Peo in Interest of LQ

24CA0813 Peo in Interest of LQ 02-13-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0813
Weld County District Court No. 22JV12
Honorable Anita J. Crowther, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of L.Q., a Child,

and Concerning R.Q. and C.R.H.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
Harris and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 13, 2025

Bruce T. Barker, County Attorney, David S. Anderson, Assistant County
Attorney, Greeley, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant R.Q.

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant C.R.H.
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, R.Q. (father) and

C.R.H. (mother) appeal the judgment terminating their parent-child

legal relationships with L.Q. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In January 2022, the Weld County Department of Human

Services (the Department) filed a petition in dependency and neglect

concerning the then-newborn child. At the time of filing, the

Department did not know the identity of the child’s father. The

Department alleged concerns about mother’s substance use

because the child tested positive for benzodiazepines and

methadone at birth.

¶3 Initially, the juvenile court granted temporary legal custody to

mother’s stepfather, and the Department placed the child with him.

But a few weeks later, he informed the Department that he was no

longer able to care for the child, prompting the juvenile court to

grant temporary legal custody to the Department. The Department

then placed the child in foster care for approximately five months

before placing her with her paternal uncle and aunt.

¶4 When father was confirmed to be the child’s biological father

through genetic testing, the juvenile court adjudicated him as the

1
child’s legal father. Both parents agreed to deferred adjudications,

which required that they comply with court-approved treatment

plans. The court later revoked the deferred adjudications and

adjudicated the child dependent or neglected.

¶5 The Department then filed a motion to terminate the parents’

legal relationships with the child. Approximately two years after the

petition was filed, the juvenile court granted the termination motion

following a contested hearing.

II. Reasonable Efforts

¶6 Both parents contend that the juvenile court erred by finding

that the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate them

and reunify their family. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Preservation

¶7 Whether the Department satisfied its obligation to make

reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and law. People in

Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. Therefore, we review the

juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo its

legal determination that the Department made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate the parents. Id.

2
¶8 The guardian ad litem contends that the parents’ reasonable

efforts claims are unpreserved because they waited until the “eve of

termination” to raise them. And divisions of this court are split on

whether a parent must challenge a department’s reasonable efforts

prior to the termination hearing to preserve the issue for appellate

review. Compare People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 916

(Colo. App. 2011) (holding that a parent’s failure to object to

services does not bar appellate review of a reasonable efforts

finding), with People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 355-56 (Colo.

App. 2007) (declining to review a reasonable efforts finding because

the parent failed to object to services provided before the

termination hearing).

¶9 However, we need not determine whether the parents

preserved their reasonable efforts claims because even if we assume

that they did, we discern no basis for reversal.

B. Applicable Law

¶ 10 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not

3
been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct

or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 11 To determine whether a parent is unfit, the juvenile court

must consider whether the department of human services made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.

See §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024; S.N-V., 300 P.3d

at 911. “Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and

care” for children who are in out-of-home placement.

§ 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2024. Services provided in accordance with

section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2024, satisfy the reasonable efforts

standard. § 19-1-103(114).

¶ 12 Under section 19-3-208, a department must provide

screenings, assessments, and individual case plans for the

provision of services; home-based family and crisis counseling;

information about and referral services to available public and

private assistance resources; family time services; and placement

services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). And if funding is available, section

19-3-208 requires a department to provide services such as

transportation; diagnostic and mental health services; and drug

4
and alcohol treatment services. § 19-3-208(2)(d). However, services

must be provided only if they are determined to be necessary and

appropriate based on the individual case plan. § 19-3-208(2)(b), (d).

¶ 13 In determining whether a department made reasonable efforts,

a juvenile court should consider the totality of the circumstances

and account for all services and resources provided to a parent,

measuring them holistically rather than in isolation with respect to

specific treatment plan objectives. See People in Interest of

My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶¶ 33, 35.

¶ 14 A parent is ultimately responsible for using the services to

obtain the assistance needed to comply with their treatment plan.

People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011).

When a parent voluntarily chooses not to participate in a

proceeding and cannot be located, a department need not persist

with futile efforts. See People in Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210,

¶ 12.

C. Analysis

¶ 15 In evaluating whether the Department made reasonable efforts

to rehabilitate the parents, the juvenile court found that throughout

the case, the parents were “in and out of [the] custody of multiple

5
county jails,” which made it difficult for the Department to stay in

contact with them, particularly when they were out of custody.

