Marriage of Campbell

24CA1041 Marriage of Campbell 06-05-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1041
Arapahoe County District Court No. 23DR31193
Honorable Michelle Jones, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Andrea Yanique Palmer,

Appellee,

and

Bobby Lee Campbell JR,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Gomez and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced June 5, 2025

No Appearance for Appellee

Bobby Lee Campbell JR, Pro Se
¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case between Andrea Yanique

Palmer (wife) and Bobby Lee Campell Jr. (husband), husband

appeals the district court’s judgment and challenges the court’s

rulings concerning parenting time, child support, and attorney fees.

We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The parties married in 2021 and have two minor children. In

2023, wife petitioned to dissolve the marriage. In May 2024,

following a hearing,1 the district court dissolved the parties’

marriage and entered permanent orders.

¶3 The district court first found the following facts. From

February through May 2023, the parties lived separately in

Colorado and that wife was the primary caretaker for the parties’

1 The transcript from the May 2, 2024, hearing was not included in

the appellate record. Therefore, we must presume the court’s
rulings based on the hearing evidence from that day are correct.
See Colo. Ass’n of Pub. Emps. v. Colo. Dep’t of Pers., 991 P.2d 827,
831 (Colo. App. 1999) (our review is limited to the record
presented); see also In re Marriage of Rivera, 91 P.3d 464, 466 (Colo.
App. 2004) (“It is the obligation of the party asserting error in a
judgment to present a record that discloses that error, because a
judgment is presumed to be correct until the contrary affirmatively
appears.”).

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two children. The parties discussed developing a parenting time

schedule, but they were unable to reach an agreement.

¶4 At the end of May 2023, wife moved to Florida where both she

and husband had family. Wife informed husband that she had a

job in Florida and asked for his input. At the time, husband

indicated that he was okay with wife having primary custody of the

children and wanted to have as close to equal parenting time as

possible.

¶5 The district court then divided the marital estate. The court

found that the parties were not married for long and, therefore,

could leave the marriage in similar positions where both had the

ability to work, earn funds, and not be burdened with substantial

marital property or debt. As relevant here, the court ordered a

parenting time schedule that accommodated wife’s relocation to

Florida, ordered husband to pay child support both retroactively

and in the future, and ordered husband to pay $5,000 of wife’s

attorney fees.

II. Evidence Admission and Due Process Violation

¶6 Husband challenges the district court’s refusal to admit

evidence allegedly critical to his case. He also asserts that the

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court’s refusal to consider this evidence, as a sanction for

noncompliance with the rules, denied him due process. We are

unable to review the court’s rulings on these issues because

husband did not designate the transcript of the May 2 hearing at

which the court heard evidence and issued its ruling. As the

appellant, it was his responsibility to “include in the record

transcripts of all proceedings necessary for considering and

deciding the issues on appeal.” C.A.R. 10(d)(3). Consequently,

husband’s failure to include the May 2 transcript as part of the

appellate record requires us to presume that the district court’s

findings and conclusions are correct. See In re Marriage of Dean,

2017 COA 51, ¶ 13 (“Where the appellant fails to provide . . . a

transcript, the reviewing court must presume that the record

supports the judgment.”); In re Marriage of Beatty, 2012 COA 71,

¶ 15 (same); see also McCall v. Meyers, 94 P.3d 1271, 1272 (Colo.

App. 2004) (“A party cannot overcome a deficiency in the record by

statements in the briefs.”).

¶7 While we recognize that husband appears pro se, he is bound

by the same rules of procedure as attorneys. See Yadon v.

Southward, 64 P.3d 909, 912 (Colo. App. 2002); see also Dean,

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¶ 12; Rosenberg v. Grady, 843 P.2d 25, 26 (Colo. App. 1992) (“A pro

se litigant who chooses to rely upon his own understanding of legal

principles and procedures is required to follow the same procedural

rules as those who are qualified to practice law and must be

prepared to accept the consequences of his mistakes and errors.”).

Accordingly, we affirm the court’s rulings on these issues.

III. Child Support

¶8 Husband next contends that the court’s imposition of child

support in the amount of $1,100 per month is unreasonable.

Because the record supports the court’s order, we disagree.

A. Additional Facts

¶9 The record reflects that the district court acknowledged

husband’s argument that wife was capable of earning more income

than she was currently earning. But it refused to impute additional

income because wife cared for their youngest child, who was less

than two years old, full time. The court also ordered retroactive

child support to the time husband was served with the dissolution

petition.

