In re Marriage of Wiggs

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
January 30, 2025

2025COA10

No. 23CA1561, In re Marriage of Wiggs — Family Law —
Dissolution — Permanent Protection Order; Appeals — Final
Appealable Order — Separate and Independent Relief

A division of the court of appeals holds that a permanent

protection order issued in an ongoing dissolution of marriage case

constitutes a final, appealable order. The division concludes that a

motion for a protection order effectively commences a discrete

action for separate and independent relief. Because a permanent

protection order finally disposes of those proceedings, it is final and

appealable, even if the dissolution proceeding remains pending.

Reviewing the permanent protection order on the merits, the

division concludes that the evidence was sufficient to support it.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2025COA10

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1561
Arapahoe County District Court No. 23DR30847
Honorable Cajardo Lindsey, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Jennifer Lee Wiggs,

Appellee,

and

Kyle William Wiggs,

Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE SCHOCK
Fox and Johnson, JJ., concur

Announced January 30, 2025

Anne Whalen Gill, L.L.C., Anne Whalen Gill, Castle Rock, Colorado, for
Appellee

Griffiths Law PC, Suzanne Griffiths, Christopher J. Griffiths, Kimberly A.
Newton, Lone Tree, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 Kyle William Wiggs (husband) appeals the permanent

protection order (PPO) entered in the dissolution of marriage

proceeding between him and Jennifer Lee Wiggs (wife). Before

addressing the merits of husband’s appeal, we must first determine

for the first time in a published Colorado opinion whether a PPO

issued before permanent orders in an ongoing dissolution

proceeding is a final, appealable order. Given the separate and

independent nature of the PPO proceedings, we hold that it is. We

therefore address the merits of husband’s appeal and affirm.

I. Background

¶2 One month after filing a petition to dissolve the parties’

marriage, wife filed a motion for a protection order against husband

in the dissolution proceeding, alleging domestic abuse and stalking.

She alleged that husband had grabbed her and their youngest child

during an incident three months earlier and that he had continued

to access the marital home’s camera system after moving out of the

home. She also alleged prior instances of physical confrontations.

¶3 The district court granted a temporary protection order and

set the case for a PPO hearing. At the beginning of that hearing,

the court asked if the parties would agree to continue the temporary

1
protection order for up to twelve months. See § 13-14-106(1)(b),

C.R.S. 2024. They did not agree, so the hearing went forward.

¶4 After the hearing, at which husband and wife both testified,

the district court entered the PPO against husband, with wife as the

protected person. The court did not find either party credible. But

it found by a preponderance of the evidence that husband had

committed domestic abuse by physically harassing wife on two

occasions: (1) in August 2022, by throwing her against a wall (and

then lying to police about what happened); and (2) in April 2023, by

grabbing her on the arm and leaving a bruise. The court also found

that, “unless restrained, husband will continue to commit such acts

or acts designed to intimidate or retaliate against wife.”

¶5 The PPO required husband to stay at least one hundred yards

away from wife, her workplace, and the marital home where wife

was living. It permitted each party to attend their children’s events

only during the party’s own parenting time and required the parties

to communicate exclusively through the Talking Parents online

application. The PPO did not restrain husband as to the children or

include any orders concerning parenting time or decision-making.

2
II. Wife’s Motion to Dismiss

¶6 Wife moved to dismiss this appeal for lack of a final,

appealable order. She asserts that a PPO issued in a dissolution of

marriage proceeding is not a final judgment for purposes of appeal

until the dissolution action has been finally resolved through

permanent orders. We disagree as to the PPO issued in this case.1

A. Finality

¶7 As a general matter, our jurisdiction is limited to the review of

final judgments. L.H.M. Corp., TCD v. Martinez, 2021 CO 78, ¶ 14;

see also § 13-4-102(1), C.R.S. 2024; C.A.R. 1(a)(1). A judgment is

final if it “ends the particular action in which it is entered, leaving

nothing further for the court pronouncing it to do in order to

completely determine the rights of the parties involved in the

proceeding.” Schaden v. DIA Brewing Co., 2021 CO 4M, ¶ 46

(citation omitted). Ordinarily, that means “an entire case must be

1 We do not consider PPOs that include the parties’ children as

protected persons or that address parenting time or decision-
making responsibility. See § 14-10-129(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2024 (“[T]he
court may make or modify an order granting or denying parenting
time rights whenever such order or modification would serve the
best interests of the child.”); § 14-10-131, C.R.S. 2024 (outlining
procedures for modification of decision-making responsibility).