Despite these challenges, the court found that the caseworker tried

to contact the parents through various means, including text

messages, phone calls, emails, and letters. The court found that

the caseworker was able to make some referrals when she was able

to contact the parents. And the court found that the caseworker

attempted to set up family time by communicating with the various

jails and facilities when the parents were in custody and by making

referrals when they were out of custody. Ultimately, the court

concluded that the Department made “reasonable efforts as it was

appropriate in this case,” but that those efforts were not successful

in rehabilitating the parents.

¶ 16 The record supports these findings. The caseworker testified

that when father was not in custody, he did not communicate with

her, despite her attempts to reach out to him in various ways.

Similarly, there were times when mother was out of custody, and

the caseworker could not get ahold of her and did not know where

she was. The caseworker was unable to submit referrals for

6
services when she did not know where the parents were or when

they were not in communication with her.

¶ 17 Still, the caseworker referred both parents for integrated

evaluations and sobriety monitoring. Father did not complete his

evaluation until about a month before the termination hearing. By

the time of the hearing, the caseworker was still waiting to receive

the evaluation recommendations, which would have helped her

determine whether father needed additional service referrals. And

although mother completed her evaluation about a year after the

case was filed, she attended only one of the recommended therapy

sessions afterward.

¶ 18 The caseworker also testified that at the beginning of the case,

father did not communicate with her, so she could not make any

family time referrals. Then, when father was in the Adams County

jail, she reached out to see whether she could arrange family time,

but father did not have visitation privileges. Once father became

eligible for visits, the caseworker attempted to schedule them, but

the jail’s billing system caused delays. When father was released to

a halfway house, the caseworker contacted the halfway house to set

up family time, but father was not initially allowed to have visits.

7
The caseworker followed up every month, and when father was

allowed to have visits, she worked on setting up family time that

would be supervised by the paternal uncle. When the paternal

uncle decided he was unwilling to supervise, the caseworker made a

referral for supervised family time, and father had a visit with the

child before the termination hearing.

¶ 19 For mother, when she was initially in custody, the caseworker

contacted the jail to see whether she could set up family time and

submitted the paperwork to do so. Shortly after that, mother was

transferred to a different facility, which required the caseworker to

restart the paperwork, leading to some delays. When mother was

not in custody, the caseworker made four different referrals for

supervised family time, but mother was discharged from the family

time providers due to her lack of engagement. By the time of the

termination hearing, the caseworker had set up weekly virtual

family time for mother at the Boulder County jail.

¶ 20 We disagree with father’s argument that the Department failed

to make reasonable efforts because the caseworker did not make

referrals for services or family time while he was in custody. The

caseworker testified that she did not make any service referrals

8
while father was in jail because the jail did not allow service

providers to go into the facility. And as noted above, the caseworker

reached out to the jail to try to arrange family time, but she was

informed that father did not have visitation privileges. Moreover,

the court properly considered the efforts made throughout the

case — when father was both in and out of custody — in evaluating

whether the Department met its reasonable efforts obligation. See

My.K.M., ¶¶ 33, 35 (stating that a juvenile court’s determination of

whether a department made reasonable efforts must be based on

the totality of the circumstances).

¶ 21 We also reject mother’s argument that the Department failed

to make reasonable efforts because the caseworker did not have

monthly, in-person meetings with her while she was in custody, as

required under the Social Service Rules (Volume 7). See Dep’t of

Hum. Servs. Reg. 7.204(B)(1), 12 Code Colo. Regs. 2509-3.

Although we acknowledge that the Department is expected to follow

its own regulations, we note that nothing in section 19-3-208

requires a specific number of outreach efforts or contacts with a

parent each month to satisfy the Department’s reasonable efforts

obligation. And the juvenile court’s determination of whether the

9
Department made reasonable efforts must be guided by the

Children’s Code, rather than Volume 7. See §§ 19-1-103(114),

19-3-208. We do not suggest that the Department has no

obligation to conduct outreach or contact a parent to ensure that

the parent receives appropriate services and support. But here, the

caseworker testified that she had several in-person meetings with

mother throughout the case, and that she reached out to mother

via phone, text message, and letters on numerous other occasions.

