Marriage of Skellchock

23CA1178 Marriage of Skellchock 07-17-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1178
Larimer County District Court No. 18DR30326
Honorable Kandace B. Majoros, Magistrate
Honorable Susan Blanco, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Derek Skellchock,

Appellant,

and

Alora-Ann Paige Volz,

Appellee.

ORDERS AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
Lipinsky and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 17, 2025

Harwich Brickley, LLC, Kara M. Harwich, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Appellant

No Appearance for Appellee
¶1 In this post-decree dissolution of marriage case between Derek

Skellchock (father) and Alora-Ann Paige Volz (mother), father

appeals the district court’s order adopting a magistrate’s ruling that

imposed remedial and punitive contempt sanctions against him. He

also contends that Eighth Judicial District Court Chief Judge

Susan Blanco lacked jurisdiction over the case following her

January 2020 recusal and that the orders she issued after that date

must be vacated. We affirm.

I. Relevant Facts and Procedural History

¶2 During the dissolution of marriage proceedings, father asked

Judge Blanco to recuse because she was presiding over a criminal

case involving the parties. In a January 2020 order, Judge Blanco

granted his request, and the case was reassigned to another district

court judge.

¶3 About a year later, the court dissolved the marriage and

entered permanent orders. The court ordered father to pay mother

$111 per month in child support. In determining this obligation,

the court accepted the parties’ stipulation that father’s gross

monthly income was $3,304, which represented his veteran’s

disability benefits. The court adopted the parties’ stipulation

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concerning parenting time in an amended joint trial management

certificate (amended JTMC) that allowed mother to exercise

parenting time on Thanksgiving in even numbered years.

¶4 Father appealed the permanent orders, challenging, among

other issues, the court’s child support determination. In particular,

he argued that his veteran’s disability benefits could not be

included in his gross income. A division of this court affirmed. In

re Marriage of Skellchock, (Colo. App. No. 21CA0503, Feb. 24, 2022)

(not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Skellchock I).

¶5 Father then asked the court to modify child support, again

arguing that his veteran’s disability benefits must be excluded from

his gross income. The magistrate rejected father’s argument and

found that his gross income from those benefits was $3,306 per

month. The magistrate also determined that, due to changes in

mother’s financial circumstances, father’s child support obligation

would increase to $200 per month.

¶6 Father filed a petition for review of that order, and, when the

petition was ripe, he filed a motion asking the “Chief Judge” to

review the order or appoint another judge to do so. Judge Blanco,

who had been appointed the chief judge, ruled on the petition and

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adopted the magistrate’s order. Father appealed, and a division of

this court affirmed. In re Marriage of Skellchock, (Colo. App. Nos.

22CA0249 & 22CA0250, Oct. 13, 2022) (not published pursuant to

C.A.R. 35(e)) (Skellchock II).

¶7 Mother later filed two contempt motions against father. In the

first, she accused father of not paying child support, and she

requested remedial and punitive sanctions. In the second, she

alleged that father did not allow her to exercise parenting time with

the child on Thanksgiving in 2022, and she requested punitive

sanctions.

¶8 After a hearing, the magistrate granted both motions and

found father guilty of contempt. Regarding father’s violation of the

child support order, the magistrate imposed remedial sanctions

requiring him to pay $7,735 in arrearages in installments of $100

per month and imposed a punitive sanction requiring him to serve

three days in jail.1 For father’s violation of the parenting time order,

1 The magistrate advised mother that if father failed to comply with

the remedial sanctions, she could immediately file an affidavit of
noncompliance and notice to set a hearing for a further sentence.
Mother later did so. The magistrate stayed the imposition of any
further sentence until resolution of this appeal. We express no
opinion concerning the propriety of the additional proceedings.

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the magistrate directed father to pay a $100 fine as a punitive

sanction.

¶9 Father filed a petition for review with the district court and

asked the court to stay the enforcement of the contempt sanctions.

Father also filed a motion for Judge Blanco’s recusal and a change

of venue. He argued that, as a consequence of the 2020 recusal

order, Judge Blanco lacked jurisdiction over the case and that any

orders she issued after January 2020 were void. Judge Blanco

denied the motion to recuse and change venue, directed the

magistrate to rule on the motion to stay, and adopted the

magistrate’s contempt rulings.

II. Judge Blanco’s Authority

¶ 10 Father contends that all orders Judge Blanco issued after

January 2020 were void because she lost “jurisdiction” to enter the

orders following her 2020 recusal. We disagree.

