Peo in Interest of ZDW

24CA1097 Peo in Interest of ZDW 04-24-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1097
Rio Grande County District Court No. 21JV2
Honorable Amanda C. Hopkins, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of Z.D.W., a Child,

and Concerning T.L. and J.D.W.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE SCHOCK
Freyre and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 24, 2025

W. Ryan Dunn, County Attorney, Del Norte, Colorado, for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant T.L.

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant J.D.W.
¶1 T.L. (mother) and J.D.W. (father) appeal the judgment

terminating their parent-child legal relationships with Z.D.W. (the

child). We affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶2 In January 2021, the Rio Grande County Department of Social

Services (Department) filed a petition in dependency or neglect,

alleging, among other things, that mother was using illegal

substances while caring for the child and had physically and

verbally abused him. The Department also cited concerns about

mother’s lack of supervision and inability to provide proper care for

the child. It alleged that father did not have any relationship with

the child. The parents admitted to the allegations in the petition,

and the juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent or neglected.

¶3 The juvenile court adopted treatment plans for the parents.

Mother’s treatment plan required her to (1) address her substance

abuse issues; (2) participate in family time; (3) complete a mental

health evaluation and treatment; (4) attend parenting classes;

(5) maintain stable housing and employment; and (6) sign releases

for the Department. Father’s treatment plan was similar, with the

exception of the substance abuse and mental health components.

1
¶4 In September 2022, the guardian ad litem (GAL) moved to

terminate the parents’ parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(c),

C.R.S. 2024. The juvenile court held a three-day evidentiary

hearing on the motion in January 2023. It then reopened the

evidence to hear additional testimony regarding the Department’s

efforts to rehabilitate the parents and evaluate kinship placements.

¶5 The juvenile court held another evidentiary hearing in

September 2023, after which it concluded that the GAL had not

established that mother was unfit because the Department had not

made reasonable efforts to reunify her with the child. The court

found that the GAL had established the termination criteria with

respect to father, but it declined to terminate his parental rights

because an allocation of parental responsibilities to mother or a

maternal relative could still have been a less drastic alternative to

termination. The court held its final judgment in abeyance to allow

the GAL another opportunity to present additional evidence.

¶6 The juvenile court held a final evidentiary hearing in April

2024. After that hearing, the court entered a written order

terminating the parent-child legal relationships between the parents

and the child. The court found the Department had made

2
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother, but she remained unfit. It

also found there were no less drastic alternatives to termination.

II. Reasonable Efforts

¶7 Both parents assert that the juvenile court erred by

concluding that the Department made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate them and reunify them with the child. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶8 Before a juvenile court may find a parent unfit under section

19-3-604(1)(c), the county department of human services must

make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the

family. §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024.

¶9 Reasonable efforts means the “exercise of diligence and care.”

§ 19-1-103(114). This standard is satisfied by the provision of

services in accordance with section 19-3-208. § 19-1-103(114).

Such services may include, as necessary and appropriate,

screening, assessments, and individual case plans; home-based

family and crisis counseling; information and referral services;

family time; and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b).

¶ 10 The services must be “appropriate to support the parent’s

treatment plan.” People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915

3
(Colo. App. 2011). But the parent is responsible for using those

services to obtain the assistance needed to comply with the plan.

People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011).

¶ 11 When determining whether family time services are necessary

and appropriate under section 19-3-208(2)(b)(IV), the child’s health

and safety are the paramount concerns. People in Interest of B.C.,

122 P.3d 1067, 1070 (Colo. App. 2005). Questions about family

time are entrusted to the juvenile court’s sound discretion, and the

court may not delegate those decisions to someone else. People in

Interest of D.G., 140 P.3d 299, 302-05 (Colo. App. 2006).

¶ 12 When a parent has a qualifying disability under the Americans

with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Department must “account for and,

if possible, make reasonable accommodations for the parent’s

disability when devising a treatment plan and providing

rehabilitative services.” People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36,

¶ 34; see also § 19-3-208(2)(g) (requiring services to comply with the

ADA). And in assessing the reasonableness of the Department’s

efforts, the juvenile court must consider whether reasonable

accommodations were made. S.K., ¶ 34. A parent is responsible for

disclosing to the department and the court information regarding a

4
disability and any necessary accommodations. Id. at ¶ 21. If the

parent’s disability status is in dispute, the court must then make a

factual finding as to whether the parent has a qualifying disability.

See id. at ¶ 21 n.2; People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 21.