Thus, we are not persuaded that the caseworker’s failure to conduct

monthly, in-person meetings with mother constituted a lack of

reasonable efforts.

¶ 22 Mother also asserts that the caseworker failed to verify her

participation in therapy and other services at the Boulder County

jail. But she does not provide any legal authority stating that a

caseworker must verify a parent’s engagement in services while in

jail to meet the Department’s reasonable efforts obligation. And

here, such verification would not have made a difference because no

one claimed that mother was not engaged in therapy and other

services at the Boulder County jail by the time of the termination

10
hearing. In fact, the caseworker testified that mother told her she

was engaged in therapy and other services through the jail.

¶ 23 We also reject mother’s argument that the Department failed

to meet its reasonable efforts obligation by not providing her with

family time, housing assistance, or transportation. First, as noted

above, when mother was in custody, the caseworker attempted to

set up family time by working with the various facilities where

mother was located. And when mother was released from custody,

the caseworker made several referrals for supervised family time.

Second, when mother was out of custody, the caseworker offered to

submit a request for funds to help her obtain housing, but mother

never provided the required documentation requested by the

caseworker. Third, it is true that the caseworker admitted that she

was aware of mother’s transportation issues in January and

February 2023 because mother missed some family time sessions

due to a lack of transportation. At that time, the caseworker talked

to mother about obtaining a driver’s license. But by March 2023,

the caseworker did not know mother’s whereabouts, making it

impossible for her to determine whether mother still needed

transportation assistance. Then, in April 2023, mother resumed

11
communication with the caseworker and attended eight of ten

family time sessions without having transportation problems. And

nothing in the record indicates that mother continued to need

transportation assistance thereafter. See § 19-3-208(2)(d)

(transportation is only required if it is determined to be necessary

and appropriate).

¶ 24 Based on all of this, we do not perceive any error in the

juvenile court’s determination that the Department made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parents.

III. Fit Within a Reasonable Time

¶ 25 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by determining

that he could not become fit within a reasonable time. We are not

persuaded.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 26 A parent is unfit if they are unable or unwilling to give a child

reasonable parental care. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA

133, ¶ 23. “Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that

the parent provide nurturing and protection adequate to meet the

child’s physical, emotional, and mental health needs.” People in

Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 9.

12
¶ 27 A parent must have a reasonable amount of time to work on a

treatment plan before the juvenile court terminates their parental

rights. People in Interest of D.Y., 176 P.3d 874, 876 (Colo. App.

2007). The determination of a reasonable period is necessarily fact

specific, and what constitutes a reasonable time to comply with a

treatment plan may vary from case to case. Id. But a reasonable

time is not an indefinite time, and it must be determined by

considering the physical, mental, and emotional conditions and

needs of the child. S.Z.S., ¶ 24. Periods as short as five to nine

months have been held to be sufficient to comply with a treatment

plan. People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App.

2006).

¶ 28 When, as in this case, a child is under six years old at the time

the petition in dependency and neglect is filed, the juvenile court

must consider the expedited permanency planning (EPP) provisions,

which require that such children be placed in a permanent home as

expeditiously as possible. §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123,

19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2024; see also S.Z.S., ¶-25.

¶ 29 We review the court’s factual findings related to the

termination of parental rights for clear error, but we review de novo

13
the court’s legal conclusions based on those facts. S.R.N.J-S., ¶ 10.

Further, the credibility of the witnesses, the sufficiency, probative

effect, and weight of the evidence, and the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn from the evidence are within the province

of the juvenile court. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244,

249-50 (Colo. 2010).

B. Analysis

¶ 30 Father contends that he was likely to become fit within a

reasonable amount of time because, by the date of the termination

hearing, he was sober, employed, and in substantial compliance

with his treatment plan. But even though the caseworker testified

that father was sober, employed, and had “made significant

progress in this treatment plan,” the juvenile court still found that

father was unable to meet the child’s needs and that his condition

was unlikely to change within a reasonable amount of time.

Specifically, the court noted that this EPP case had been open for

approximately two years, which constituted the majority of the

child’s life. The court then found that the child needed permanency

and that it remained “unclear on how much longer” it would take

father to become fit.