¶ 11 We review de novo a court’s jurisdiction. See In re Marriage of

Roth, 2017 COA 45, ¶ 13. An order entered without jurisdiction is

void and may be challenged on that basis at any time. In re

Marriage of Mallon, 956 P.2d 642, 645 (Colo. App. 1998).

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¶ 12 In Beckord v. District Court, 698 P.2d 1323, 1330 (Colo. 1985),

the supreme court said that once a judge recuses from a case, that

judge loses “jurisdiction” to rule on further motions in that case.

However, there can be “a blurring of the distinction between the

appropriate exercise of power and the absence of power” when

referring to a court’s jurisdiction. Minto v. Lambert, 870 P.2d 572,

575 (Colo. App. 1993). “Jurisdiction” concerns the court’s authority

to render judgment within the types of cases “that the court has

been empowered to entertain by the sovereign from which the court

derives its authority.’” People in Interest of J.W. v. C.O., 2017 CO

105, ¶ 24 (quoting Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Adams,

718 P.2d 508, 513 (Colo. 1986)). It is not a court’s “authority to

enter a particular judgment [or ruling] within that class” of cases.

Id.

¶ 13 The Colorado Constitution vests district courts with general

subject matter jurisdiction over dissolution of marriage proceedings.

In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶¶ 15-16. Thus, while

Beckord referred to a judge’s loss of “jurisdiction” following a

recusal, a close reading of that case (and others since) reveals that

the recusal does not create a true jurisdictional defect. See

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Beckord, 698 P.2d at 1330 (holding that a judge’s recusal only

precludes that judge from entering orders involving “an exercise of

judicial discretion”); Zoline v. Telluride Lodge Ass’n, 732 P.2d 635,

638 (Colo. 1987) (recognizing a chief judge’s reassignment of a case

to a judge who had previously recused); see also El Fenix de Puerto

Rico v. M/Y JOHANNY, 36 F.3d 136, 142 (1st Cir. 1994)

(acknowledging that a recused judge may still enable

“administrative” reassignment). The judge, instead, loses the

“authority” to issue discretionary rulings. Johnson v. Dist. Ct., 674

P.2d 952, 957 (Colo. 1984); cf. People v. Babcock, 2023 COA 49, ¶¶

8-11 (discussing the difference between a court’s jurisdiction and

its authority), aff’d, 2025 CO 26.

¶ 14 A party can waive a claim that the judge acted without

authority. See People v. Garcia, 2024 CO 41M, ¶¶ 45-46, 53 (Garcia

I); Aaberg v. Dist. Ct., 319 P.2d 491, 493-94 (Colo. 1957); see also

People v. Garcia, 2024 COA 91, ¶¶ 4-7 (Garcia II); In re Marriage of

Fifield, 776 P.2d 1167, 1168 (Colo. App. 1989). And “[t]he law is

well settled” that when a party asks “the court for affirmative relief,”

they may not simultaneously “question the [court’s] authority” to

act. Aaberg, 319 P.2d at 493. Thus, when a party knows of

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grounds for a judge’s disqualification or lack of authority but fails to

timely assert those grounds as an issue, the party waives their right

to object to the judge’s actions. See Garcia I, ¶ 46; Aaberg, 319

P.2d at 494; Garcia II, ¶¶ 4-7; Fifield, 776 P.2d at 1168.

¶ 15 Two years after Judge Blanco’s recusal, father filed a motion

asking the “Chief Judge” to rule on his pending motions, noting

that he had contacted the chief judge’s clerk “numerous times.” In

February 2022, Judge Blanco was the chief judge, and, following

father’s request, she began to rule on his outstanding motions. In

June 2023, father argued, for the first time, that Judge Blanco

could not preside over the case.

¶ 16 But father cannot now contest Judge Blanco’s authority. He

specifically asked her to rule on his pleadings, and he raised no

objection to her multiple orders for over a year and a half. Father

thus waived his current objection to Judge Blanco’s authority to

issue orders after her 2020 recusal. See Garcia I, ¶ 46; Aaberg, 319

P.2d at 493-94; see also Garcia II, ¶¶ 4-7; Fifield, 776 P.2d at 1168.