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decided before any ruling in that case may be appealed.” In re

Marriage of Farr, 228 P.3d 267, 268 (Colo. App. 2010).

¶8 But while our subject matter jurisdiction is governed by

statute, finality is determined by case law. Chavez v. Chavez, 2020

COA 70, ¶ 21. And in determining whether an order is final, we

must look to the legal effect of the order and not merely its form.

Luster v. Brinkman, 250 P.3d 664, 666 (Colo. App. 2010). Thus, an

order is final for purposes of appeal when it “finally disposes of the

particular action and prevents further proceedings as effectually as

would any formal judgment.” Id. (citation omitted).

¶9 In dissolution proceedings, an order generally is not final and

appealable until the district court has issued permanent orders

resolving all outstanding issues between the parties, including

parental responsibilities, child support, maintenance, disposition of

property, and attorney fees. In re Marriage of Hill, 166 P.3d 269,

272 (Colo. App. 2007); see also Est. of Burford v. Burford, 935 P.2d

943, 955 (Colo. 1997) (holding that a dissolution decree entered

before permanent orders is not final for purposes of appellate review

absent a proper C.R.C.P. 54(b) certification). That is because such

4
issues are “inextricably intertwined” and “part and parcel of

dissolving the marriage.” Hill, 166 P.3d at 272 (citation omitted).

¶ 10 There are, however, some established exceptions to the rule

that a final order must dispose of the entire litigation. For example,

temporary orders that establish the parties’ “financial rights and

obligations” pending permanent orders — including temporary

orders for maintenance, child support, and attorney fees — “are

reviewable as final judgments even if there has not been a final

judgment in the form of a decree of dissolution or entry of

permanent orders.” In re Marriage of Mockelmann, 944 P.2d 670,

671 (Colo. App. 1997). Though issued in an ongoing proceeding,

such orders are immediately appealable because they involve

“separate and independent relief.” Id. at 672 (citation omitted).

¶ 11 In other distinctive scenarios outside the dissolution context,

certain orders have been deemed to be final and appealable when

they terminate a discrete proceeding embedded within another. See

Scott v. Scott, 136 P.3d 892, 894 (Colo. 2006); In re Estate of

Gadash, 2017 COA 54, ¶¶ 14, 36 (holding that probate court’s

order resolving discrete petition was final); Luster, 250 P.3d at 667

(holding that a postjudgment collection order is final if it “end[s] the

5
particular part of the action in which it is entered”) (emphasis

added); People v. Proffitt, 865 P.2d 929, 931 (Colo. App. 1993)

(holding that order denying motion for contempt was final).

B. Permanent Protection Orders in Dissolution Proceedings

¶ 12 The Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act (UDMA) authorizes a

district court to issue a temporary or permanent protection order

under sections 13-14-100.2 to -111, C.R.S. 2024. § 14-10-108(3),

C.R.S. 2024. A party to a dissolution of marriage proceeding may

seek such an order by filing a motion and accompanying affidavit in

the dissolution proceeding. § 13-14-104.5(5), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 13 The issuance of a protection order is governed not by the

UDMA but by the statutory procedures governing civil protection

orders more generally. At the time of the district court proceedings

in this case, a temporary protection order could be issued upon a

finding that “an imminent danger exists to the person or persons

seeking protection.” § 13-14-104.5(7)(a), C.R.S. 2024 (version

effective until Jan. 1, 2025).2 In a dissolution proceeding, the court

2 The statute has since been amended to replace the finding of

“imminent danger” with a finding of “a risk or threat of physical
harm or the threat of psychological or emotional harm.” Ch. 330,
sec. 4, § 13-14-104.5(7)(a), 2024 Colo. Sess. Laws 2232.