¶ 13 Whether a department satisfied its obligation to make

reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and law. People in

Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the juvenile

court’s factual findings for clear error and review de novo its legal

determination, based on those findings, as to whether the

department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.

B. Father

¶ 14 Father first contends that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts because it did not provide him with reasonable

accommodations for his intellectual disability. He also argues that

the Department did not make reasonable efforts with respect to

family time and housing resources. We discern no error.

¶ 15 Initially, the juvenile court found, with record support, that

father failed to establish that he was a qualified individual with a

disability under the ADA. Although the record indicates that one of

father’s providers believed that father might have an intellectual or

5
learning disability, father did not disclose any such disability or

request any accommodations before the court adopted his

treatment plan. After the GAL moved to terminate father’s parental

rights, father filed an ADA notice, and the court ordered the

Department to provide father with a psychological evaluation.

¶ 16 A psychological evaluator submitted a report in December

2022. As pertinent to this appeal, the evaluator believed that father

might have “a significant cognitive deficit consistent with an

intellectual disability,” but he could not confirm that father had an

intellectual disability until he completed an adaptive assessment.

The adaptive assessment never occurred. In finding that it was “not

evident” that father was a qualified individual with a disability, the

court relied on the psychological evaluator’s testimony. Because

the record supports the juvenile court’s finding, the Department did

not have any ADA-based obligation to make reasonable

accommodations for father. See S.Z.S., ¶ 21; S.K., ¶ 21.

¶ 17 In any event, the juvenile court directed the Department to

address any requests for accommodation by father as if he did have

a qualified disability. With respect to this direction, the court found

that the Department made inquiries but that father never requested

6
any additional services or accommodations beyond those the

Department was already providing. In other words, the court

found, with record support, that even if father had an ADA-

cognizable disability, the Department provided reasonable

accommodations for him and father did not request any additional

accommodations. See S.K., ¶ 21. We thus reject father’s argument

that the Department did not make reasonable accommodations.

¶ 18 Father next asserts that the Department failed to provide him

with adequate family time because the juvenile court allowed the

child to decide whether he would attend visits. As explained in

more detail below, the court recognized its error in allowing the

child to dictate whether a visit would occur, and it rescinded that

order. See D.G., 140 P.3d at 302. We recognize that the court’s

improper order may have caused father to miss some visits with the

child. But the record otherwise shows that the Department made

reasonable efforts to provide father with family time during the rest

of the case, except when the court suspended father’s visits, which

father does not challenge. Under these circumstances, we cannot

conclude that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts.

7
¶ 19 Father also argues that the Department failed to provide him

with housing resources. But the record is to the contrary. Father’s

life skills worker testified that he worked with father to obtain

housing by helping him fill out housing applications. And the

caseworker testified that the Department offered housing financial

assistance, but father declined. We therefore discern no error.

C. Mother

¶ 20 Mother’s challenges to the juvenile court’s reasonable efforts

determination center primarily on her family time. She asserts that

the Department failed to make reasonable efforts by suspending her

family time with the child and failing to provide her with necessary

services for her family time to resume. We are not persuaded.

¶ 21 The juvenile court determined that the Department did not

make reasonable efforts to provide mother with family time services

before September 2023. It found that the Department did not

provide mother with any family time while she was in inpatient

treatment during the fall of 2021. Although the Department did

offer visits to mother in the summer of 2022, the court granted the

Department’s request to suspend family time after the first visit

“due to the child’s regression in behavior.” Then, at the termination

8
hearing in January 2023, the court realized it had never restarted

mother’s family time and ordered visits to begin as soon as possible.

But the court again suspended family time after only one visit.

¶ 22 In the spring of 2023, the child “began showing a disinterest in

attending visits,” and the GAL requested that the child be allowed to

cancel visits if he did not want to attend. The court granted this

request. But it later reversed that decision. In September 2023,

the court ordered the Department and the child’s treatment

providers to develop a plan to “reintroduce” the child to mother.

¶ 23 The child’s family time supervisor testified at the termination

hearing that she had developed a reintegration plan, which began

with mother recording videos for the child, then moving to virtual

visits, and finally to in-person visits. Consistent with this plan,

mother recorded a message for the child, but he refused to watch it,

and when the child’s therapist attempted to play the message for

the child, the child threw a chair at her. As a result, the team

decided to “skip steps” and just start in-person therapeutic visits.

