate, he was

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necessarily acting in his capacity as a magistrate when handling

this case. See § 19-1-104(1), C.R.S. 2024 (providing that the

juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction over proceedings

under the Children’s Code); § 19-1-103(89), C.R.S. 2024 (providing

that, outside of Denver, the juvenile court is the juvenile division of

the district court); § 19-1-108(1), C.R.S. 2024 (providing authority

for juvenile court magistrates); C.R.M. 6(d) (same); see also § 13-6-

104, C.R.S. 2024 (establishing the jurisdiction of the county court

with no reference to matters under title 19); C.R.M. 8 (establishing

the authority of county court magistrates with no reference to

matters under title 19).

¶ 18 We acknowledge that the judicial officer’s signature on the

order on appeal might be read to suggest that the order was entered

by a district court judge. Under the judicial officer’s signature, the

order reads “District Court Judge/Magistrate.” Indeed, the judicial

officer’s orders throughout this case have routinely misstated his

specific role.2 Nevertheless, father clearly knew that the order was

2 The judicial officer has signed orders in this case as a

“Magistrate,” “County Court Judge,” “District Court Judge,”
“District Court Judge/Magistrate,” and “District Court
Judge/Magistrate” (with the “Judge” portion crossed out).

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issued by a magistrate because he filed a petition for the district

court to review the magistrate’s ruling without questioning the

judicial officer’s title or role. Thus, the judicial officer’s signature

line did not absolve father of his obligation to properly preserve his

appellate issues.

¶ 19 In short, in father’s petition for review, he challenged only

whether (1) mother sufficiently raised the fees issue at the merits

hearing on her motion to enforce; (2) the magistrate should have

conducted a hearing after the case was administratively closed

following that merits hearing; and (3) considerations involving the

parties’ disparate resources are appropriate when a party requests

fees in a child support enforcement action. Because he did not

raise the issue of whether the fees requested were reasonable or

necessary, he failed to preserve that issue for appeal.

V. Mother’s Request for Appellate Fees

¶ 20 Mother asks to be awarded attorney fees for defending this

appeal. Notably, mother embedded her request in the conclusion

section of her answer brief. Such requests must be set forth under

a separate heading. See C.A.R. 39.1. For this reason, it is within

our discretion to deny the request.

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¶ 21 But we also deny the request for another reason. As mother

notes in her answer brief, this court has “full discretion as to an

[o]rder of attorney[] fees,” and that discretion includes the ability to

consider “the protracted nature of litigation and the high costs of

fees resulting from [the parties’] ceaseless arguments.” See D.R.V.,

885 P.2d at, 354.

¶ 22 Along those lines, we note that the parties’ dispute has

persisted for so long that, at least at this point, litigation has been

reduced to the expenditure of attorney fees to seek nothing more

than more attorney fees. Granting mother’s request would require

remanding the matter to the juvenile court for yet another

consideration of fees, which would inevitably lead to an appeal of

that order, followed by yet another request for fees for that appeal,

and so on. We exercise our discretion to declare that enough is

enough. Mother’s request for appellate attorney fees is denied.

VI. Disposition

¶ 23 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE YUN and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.

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