Peo in Interest of ZS

25CA0375 Peo in Interest of ZS 07-24-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0375
Alamosa County District Court No. 23JV30015
Honorable Amanda C. Hopkins, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of Z.S., a Child,

and Concerning E.V.F. and C.O.S.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
Lipinsky and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 24, 2025

Jason T. Kelly, County Attorney, Alamosa, Colorado, for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Appellant E.V.F.

Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parent’s Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for
Appellant C.O.S.
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, E.V.F. (mother)

and C.O.S. (father) appeal the judgment terminating their parent-

child legal relationships with Z.S. (the child). Specifically, they

challenge the juvenile court’s determination that they were unlikely

to become fit within a reasonable amount of time. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Upon receiving notice that the child tested positive for

methamphetamine and fentanyl at birth, the Alamosa County

Department of Human Services filed a petition in dependency and

neglect. The Department cited concerns about the parents’

substance use and lack of housing and stated that the parents

admitted using methamphetamine.

¶3 The court adjudicated the child dependent or neglected and

adopted treatment plans for the parents that required them to

attend family time and, among other things, address their

substance use.

¶4 Several months later, the Department moved to terminate the

parents’ parental rights and, following an evidentiary hearing, the

court granted the motion.

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II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review

¶5 A juvenile court may terminate a parent’s rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not reasonably

complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the

plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the

parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable

time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.

¶6 A juvenile court’s judgment terminating parental rights

presents a mixed question of fact and law involving the application

of the termination statute to the evidentiary facts. People in Interest

of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. The credibility of witnesses and

the sufficiency, probative value, and weight of the evidence, as well

as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn from it, are within

the juvenile court’s discretion. Id. We review the juvenile court’s

factual findings for clear error and will set them aside only if they

lack any support in the record. Id. at ¶¶ 15, 48; see People in

Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 29. We review de novo the

juvenile court’s legal conclusions based on those facts. People in

Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.

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III. Fit Within a Reasonable Time

¶7 Both parents raise a single issue on appeal — they contend

that the court erred by finding that they were unlikely to become fit

within a reasonable time. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law

¶8 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders the

parent unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental

care. People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App.

2007). Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the

parent provide nurturing and safe parenting adequate to meet the

child’s physical, emotional, and mental needs and conditions.

People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006). A

juvenile court can also consider a parent’s noncompliance with a

treatment plan in determining unfitness. People in Interest of D.P.,

181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008).

¶9 In determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change in a reasonable time and whether the parent can

therefore become fit in a reasonable time, the juvenile court may

consider whether any change has occurred during the proceeding,

the parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of

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the parent’s conduct or condition. People in Interest of D.L.C., 70

P.3d 584, 588-89 (Colo. App. 2003). The determination of

a reasonable period is fact-specific and varies from case to

case. S.Z.S., ¶ 25.

¶ 10 When a child is under six years old, as in this case, the

juvenile court must also consider the expedited permanency

planning (EPP) provisions, which require that the child be placed in

a permanent home as expeditiously as possible. See §§ 19-1-

102(1.6), 19-1-123, 19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2024. In EPP cases, no

parent shall be found to be in reasonable compliance with, or have

been successful at, a treatment plan when the parent (1) has not

attended family time as set forth in the treatment plan, unless good

cause is shown for failing to attend, or (2) exhibits the same

problems addressed in the treatment plan without adequate

improvement. § 19-3-604(1)(c)(I).

B. Analysis

¶ 11 The court determined that the parents remained unfit and that

their conduct or condition was unlikely to change within a

reasonable period of time. The court based this determination of

unfitness on, among other things, the parents’ chronic use of

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intoxicating controlled substances, see § 19-3-604(2)(e), and the

termination of mother’s parental rights in a prior case. In support

of its determination that the parents’ conduct or condition was

unlikely to change within a reasonable time, the court found the

parents “have suffered from substance use disorders for decades

and, while they did experience brief periods of sobriety during this

case, they are still unprepared to access and utilize the tools and

other resources required to achieve the type of permanent change

that this child requires now.” The court also found that the parents

had not stopped using illegal substances and did not understand

the danger their addiction posed to the child. And the court found

that the parents had missed family time without good cause and

attended visits when they had “very recently used” substances.

¶ 12 The court noted that the EPP provisions applied to this case

and indicated it was not presented with evidence showing that any

further delay in permanency would serve the child’s best interests.

¶ 13 The record supports the court’s findings and shows:

• Mother struggled with methamphetamine, fentanyl, and

heroin use for over twelve years. Father struggled with using

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those same substances for two decades but was sober for a

long time within that period.

