Marriage of Knipe

24CA1167 Marriage of Knipe 05-15-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1167
Boulder County District Court No. 20DR30096
Honorable J. Keith Collins, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Paul David Knipe,

Appellee,

and

Archana Singh Knipe,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
Kuhn and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 15, 2025

Aitken Law, LLC, Sharlene J. Aitken, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Archana Singh Knipe, Pro Se
¶1 Archana Singh Knipe (wife) appeals the district court’s

judgment concerning the dissolution of her marriage with Paul

David Knipe (husband). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2021, the court dissolved the parties’ nineteen-year

marriage and entered permanent orders. The court allocated to

each party about $200,000 from the marital estate, awarded wife

$1,100 per month in maintenance for a term of two years, and

declined to award wife her attorney fees under section 14-10-119,

C.R.S. 2024.

¶3 Wife appealed, and a division of this court reversed the

permanent orders. In re Marriage of Knipe, (Colo. App. No.

21CA1598, May 4, 2023) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e))

(Knipe I). The division concluded that when the court divided the

marital estate, it erred by (1) setting aside certain debts as wife’s

separate debt; (2) miscalculating wife’s one-half share of the marital

home equity; and (3) dividing the parties’ personal property. Id. at

¶¶ 14-17, 21-23, 31-32. The division remanded the case and

directed the district court to correct these property division errors,

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redetermine maintenance and attorney fees, and address wife’s

request for appellate attorney fees. Id. at ¶¶ 33, 35-37.

¶4 On remand, the court allocated to husband half of the marital

debts incorrectly excluded from the marital estate and corrected its

calculation of the marital home equity so that wife received her

equal share. The court also adopted the parties’ agreement

concerning most of the personal property. Regarding the few

disputed personal property items that remain relevant to this

appeal, the court (1) allocated to husband a guitar, finding that wife

gifted it to him; and (2) excluded from the marital estate an

engagement ring, finding that the ring had been lost. The court

didn’t disturb its remaining equal allocation of the marital estate.

¶5 The court also found that wife was voluntarily unemployed,

and it imputed to her an income of $5,665 per month, which

corresponded to the amount wife indicated she could earn at a local

school district based on her level of experience and education. The

court then found that wife could sufficiently provide for her

reasonable needs through appropriate employment and therefore

declined to award her maintenance.

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¶6 And the court denied wife’s request for attorney fees related to

the dissolution proceedings and Knipe I. But the court ordered wife

to pay husband approximately $3,000 for the attorney fees and

costs he incurred for filing two motions to compel wife’s mandatory

disclosures.

II. Wife’s Potential Income

¶7 As part of wife’s contentions related to property division,

maintenance, and attorney fees, she argues that the court erred by

finding her voluntarily unemployed and imputing to her a potential

income of $5,665 per month. Because this argument impacts

multiple contentions, we address it first and discern no error.

¶8 A party is voluntarily unemployed when they are shirking their

financial obligations by unreasonably forgoing employment that

they could obtain. See In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M,

¶ 29. When a court finds that a party is voluntarily unemployed, it

imputes a potential income to that party. In re Marriage of

Capparelli, 2024 COA 103M, ¶ 34. Potential income is an income

that the party can reasonably earn from a full-time job

commensurate with their demonstrated earning ability. Id. at ¶ 35.

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¶9 Whether a party is voluntarily unemployed and the potential

income imputed to them are typically questions of fact. See Collins,

¶ 30; In re Marriage of Connerton, 260 P.3d 62, 66 (Colo. App.

2010). We won’t disturb a court’s factual findings if the record

supports them. See Collins, ¶ 30; Connerton, 260 P.3d at 66.

¶ 10 When the parties married in 2002, wife worked as a teacher.

She stopped teaching in 2011. Wife then cared for the family, and,

for a few years, she tutored students and ran a chai tea business.

At the initial permanent orders hearing, wife had been unemployed

for about four years, and the parties agreed that the court could

impute to her a monthly potential income of $3,667.

¶ 11 In 2022, wife moved to Oakland, California and worked as an

elementary school teacher, earning a salary of $72,000 per year.

