LS v. Prospect Recreation

24CA1674 LS v Prospect Recreation 07-24-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0803
Jefferson County District Court No. 22CV30158
Honorable Diego G. Hunt, Judge

L.S., a Minor, by and through his parents and next friends, Tammy and Frank
Straton, Tammy Stratton, and Frank Stratton,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

Prospect Recreation and Park District,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON
Welling and Grove, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 24, 2025

Parker Lipman, LLC, Christopher P. Koupal, Karen H. Blau, Denver, Colorado,
for Plaintiffs-Appellees

The Lane Law Firm, P.C., Sean J. Lane, Brittney M. Townsley, Aurora,
Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant Prospect Recreation and Park District (Prospect)

appeals the district court’s order denying its motion to dismiss the

claims asserted against it by plaintiff, L.S. (the child), whose

parents and next friends, Tammy and Frank Stratton, brought the

action on the child’s behalf, alleging that the child was injured in an

area maintained by Prospect.1

¶2 Prospect contends that the district court erred by finding that

it waived immunity under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act

(CGIA) because (1) the horse pathway where the incident occurred

(also referred to as the horse alley) was not a public facility; (2) the

empty fencepost hole that allegedly caused the child to trip was not

a public facility located in any park or recreation area; and (3)

Prospect did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the

dangerous condition. As a result, Prospect asserts that the district

court erred by failing to dismiss the child’s claims against Prospect

pursuant to the CGIA. We disagree and, therefore, affirm the order.

1 Richard Sherrill is also a named defendant in the case but he is

not a party to this appeal.

1
I. Background

¶3 Prospect is a governmental entity. On behalf of Jefferson

County, Prospect owns and maintains Prospect Arena, a public

park located in Arvada. Prospect Arena is a rectangular parcel of

land that runs north to south. It contains a horse arena on the

south end and a playground and covered pavilion on the north end.

The park also has a horse pathway that is approximately ten feet

wide and runs in an upside-down “L” shape along the northern and

eastern edges of the park. The horse pathway allows riders to

access the horse arena from the northern end of the park.

2
Figure 1: Map of Prospect Arena

The rectangular image depicts Prospect Arena. The playground and
pavilion are located toward the top of the image. The playground is
a square parcel with an additional square jutting out on the upper
lefthand corner. The pavilion can be identified by the blue square
roof directly to the right and in line with the southern edge of the
playground. The horse arena is located two-thirds down from the
top and is a large dirt tract. The northern edge of the horse arena
forms a roughly semicircular shape before it runs in straight lines
north and south. The horse pathway runs along the top and down
the right edge of the diagram. The fence line runs between the
horse pathway and playground and pavilion. The image depicts the
fence line before sections of the fence were removed.

3
¶4 Historically, a fence running along the inner edge of the horse

pathway separated riders from the playground and pavilion. But in

September or October 2020, Prospect’s employees removed a large

section of the fence running from west to east and north to south

on the northeastern edge of the park near the pavilion. The fence

was deteriorating, causing a safety hazard. To remove the fence,

Prospect employees wrapped a chain around the fenceposts and

pulled them straight out of the ground with a small front end

loader. Prospect employees testified they filled in the fencepost

holes with dirt after removing them.

¶5 In November 2020, the child was playing at the playground in

Prospect Arena. The child noticed two horse riders, Richard Sherrill

(Sherrill) and another person, heading north on the horse pathway

away from the horse arena. As the child got closer, he tripped in

what the district court determined was a half-empty fencepost hole,

which had been created by Prospect’s employees when they

removed the fence in 2020. As the child fell, he flailed his arms,

scaring one of the horses. The startled horse kicked sideways and

struck the child in the head, causing the child to suffer a traumatic

brain injury.

4
¶6 The child’s parents filed this lawsuit against Prospect and

Sherrill asserting claims for negligence and premises liability.

Prospect filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to the CGIA. The

district court held a hearing in accordance with Trinity Broadcasting

of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1993).

Following the hearing, the district denied the motion to dismiss,

determining that Prospect had waived immunity under the CGIA.

Prospect now appeals. See § 24-10-108, C.R.S. 2024 (a court’s

decision on a motion raising sovereign immunity is a final order

subject to an interlocutory appeal).