6
may continue a temporary protection order until the final decree

and permanent orders if the parties agree. § 13-14-106(1)(c).

Otherwise, the court must hold a hearing and issue a PPO if it

“finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent has

committed acts constituting grounds for the issuance of a civil

protection order and that unless restrained the respondent will

continue to commit the acts or acts designed to intimidate or

retaliate against the protected person.” § 13-14-106(1)(a).

¶ 14 Once a PPO has been issued, the protected party may move to

modify or dismiss it at any time, but the restrained party may not

do so for two years. § 13-14-108(2), C.R.S. 2024.

C. Finality of the PPO

¶ 15 A PPO issued in a separate and independent action is a final

and appealable order because it represents the court’s “final ruling

regarding the plaintiff’s entitlement to a civil protection order.”

Martin v. Arapahoe Cnty. Ct., 2016 COA 154, ¶¶ 22-23. The

question we must answer is whether the result is different when the

PPO is instead issued in an ongoing dissolution proceeding.

¶ 16 We conclude that it is not. As with a PPO in a separate action,

the legal effect of the PPO in this case was to finally dispose of the

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protection order proceedings and “leave nothing further for the

court . . . to do in order to completely determine the rights of the

parties” as to the protection order. Luster, 250 P.3d at 666.

¶ 17 Even when filed within a dissolution of marriage proceeding, a

motion for a protection order effectively commences a discrete

action for “separate and independent relief.” Mockelmann, 944 P.2d

at 672 (citation omitted). The protection order proceedings are

initiated by a separate filing, governed by a separate statutory

scheme, and concern a different subject matter. Cf. Gadash, ¶¶ 29-

30 (holding that petition initiated discrete proceeding where it was

filed separately, raised distinct claims, and “neither overlapped nor

involved the same subject matter”). Indeed, a party may choose to

seek such relief by filing a separate action. § 13-14-104.5(1), (3).

¶ 18 Thus, unlike orders concerning parental responsibilities, child

support, maintenance, and the disposition of property, the

protection order issues are not “part and parcel of dissolving the

marriage.” Hill, 166 P.3d at 272. To the contrary, they solely

concern the safety of the protected person. See § 13-14-100.2(1).

¶ 19 Moreover, unlike other orders issued during the pendency of a

dissolution proceeding, the default assumption is that the PPO will

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not be revisited in the permanent orders. Although the district

court retains jurisdiction to modify or dismiss the PPO, and wife

may request modification at any time, husband may not move to

modify or dismiss the PPO for two years. See § 13-14-108(2). Nor

is the PPO one of the issues the district court must consider in

connection with the entry of the decree of dissolution. See § 14-10-

106(1)(b), C.R.S. 2024. Even if the court could modify portions of

the PPO that are inconsistent with the permanent orders — for

example, if it awards husband the marital home he is excluded

from — the core of the PPO (i.e., the restraints on husband for the

protection of wife) generally will be unaffected by the entry of

permanent orders. Cf. Hill, 166 P.3d at 271 (noting that an

outstanding issue “does not prevent finality when its resolution will

not change or moot the determinations contained in the order”).

¶ 20 In contrast, temporary orders terminate when the final decree

is entered. § 14-10-108(5)(c); see also In re Marriage of Salby, 126

P.3d 291, 295 (Colo. App. 2005) (holding that temporary orders may

not be appealed after permanent orders are entered). And

temporary parenting time orders — which are not final and

appealable — may be modified at any time. See § 14-10-129(1)(a)(I),

9
C.R.S. 2024; In re Marriage of Fickling, 100 P.3d 571, 574 (Colo.

App. 2004) (holding that temporary parenting time orders do not

grant “parenting time rights” that “stay in effect until one party

establishes a change in circumstances”); In re Marriage of Adams,

778 P.2d 294, 295 (Colo. App. 1989) (“An order awarding temporary

custody is not an order that may be appealed to this court.”).

