Marriage of Stevens

24CA1056 Marriage of Stevens 05-01-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1056
Boulder County District Court No. 12DR48
Honorable Timothy L. Johnson, Magistrate
Honorable Andrew Hartman, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Bethany Kay Stevens,

Appellee,

and

John Richard Stevens,

Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE KUHN
Welling and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 1, 2025

Bethany Kay Stevens, Pro Se

John Richard Stevens, Pro Se
¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage proceeding between John

Richard Stevens (father) and Bethany Kay Stevens (mother), father

appeals the order granting mother’s motion to enforce parenting

time under section 14-10-129.5, C.R.S. 2024. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The district court dissolved father and mother’s marriage in

2013. In doing so, the court approved the parties’ stipulated

parenting plan providing that their only child would primarily reside

with father and that mother would have the child “on Monday and

Wednesday from 4:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. and every other

Saturday from 8:00 a.m. until 8:00 p.m.”

¶3 In 2021, mother moved to modify parenting time. Those

proceedings concluded with the district court approving the parties’

stipulated amended parenting plan. Under the amended plan, the

parties agreed that mother would follow a step-up parenting

schedule intended to gradually increase her parenting time with the

child. Consisting of five steps, mother would start with the

parenting schedule that she had been following in accordance with

the original plan and would progress to each next step after

satisfying the terms of the previous step. Upon reaching step five of

1
the schedule, she would have parenting time with the child every

Wednesday for four hours and every other weekend beginning on

Friday “after school or camp, or 4:00 p.m.,” and “until 4:00 p.m.

Sunday if the following Monday is not a school day, and until 12:00

p.m. Sunday if the following Monday is a school day.”

¶4 However, under paragraph 7 of the amended plan, mother had

to comply with certain conditions to advance between the steps and

avoid demotion to the baseline step one schedule. The relevant

conditions included the following:

b. Mother shall respond to communications
regarding the child in a timely manner (defined
as a response or acknowledgement within
[forty-eight] hours). . . .

c. Mother shall engage in weekly therapy with
a state licensed mental health provider.
Mother shall provide a release to the therapist
and the therapist must be willing to provide
written confirmation to [f]ather that [m]other is
consistently and steadily attending weekly
therapy and complying with any prescribed or
recommended treatment plans. If in the future
[m]other and her therapist believe that
[m]other no longer needs weekly therapy,
[m]other will provide to [f]ather written
verification from her therapist and the parties
will discuss and attempt to agree as to whether
continued therapy is necessary. If the parties
do not agree, then [m]other may seek [c]ourt

2
[o]rders concerning the issue of ongoing
therapy . . . .

Paragraph 7(e) provided that if mother failed to comply with any of

these conditions, her parenting time would “move back to or remain

on [s]tep [one] until [she was] compliant with the conditions for a

period of [thirty] consecutive days,” before she could again start

progressing through the steps in order.

¶5 In November 2023, mother filed an “Emergency Motion

Concerning Parenting Time Disputes Pursuant to [Section

14-10-129.5],” asserting that father had been withholding parenting

time from her to which she was entitled under step five of the

amended plan. Specifically, she argued that father had improperly

moved her from step five to step one a month earlier on the grounds

that she had violated paragraph 7 of the plan by failing to

(1) provide certain information regarding her mental health therapy

and (2) respond within forty-eight hours to one of father’s messages.

Mother further argued that father had engaged in a pattern of

inappropriately moving her down to lower steps in the parenting

plan. She requested makeup parenting time as a remedy for

father’s alleged noncompliance.

3
¶6 A magistrate held an evidentiary hearing in February 2024, at

which both parties appeared pro se. Roughly one month later, the

magistrate issued an order granting mother’s motion after finding

that father had violated the amended parenting plan “by restricting

[m]other’s parenting time without cause and depriving her of her

four monthly overnights with the [child].” The magistrate awarded

mother twenty-two overnights in makeup parenting time. As a

further remedy, the magistrate modified the amended plan, as

permitted by section 14-10-129.5(2)(b). Among other changes, the

magistrate removed paragraph 7(e), ordered mother to attend

therapy as recommended by her therapist instead of every week,

and removed the step-up plan. In its place, the magistrate ordered

that mother must exercise her parenting time under a schedule that

was similar to the schedule that she had followed until father’s

violation.1

1 Specifically, following the magistrate’s modifications, mother’s

regular parenting schedule differed from the schedule under step
five to the extent that “[i]f [m]other is exercising parenting time
during the school year and there is no school on Monday, [her]
parenting time shall be extended until 4:00 p.m. on Monday
(allowing an extra overnight).”