¶ 10 Using Worksheet A, the court computed child support for

August through November 2023 at $732 per month, and husband

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does not challenge that calculation, which is supported by the

worksheet in the record. It then computed child support for

December 2023, based on wife’s incursion of child care expenses, at

$1,333. Again, husband does not challenge this calculation, which

is supported by the worksheet in the record.

¶ 11 Using the same worksheet, the court calculated child support

for January 2024 at $1,615 based on wife’s reduced income, a

calculation not challenged on appeal. For February 2024, the court

noted that wife’s child care expense was reduced and ordered child

support in the amount of $948. Additionally, for March through

May 2024, the court found husband had obtained new employment

with a higher income and it rejected wife’s argument that the State

of Florida considered child support income. Using Worksheet A, it

ordered child support in the amount of $1,077.

¶ 12 Finally, the court recognized the additional expense husband

would incur to exercise his parenting time with the children in

Florida and reduced his child support obligation by $300 per month

to $777 per month, beginning in June 2024. The court noted this

was a deviation from the child support guidelines and found it was

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equitable and appropriate to deviate given the “significant and

unknown travel expenses that [husband] will incur.”

¶ 13 In addition to husband’s ongoing child support expense, the

district court ordered father to pay his retroactive child support,

totaling $10,055, over the ensuing twenty-four months, bringing

husband’s monthly child support obligation to $1,196 until the

retroactive fees were paid in full.

¶ 14 During the court’s oral ruling on child support, husband left

the virtual proceeding after attempting to object and being told he

could not do so during the reading of the court’s judgment.

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 15 We review a court’s maintenance and child support orders,

including its determination of the parties’ incomes, for an abuse of

discretion. In re Marriage of Tooker, 2019 COA 83, ¶¶ 12, 21, 27.

We defer to the district court’s factual findings unless they are

clearly erroneous, meaning there is no evidence in the record to

support them. Dean, ¶ 8; In re Marriage of Connerton, 260 P.3d 62,

66 (Colo. App. 2010). But the court’s findings of fact and

conclusions of law must be “sufficiently explicit” to give us a clear

understanding of the basis of its order. In re Marriage of Gibbs,

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2019 COA 104, ¶ 9; see also C.R.C.P. 52. Factual findings are

sufficient if they “identify the evidence which the fact finder deemed

persuasive, and determinative of the issues raised.” In re Marriage

of Garst, 955 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Colo. App. 1998).

¶ 16 Colorado’s child support guidelines provide district courts with

a framework for determining the amount of child support they

should award in dissolution of marriage proceedings. In re Marriage

of Boettcher, 2019 CO 81, ¶ 1. These guidelines establish specific

presumptive payment amounts based on the number of children

and the parties’ combined income. Id.

¶ 17 In calculating child support, the court must consider the

parties’ financial resources, including each parent’s income. See

§ 14-10-115(2)(b)(II), (V), C.R.S. 2024. “Income” for purposes of the

child support guidelines means the “actual gross income of a

parent, if employed to full capacity, or potential income, if

unemployed or underemployed.” § 14-10-115(3)(c). Potential

income is used to calculate child support only if the parent is

voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. See § 14-10-115(5)(b)(I).

“‘Voluntarily’ in this context means that the parent is

underemployed ‘intentionally, of free will.’” In re Marriage of Garrett,

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2018 COA 154, ¶ 10 (quoting People v. Martinez, 70 P.3d 474, 477-

78 (Colo. 2003)). Thus, before the court may impute potential

income to a parent, it must find that the parent is “shirking his or

her child support obligation by unreasonably forgoing higher-

paying, obtainable employment.” Id. A court may not impute

income if a parent is unemployed or underemployed because they

are caring for a child under the age of twenty-four months for whom

the parties owe a joint legal responsibility. See § 14-10-

115(5)(b)(I)(B); see also In re M.E.R-L., 2020 COA 173, ¶ 34

(declining to impute any income to wife because she cared for a

child under the age of two).

C. Analysis

¶ 18 We discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s child support

orders because they are supported by the record, which shows that

the court followed the child support guidelines by considering the

parties’ varying incomes and child care expenses. See Boettcher,

¶ 1; see also § 14-10-115(2)(b)(II), (V) (in calculating child support,

the court must consider the parties’ financial resources, including

each parent’s income).

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¶ 19 Additionally, in rejecting husband’s argument that wife should

have additional income imputed when determining his child

support obligations, the district court correctly reasoned that wife

was caring for a child under twenty-four months. See § 14-10-

115(5)(b)(I)(B); see also M.E.R-L., ¶ 34. Moreover, to the extent

husband challenges the court’s ruling ordering him to pay

retroactive child support, we discern no error and conclude it is

consistent with section 14-10-115(2)(a), under which a court may

order a party to pay child support for the time before the entry of a

support order back to the date the dissolution petition was filed.