About seven months later, wife left this job and moved back to

Colorado.

¶ 12 At the remand hearing, wife reported that for the year she had

lived in Colorado, she hadn’t found a new job. She believed that

arrests she had experienced a few years earlier were dissuading

potential employers. But she conceded that the court could impute

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her a potential income, saying that $50,000 per year was an

appropriate amount.

¶ 13 Husband presented a vocational expert, who opined that

based on wife’s experience and education, she could earn $64,000

to $79,000 per year as a teacher. The expert disputed wife’s claim

that her arrest record impacted her ability to get a job, explaining

that those records were sealed and not disclosed to potential

employers. The expert also opined that, even if wife didn’t return to

teaching, she could pursue a sales and marketing job, earning

around $70,000 per year.

¶ 14 After considering this evidence, the court determined that wife

was voluntarily unemployed. The court then determined that wife

could earn a potential income of $67,978 per year ($5,665 per

month), which, as noted above, corresponded to the amount wife

indicated she could earn at a local school district.

¶ 15 Wife disagrees with the court’s findings, highlighting her

inability to obtain a job and the court’s previous finding that her

potential income was only $3,667 per month. However, the court

wasn’t bound by its previous income finding. On remand, it had to

determine wife’s income and economic circumstances at the time of

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the remand hearing. See In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11,

¶ 24. On remand, the court found wife’s testimony concerning her

lack of employment incredible, and after weighing the conflicting

evidence, determined that wife could earn $5,665 per month. We

must defer to the court’s credibility determinations and its findings

on the weight, probative force, and sufficiency of the evidence. See

Connerton, 260 P.3d at 66. We therefore won’t disturb the court’s

determinations when, as here, the record supports them. See

Collins, ¶ 33.

III. Property Division

¶ 16 Wife contends that the district court erred by improperly and

inequitably dividing the marital estate. We disagree.

¶ 17 The court has great latitude to equitably divide the marital

estate in such proportions as it deems just and equitable. See § 14-

10-113(1), C.R.S. 2024; In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M,

¶ 28. We won’t disturb the court’s allocation absent a showing that

the court abused its discretion. Medeiros, ¶ 28. A court abuses its

discretion when it acts in a manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair manner, or it misapplies the law. Id.

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¶ 18 The court divided the parties’ approximately $400,000 marital

estate almost exactly in half. In doing so, the court considered the

parties’ changed standard of living since the marriage and their

present financial circumstances. The court also considered wife’s

voluntary unemployment and found that she could meet her

reasonable financial needs with her potential income. And the

court noted that wife was making numerous, unexplained cash

withdrawals and payments, which were depleting her assets, and

that husband shouldn’t be responsible for her indiscriminate

spending. While wife believes she should have received a larger

share of the marital estate, the court considered the relevant

circumstances, and the record supports its allocation. See id.; see

also In re Marriage of Hunt, 909 P.2d 525, 538 (Colo. 1995) (“[A]n

appellate court must not disturb the delicate balance achieved by

the trial court in division of [marital] property . . . unless there has

been a clear abuse of discretion.”).

¶ 19 In advancing her contention that the court erred in dividing

the marital estate, wife contends that the court improperly

considered her voluntary unemployment. We disagree. Although

wife suggests that the court was penalizing her for being

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unemployed, the court had to consider all relevant factors,

including a party’s present economic circumstances. § 14-10-

113(1)(c). And wife’s voluntary unemployment was a relevant

economic circumstance for the court to consider when equitably

dividing the marital estate. See id.

¶ 20 Wife also argues that the court abused its discretion by

dividing the parties’ personal property. In doing so, wife reasserts

many of her arguments challenging the court’s initial orders on the

mechanism for dividing these assets that she raised in Knipe I.

However, the division reversed that portion of the court’s permanent

orders. The court corrected its allocation on remand, and thus, the

aspects of the court’s initial permanent orders that wife contends

“effectively delegated the division” of personal property to husband

no longer exist.