II. CGIA

¶7 We first conclude that the district court correctly ruled that

the horse pathway is a public facility. We then determine that the

district court was correct by finding that the pathway and fencepost

hole are located in a recreation area. Finally, we agree with the

district court that the fencepost hole was a dangerous condition.

As a result, we conclude the district court’s order finding that

Prospect waived sovereign immunity under the CGIA was proper.

5
A. Standard of Review

¶8 “Governmental immunity implicates issues of subject matter

jurisdiction that are determined in accordance with C.R.C.P.

12(b)(1).” St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L., 2014 CO 33,

¶ 9 (St. Vrain I). “When the jurisdictional issue involves a factual

dispute, a reviewing court employs the clearly erroneous standard

of review . . . .” Springer v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 798

(Colo. 2000). A district court’s conclusions are clearly erroneous if

there is no support in the record. Parocha v. Parocha, 2018 CO 41,

¶ 11.

¶9 If disputed jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined

with the merits, the plaintiff must prove a likelihood of success on

the merits. Jefferson County v. Dozier, 2025 CO 36, ¶¶ 21, 24.

This standard requires the district court to engage in “factfinding

rather than merely making a ruling of law regarding sufficiency of

the evidence to present a fact question.” Id. at ¶ 21 (quoting Foster-

Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcock Can., 46 F.3d 138, 146 (1st Cir.

1995)).

¶ 10 If, however, “the facts are undisputed and the only issue is one

of statutory interpretation, we review the district court’s ruling de

6
novo.” Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colorado Springs, 2018 CO 10,

¶ 17. “[O]ur primary task is to ascertain and give effect to the

legislature’s intent . . . .” St. Vrain I, ¶ 10. “To determine legislative

intent, we construe the statute as a whole, giving consistent,

harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts.” Smokebrush,

¶ 18.

¶ 11 When “a statute is unambiguous, we give effect to the statute’s

plain and ordinary meaning and look no further.” Daniel v. City of

Colorado Springs, 2014 CO 34, ¶ 12. On the other hand, if the

statute is ambiguous, we may employ other tools of statutory

interpretation to determine legislative intent. St. Vrain I, ¶ 11.

B. Applicable Law

¶ 12 “[S]overeign immunity generally bars any action against a

public entity for injuries that lie in tort or could lie in tort.”

Smokebrush, ¶ 20. The CGIA waives governmental immunity in “an

action for injuries resulting from certain tortious governmental

conduct, including certain kinds of negligent acts or omissions by

public entities or their employees.” Id. Because the CGIA derogates

Colorado’s common law, we strictly construe the CGIA’s immunity

provisions and broadly construe its waiver provisions. Id. at ¶ 22.

7
¶ 13 The CGIA provides that sovereign immunity “is waived by a

public entity in an action for injuries resulting from . . . [a]

dangerous condition of any . . . public facility located in any park or

recreation area maintained by a public entity. § 24-10-106(1)(e),

C.R.S. 2024 (emphasis added). Thus, under the CGIA, a plaintiff

must prove that (1) “his . . . injury occurred in or on a ‘public

facility’”; (2) the public facility was “‘located in’ a ‘recreation area’”;

(3) the public facility was “maintained by” a public entity; and (4) a

“‘dangerous condition’ existed and caused an injury in or on the

public facility.” Daniel, ¶ 14.

C. The Horse Pathway is a Public Facility

¶ 14 It is undisputed that Prospect is a public entity and is

responsible for maintaining Prospect Arena, including the horse

pathway. At issue, then, is whether the horse pathway is a “public

facility” within a “recreation area” where a “dangerous condition”

existed.

¶ 15 The district court concluded that while the fencepost hole,

which was left when portions of the fence were removed, was not

alone a “facility,” “in conjunction with the other features of the

park, [it] furthered the [facility’s] purpose.” But Prospect argues

8
that the horse pathway is not part of a public facility of the

playground, but is instead a separate facility that abuts the

playground, as one does not ride horses on the playground or play

on the horse pathway and arena. We reject this narrow view of

“facility” because we — as the district court properly did — must

look at the overall purpose of Prospect Arena, not just pieces of it in

isolation.