14
¶ 31 These findings are supported by the record. By the time of the

termination hearing, the child had been out of the home for her

entire life. The caseworker testified that although father was doing

well in the halfway house, the child could not live with him there,

and father was unsure of when he would be released. The

caseworker testified that there were still “many things that would

have to happen” before returning the child to father would be an

option. Specifically, she stated that father would need to maintain

stable employment, secure housing that was safe for the child, and

demonstrate ongoing sobriety, as he had never completed any

sobriety testing when not “under the threat of incarceration for not

doing so.” Although the caseworker could not estimate the amount

of time it would take for father to become fit, she did not believe

that, considering the child’s needs, it would be a reasonable

amount of time.

¶ 32 In sum, the juvenile court concluded that father could not

become fit within a reasonable time. The court made this

determination after considering the evidence showing father’s

partial compliance with his treatment plan and weighing it against

the contrary evidence and the child’s needs. Because the record

15
supports the court’s findings, we will not disturb the judgment. See

People in Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA 56, ¶ 62 (we do not reweigh

the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile

court).

IV. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 33 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

termination was in the child’s best interests when there was a less

drastic alternative available in the form of an allocation of parental

responsibilities (APR) to the child’s paternal uncle and aunt. We

discern no error.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 34 The consideration and elimination of less drastic alternatives

are implicit in the statutory criteria for termination. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 40. In considering less

drastic alternatives, a juvenile court must give primary

consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs. People in Interest of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M,

¶ 29. A juvenile court may also consider other factors, including

whether an ongoing relationship with a parent would be beneficial

to the child, which is influenced by a parent’s fitness to care for the

16
child’s needs. People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 38.

And a juvenile court may consider whether the placement provider

favors adoption over an APR. Z.M., ¶ 31.

¶ 35 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than

“adequately” meet a child’s needs; rather, the less drastic

alternative must be the “best” option for the child. A.M., ¶ 27.

Long-term or permanent placement with a family member or foster

family, short of termination, may not be a viable less drastic

alternative if it does not provide adequate permanence that

adoption would provide or otherwise meet a child’s needs. A.R.,

¶ 41. If a juvenile court considers a less drastic alternative but

finds instead that termination is in the child’s best interests, it

must reject the less drastic alternative and order termination. A.M.,

¶ 32.

¶ 36 “We review a juvenile court’s less drastic alternatives findings

for clear error.” People in Interest of E.W., 2022 COA 12, ¶ 34.

Accordingly, when a juvenile court considers a less drastic

alternative but instead finds that termination is in the child’s best

interests, we are bound to affirm the court’s decision so long as the

17
record supports its findings. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39,

¶ 80.

B. Analysis

¶ 37 We disagree with mother’s argument that the juvenile court

“gave virtually no consideration to less drastic alternatives” and

“overlooked” the question of whether a less drastic alternative

existed. It is true, as mother points out, that the county attorney

asked the court whether it had addressed less drastic alternatives

after the court delivered its oral ruling. But contrary to mother’s

assertion, the court had addressed the issue in its ruling,

specifically finding that there was “no alternative short of

terminating the parent-child relationship that [would have]

adequately serve[d] the best interest[s] of the child.” And the record

supports this finding.

¶ 38 The caseworker opined that an APR was not in the child’s best

interests because the child needed consistency, and no APR order

could ensure the parents would maintain consistent

communication or stay out of jail. Thus, we disagree with mother’s

assertion that there was nothing in the record to indicate that an

APR would create instability or be against the child’s best interests.

18
¶ 39 Further, the caseworker testified that she discussed various

permanency options with the paternal uncle and aunt, who

preferred termination and eventual adoption over an APR. Contrary

to mother’s argument, the fact that the paternal uncle and aunt

likely would not have relinquished custody if an APR had been

entered did not, on its own, require the court to find that an APR

was a viable less drastic alternative. Rather, in assessing whether

an APR was viable, the court properly considered other factors,

such as the child’s need for consistency and permanency, in

conjunction with the paternal uncle and aunt’s preference for

adoption. See Z.M., ¶ 29 (in considering less drastic alternatives, a

juvenile court must give primary consideration to the child’s

physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs).

¶ 40 Accordingly, we hold that the juvenile court did not err by

finding that termination, rather than an APR, was in the child’s best

interests. See B.H., ¶ 80.

V. Disposition

¶ 41 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE KUHN concur.

19