4
¶7 Father then filed a petition for review of the magistrate’s

decision under C.R.M. 7(a). The district court denied the petition,

thereby adopting the magistrate’s order, and father appeals.

II. Analysis

¶8 Because both parties appear pro se in this appeal, “we liberally

construe [their] filings while applying the same law and procedural

rules applicable to a party represented by counsel.” Gandy v.

Williams, 2019 COA 118, ¶ 8. Accordingly, we seek to effectuate the

substance, rather than the form, of their briefing. People v. Cali,

2020 CO 20, ¶ 34. We won’t, however, rewrite their arguments or

act as an advocate on their behalf. Johnson v. McGrath, 2024 COA

5, ¶ 10.

¶9 As we understand it, father contends that the magistrate erred

in granting mother’s motion under section 14-10-129.5 by

(1) determining that father had violated the parenting time order in

part because he had impermissibly restricted mother’s parenting

time when he changed mother’s schedule from step five to step one;

(2) failing to consider the best interests of the child; (3) allowing

mother’s therapist to opine on matters about which she had lacked

the requisite knowledge; (4) finding that father had admitted to

5
filing a complaint with the Colorado Department of Regulatory

Agencies (DORA) against the therapist that resulted in her

discipline; and (5) miscalculating mother’s makeup parenting time.2

We consider each of these contentions in turn.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 10 A district court reviewing a magistrate’s decision under C.R.M.

7(a) may not alter the magistrate’s factual findings unless they are

clearly erroneous. C.R.M. 7(a)(9). Our review of the district court’s

decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review. In re

Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 25. Thus, like the district

court, we must accept the magistrate’s findings of fact unless they

2 Father raises two additional issues in his briefing. First, he
asserts that the magistrate erred by admitting, over his objection,
“exhibits that had not properly been served by [C.R.C.P. 5].” But he
doesn’t offer legal authority in support of this argument and
generally fails to develop it sufficiently to enable our review. And we
don’t consider arguments that are unsupported and undeveloped.
See Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n v. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA
34, ¶ 41 n.12, aff’d, 2021 CO 56. Second, father argues that the
magistrate erred by modifying the amended parenting plan because
mother had failed to file a motion seeking to modify the plan before
the hearing. We disagree with that argument. The court has the
authority to modify a previous parenting time order to meet the best
interests of the child following a hearing on a parenting time
dispute. See 14-10-129.5(2)(b), C.R.S. 2024.

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are clearly erroneous and have no support in the record. In re

Marriage of Sheehan, 2022 COA 29, ¶ 22.

¶ 11 The determination of parenting time is a matter within the

discretion of the district court, and we will not disturb the court’s

decision absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion. In re

Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App. 2007). “A court

abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair, or based on a misapplication of the law.”

In re Marriage of Bochner, 2023 COA 63, ¶ 12.

¶ 12 However, we review de novo questions of law, including

whether the court properly applied the correct legal standard or

construed a statute. Thorburn, ¶ 26.

¶ 13 The party asserting an error has the burden of showing that

the error wasn’t harmless. See Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355,

1375 (Colo. 1993). An error is harmless if it “does not affect the

substantial rights of the parties.” C.R.C.P. 61. And an error affects

a party’s substantial rights “only if it can be said with fair

assurance that the error substantially influenced the outcome of

the case or impaired the basic fairness of the [proceeding] itself.”

7
Stockdale v. Ellsworth, 2017 CO 109, ¶ 32 (quoting Laura A.

Newman, LLC v. Roberts, 2016 CO 9, ¶ 24).

B. Applicable Law

¶ 14 Section 14-10-129.5 governs the resolution of parenting time

disputes. Under that statute, a district court must determine

“[w]ithin thirty-five days after the filing of a verified motion by either

parent or upon the court’s own motion . . . whether there has been

or is likely to be substantial or continuing noncompliance with the

parenting time order or schedule.” § 14-10-129.5(1). If the court

finds after a hearing that a parent hasn’t complied with a parenting

time order, it may impose one or more remedial orders.