¶ 16 Under the CGIA, a court conducts a two-step analysis to

determine what constitutes a public facility. First, we examine

whether the horse pathway is “public.” Id. at ¶ 15. Second, we ask

whether it is a “facility” for purposes of the CGIA. Id.

¶ 17 Turning to the first step, we conclude, like the district court,

that the horse pathway is “public” because it is “accessible to and

beneficial to the general public.” Id. During the Trinity hearing,

testimony of a Prospect employee, Sherrill, and the child’s father

established that Prospect Arena is open to the general public

without the need for a permit. As a part of Prospect Arena, the

horse pathway serves the public by providing users access to the

horse arena from the north end of the park for recreational

purposes. And Prospect Arena is maintained by Prospect for the

9
benefit of the public. See St. Vrain I, ¶ 28 (“We hold that for a

facility to be ‘public’ under section 24–10–106(1)(e), it must be

accessible to the public and maintained by a public entity to serve a

beneficial public purpose.”) (footnote omitted).

¶ 18 Second, although the court did not explicitly find the horse

pathway was a facility, it found that the fencepost hole where the

fence used to be, along with the playground, was part of the public

facility comprised of the park as a whole. This is consistent with

the supreme court’s interpretation of the CGIA in St. Vrain I. In

that case, the supreme court found the CGIA’s use of the word

“facility” to be ambiguous. See id. at ¶¶ 15, 23. But by employing

the canons of statutory construction, the court concluded that the

word does not encompass individual items, nor is it limited to

buildings. Instead, it includes a “collection of items that serve a

greater purpose.” Id. at ¶ 24. The court in St. Vrain I ultimately

concluded that an injury incurred by a child on a zip line on a

public school playground occurred on a “facility” because the zip

line was a component of a larger playground. Id. at ¶ 26.

¶ 19 Additionally, in Daniel, the supreme court concluded that a

parking lot adjacent to a golf course was part of the recreation area

10
because it “promote[d] recreation by allowing golfers a convenient

place to park after transporting themselves and their golf clubs to

the golf course. While a vehicle is not absolutely necessary to play

golf, a parking lot next to a golf course clearly promotes golfing.”

Daniel, ¶ 25.

¶ 20 Like the zip line and parking lot, the horse pathway next to the

horse arena promotes recreation by allowing horse riders a pathway

to and from the horse arena. It also promotes the safety of the

recreation area by keeping horses in a designated lane and away

from the children in the playground. Thus, the horse pathway

serves as a fundamental component to the overall purpose of

Prospect Arena. Prospect Arena’s park design allows children and

horses to recreate in proximity to one another.

¶ 21 But Prospect argues that the horse pathway is more akin to

the walkway in Young v. Brighton School District 27J, 2014 CO 32.

In Young, the supreme court was tasked with determining whether

a concrete walkway that ran between a school playground and

school building was a public facility under the CGIA. The supreme

court determined that the walkway was not a public facility. Id. at

11
¶ 35. While the walkway and horse pathway may appear similar at

first blush, there are vital differences between the two.

¶ 22 The court in Young noted that the walkway “was not designed

to promote a specific play activity” but “was designed for multiple

purposes” other than recreation. Id. at ¶ 27. While children

utilized the walkway to access the playground, “the walkway also

served as a way to access the school and a way to traverse the

school grounds more generally.” Id. And the Young court

distinguished the walkway from the parking lot in Daniel, which it

said “was specifically designed for the purpose of providing visitors

with a convenient place to park their vehicles while using the golf

course’s amenities.” Id. at ¶ 26. In Young, the court clarified that

its holding should not be read to “imply that a walkway could never

qualify as a component of a larger ‘public facility.’” Id. at ¶ 30 n.11.

Rather, it held that, “[i]f a strong relationship exists between the

walkway and other recreational equipment such that together the

walkway and equipment promote a broader, common purpose of

recreation, such a walkway could so qualify.” Id.

¶ 23 Contrary to the walkway in Young, the horse pathway serves

the singular purpose of allowing horse riders to access from the

12
north side of the park the horse arena located in the south end of

the park. See id. at ¶¶ 26-27 (contrasting the multiple uses of the

walkway with the “singular purpose of the parking lot in Daniel”).