¶ 24 After that, mother’s first visit with the child in January 2024

“went fairly smoothly.” But soon after the visit, the child again

became dysregulated, and mother opted to delay her February visit.

9
The family time supervisor offered mother another visit at the end of

February or the beginning of March, which mother declined.

¶ 25 In March 2024, the GAL again requested that the juvenile

court suspend mother’s family time based upon concerns about the

child’s emotional health. After considering the reports from the

child’s therapists, the court found that it was in the best interests

of the child to temporarily suspend mother’s visits with the child.

The court did not reinstate them before the termination hearing.

¶ 26 In its order terminating the parent-child relationship, the

juvenile court acknowledged its previous finding that the

Department did not make reasonable efforts before September

2023. But based upon the additional testimony, it determined that

the Department had made reasonable efforts to provide mother with

family time after September 2023. The record supports the court’s

finding. As noted above, after September 2023, the Department

worked with its treatment providers to restart family time between

mother and the child. The Department eventually provided a visit,

but mother declined additional visits after the first one. The court

then suspended further face-to-face family time, at the request of

the GAL. See People in Interest of E.D., 2025 COA 11, ¶ 40 (noting

10
that “when a juvenile court appropriately restricts parenting time,”

a department can satisfy its reasonable efforts obligation by

“making available” therapeutic family time services, “even if those

services don’t successfully result in face-to-face contact because of

continuing risks to the child’s or youth’s health and safety”).

¶ 27 On appeal, mother largely recounts the Department’s lack of

efforts before September 2023 in support of her contention that the

Department failed to make reasonable efforts to provide her with

family time. But mother does not develop any argument as to why

the Department’s attempts to reestablish family time after

September 2023 were lacking. Nor does she contend that the

juvenile court improperly suspended her visits in March 2024.

¶ 28 We therefore conclude that the juvenile court did not err by

determining that the Department made reasonable efforts.

III. Fitness

¶ 29 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that

she was unfit and unlikely to become fit in a reasonable time. She

maintains that, in so finding, the court erroneously applied an

“improperly stringent standard of parental fitness.” We disagree.

11
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 30 To terminate a parent-child legal relationship under section

19-3-604(1)(c), the juvenile court must find that the parent is unfit

and that the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change

within a reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c)(II), (III).

¶ 31 A parent is unfit if their conduct or condition renders them

unable or unwilling to give their child reasonable parental care.

People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007).

Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent

provide nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently adequate to meet

the child’s physical, emotional, and mental needs and conditions.

People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006). In

making this determination, the juvenile court must consider the

specific physical, emotional, and mental needs of the child. See

People in Interest of K.T., 129 P.3d 1080, 1081 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 32 A parent’s noncompliance with a treatment plan generally

“demonstrates a lack of commitment to meeting the child’s needs”

and can therefore be considered in determining parental fitness.

People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008). But

even if the parent substantially complies with a treatment plan, the

12
parent may still be unfit if the plan did not successfully rehabilitate

the parent. See People in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 26; see

also D.P., 160 P.3d at 354 (affirming finding of unfitness despite the

father’s “maximum effort” and completion of his treatment plan

where he still could not consistently meet the child’s needs).

¶ 33 When deciding whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change within a reasonable time, the juvenile court may

consider whether any change has occurred during the proceeding,

the parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of

the parent’s conduct or condition. People in Interest of D.L.C., 70

P.3d 584, 588-89 (Colo. App. 2003). What constitutes a reasonable

time is fact-specific and varies from case to case. People in Interest

of D.Y., 176 P.3d 874, 876 (Colo. App. 2007). But a reasonable time

is not an indefinite time, and it must take into account the child’s

physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs. S.Z.S., ¶ 24.

¶ 34 Whether the juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

is a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M. v.

T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the court’s factual findings for

clear error, but we review de novo its legal conclusions based on

those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.

13
B. Analysis

¶ 35 The juvenile court determined that mother was unfit to parent

the child and unlikely to become fit in a reasonable time. The court

based that finding on several factors, including evidence that

mother (1) did not have a relationship with the child; (2) did not

take accountability for her part in causing the child’s trauma; and

(3) had failed to properly address her own mental health issues.

The court also found that mother could not adequately provide for

the child because she lacked insight into the child’s condition and

special needs. The record supports the court’s findings.