§ 14-10-129.5(2). As pertinent here, those include an order

modifying the previous parenting time order to meet the best

interests of the child and an order requiring that makeup parenting

time be provided to the aggrieved parent. § 14-10-129.5(2)(b), (d).

¶ 15 Before entering an order modifying parenting time under

subsection (2)(b) of the statute, the court must consider all relevant

factors to determine the best interests of the child, including the

statutory factors set forth in section 14-10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2024.

In addition, when a court sanctions a noncomplying parent by

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awarding makeup parenting time to the other parent, the makeup

time must be of the same type and duration as the parenting time

that was withheld. § 14-10-129.5(2)(d)(I).

C. Preservation

¶ 16 As an initial matter, we address the issue of preservation

because mother contends that we should decline to review father’s

unpreserved arguments that the magistrate erred by failing to

consider the best interests of the child and allowing mother’s

therapist to opine on matters beyond the therapist’s qualifications

and knowledge.

¶ 17 To preserve an issue for our review, a party appealing from a

magistrate’s decision must raise the issue in a petition for review

and give the district court an opportunity to correct any error the

magistrate may have made. See C.R.M. 7(a)(7) (petition for review

must state with particularity the alleged errors in the magistrate’s

order); see also People in Interest of K.L-P., 148 P.3d 402, 403 (Colo.

App. 2006) (declining to review an issue in a dependency and

neglect proceeding when father failed to raise the issue in his

petition for district court review of the magistrate’s judgment); In re

Marriage of Ensminger, 209 P.3d 1163, 1167 (Colo. App. 2008)

9
(declining to address an argument that the party didn’t assert in

her petition for review, raising it for the first time on appeal).

¶ 18 Father argues that the magistrate failed to consider the best

interests of the child because the magistrate didn’t address (1) the

recommendations contained in the report from the child and family

investigator (CFI)3 and (2) the statutory factors set forth in section

14-10-124(1.5)(a). Instead, father asserts, the magistrate

incorrectly confined the best interests analysis to “the parent’s

conduct [that] would result in [a] situation endangering the child’s

physical health or significantly impair the child’s emotional

development.”

¶ 19 As we understand his briefing, father argues that the

magistrate incorrectly applied the child endangerment standard,

disregarding the recommendations in the CFI report and the best

interests considerations under section 14-10-124(1.5)(a). However,

the record shows that father didn’t raise this argument to the

magistrate or in his petition for district court review. See C.R.M.

3 The CFI report was prepared in 2021 in connection with the

modification proceedings that resulted in the district court’s
adoption of the parties’ amended parenting plan.

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7(a)(7). Consequently, because this issue is unpreserved, we

decline to address it further. See K.L-P., 148 P.3d at 403.

¶ 20 Likewise, father failed to preserve in the district court his

challenge to the therapist’s statements. In support of this

challenge, he directs us to a letter in which the therapist stated that

based on her experience with father and the parents’

communications, father was violating the parenting time order; he

was “more interested in winning the power struggle than providing

a healthy, co-parenting atmosphere for [the child]”; and father’s

conduct was detrimental to the child. Father argues that the

magistrate “erred in treating those statements as credible” because

the evidence established that the therapist didn’t have the

“credentials, training, certification, or authorization” to provide an

opinion about any of these issues.

¶ 21 But the record shows that father didn’t object to the admission

of the letter during the hearing. Nor did he challenge the therapist’s

statements on the basis of her credentials or licensure. And father

also didn’t raise this issue in his petition for review. Under these

11
circumstances, this issue likewise isn’t preserved for our review.

We thus decline to address it further.4 See id.

D. Father’s Failure to Comply
with the Parenting Time Order

¶ 22 Father contends that the magistrate erred by determining that

father violated the parenting time order when he changed mother’s

parenting schedule in accordance with paragraph 7(e) of the

amended parenting plan. He argues that (1) the record doesn’t

support the magistrate’s finding that father improperly moved

mother from step five to step one of the step-up parenting schedule,

and (2) the magistrate erred by determining that father

impermissibly restricted mother’s parenting time. We disagree with

both contentions.

4 In any case, father challenges the therapist’s credibility and the

weight the magistrate accorded to her statements, but those
matters are within the magistrate’s sole discretion. See In re
Marriage of Lewis, 66 P.3d 204, 207 (Colo. App. 2003) (noting that
credibility and weight of evidence determinations are matters within
the sole discretion of the trial court).