¶ 20 Furthermore, we reject husband’s assertion that the court

never considered his expenses at all. The record contains

numerous worksheets showing otherwise, and the court’s ruling

departing from the guidelines that reduced his monthly child

support payment was specifically based on the significant travel

expenses he would incur in exercising parenting time in the future.

¶ 21 Finally, we reject husband’s assertion that the court failed to

consider the best interests of the children in its child support order.

Husband argues that an excessive child support burden would

negatively impact his ability to provide for his children. We disagree

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because, as discussed above, the court utilized Worksheet A and

considered the parties’ incomes and expenses when determining

child support and recognized that wife was the children’s primary

caretaker. Moreover, the court exercised its discretion to deviate

from the guidelines and reduce husband’s child support obligation,

reflecting the importance of the children maintaining a close

relationship with their father. Under these circumstances, we

cannot say that the court failed to consider the children’s best

interests.

¶ 22 Accordingly, we affirm the court’s child support orders.

IV. Attorney Fee Sanction

¶ 23 Husband next contends that the court abused its discretion in

ordering him to pay a portion of wife’s attorney fees because he

represented himself and the court was biased. We disagree.

A. Additional Facts

¶ 24 The court heard evidence concerning wife’s attorney fee

request at the May 2 hearing and issued its oral ruling on May 24.

According to the court’s order, wife asked that husband be ordered

to pay all of her attorney fees. The court ordered husband to pay

$5,000 of wife’s attorney fees. It first found there was no significant

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disparity in income between the parties to support equalizing the

footing of each party or allocating attorney fees based on section 14-

10-119, C.R.S. 2024. Instead, it noted that wife’s initial request for

attorney fees stemmed from husband’s repeated and willful

disregard for court orders and procedures.

¶ 25 Turning to section 13-17-102(4), C.R.S. 2024, the court agreed

that husband, as a self-represented party, did not initially know

that some of his actions were frivolous. But it ultimately found that

he knew or reasonably should have known that he should not have

filed some of his later motions or requests. For example, husband

failed to respond to discovery requests even after the court entered

orders denying the abduction prevention measures that he

requested, and husband consistently failed to comply with many

procedural orders and scheduling requests. The court found that

approximately one-fourth of the costs wife incurred in attorney fees

were solely related to conduct that husband clearly knew or should

have known was “vexatious in failing to move this case forward.”

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 26 We review a district court’s award of attorney fees for an abuse

of discretion. See In re Estate of Shimizu, 2016 COA 163, ¶ 15. A

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court abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law or acts in a

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair manner. Id. But we

review de novo whether the court properly applied the law. See In

re Marriage of Gallegos, 251 P.3d 1086, 1087 (Colo. App. 2010).

¶ 27 A court may assess reasonable attorney fees against a party

when it finds that the party brought an action that lacked

substantial justification. § 13-17-102(4). But when a party is not

represented by an attorney, the court must also find that “the party

clearly knew or reasonably should have known” that the action

“was substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or

substantially vexatious” before it may assess attorney fees against

that pro se party. § 13-17-102(6). Absent this finding, an order

“awarding attorney fees cannot stand.” Artes-Roy v. Lyman, 833

P.2d 62, 63 (Colo. App. 1992).

C. Analysis

¶ 28 We discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s attorney fee

order for two reasons.

¶ 29 First, the record shows that the court considered husband’s

actions in light of his pro se status, contrary to his argument. The

record shows the court did not believe husband’s conduct was

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substantially frivolous, groundless, or vexatious in the beginning.

For example, the court noted husband’s filing of a petition for

allocation of parental responsibilities instead of a petition for

divorce or dissolution of marriage, a reflection of his pro se status.

Husband also filed a motion for abduction prevention measures,

despite the facts that he knew where the parties’ children were and

that he had discussed the relocation with wife before the move.

¶ 30 Second, the record shows the court sanctioned husband for

actions he knew or reasonably should have known were frivolous

and vexatious, not because he appeared pro se. Specifically, the

court found that husband failed to respond to reasonable discovery

requests. It also noted that even after it had entered orders denying

his request for abduction prevention measures, husband continued

to fail to comply with court orders and failed to schedule and attend

mediation with wife. Thus, it was husband’s failure to adhere to

court orders and procedures that led the district court to order him

to pay $5,000 of wife’s attorney fees.