The horse pathway is more analogous to the parking lot in Daniel

because it was designed so that riders could conveniently access

the horse arena from the northern end of the park.

¶ 24 And Prospect acknowledges that the horse pathway is “an

accessway to recreation” for horse riders to get to and from the

horse arena. (Emphasis added.) Prospect also concedes that the

“[h]orse alley exists for the very purpose of separating horses and

pedestrians, so horses and pedestrians do not share common

spaces” and that the horse pathway is “meant only for travel by

horse.” But the horse pathway does not have different hours of

operation from the playground, nor does it require an entrance fee

or permit. In other words, while the playground and horse pathway

serve different functions, their overall purpose is to promote

recreation activities and safety for all users of the entire park.

Thus, the horse pathway, along with the other components of

Prospect Arena, promotes recreational opportunities for the public.

13
D. The Horse Pathway is Located in a Recreation Area

¶ 25 The closer question is whether the horse pathway and the

fencepost hole are “recreation areas.” To determine this, we

conduct a three-step analysis. First, we determine what property

constitutes the relevant recreation area. Daniel, ¶ 24. “To do this,

we include any contiguous areas of public property that plausibly

promote recreation and exclude any areas that clearly do not

promote recreation.” Id. at ¶ 23. Second, if the recreation area was

designed for both recreational and non-recreational purposes, we

determine if the “‘primary purpose’ in constructing or maintaining

the area was the promotion of recreation.” Id. Third, if “the

primary purpose was the promotion of recreation, we then

determine whether the public facility at issue is ‘located in’ the

boundaries of the recreation area.” Id.

¶ 26 The court did not conduct a separate analysis to determine

whether the fencepost hole was a “recreation area” once it

determined Prospect Arena was a “public facility.” Instead, because

it impliedly considered the analyses to be similar, it used much of

the same reasoning for both.

14
¶ 27 Prospect attempts to argue that the fencepost hole “was

allegedly located at the nexus of two adjoining properties: Prospect

Arena and the Van Bibber Trail [a residential path].” It further

argued that “the hole along the fence line that separated the two

facilities could not plausibly be considered to promote recreation.”

¶ 28 We can certainly contemplate instances where specific areas of

a public facility would likely not be considered located within a

“recreation area” because they encompass spaces within the public

facility that does not primarily promote recreation. But there was

no signage noting that the fence or horse alley were off limits to

certain users of the park. Nor was the horse alley off limits to the

playground users.

¶ 29 But because the fence had been removed before the child fell,

identified in Figure 2 below, Prospect cannot rely on what the

fence’s intended purpose had been. Rather, by the time the child

ran toward the horses, there was no fence present at all. Therefore,

pedestrians could access the horse alley — and ostensibly horses

could easily enter into the playground and pavilion area — without

anyone knowing or even perceiving that Prospect Arena had

intended for those two areas to be delineated with a fence. Because

15
the area where the child fell and was injured had no barrier

between the horse alley and playground, on this record, we cannot

say that the horse path and playground, along with the land

between those two areas, did not together primarily promote

recreation.

Figure 2: Map of Prospect Arena After Fence Removal

16
The rectangular image depicts Prospect Arena after Prospect
removed the fence. Portions of the fence along the top right corner
of the image were removed and never replaced.

¶ 30 Finally, as to the third step, there is no dispute that the

fencepost hole was “located in” the boundaries of the recreation

area. See Daniel, ¶ 30 (concluding the parking lot was “located in”

the recreation area because it was located on the public entity’s

property and adjacent to the public recreation area).2

¶ 31 Therefore, we affirm the district court’s finding that the area

where the child fell was located within a recreation area, albeit on

slightly different grounds than relied on by the court. Stickle v.

County of Jefferson, 2022 COA 79, ¶ 41, aff’d, 2024 CO 7.

E. The Fencepost Hole was a Dangerous Condition

¶ 32 Prospect contends that the fencepost hole was not a

dangerous condition. We disagree and conclude that there was

record support for the district court’s finding that the fencepost hole

was a dangerous condition that existed for such time that, had

Prospect exercised reasonable care, it would have been discovered.