¶ 36 The family time supervisor opined that mother did not “fully

understand the depth of what [the child’s] needs [were] and what he

require[d].” She also testified that mother could not care for the

child’s mental and emotional needs, nor would she likely be able to

do so at any point in the future. The supervisor explained that

mother had not learned any techniques to cope with the child’s

dysregulation and that her only response was to avoid spending

time with him. She testified that the child needed a stable home

more than anything and that she had no confidence that mother

would be able to provide such stability within a reasonable time.

14
¶ 37 The child’s therapist agreed that mother did not fully

understand the child’s condition and needs. She also said that

mother never asked her about the child’s dysregulation to better

understand his needs and that if the child were returned to mother,

he would “continue to have significant behavioral and emotional”

issues and be “in [a] constant [state of] dysregulation.” She opined

that no amount of additional time would alleviate these issues

because the child did not “have any more time to give.”

¶ 38 Another of the child’s therapists testified that returning the

child to mother would not be in his best interests because he had

“pretty high needs” that mother could not address. She also noted

that, because mother caused the child’s initial trauma, he would

continue to have “red flags” around her. This therapist agreed with

the other therapist’s opinion that no additional time would resolve

the issues in this case. In reaching this opinion, she pointed to the

length of time the child had been out of the home, his young age,

the history of abuse and neglect, and his continued dysregulation.

¶ 39 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred because the

record established that she had addressed all the issues that

precipitated the filing of the case by completing substance abuse

15
treatment and maintaining sobriety, as well as having housing and

employment. She contends that the court applied an “unrealistic

standard of parental fitness” by considering information beyond the

original reasons for the Department’s involvement. We disagree.

¶ 40 The Department’s initial report filed at the outset of the case

did cite concerns about mother’s substance abuse and impending

eviction. But it also alleged other concerns regarding mother’s

inability to provide proper care for the child, including physical

abuse, verbal abuse, and lack of supervision. Consistent with the

breadth of these concerns, mother’s treatment plan required not

only that she refrain from drugs and alcohol and maintain stable

housing and employment, but also that she actively engage in

family time and mental health counseling. And although the

juvenile court recognized that mother had made significant progress

with respect to sobriety, housing, and employment, it determined,

with record support, that she had not successfully addressed the

family time and mental health components of her treatment plan.

¶ 41 In particular, the court found that mother (1) did not

adequately engage in family time; (2) had not developed any

relationship with the child; (3) had not taken responsibility for

16
causing the child’s trauma; and (4) was not capable of properly

caring for her own mental health needs. See D.P., 160 P.3d at 353-

54 (affirming finding that parents were unfit where there had been

“‘just minimal’ improvement in their parenting skills” and they had

a limited ability to recognize and meet the child’s needs). In other

words, although mother may have addressed some of the concerns

underlying the case, she had been unsuccessful in addressing

others, and she remained unable to properly care for the child.

¶ 42 We are not convinced otherwise by mother’s assertion that the

evidence established that she was “willing” to provide reasonable

parental care by “engaging in therapeutic work” with the child. The

juvenile court explicitly (and correctly) recognized that the matter at

issue was not whether mother was willing to provide the child with

reasonable parental care, but whether she was able to do so. See

§ 19-3-604(2) (defining an unfit parent as one who is “unable or

unwilling” to provide reasonable parental care) (emphasis added).

In doing so, the juvenile court applied the correct legal standard.

¶ 43 Finally, mother’s reliance on S.R.N.J-S. is misplaced. In that

case, a division of this court concluded that the record did not

support the juvenile court’s finding that the parents were unfit.

17
S.R.N.J-S., ¶¶ 30, 57. But in that case, the caseworker testified that

the parents had successfully complied with their treatment plans,

could provide reasonable parental care, and were fit parents. Id. at

¶¶ 19, 31. The division determined that, because the evidence did

not support a finding that the parents were unfit, “the need for

permanency alone” could not justify termination. Id. at ¶ 60.

¶ 44 In contrast, as described above, the expert witnesses in this

case opined that mother was unfit and could not become fit in a

reasonable time because she could not provide for the child’s

special needs. The evidence also establishes that, even though

mother had complied with parts of her treatment plan, her partial

compliance did not render her a fit parent. Thus, unlike in

S.R.N.J-S., the record supports the juvenile court’s findings that

mother was unfit and unlikely to become fit in a reasonable time.

And because the court properly found that mother was unfit and

unlikely to become fit in a reasonable time, it could consider the

child’s need for stability and permanency in determining whether

termination was in the child’s best interests. We discern no error.

IV. Disposition

¶ 45 The judgment is affirmed.

18
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.

19