¶ 17 To the extent father also suggests that Judge Blanco abused

her discretion by denying his June 2023 motion to recuse, we are

unpersuaded. See Adams Cnty. Hous. Auth. v. Panzlau, 2022 COA

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148, ¶ 17 (reviewing a judge’s recusal ruling for an abuse of

discretion). Judge Blanco explained that her 2020 recusal was

based on the parties’ pending criminal case and done in an

abundance of caution. However, she determined that those

concerns never came to fruition and that there were no longer any

valid reasons for her to recuse. She explained that the criminal

case was dismissed without a trial and that she received no

information from that case that biased her against either party. See

People in Interest of S.G., 91 P.3d 443, 447-48 (Colo. App. 2004)

(noting that a judge’s prior involvement in a case between the

parties does not automatically require recusal). Because father

develops no meaningful argument to challenge her determination,

we will not further address it. See In re Marriage of Drexler, 2013

COA 43, ¶ 27 (declining to address undeveloped argument).

¶ 18 We therefore reject father’s claim that Judge Blanco lacked

jurisdiction to issue orders after January 2020.

III. The Contempt Rulings

¶ 19 Father also contends that the district court erred by adopting

the magistrate’s ruling finding him in contempt and imposing

remedial and punitive contempt sanctions. We disagree.

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A. Standard of Review

¶ 20 Our review of a district court’s order adopting a magistrate’s

decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review. In re

Marriage of Sheehan, 2022 COA 29, ¶ 22. We review the

conclusions of law de novo but defer to the magistrate’s factual

findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.

B. Due Process

¶ 21 Father contends that the magistrate violated his due process

rights when the magistrate solicited testimony from mother at the

hearing and allegedly acted as a surrogate attorney to prosecute

mother’s allegations of contempt. We disagree.

¶ 22 Due process entitles a party to a fair trial in a fair tribunal.

City of Manassa v. Ruff, 235 P.3d 1051, 1057 (Colo. 2010). The

court therefore must exercise restraint over its conduct and

statements to maintain an impartial forum and ensure that it does

not become an advocate. See People v. Coria, 937 P.2d 386, 391

(Colo. 1997); People v. Adler, 629 P.2d 569, 573 (Colo. 1981).

However, the “court has the prerogative and, at times, the duty to

question witnesses.” People v. Rodriguez, 209 P.3d 1151, 1162

(Colo. App. 2008), aff’d, 238 P.3d 1283 (Colo. 2010); see also CRE

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614(b). Indeed, “[i]t is sometimes the court’s duty to question

witnesses to develop the truth more fully and to clarify testimony.”

Eggert v. Mosler Safe Co., 730 P.2d 895, 897 (Colo. App. 1986); see

also People v. Hall, 2021 CO 71M, ¶ 22 (“[A] trial court . . . has the

duty to ensure that the facts are not obscured and to illuminate

confusing issues.”).

¶ 23 A court’s comments or questions only infringed on a party’s

due process rights if the court “so departed from the required

impartiality as to deny the [party] a fair trial.” Rodriguez, 209 P.3d

at 1162.

¶ 24 At the hearing, mother, who appeared without an attorney,

began by testifying that father had not made any “payments” to her.

The magistrate asked mother to clarify “what payments” she was

referencing, explaining that she should approach the hearing “as if

[the magistrate] kn[e]w nothing.” Mother clarified that father was

not paying child support. Mother then sought to admit a screen

shot of the Family Support Registry account summary, which

showed that father had not paid his child support obligation.

Father objected, and the magistrate asked mother some

foundational questions about the exhibit. Mother responded that

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she had obtained the document a week before the hearing, it was a

true and accurate copy, and it had not been altered. The

magistrate then admitted the exhibit.

¶ 25 Father argues that, through this inquiry, the magistrate

improperly stepped into the role of advocate and facilitated the

admission of evidence concerning father’s contemptuous conduct.

However, the magistrate’s questions merely sought to clarify the

evidence and bring out facts important to a just determination of

the matter. See Hall, ¶ 22; Eggert, 730 P.2d at 897. Moreover, the

magistrate’s inquiry was brief and limited in scope.

¶ 26 We therefore see no indication in the record that the

magistrate improperly acted as both prosecutor and judge, and we

are not persuaded otherwise by father’s reliance on Harthun v.

District Court, 495 P.2d 539 (Colo. 1972), or Groves v. District Court,

806 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1991). Those cases are distinguishable. In

Harthun, the judge actively prosecuted the contempt allegations,

including engaging in direct- and cross-examination of witnesses.

Harthun, 495 P.2d at 541-42. Groves merely reiterated Harthun’s

determination that “it was inappropriate for the judge to be both the

finder of fact and the prosecutor.” 806 P.2d at 948.