¶ 21 As for the court’s allocation after remand, the court adopted

the parties’ agreement, which, in accordance with wife’s request,

allocated most of the personal property to her. Concerning the few

personal property items disputed on remand, wife challenges the

court’s allocation of a guitar to husband and determination that an

engagement ring was lost. At the hearing, husband testified that

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wife gave the guitar to him as a gift. He also said that wife was the

last person to have the engagement ring and that he had no idea

where the ring was now. While wife disputed this testimony, the

court found husband credible, and we may not reweigh its

resolution of the conflicting evidence. Medeiros, ¶¶ 28, 54.

¶ 22 The court thus acted within its broad discretion to equally

divide the marital estate.

IV. Maintenance

¶ 23 Wife next contends that the court erred by not awarding her

maintenance. We consider and reject her arguments.

A. Legal Principles

¶ 24 We review the court’s maintenance decision for an abuse of

discretion. See id. at ¶ 58.

¶ 25 When the court considers a party’s maintenance request, it

must make findings concerning the parties’ incomes, the

distribution of marital property, the parties’ financial resources,

their reasonable financial need established during the marriage,

and the tax consequences of any maintenance awarded. § 14-10-

114(3)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2024. The court must then consider the

advisory statutory guideline amount and term of maintenance, and

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any other relevant circumstances, including a nonexclusive list of

statutory factors, to determine a fair and equitable amount and

term of maintenance. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(A)-(B), (3)(b), (3)(c), (3)(e).

The court may not, however, award maintenance unless it finds

that the requesting party lacks sufficient property to provide for

their reasonable needs and is unable to support themself through

appropriate employment. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(C), (3)(d).

B. Advisory Statutory Guidelines

¶ 26 Wife claims that the court didn’t make any specific findings on

the advisory statutory guideline amount and term of maintenance.

But the court’s ruling on remand expressly found that, based on

the parties’ incomes and the length of the marriage, “[t]he

guidelines recommend that [h]usband pay maintenance to [w]ife in

the amount of $1,201 per month for approximately ten . . . years.”

While wife notes the absence of those findings in the court’s initial

permanent orders, any error by the court in that ruling was

rendered moot by the court’s redetermination of maintenance on

remand. See In re Marriage of Salby, 126 P.3d 291, 301 (Colo. App.

2005) (concluding that a court’s later orders that superseded its

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original order rendered a party’s challenge to the original order

moot).

¶ 27 To the extent wife also generally asserts that the court didn’t

make other statutorily required findings, she doesn’t identify any

that the court failed to make. See In re Marriage of Drexler, 2013

COA 43, ¶ 27 (declining to address an undeveloped argument).

C. Ability to Meet Wife’s Reasonable Needs

¶ 28 Wife next argues that the record doesn’t support the court’s

finding that she could sufficiently meet her reasonable needs

through appropriate employment. We disagree.

¶ 29 At the remand hearing, wife reported total expenses of $4,430

per month and minimum debt payments of $960 per month on her

sworn financial statement. The court found these reported

expenses reasonable. The court also found that wife was

voluntarily unemployed, was capable of working as a teacher, and

had a potential income of $5,665 per month. See § 14-10-

114(8)(c)(IV).

¶ 30 Given the record support for these findings, we don’t agree

with wife that the court erred by determining that she could provide

for her reasonable needs with her potential income from appropriate

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employment. See Medeiros, ¶¶ 54, 58. And contrary to wife’s

conclusory claim, nothing in the court’s determination suggests

that the court required her to deplete her share of the marital

assets before she could qualify for maintenance. See In re Marriage

of Nordahl, 834 P.2d 838, 842 (Colo. App. 1992).

D. Inappropriate Factors

¶ 31 Wife further argues that the court considered improper factors

when it determined maintenance. However, other than her dispute

with the court’s income imputation, rejected above, wife directs us

to no improper factors considered by the court on remand. Rather,

she highlights factors that the court discussed in its initial

permanent orders. But, as noted above, the court’s initial

maintenance determination has been rendered moot. See Salby,

126 P.3d at 301.

E. Manifestly Inequitable

¶ 32 Wife also argues that the court’s maintenance decision was

manifestly inequitable. She highlights that she was married to

husband for nineteen years, she made noneconomic contributions

to the marriage, husband earned a higher income, and she was

struggling to find a job.