• Most of the drug tests that the parents took during the first

eleven months of the case were positive for some combination

of methamphetamine, amphetamine, and fentanyl.

• Both parents admitted to using substances two and a half

months before the termination hearing.

• Mother’s hair follicle test taken three weeks after the hearing

was positive for fentanyl and (at a low level) positive for

methamphetamine. Father’s hair follicle test taken the same

day was positive for methamphetamine.

• The child tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine,

and fentanyl after a visit with the parents. During a different

visit, the caseworker observed mother slumped over.

• While the parents consistently attended family time at the

beginning and end of the case, they missed numerous visits

throughout the middle of the case.

• Neither parent would attend visits when one parent claimed

illness or injury, and both parents admitted that withdrawals

were one of the reasons for their absences.

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• Mother’s parental rights had been terminated as to two

different children — one by relinquishment and one via court

order terminating her parental rights.

• Father had relinquished his parental rights to two other

children in a separate dependency and neglect case that

involved allegations of substance use.

¶ 14 The caseworker opined that the parents were not fit and

unlikely to become fit within a reasonable time because they had

only demonstrated change within the three- or four-week period

preceding the hearing even though the case had been open for a

year.

¶ 15 Further, the child was a newborn when the case opened and

was one year old at the time of the hearing. The caseworker opined

that the young child needed a safe and stable home with sober

caregivers who could provide for her basic needs. She further

opined that the child would not be safe to go back into the parents’

care because they had not addressed their substance use on a

“long-term level.”

¶ 16 In support of their contentions that the court erred, both

parents point to their compliance with aspects of their treatment

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plan. For instance, they cite their housing stability, bond with the

child, and engagement in parenting classes and substance use

treatment. Both parents specifically rely on their substance use

treatment provider’s testimony that they “ha[d] been marking things

off their [substance use] treatment plans.”

¶ 17 We first observe that the court “struggle[d] to find much

credibility” in the treatment provider’s testimony, characterizing her

testimony as “illogical.” Nonetheless, the court heard evidence of

the parties’ compliance with aspects of their treatment plan and

their bond with the child. And based on that evidence, the court

found that the parents were partially compliant with their treatment

plan objectives and commended them for quickly securing and

maintaining housing. But the court ultimately weighed the

evidence of ongoing substance use during the case more heavily

than the evidence of the parents’ partial compliance with other

aspects of the treatment plan. See People in Interest of K.B., 2016

COA 21, ¶ 26 (noting that partial or even substantial compliance

with a treatment plan does not necessarily render a parent fit);

D.L.C., 70 P.3d at 589 (providing that court may consider whether

any change has occurred during the dependency and neglect case).

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It is not our role to reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment

for that of the juvenile court. People in Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA

56, ¶ 62. And as noted, the court did not find good cause existed

for the parents’ absences from the required family time and thus

could not find that they were in reasonable compliance with their

treatment plans. See § 19-3-604(1)(c)(I)(A).

¶ 18 Father also asserts that he could have become fit had he been

able to complete his substance use program and suggests the child

was “not desperately needing permanency.” But as the court

indicated, the parents’ substance use treatment provider testified

that, even if the parents were fully compliant with all their

treatment requirements, it would still take them about another year

to complete treatment. And critically, the court determined that the

young child required “permanent change . . . now.” See S.Z.S., ¶ 24

(providing that a reasonable time is not an indefinite time, and it

must be determined by considering the child’s physical, mental,

and emotional conditions and needs).

¶ 19 Indeed, this EPP case had been open over a year by the time

the court issued its oral ruling. The child was placed in foster care

for the duration of the case. Consequently, the court was required

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to permanently place the child as expeditiously as possible. See §§

19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, 19-3-702(5)(c). And notably, our

legislature established the EPP provisions because it recognized

that “children undergo a critical bonding and attachment process

prior to the time they reach six years of age” and that “a child who

has not bonded with a primary adult during this critical stage will

suffer significant emotional damage” that frequently leads to future

chronic psychological problems and antisocial behavior. § 19-1-

102(1.6). Accordingly, we are not persuaded by father’s assertions.

¶ 20 Because the record supports the court’s determination that

the parents were unlikely to become fit within a reasonable time, we

decline to disturb the judgment. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29 (appellate court

will not disturb the juvenile court’s finding that a parent could not

become fit within a reasonable time when the record supports it).

IV. Disposition

¶ 21 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE LUM concur.

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