Peo in Interest of Boyd

25CA0456 Peo in Interest of Boyd 05-22-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0456
Pueblo County District Court No. 25MH30022
Honorable Gregory J. Styduhar, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of Marvin Tyrone Boyd,

Respondent-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
Tow and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 22, 2025

Cynthia Mitchell, County Attorney, Kate H. Shafer, Special Assistant County
Attorney, Pueblo, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Tezak Law, P.C., Mary Tezak, Florence, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant
¶1 In this mental health proceeding, Marvin Tyrone Boyd appeals

the district court’s order authorizing the involuntary administration

of medications. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Boyd suffers from schizoaffective disorder. He exhibits

delusional ideation and paranoia, along with manic symptoms

including irritability, pressured speech, and disorganized thinking.

¶3 Boyd was admitted to the Colorado Mental Health Hospital in

Pueblo (the hospital) for inpatient competency restoration. In

March 2025, Boyd refused treatment, prompting the hospital to

request involuntary administration of olanzapine (Zyprexa), lithium,

and chlorpromazine (Thorazine). The People petitioned for review of

Boyd’s refusal of treatment. Consistent with People v. Medina,

705 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1985), the petition asserted that (1) Boyd is

incapable of participating in decisions affecting his health and

treatment; (2) the requested treatment is necessary to prevent a

significant and likely long-term deterioration in his mental health

condition or to prevent the likelihood of him causing serious harm

to himself or others; (3) a less intrusive treatment alternative is not

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available; and (4) Boyd’s need for treatment is sufficient to override

any bona fide and legitimate interest he has in refusing treatment.

¶4 At a hearing on the People’s petition, the district court heard

testimony from both Boyd and Dr. Hareesh Pillai, the psychiatrist

responsible for supervising Boyd’s care. At the end of the hearing,

the court found Dr. Pillai’s testimony to be credible and persuasive.

Based largely on his testimony, the court concluded that the People

had proved all four Medina elements and issued an order

authorizing the hospital staff to administer the requested

medications to Boyd against his will.

II. Standard of Review

¶5 When, as here, a patient challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting an involuntary medication order, we review the

district court’s legal conclusions de novo but defer to its factual

findings if they have record support. People v. Marquardt, 2016 CO

4, ¶ 8. We view the evidence as a whole and in the light most

favorable to the prevailing party, leaving the resolution of

testimonial conflicts and the determination of witness credibility

solely to the fact finder. People in Interest of Uwayezuk, 2023 COA

69, ¶ 57; People in Interest of R.C., 2019 COA 99M, ¶ 7. As the fact

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finder, the district court determines the sufficiency, probative effect,

and weight of the evidence, along with the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn therefrom. R.C., ¶ 7.

III. Discussion

¶6 A district court may order the involuntary administration of

medication to a patient only if the People prove, by clear and

convincing evidence, each of the four elements outlined in Medina.

Medina, 705 P.2d at 973. Boyd does not contest the first, second,

or third Medina elements. He contends only that the evidence

presented at the hearing was insufficient to prove the fourth

element. We are not persuaded.

¶7 The fourth Medina element requires a court to assess whether

the patient’s need for treatment is sufficiently compelling to override

the patient’s interest in refusing treatment. Id. at 974. The court

must determine (1) “whether the patient’s refusal is bona fide and

legitimate” and, if so, (2) “whether the prognosis without treatment

is so unfavorable that the patient’s personal preference must yield

to the legitimate interests of the state in preserving the life and

health of the patient placed in its charge and in protecting the

safety of those in the institution.” Id.

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¶8 Boyd asserts that the district court erred by concluding that

he does “not have a legitimate reason for refusing medications.”

This is so, he argues, because the court failed to acknowledge that

he has a legitimate interest in “avoiding serious side effects.” As

evidence of such side effects, he points to (1) Dr. Pillai’s testimony

that Boyd has reported difficulty sleeping, headaches, drowsiness,

and dizziness; and (2) his own testimony about drooling and slurred

speech. But Dr. Pillai testified that, in fact, Boyd’s difficulty

sleeping is “more related to his underlying manic symptoms” and

that, with the requested medications, he “is able to sleep.”

Although Dr. Pillai acknowledged that Boyd had reported

headaches, drowsiness, and dizziness, Boyd himself downplayed

the significance of those side effects. When asked if he was having

any side effects from the medications, he stated, “I wouldn’t say

side effects,” but “maybe a little bit of drowsiness.” When further

asked if he had experienced slurred speech or drooling, he replied,

“maybe a little bit” and “just a little bit.”

¶9 Although significant side effects can constitute a bona fide

reason to refuse medication, Uwayezuk, ¶ 62, Boyd’s equivocation

on whether and what side effects he was experiencing, and their

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significance, supports the court’s determination that his reasons for

refusing medications are not bona fide and legitimate. Nonetheless,

even if we assume that they are, the district court found that Boyd’s

need for treatment “is sufficiently compelling to override any bona

fide [and] legitimate interest [he has in] refusing treatment.” The

record supports this determination, which goes to the ultimate

determination under the fourth element of Medina.

¶ 10 Dr. Pillai’s testimony established that without treatment,

Boyd’s condition significantly and quickly deteriorates, leading to

agitation, aggression, and threatening behaviors that pose a serious

risk of harm toward others. We conclude that this evidence —

which the court credited — clearly and convincingly supports the

conclusion that Boyd’s interest in refusing medication must yield to

the state’s legitimate interests in preserving his health and

protecting the safety of others in the institution. See Medina,

705 P.2d at 974; People v. Pflugbeil, 834 P.2d 843, 846-47 (Colo.

App. 1992).

IV. Disposition

¶ 11 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.

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