2 Prospect’s reference to the Van Bibber Trail to argue that the

horse path and fencepost were within that area appears irrelevant,
as the record contains no precise location of the trail.

17
¶ 33 The CGIA defines a “dangerous condition” as

either a physical condition of a facility or the
use thereof that constitutes an unreasonable
risk to the health or safety of the public, which
is known to exist or which in the exercise of
reasonable care should have been known to
exist and which condition is proximately
caused by the negligent act or omission of the
public entity or public employee in
constructing or maintaining such facility. For
the purposes of this subsection (1.3), a
dangerous condition should have been known
to exist if it is established that the condition
had existed for such a period and was of such
a nature that, in the exercise of reasonable
care, such condition and its dangerous
character should have been discovered.

§ 24-10-103(1.3), C.R.S. 2024 (emphasis added).

¶ 34 “Colorado courts have consistently held that the phrase ‘knew

or should have known’ is satisfied by actual or constructive

knowledge, also referred to as the knowledge that one exercising

reasonable diligence should have.” Lombard v. Colo. Outdoor Educ.

Ctr., Inc., 187 P.3d 565, 571 (Colo. 2008). And “the plaintiff must

prove that the [hole] created a chance of injury . . . which exceeded

the bounds of reason.” City & Cnty. of Denver v. Dennis, 2018 CO

37, ¶ 23. “Assessing whether the plaintiff has met this burden

requires examining the totality of the circumstances presented by

18
the undisputed evidence as to whether that particular condition

presented an unreasonable risk.” Maphis v. City of Boulder, 2022

CO 10, ¶ 22. The existence of a dangerous condition is a question

of fact, and we defer to the district court’s factual findings unless

they are clearly erroneous. McKinley v. City of Glenwood Springs,

2015 COA 126, ¶ 12.3

¶ 35 To determine whether a dangerous condition exists for

purposes of the CGIA, we employ a four-part test. A public entity

waives immunity if the injuries occurred as a result of

1. the physical condition of the public facility or the use

thereof;

2. which constitutes an unreasonable risk to the health or

safety of the public;

3. which is known to exist or should have been known to

exist in the exercise of reasonable care; and

3 We disagree with Prospect that whether a defendant had actual or

constructive knowledge of a “dangerous condition” is reviewed de
novo. See Jefferson County v. Dozier, 2025 CO 36, ¶ 36
(determining that a district court’s finding of when a public entity
learns of the dangerous condition is reviewed under the clear error
standard).

19
4. which condition is “proximately caused by the negligent

act or omission of the public entity in constructing or

maintaining the facility.”

St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. Loveland, 2017 CO 54, ¶ 16 (St.

Vrain II).

¶ 36 First, we have already determined that the horse pathway is a

“public facility” and neither party disputes that the hole was a

physical condition. But Prospect appears to dispute whether the

hole was actually a fencepost hole from the fence Prospect

employees removed in September or October 2020. There was

ample evidence to support the district court’s conclusion that it

was, including photographs and testimony from a park visitor who

said it was “obvious[ly]” a posthole located “sort of right along where

that fence line would have been.” The district court compared

Sherrill’s testimony with Exhibit 4, a photograph taken of the

location of the injury by Sherrill, and found it was consistent with

the picture.

¶ 37 Second, we conclude that there was evidence to support the

district court’s finding that the fencepost hole posed a risk to the

health and safety of the public that a reasonable person could

20
conclude exceeded the bounds of reason. Sherrill described the

hole as five to six inches in diameter, and said that it appeared to

be made by an auger and perfectly round; that it appeared to be

manmade. Sherrill also testified that he estimated the hole to be

approximately four inches deep, although there was additional

testimony that it may have been as much as ten inches. Brad

Sassolino, a Prospect maintenance technician and the supervisor of

the Prospect Arena’s fence removal, testified that the fencepost

holes were “a safety hazard” that could result in injury because the

holes were “a trip hazard.” See McKinley, ¶ 13 (depression in

parking lot that was approximately four inches deep was a

dangerous condition). The district court found that Prospect’s

“employees allegedly failed to fully fill, or improperly filled, at least

one fencepost hole. Its employees created a dangerous condition.”

