Peo in Interest of JM

24CA1267 Peo in Interest of JM 02-20-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1267
El Paso County District Court No. 22JV30243
Honorable Lin Billings Vela, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of J.M., a Child,

and Concerning K.M.,

Appellant.

JUDGEMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE
Lipinsky and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 20, 2025

Kenneth Hodges, County Attorney, Shannon Boydstun, Assistant County
Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, K.M. (mother)

appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal

relationship with J.M. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Mother gave birth to the child in August 2022. Days later, the

El Paso County Department of Human Services (Department) filed a

petition in dependency and neglect, alleging that mother, who had a

traumatic brain injury and history of mental illness, failed to

provide proper care to the newborn child while at the hospital.

Mother left the hospital before the child was discharged, and the

Department subsequently lost contact with her. The Department

assumed temporary legal custody of the child and placed him in

foster care.

¶3 The juvenile court entered a default judgment against mother

and adjudicated the child dependent and neglected based on

parental abandonment. The court found that no reasonable

treatment plan could be adopted for mother due to her

abandonment of the child and because her whereabouts were

unknown.

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¶4 Later, the Department was able to contact mother twice while

she was in jail: once in January 2023, and once in November 2023.

Mother never followed up with the Department, attended any court

hearings, or visited the child.

¶5 The Department moved to terminate mother’s parental rights,

asserting that she abandoned the child. The court held a

termination hearing in May 2024, at which mother’s counsel

appeared but mother did not. After receiving testimony from the

caseworker, an expert in child welfare and protection, the court

terminated mother’s parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(a)(I),

C.R.S. 2024.

II. Discussion

¶6 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M.

v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. It is within the juvenile court’s

discretion to determine the credibility of the witnesses; the

sufficiency, probative value, and weight of the evidence; and the

inferences to be drawn from the evidence. See id. We review the

juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error and accept them if

they have record support, but we review de novo the juvenile court’s

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legal conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of

S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.

¶7 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding there

was no less drastic alternative to termination. She asserts there

were “possible” less drastic alternatives, such as an allocation of

parental responsibilities (APR) to a relative or the foster placement,

which would allow mother to “maintain family ties” with her child.

We discern no basis for reversal.

¶8 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights when the

parent has abandoned the child by (1) surrendering physical

custody of the child for six months or more and (2) showing no firm

intention to resume physical custody of the child or make

permanent legal arrangements for the child’s care.

§ 19-3-604(1)(a)(I). Unlike section 19-3-604(1)(c), section

19-3-604(1)(a)(I) does not require a juvenile court to consider and

eliminate less drastic alternatives when it terminates parental

rights. See People in Interest of A.M., ¶ 19 (noting that

consideration of less drastic alternatives is implicit in termination

criteria under section 19-3-604(1)(c)); People in Interest of L.M.,

2018 COA 57M, ¶ 24 (“When considering termination under section

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19-3-604(1)(c), the court must also consider and eliminate less

drastic alternatives to termination.”).

¶9 Even so, the juvenile court determined that no less drastic

alternative to termination existed. In doing so, the court found that

no maternal family members expressed interest in taking custody of

the child; that the child’s maternal grandparents, who were involved

in the case, supported adoption by the foster placement; and that

mother had no contact with the child for two years. The court also

found that this was an expedited permanency planning case and

that the child, who was then nearly two years old, was thriving and

having his needs met in his foster home.

¶ 10 The record supports these findings.

¶ 11 The court found the caseworker credibly testified that the

Department’s investigation into the possibility of a kin placement

did not reveal any maternal family members interested in becoming

a permanent placement for the child. The child’s maternal

grandparents — who were involved with the child and facilitated

contact between the child and his other maternal relatives —

supported the foster placement adopting him. Mother had no

contact with the child after leaving the hospital and told the

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caseworker that it was in the child’s best interests to stay in the

foster home. Further, at the time of the termination hearing, the

child was doing well and having his needs met in the foster home,

the only home he had ever known. The caseworker opined that

termination was in the child’s best interests because he needed

permanency.

¶ 12 We reject mother’s assertion that an APR would enable her to

“maintain family ties” with her child for three reasons.

¶ 13 First, mother had no contact with the child for nearly two

years, which was practically his entire lifetime. See People in

Interest of N.D.V., 224 P.3d 410, 421 (Colo. App. 2009) (considering

whether the child is bonded to the parent as a factor in assessing

less drastic alternatives).

¶ 14 Second, there was not a permanent placement option with a

relative available, let alone one that was in the child’s best interests.

See A.M., ¶ 27 (a less drastic alternative is not viable simply

because it is “adequate”; rather, it must be in the child’s best

interests).

¶ 15 Third, the court explicitly considered the child’s physical,

mental, and emotional needs, and his need for a stable and

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permanent home, particularly at his young age, when it concluded

that termination was in the child’s best interests. See

§ 19-3-604(3); People in Interest of Z.P., 167 P.3d 211, 214-15 (Colo.

App. 2007) (in considering less drastic alternatives, the court must

give primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs; permanent placement is not a

viable less drastic alternative if the child needs a stable, permanent

home that can only be assured by adoption); see also A.M., ¶ 32

(“[I]f a trial court considers a less drastic alternative . . . and finds

that termination is in the child’s best interests, it must reject the

alternative and order termination.”).

¶ 16 To the extent mother argues the Department failed to

sufficiently explore kin placements, we also reject that argument.

The Department must evaluate for possible placement a reasonable

number of people suggested to it by family members and other

interested people. See People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 532

(Colo. App. 2004). But it is “not responsible for ferreting out and

investigating relatives who have not been identified as placement

alternatives.” People in Interest of M.T., 121 P.3d 309, 314 (Colo.

App. 2005). Mother does not assert on appeal that she or other

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relatives suggested any kin placement options for the child. To the

contrary, the petition alleged mother did not want the child placed

with her parents and, as noted, the Department’s contacts with the

maternal extended family members did not yield anyone interested

in becoming a placement for the child.

¶ 17 To the extent mother asserts that the Department did not

provide her with reasonable accommodations under the Americans

with Disabilities Act of 1990 for her traumatic brain injury or other

conditions, she does not develop this argument on appeal. See

D.B-J., 89 P.3d at 531 (declining to address undeveloped argument

on appeal). Regardless, mother’s absence during the case

prevented the Department from determining what accommodations

she might need. See People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 21.

III. Disposition

¶ 18 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.

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