¶ 31 Finally, we do not address husband’s undeveloped claim that

the court was biased in ordering father to pay $5,000 for “Palmer

attorney.” See, e.g., Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n v. Lo Viento Blanco,

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LLC, 2020 COA 34, ¶ 41 n.12 (“We don’t consider undeveloped and

unsupported arguments.”), aff’d, 2021 CO 56.

¶ 32 Accordingly, we affirm the court’s attorney fee award.

V. Relocation

¶ 33 Husband lastly contends that the district court abused its

discretion by failing to consider the fact that husband could not

relocate to another state given his obligations to his older children

from a previous relationship, who resided in Colorado. Husband

also argues that relocating to Florida was not in the children’s best

interest because it significantly limited his ability to maintain a

meaningful relationship with them. We are not persuaded.

A. Additional Facts

¶ 34 We presume that the following facts set forth in the court’s

order are correct because husband did not designate the May 2

hearing at which the court heard the evidence. The court ordered

wife to be the children’s primary caretaker. It found that the

children had integrated into their new Florida community and that

husband had inconsistently been involved in the children’s lives.

The court also found that husband traveled to Florida to visit his

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family after wife’s relocation but had not attempted to see his

children while he was there.

¶ 35 The court then implemented a three-step parenting plan for

husband moving forward to help husband maintain a relationship

with the children. First, husband was required to spend one

weekend in Florida per month, to see his children, for three months

in a row. After compliance with step one, then parenting moved to

step two, consisting of an allocation of parenting time during school

breaks, holidays, and summers. Following compliance with step

two, husband would receive additional parenting time over school

holidays in Colorado. The court also created a set schedule for

video contact between the children and the parent who was not

exercising parenting time.

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 36 We review the court’s relocation decision for an abuse of

discretion, see In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 148 (Colo.

2005), meaning that we will not disturb the decision unless it is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Gibbs, ¶ 8. We

exercise every presumption that supports upholding the court’s

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decision. In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App.

2007).

¶ 37 When a parent’s relocation is requested prior to permanent

orders, the court must fashion a parenting plan that takes the

planned locations of the parties and their proximity to each other

into account. § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VIII), C.R.S. 2024; Spahmer v.

Gullette, 113 P.3d 158, 161-64 (Colo. 2005) (court must fashion a

parenting plan that can be exercised with the parties living in

different states, if that is their stated intention). A court does not

have the authority to order a party to live in a particular location.

Spahmer, 113 P.3d at 162.

¶ 38 When allocating parenting time, the court must focus on the

children’s best interests, giving paramount consideration to their

safety and physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs.

See § 14-10-123.4(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024; § 14-10-124(1.5), (1.7); see

also In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning M.W., 2012 COA 162,

¶ 16. In making this determination, the court must consider (1) the

wishes of the child’s parents as to parenting time; (2) the interaction

and interrelationship of the child with his or her parents and any

other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interests;

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(3) any report of domestic violence; (4) the child’s adjustment to his

or her home, school, and community; (5) the ability of the parties to

encourage the sharing of love, affection, and contact between the

child and the other party; (6) whether the past pattern of

involvement of the parties with the child reflects a system of values,

time commitment, and mutual support; (7) the physical proximity of

the parties to each other as it relates to the practical considerations

of parenting time; and (8) the ability of each party to place the

needs of the child ahead of his or her own needs. § 14-10-

124(1.5)(a).

C. Analysis

¶ 39 We begin by noting that we must presume the May 2

transcript supports the court’s factual findings. See Dean, ¶ 13. In

doing so, we discern no error in the court’s ruling. The record

shows that the court considered both parties’ circumstances when

fashioning the parenting plan. Wife attempted to co-parent with

husband during her time in Colorado, following the parties’

separation. The district court found that husband’s “lack of

interest and lack of response to a set schedule” has “caused the

children to have a better interaction, and bond, with [m]other.” The

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court also found that despite her treatment by husband, wife

continued to make “significant attempts to continue to share the

relationship the children have with their father and to encourage

that relationship.” Moreover, wife had already informed husband of

her relocation at the time the district court entered the parenting

time order. See Spahmer, 113 P.3d at 164 (reversing a parenting

time order that required a mother to remain in Colorado even

though she had told both the father and the trial court of her

intentions to relocate to Arizona). Wife told husband that she had a

job in Florida and asked for his input. At the time, husband

indicated that he was okay with wife having primary custody of the

children and wished to have as close to equal parenting time as

possible. After wife moved to Florida, husband travelled to Florida

to visit family, but he made no attempt to visit the children.

Accordingly, we discern no error in the court’s ruling.

VI. Disposition

¶ 40 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

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