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¶ 33 But the court considered the relevant factors under section

14-10-114(3)(c) and determined, with record support, that not

awarding wife additional maintenance was fair and equitable under

the totality of the circumstances. See In re Marriage of Atencio, 47

P.3d 718, 722 (Colo. App. 2002) (providing that we will not disturb

a court’s maintenance determination when the record supports it).

The court acknowledged the length of the marriage and the

disparity in the parties’ incomes, but it found that wife had already

received two years of maintenance from husband and that her

economic circumstances didn’t warrant further spousal support.

See § 14-10-114(3)(c)(I), (V), (VII), (VIII). The court explained that

wife was fully capable of being employed but that, during the five

years the parties have been separated, she worked for only one of

those years. See § 14-10-114(3)(c)(V), (XIII). The court also found

that even though wife was presently unemployed, she was making

significant, unexplained cash withdrawals and payments from her

accounts and that husband shouldn’t be responsible for her

conduct. See § 14-10-114(3)(c)(I), (XIII). The court further found

that husband was financially supporting the parties’ adult children

without wife’s assistance. See § 14-10-114(3)(c)(II), (XIII). And the

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court recognized that wife received an equal share of the marital

estate. See § 14-10-114(3)(c)(IV).

¶ 34 The court thus acted within its discretion by declining to

award wife additional maintenance.

V. Attorney Fees

¶ 35 Wife contends that the court erred by not awarding her

attorney fees related to the dissolution proceeding and her first

appeal. We disagree.

¶ 36 To ensure that a party in a dissolution proceeding doesn’t

suffer undue economic hardship, a court may equitably apportion

attorney fees and costs between parties based on their relative

economic circumstances. Collins, ¶ 49; see § 14-10-119. We won’t

disturb the court’s decision absent a showing that it abused its

discretion. See Collins, ¶ 51.

¶ 37 Again, the court found that even though wife was currently

unemployed, she was fully capable of finding a job to meet her

reasonable needs. It then found that the parties had incurred a

similar amount of attorney fees and that when accounting for wife’s

potential income, the parties’ financial circumstances were “similar

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enough” that husband should not be ordered to pay her attorney

fees.

¶ 38 In light of the record support concerning the parties’ economic

circumstances, the court didn’t abuse its discretion by declining to

award wife attorney fees under section 14-10-119.

¶ 39 To the extent wife also disagrees with the court’s ruling that

directed her to pay a portion of husband’s attorney fees, the court

awarded those fees as sanctions for wife’s failure to comply with her

disclosure obligations during the dissolution proceedings on

remand. See C.R.C.P. 16.2(j). And wife develops no legal or factual

argument to explain why the court erred by doing so. See Drexler,

¶ 27.

VI. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 40 Wife asks us to award her attorney fees in connection with this

appeal, Knipe I, and the remand proceedings. However, the district

court already resolved wife’s request for attorney fees in connection

with Knipe I and the remand proceedings. We are affirming the

court’s denial concerning those fees. And we reject wife’s request

for attorney fees related to this appeal because wife is representing

herself, and there is no legal basis to award attorney fees to a non-

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attorney pro se litigant. See Smith v. Furlong, 976 P.2d 889, 890

(Colo. App. 1999).

¶ 41 Husband asks for an award of his appellate attorney fees,

arguing that wife’s appeal is frivolous and groundless. See § 13-17-

102(4), C.R.S. 2024; C.A.R. 38(b). Even though unsuccessful, we

don’t agree that wife’s appeal warrants such an award. See Glover

v. Serratoga Falls LLC, 2021 CO 77, ¶ 70 (noting that we award

such attorney fees only in clear and unequivocal cases of egregious

conduct where no rational argument is presented); see also § 13-17-

102(6) (When a party is not represented by an attorney, the court

must find that “the party clearly knew or reasonably should have

known” that the action “was substantially frivolous, substantially

groundless, or substantially vexatious” before it may assess

attorney fees against that pro se party.). We therefore deny his

request.

¶ 42 Costs are taxed in accordance with C.A.R. 39(a)(2).

VII. Disposition

¶ 43 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE KUHN and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

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