¶ 21 In short, like temporary financial orders, a PPO has an

immediate and substantial effect on the rights and obligations of

the parties. See Mockelmann, 944 P.2d at 671-72. But unlike

temporary financial orders, those rights and obligations will often

remain in effect beyond the permanent orders. We see no reason

why a permanent protection order should not be deemed final when

it is less subject to modification than the temporary financial orders

that are. Cf. In re Marriage of Henne, 620 P.2d 62, 64 (Colo. App.

1980) (holding that an “order prohibiting the mother from leaving

this jurisdiction is . . . subject to review because, until the order is

modified . . . it finally resolves the mother’s rights relative thereto”).

¶ 22 Finally, we highlight one other point that we allude to above.

Although wife chose to file her motion for a protection order in the

dissolution proceeding, a petitioner may seek a protection order by

10
filing a complaint in any county where venue is proper. See § 13-

14-104.5(3). When the petitioner chooses the latter path, there is

no question that the PPO is final and appealable. Martin, ¶ 23. If

we were to conclude that the PPO in this case is not final and

appealable, the restrained party’s ability to appeal would turn

entirely on the forum in which the petitioner chooses to seek relief,

even though the order’s effect on the parties would be the same.

¶ 23 Wife contends that the solution to all these concerns is

certification of the PPO as a final judgment under C.R.C.P. 54(b).

And it is true that “[w]hen confronted with circumstances where the

jurisdiction of the court of appeals is uncertain, [the supreme court

has] generally required Rule 54(b) certification.” Scott, 136 P.3d at

898. But for two reasons, we do not think such certification is

required. First, a PPO in a dissolution proceeding is not a neat fit

for Rule 54(b). As we have explained, a motion for a protection

order is not merely one of several dissolution-related “claims for

relief” but rather the trigger for a separate and independent

statutory process and remedy. Second, for many of the same

reasons, if a PPO were treated as “one claim for relief” for purposes

of Rule 54(b), it would by its nature almost inevitably warrant

11
certification in every case. See Wolf v. Brenneman, 2024 CO 31,

¶ 16 (listing requirements of a certification order). Given the finality

of other separate and independent relief in dissolution proceedings,

see Mockelmann, 944 P.2d at 672, requiring Rule 54(b) certification

of a PPO would place form over function, contrary to our obligation

to look to the “legal effect of the order,” Luster, 250 P.3d at 666.

¶ 24 Thus, the PPO issued in this case is a final and appealable

order, notwithstanding the pendency of the dissolution proceeding.

We therefore deny wife’s motion to dismiss the appeal. We likewise

deny wife’s request for attorney fees in connection with the motion

and “ancillary litigation” under section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2024.

III. Permanent Protection Order

¶ 25 Turning to the merits of husband’s appeal, husband contends

that the evidence was insufficient to support the district court’s

findings that (1) he committed acts of domestic abuse; and

(2) unless restrained, he will continue to commit such acts or acts

designed to intimidate or retaliate against wife. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 26 As noted above, to enter a PPO, a district court must find two

elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the respondent

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has committed acts constituting grounds for the issuance of a civil

protection order; and (2) unless restrained, the respondent will

continue to commit those acts or other acts designed to intimidate

or retaliate against the protected person. § 13-14-106(1)(a).

¶ 27 One ground for issuing a civil protection order is “[t]o prevent

domestic abuse.” § 13-14-104.5(1)(a)(II). “Domestic abuse,” at the

time of the district court proceedings, included “any act, attempted

act, or threatened act of violence, stalking, harassment, or coercion

that is committed . . . against another person . . . with whom the

actor is involved or has been involved in an intimate relationship.”