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¶ 27 The district court thus correctly rejected father’s argument

that the magistrate improperly acted as a surrogate attorney and

prosecuted mother’s contempt motions.

C. Sufficiency of Evidence

¶ 28 Father next contends that the court erred by adopting the

magistrate’s contempt rulings because mother did not present

sufficient evidence to support the magistrate’s determinations of

contempt and imposition of sanctions. We are unpersuaded.

1. Applicable Law

¶ 29 A court may hold a party in contempt upon a finding that the

party did not comply with a lawful court order of which the party

was aware. See C.R.C.P. 107(a)(1); Sheehan, ¶ 24. The court may

then impose remedial or punitive sanctions. See C.R.C.P. 107(d)(1)-

(2).

¶ 30 Remedial sanctions “force compliance with a lawful order or

. . . compel performance of an act within the person’s power or

present ability to perform.” C.R.C.P. 107(a)(5). To impose such

sanctions, the court must find that the contemnor has the present

ability to comply with the order and the present ability to purge the

contempt. See C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2); Sheehan, ¶¶ 24, 26-27.

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¶ 31 Punitive sanctions punish a party for “conduct that is found to

be offensive to the authority and dignity of the court.” C.R.C.P.

107(a)(4). Punitive sanctions require the court to find that the

contemnor had the ability to comply with the order and willfully

refused to do so. Sheehan, ¶ 25.

¶ 32 A determination of whether a party is in contempt lies within

the court’s sound discretion, and we will uphold its decision absent

a showing that the court acted in a manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair manner, or it misapplied the law. Id. at ¶

23.

2. Unpaid Child Support

¶ 33 Father argues that the magistrate erred by not dismissing

mother’s contempt motion based on his purported failure to pay

child support. But the record supports the magistrate’s findings for

contempt, and we therefore will not disturb her determination. See

Aspen Springs Metro. Dist. v. Keno, 2015 COA 97, ¶ 27.

¶ 34 Father claims that mother did not establish the existence of a

lawful court order. He argues that her contempt motion only

referenced orders from January 23, 2021, and January 23, 2022,

which he asserts do not exist. While that may be true, mother

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attached to her contempt motion the January 3, 2022, order, which

was the child support order in effect at that time. See Harriman v.

Cabela’s Inc., 2016 COA 43, ¶ 64 (recognizing that a court may take

judicial notice of its case file). In a prehearing order, the magistrate

also found that, by attaching the January 3, 2022, order to her

motion, mother clarified “the actual order [father] allegedly

violated.” Moreover, at the hearing, mother testified about father’s

current and past court-ordered child support obligations, and she

offered the January 3, 2022, order as an exhibit, which the

magistrate admitted without objection.

¶ 35 That exhibit showed that (1) father’s current obligation was

$200 per month and (2) the permanent orders previously required

him to pay $111 per month. Mother thus sufficiently established

the existence of a court order requiring father to pay child support.

See Aspen Springs, ¶ 27; see also Thorburn, ¶ 49 (recognizing that

credibility determinations and the weight, probative force, and

sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn from that evidence, are issues within the

sole discretion of the district court).

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¶ 36 We also reject father’s suggestion that mother failed to prove

he knew of the court’s order. See Aspen Springs, ¶ 27; see also

Thorburn, ¶ 49. Mother testified that father’s multiple appeals

(Skellchock I and Skellchock II), in which he challenged the court’s

child support orders, showed that he was aware of his child support

obligation. She also said that father “studies the court orders.”

¶ 37 Father next claims that mother did not prove that he violated

the court’s child support order. But she testified that father “never

made a single payment,” which she clarified meant payment of child

support. And the magistrate admitted her exhibit of the Family

Support Registry account summary, which showed that father had

over $9,000 in arrearages. This evidence sufficiently established

that father had not complied with the child support order. See

Aspen Springs, ¶ 27; see also Thorburn, ¶ 49.

¶ 38 Still, father argues that mother did not prove that he had the

present ability to comply with the court’s order. For remedial

sanctions, the magistrate must find that father had the present

ability to pay child support. See C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2); Sheehan,

¶¶ 24, 26-27. But mother did not bear the burden to prove father’s

present ability to comply. She only needed to establish that father

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violated the underlying court order and that he was aware of that

order. See Sheehan, ¶ 24. Mother met that burden. The burden

then shifted to father to prove a present inability to pay. See id.;

see also In re Marriage of Lamutt, 881 P.2d 445, 447 (Colo. App.