Whether a condition on a public facility “presents an unreasonable

risk will necessarily be a fact-specific inquiry,” and we will defer to

the district court’s factual findings if they are supported by the

record. Dennis, ¶ 23. Given this evidence, we agree with the

district court that the hole presented an unreasonable risk to the

public.

21
¶ 38 Prospect further contends that the fencepost hole, by itself, did

not create an unreasonable risk, as it was the child’s actions that

contributed to the injury. Specifically, Prospect argues that the

child “was injured because he ran at [an] unknown animal, [and]

ignored warnings from its owner,” and the “way in which [the child]

approached the horses” was unreasonable. In essence, Prospect

states that the child’s injuries did not result from the fencepost

hole. We disagree.

¶ 39 But the proper analysis is whether a dangerous condition is

proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of the public

entity in constructing or maintaining the facility. Dozier, ¶ 32; see

also St. Vrain II, ¶ 16. Thus, whether the child’s injuries were

proximately caused by his own negligence is irrelevant to determine

whether Prospect waived immunity. Daniel, ¶ 27 (“[A]n injured

individual’s purpose in visiting the recreation area where he or she

was injured is irrelevant. . . . [A] public entity owes the same duty

to an individual injured by a dangerous condition ‘located in’ a

‘recreation area’ regardless of the idiosyncratic reasons why that

individual might have visited the recreation area.”).

22
¶ 40 Third, the fencepost hole existed for such a time that the

exercise of reasonable care should have led to its discovery. The

fence was removed in September or October of 2020. The child was

injured on November 21, 2020. Between when the fenceposts were

removed and the date of the injury, Prospect employees visited

Prospect Arena multiple times for routine inspections and trash

cleanup. And based off these routine inspections, Prospect argues

that its employees did inspect its work. But Prospect’s employees

did not visit the park to specifically inspect for fencepost holes until

after the child was injured. And photographs of the hole taken after

the child’s injury reveal that the hole would have been reasonably

visible if Prospect employees inspected that area.

¶ 41 Thus, had Prospect exercised reasonable care and inspected

its work removing the fence, it should have discovered the fencepost

hole.

¶ 42 Prospect further argues that there was no evidence that the

fencepost hole existed before the date of the child’s injury and that

there was testimony offered by a park visitor that she did not notice

any holes in September and October of 2020. Additionally,

Prospect alleges testimony during the Trinity hearing indicated that

23
the fencepost hole “rapidly deteriorated or settled, creating a

condition [that Prospect] lacked any opportunity to discover.” As we

have already stated above, however, the existence of a dangerous

condition is a factual question, and we defer to the district court’s

factual findings. McKinley, ¶ 12. And the district court found,

“Ultimately, there was a fencepost hole that [the child] tripped on

from fencing [Prospect] recently removed. And [Prospect] should

have known of the dangerous condition it created had it inspected

its work.” While the record may not contain an exact date of when

the hole was created, we are not in a position to second-guess the

district court’s findings that it existed for such a time that it should

have been discovered upon reasonable inspection.

¶ 43 Finally, because we determine that Prospect created the hole

by removing the fence in 2020, Prospect’s negligence by not

24
ensuring all the fencepost holes were properly filled proximately

caused the hole.4

III. Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 44 Prospect requests its attorney fees and costs pursuant to

C.A.R. 28(a)(9), C.R.C.P. 12(b), and sections 13-16-113 and 13-17-

201, C.R.S. 2024. Because we affirm the district court’s order, we

decline to award Prospect its attorney fees.

IV. Conclusion

¶ 45 We affirm the district court’s order.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE GROVE concur.

4 This case is not like the timing at issue in Dozier, ¶¶ 3, 27.There,
the supreme court determined that immunity had not been waived
because “the County wasn’t afforded ‘a reasonable time under the
circumstances to discover and correct the condition’” because it was
just minutes between when water spilled on the courthouse floor
and the plaintiff slipping on the puddle. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 27 (quoting
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Smith, 658 P.2d 255, 257 (Colo. 1983)). In
this case, the district court determined, with record support, that
the fencepost hole existed for two to three months before the child’s
fall, so the dangerous condition existed for a sufficient amount of
time that Prospect should have known about the condition and
fixed it.

25