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1. The Magistrate Didn’t Clearly Err by Finding that Father
Violated the Parenting Time Order when He Changed
Mother’s Parenting Schedule Back to Step One

¶ 23 In the proceedings before the magistrate, the parties disputed

mother’s parenting time and her compliance with the conditions in

paragraphs 7(b) and 7(c) of the amended parenting plan. In his

response to mother’s motion, father argued that he was authorized

to move mother’s parenting time back to step one after (1) her

therapist had failed to provide information regarding the length and

location of mother’s therapy sessions; and (2) mother had failed to

respond within forty-eight hours to the following message that

father had sent her on September 29, 2023: “It will mess up my

schedule to bring [the child] to you on Monday[, October 2]. If I

need to do that, I would like confirmation asap.”

¶ 24 The magistrate disagreed with father, finding that when father

informed mother that he would start following the parenting

schedule under step one, mother was still in compliance with the

plan. Specifically, the magistrate found that mother had been

attending weekly therapy and that she had “complied with the

requirement of providing a release to her therapist so the therapist

[could] provide information to [f]ather.” However, the magistrate

13
also found that father wasn’t entitled to rest of the information he

sought regarding the length and duration of therapy sessions under

the plan’s plain language.

¶ 25 As for the communication condition under paragraph 7(b), the

magistrate stated that mother didn’t timely respond to or

acknowledge father’s September 29 message and that her untimely

response was technically a violation of the plan. However, he

observed that this provision of the amended parenting plan violated

section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2024, because it amounted to an

impermissible restriction on mother’s parenting time, and

regardless, father’s message was an unnecessary communication to

which mother didn’t need to respond. In making the last finding,

the magistrate noted that because the terms of the amended

parenting plan set forth the parenting schedule and which parent

was responsible for dropping off the child, it was unnecessary for

mother to confirm these points with father.

¶ 26 The record supports the magistrate’s finding that father

violated the parenting time order by improperly changing mother’s

schedule under the step-up plan. As noted above, to comply with

the therapy condition, mother was required to provide a release of

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information (ROI) to her therapist, and the therapist was then

obligated to inform father in writing that mother had been

“consistently and steadily attending weekly therapy and complying

with any prescribed or recommended treatment plans.” The record

shows that mother executed the ROI in August 2022, soon after she

started seeing her therapist. It also shows that mother had been

consistently attending weekly therapy and that her therapist had

been emailing father every month with updates regarding the dates

of mother’s therapy sessions. While some updates specified that

the sessions were one hour long, the magistrate correctly observed

that the language of the parenting plan didn’t require mother to

provide information regarding the length and location of her therapy

to comply with the condition in paragraph 7(c).

¶ 27 True, it’s undisputed that mother didn’t acknowledge father’s

September 29 message until October 2, one day late. However, the

record doesn’t support father’s argument that this late response

was the reason why he started to follow the parenting schedule

under step one, “which meant the child was scheduled to be in

[m]other’s care from [4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.] on Monday,

October 2.” As the magistrate noted, father had communicated to

15
mother that her parenting plan would revert to step one even before

she was supposed to respond to the relevant message, on the

grounds that she had failed to comply with the therapy condition in

the plan.

¶ 28 For example, on September 26, father wrote to mother,

I am giving you until Friday (September 29,
2023) to provide your therapist with the
required ROI so she can verify the standard
information I have requested: day, time,
duration, and modality of sessions. For July,
August, and if we reach Friday before I receive
these documents, for September [2023]. . . .

If you do not provide the ROI to your therapist,
and she does not verify your therapy session
details, the plan says that you being out of
compliance with those requirements means
our plan reverts to Step 1.

¶ 29 Then, on September 29, mother sent father the following

message: “You might have noticed I paid [child] support early. This

is because I’m going out of town, camping, and will likely be out of

cell range. So, if you send me a message between now and then[,] I

won’t be responding until after [October 1].” Father responded,

“Well, I need you to communicate about your therapy verification

before then.” This exchange supports the magistrate’s conclusion

that when father attempted to bring the child to mother on October

16
2 for parenting time in accordance with the step-one schedule, he

did so because he didn’t receive the therapy information that he

had requested, not because mother failed to timely respond to his

message about why it was important for mother to confirm whether

she would be sending that information.