1994) (“The rationale for imposing the burden upon the alleged

contemnor is that the evidence relative to that person’s ability to

pay is more readily available to the alleged contemnor than it is to

the movant; the trial court in earlier proceedings has already heard

evidence and in entering its order has determined the alleged

contemnor’s ability or inability to pay; and the movant has

established a prima facie case by proving entry of the decree and

default on the part of the alleged contemnor to pay the amount or

amounts therein.”). The magistrate found that father’s claim of an

inability to pay was not credible, and we must defer to that finding.

See Aspen Springs, ¶ 27; see also Thorburn, ¶ 49.

¶ 39 For punitive sanctions, even though the burden of proving the

claim rested solely on mother, those sanctions did not require a

finding that father had the present ability to comply. See Sheehan,

¶¶ 25-26, 41. Rather, mother had to show that, at some point,

father had the ability to comply but refused to do so. Id.; see also

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In re Marriage of Nussbeck, 974 P.2d 493, 498 (Colo. 1999) (Punitive

sanctions punish a contemnor for “failing to pay amounts due at a

time when the contemnor had the ability to pay.”). The record

supports the finding that she met that burden. See Aspen Springs,

¶ 27; see also Thorburn, ¶ 49.

¶ 40 Mother testified that father had continuously received

veteran’s disability benefits after the dissolution but that he refused

to use those benefits to pay his support obligation. She also

presented evidence that, during that time, father received over

$3,000 per month from these benefits. Moreover, the record reveals

that father steadfastly asserted that the court could not require him

to use his veteran’s disability benefits to pay child support despite

repeated court rulings holding that such benefits may be used to

satisfy child support obligations. See Harriman, ¶ 64; see also

Skellchock I, No. 21CA0503, slip op. at ¶¶ 42-43; Skellchock II, Nos.

24CA0249 & 24CA0250, slip op. at ¶¶ 37-40.

¶ 41 The district court therefore did not err by adopting the

magistrate’s ruling finding father in contempt and imposing

remedial and punitive sanctions for his failure to pay child support.

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3. Thanksgiving Parenting Time

¶ 42 Father next argues that mother did not present sufficient

evidence to establish that he willfully violated a court order

regarding mother’s Thanksgiving parenting time. We disagree.

¶ 43 Mother testified that she was entitled to parenting time on

Thanksgiving in 2022. She explained that, when she tried to pick

up the child from father, he told her that he “got [his] holidays . . .

wrong” and they were “out of town with family.” She further

testified that father refused to return the child to her on

Thanksgiving, even though they were “less than five minutes” from

her home, and that he “intentionally” interfered with her holiday

parenting time because he disliked her family.

¶ 44 This testimony and the admitted exhibits memorializing

mother’s conversations with father, which the magistrate credited,

sufficiently supported the magistrate’s finding that father willfully

refused to comply with the court-ordered parenting plan. See

Aspen Springs, ¶ 27; see also Thorburn, ¶ 49.

¶ 45 Father argues, however, that mother did not establish the

existence of a valid court order because the magistrate did not

admit into evidence an order concerning Thanksgiving parenting

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time. Even so, the court’s permanent orders, which adopted the

parties’ stipulation on holiday parenting time, established that

mother received parenting time on Thanksgiving in even numbered

years. That stipulation was set forth in the amended JTMC, and,

during the contempt hearing, mother repeatedly referenced the

amended JTMC and testified that she was entitled to parenting time

on Thanksgiving in 2022. In addition, mother attached both the

amended JTMC and the permanent orders to her contempt motion,

which the record shows was hand delivered to father before the

hearing. See Harriman, ¶ 64. Mother thus sufficiently established

the existence of a valid court order concerning her Thanksgiving

parenting time. See Aspen Springs, ¶ 27; see also Thorburn, ¶ 49.

¶ 46 The district court properly adopted the magistrate’s

determination to impose punitive contempt sanctions for father’s

parenting time violation.

IV. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 47 Father asks us to award him attorney fees on appeal. But

other than citing C.A.R. 38, he develops no legal argument to

support his request. We therefore decline to award attorney fees.

See In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 39 (“Citing [an]

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appellate fee rule as the sole legal basis for an attorney fees request

is not sufficient.”).

¶ 48 He also seeks an award of appellate costs under C.A.R. 39.

But because we are affirming the orders, he is not entitled to such

costs. See C.A.R. 39(a)(2).

V. Disposition

¶ 49 The orders are affirmed.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE LUM concur.

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