¶ 30 And because the magistrate found, with record support, that

mother wasn’t required to provide information regarding the length

and duration of her therapy sessions, father couldn’t use the lack of

such a disclosure as the basis for changing mother’s parenting

schedule back to step one and withholding from her the parenting

time that she was entitled to under the step-five schedule.5

2. The Magistrate Didn’t Err by Concluding that Father
Impermissibly Restricted Mother’s Parenting Time

¶ 31 Father also contends that the magistrate erred when he

determined that by utilizing the step-down procedure under

5 While it’s true that the court found that mother had committed a

technical violation of the plan, the court also found that the
violation wasn’t material. Under the circumstances, the court
found that mother’s response was one day late but that father also
knew that she would be unavailable when he sent the message.
Additionally, the court found that this wasn’t the kind of message
that mother had to respond to under the court’s orders. Those
findings have record support, so we have no basis to disturb them.

17
paragraph 7(e) to revert mother to step one, father improperly

imposed a restriction on her parenting time. Section

14-10-129(1)(b)(I) prevents a court from restricting a parent’s

parenting time unless the court finds that the parenting time would

endanger the child’s physical health or significantly impair the

child’s emotional development.

¶ 32 In response to father’s argument that he was authorized to

change mother’s parenting schedule as soon as she failed to

respond to his message as required under paragraph 7(b), the

magistrate observed that this provision and paragraph 7 as a whole

were “problematic at best” because it purported to allow father to

restrict mother’s “parenting time without a correlating finding that

the parent’s conduct would result in [a] situation endangering the

child’s physical health or significantly impair the child’s emotional

18
development.”6 See id. The magistrate also “note[d] that the step[-

]down procedure within the Amended Parenting Plan [was]

draconian and [did] not consider the best interests of the child”

given that “[t]here [was] nothing correlative between the violations

[of the conditions] and the step down.”

¶ 33 Father contends that the magistrate “improperly designate[d]

moves between steps in the Step plan portion of the Amended

Parenting Plan as a ‘restriction in time.’” He asserts that the time

“allocation between steps is similar for all Steps, it is only the

parenting schedule that changes.” In support of his argument,

6 We disagree with father to the extent he repeats on appeal the

argument that he didn’t impermissibly withhold mother’s parenting
time because he was only acting in accordance with paragraph 7(e)
when he started to follow the parenting schedule under step one.
Regardless of what father believed the amended parenting plan
said, only the district court had the authority to make decisions
regarding mother’s parenting time with the child. See In re
Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 334 (Colo. App. 2007)
(concluding that it was improper for the trial court to delegate to
one parent decisions regarding the other parent’s parenting time);
see also In Interest of D.R.V-A., 976 P.2d 881, 884 (Colo. App. 1999)
(concluding that a court may not delegate parenting time
decision-making to a guardian ad litem and family therapist).
Moreover, as discussed above, the magistrate determined with
record support that mother had not committed a material violation
of the parenting plan.

19
father points out that mother and the child had the same number

of monthly “contact days” under steps one and five.

¶ 34 But this argument misses the mark. The fact that the number

of days on which mother may get to spend at least some time with

the child is roughly the same doesn’t automatically mean that her

parenting time is also the same regardless of the step she is on. In

other words, the parenting days and parenting time are not

coextensive under the amended parenting plan. Indeed, a

comparison of the parenting schedules under steps one and five

reveals that mother’s parenting time varied significantly between

the two plans. Under step one, mother had eight hours of

parenting time on two weeknights each week plus an additional

twelve hours on one Saturday every other weekend. This means

that in a four-week month, mother was entitled to about fifty-six

hours of parenting time. Under step five, in contrast, mother was

entitled to parenting time consisting of four hours one weeknight

every week and two overnights every other weekend. On a

parenting time weekend, mother would have parenting time

between approximately forty-four hours (if the next day was a

school day) and forty-eight hours (if there was no school).

20
Accordingly, mother had between 104 and 112 hours of parenting

time a month under step five.

¶ 35 Considering these differences in the amount of mother’s

parenting time between the two plans, we can’t say that the

magistrate erred by determining that when father improperly moved

mother back to step one of the parties’ parenting schedule, father

also inappropriately restricted her parenting time.7

¶ 36 In sum, we discern no error in the magistrate’s determination

that father violated the parenting time order.

E. The Magistrate Didn’t Reversibly Err when Making a Finding
Regarding Father’s Disciplinary Complaint Against the
Therapist

¶ 37 Father next contends that the magistrate clearly erred by

finding that father had admitted to filing a complaint against

mother’s therapist resulting in the therapist’s discipline.

Specifically, the magistrate stated that

7 We can’t tell from father’s briefing if he’s asserting that the

magistrate incorrectly applied the child endangerment standard, as
opposed to the best interests of the child standard, in determining
whether there was a restriction on mother’s parenting time. To the
extent he’s arguing that the magistrate applied the wrong legal
standard, we decline to address it because father failed to raise it in
his petition for district court review. See C.R.M. 7(a)(7); People in
Interest of K.L-P., 148 P.3d 402, 403 (Colo. App. 2006).

21
[f]ather confronted the [therapist] about not
being in contact with [m]other’s prior
therapists. Father admitted to filing a DORA
complaint against [the therapist]. As a result of
this complaint, [the therapist] took additional
education classes. Father went through [an
exhibit] which indicated [that the therapist]
“violated boundaries by bringing a client [into]
her home.” The [c]ourt did not find this line of
questioning to be helpful to the [c]ourt.

(Emphasis added.) Father asserts that the italicized finding has no

record support because the relevant complaint had been filed in

2021, approximately one year before mother started therapy with

the therapist.

¶ 38 We agree with father that this specific finding isn’t supported

by the record. We see no indication that father admitted to filing

the complaint that resulted in the therapist’s discipline. Even so,

we conclude that this error doesn’t require reversal because father

fails to carry his burden of showing harm from the magistrate’s

finding. See Moody, 843 P.2d at 1375.

¶ 39 In his opening brief, father contends that “[t]his error was one

of several that [he] believes affected the [magistrate’s] discretion and

led to . . . [the magistrate’s] arbitrary assessment” that his

testimony wasn’t credible. But while the magistrate did find

22
father’s testimony not credible, father doesn’t explain how the

finding he challenges on appeal bore upon his credibility.

¶ 40 Further, the magistrate heard testimony from the therapist

suggesting that father had filed a separate disciplinary complaint

against her.

[Father:] . . . [W]ere you sanctioned in 2022 for
infractions related to your private therapy?

[Therapist:] What does that have to do with
anything?

[Father:] I’m asking a question.

THE COURT: It goes to credibility -- is what
he’s trying to establish. And I’ll overrule the
objection. You need to answer the question.

[Therapist:] So a person did file a complaint just
as you filed a complaint.

....

[Father:] Okay.

(Emphasis added.) This colloquy shows that the magistrate erred

only to the extent he equated father’s complaint with the complaint

that purportedly resulted in the therapist’s discipline. There was

still record support for the conclusion that father had filed a

complaint against the therapist, even if he hadn’t admitted to that

fact.

23
¶ 41 Regardless, we don’t see any indication that this conclusion

was the foundation of the magistrate’s credibility determination. To

the contrary, the magistrate characterized the line of questioning as

unhelpful in resolving the issues before him. Considering this

record, we can’t say that the magistrate’s error in summarizing the

evidence substantially influenced the outcome of this case or

impaired the basic fairness of the proceeding itself. See Stockdale,

¶ 32. Accordingly, any error was harmless and doesn’t warrant

reversal. See C.R.C.P. 61 (requiring courts to disregard any error

that doesn’t affect the substantial rights of the party).

F. The Magistrate Didn’t Err in Calculating
Mother’s Makeup Parenting Time

¶ 42 Father contends that the magistrate erred in awarding mother

makeup parenting time as a remedy for father’s violation of the

parenting time order. We discern no error.

¶ 43 The magistrate determined that mother was entitled to

makeup time consisting of the two overnights every other weekend

that she missed after father started withholding parenting time that

she had been exercising in accordance with step five of the

parenting schedule. The magistrate found that during the

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five-month period between October 2023 and the hearing in

February 2024, mother had missed twenty overnights with the

child. In addition, he awarded mother two overnights for the one

month between the hearing date and when the order was issued.

The magistrate arrived at twenty-two overnights of makeup time

based on mother’s statements at the hearing that, during the

relevant period, she had missed four overnights per month except

for one month when she only had the right to two overnights. The

magistrate stated that mother “shall exercise an additional weekend

each month of overnight parenting time”; that those “overnights

shall begin after school (or at 4:00 p.m. if the child is not in school

or camp) on Friday and will last through 4:00 p.m. on Sunday”; and

that the goal was to have the makeup time completed by the start of

the upcoming school year (i.e., August 2024).

¶ 44 In challenging this ruling, father asserts that (1) mother lost

no parenting time because she had more “days of contact” with the

child under step one than what she would have had if she had

remained on step five; (2) the schedule for completing the makeup

time “was impossible to execute as written” and wasn’t in the best

25
interests of the child; and (3) the makeup time wasn’t of the same

duration as parenting time that mother was denied.

¶ 45 In support of his first argument, father points out that while

mother calculated her missed parenting time in overnights, the

magistrate repeatedly referred to missed “days” during the hearing.

Under these circumstances, father further argues, the magistrate

gave mother twenty-two “days” (not overnights) of makeup

parenting time. In doing so, father asserts, the magistrate erred

because while mother “did miss out on [seventeen] overnights”

through the date of the order, she “gained [twenty-four] Monday

afternoons under Step [one] during that time that [we]re not

allocated under Step [five], resulting in a total increase of

seven . . . additional days of contact.” But this argument is

premised on an incorrect characterization of the magistrate’s ruling.

In his order, the magistrate clearly and unequivocally calculated

mother’s makeup parenting time in overnights, not days. Further,

father offers no meaningful explanation why his calculations using

“days of contact” should prevail over the magistrate’s determination

for makeup of missed overnights. See Sinclair Transp. Co. v.

Sandberg, 2014 COA 76M, ¶ 74 (declining to address “bald

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assertions of error that lack any meaningful explanation or support

in legal authority”). Moreover, father largely rehashes his argument

that “contact days” equate to parenting time, a proposition that we

have already rejected above in connection with the restriction issue.

¶ 46 We also disagree with father’s argument that the magistrate

erred by ordering an additional weekend each month of overnight

parenting time so that mother could complete her makeup time by

the beginning of the upcoming school year. The statute provides

that if makeup parenting time can’t be completed within six months

of a parent’s violation of a parenting time order, then “the parenting

time shall be made up within one year after the noncompliance

occurs.” § 14-10-129.5(2)(d)(II). Given that father started

withholding mother’s parenting time in October 2023 — and their

dispute didn’t get resolved until about six months later — the

magistrate didn’t err by imposing a schedule that was intended to

complete makeup time by August 2024, within twelve months of

father’s noncompliance.

¶ 47 Finally, father contends that the magistrate violated section

14-10-129.5(2)(d)(I) by giving mother more parenting time than she

would have gotten had father complied with the amended parenting

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plan. Specifically, father points out that while under step five

mother was entitled to keep the child until 4:00 p.m. on Sunday

only if there was no school the next day, her makeup time provided

for that schedule regardless of whether the child had school the

next day. And as part of this argument, father asserts that the

makeup time schedule failed to incorporate the CFI’s

recommendations and was therefore not in the best interests of the

child. But like several other arguments in his appeal, father failed

to assert these two arguments in his petition for district court

review. See C.R.M. 7(a)(7). We therefore decline to address them

for the first time in this appeal. See K.L-P., 148 P.3d at 403; see

also Valentine v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 252 P.3d 1182,

1188 n.4 (Colo. App. 2011) (“We review only the specific arguments

a party pursued before the district court.”).

¶ 48 In conclusion, we perceive no error in the magistrate’s decision

to remedy father’s noncompliance with the parenting time order by

awarding mother twenty-two overnights of makeup parenting time.

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III. Appellate Fees and Costs

¶ 49 Father and mother each request an award of costs incurred in

connection with this appeal. Father also requests an award of

“attorney’s fees related to this [appeal].”

¶ 50 We deny father’s attorney fee request because he’s not entitled

to such fees as a nonattorney pro se party. See Smith v. Furlong,

976 P.2d 889, 890 (Colo. App. 1999) (holding that there is no basis

to award “attorney fees” to a nonattorney pro se litigant because no

“attorney fees” exist in such situations). And because we affirm the

order, we deny father’s request for appellate costs. However,

mother is entitled to her costs on appeal. See C.A.R. 39(a)(2) (“[I]f a

judgment is affirmed, costs are taxed against the appellant.”).

Mother may pursue those costs in the district court by filing an

itemized and verified bill of costs within fourteen days after entry of

the appellate mandate. See C.A.R. 39(c)(2).

IV. Disposition

¶ 51 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

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