§ 13-14-101(2), C.R.S. 2024 (version effective until Jan. 1, 2025).3

Although the civil protection order statutes do not define

harassment, a person commits the crime of harassment if, “with

intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person, [the actor] . . .

[s]trikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise touches a person or subjects

[the person] to physical contact.” § 18-9-111(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024.

3 The definition of “[d]omestic abuse” has been amended to remove

the clause, “with whom the actor is involved or has been involved in
an intimate relationship.” Ch. 330, sec. 2, § 13-14-101(2), 2024
Colo. Sess. Laws 2230. That clause is now part of a new definition
of “[d]omestic violence.” § 13-14-101(2.1), C.R.S. 2024.

13
¶ 28 A PPO does not require a finding of imminent danger. In re

Marriage of Fiffe, 140 P.3d 160, 162 (Colo. App. 2005); see also

§ 13-14-106(1)(a). Nor must the prohibited acts be imminent. Fiffe,

140 P.3d at 162. Rather, the second element of a PPO is satisfied if

such acts are “reasonably likely to recur in the future.” Id.

¶ 29 In deciding whether to issue a PPO, it is the district court’s

prerogative to weigh the evidence and evaluate the parties’

credibility. Parocha v. Parocha, 2018 CO 41, ¶ 16. We will not

disturb the district court’s factual findings that grounds for a PPO

exist if those findings have record support. Fiffe, 140 P.3d at 163.

B. Domestic Abuse

¶ 30 The district court found that husband committed two acts of

domestic abuse by harassing wife through physical contact.

¶ 31 The first incident occurred in August 2022. The court found

that husband threw wife against a wall, “subject[ing] her to physical

contact with [the] wall” with the intent to harass her. The court

also found that when wife said she was calling 911, husband called

911 first and then lied to police about what had happened, falsely

claiming wife had punched him, which resulted in wife’s arrest.

14
¶ 32 The second incident occurred in April 2023 in the driveway of

the marital home. The court found that husband tried to grab the

parties’ infant child from wife multiple times, and at one point,

caused the parties to be “pinned to one another,” thus “interfering

with wife’s personal space.” The court also found that, “with intent

to harass and alarm wife, [husband] grabbed her on her arm leaving

a bruise.” Throughout the altercation, husband was making

disparaging comments about wife to her and the parties’ children.

¶ 33 These findings have ample record support. As to the August

2022 incident, wife testified that the parties were vacationing in Vail

with their children, and husband had been drinking heavily. She

explained that husband became “infuriated” after a verbal

altercation and “shoved [her] up against the wall.” He put his finger

in her face while calling her derogatory names and screaming that

her kids “don’t love [her].” As she yelled that she was going to call

911, husband called 911 and hung up. When 911 called back,

husband told police wife had punched him, and she was arrested.

¶ 34 The record also supports the court’s finding that husband lied

to police about the incident. The district court took judicial notice

of husband’s statement in wife’s criminal case that wife had

15
accidentally hit him when trying to swat his finger out of her face.

The court also admitted a report from the Colorado Department of

Human Services summarizing an interview with husband in which

he similarly said that wife had no intention of hitting him and had

only “swatted at his hand to get him out of her face.” Although

husband claimed otherwise at the PPO hearing, the court found

wife more credible as to this incident. It is the district court’s role,

not ours, to resolve such factual conflicts. See Parocha, ¶ 16.

¶ 35 The April 2023 incident was caught on video by the parties’

home security system, and the video was admitted into evidence.

That video supports the district court’s findings. It shows husband

following wife around the driveway and repeatedly approaching her

as she walks away with the parties’ child. At multiple points, the

video shows husband making physical contact with wife as he

attempts to grab the child. Wife also testified that husband

grabbed her arm and pulled her toward him, causing her injury.

And a responding police officer testified that wife had a bruise on

her arm, which he described as a “red mark . . . like a fingerprint.”

¶ 36 Husband contends that the physical contact was not

sufficiently persistent, repeated, or distressing to show an “intent to

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harass, annoy, or alarm” wife. § 18-9-111(1)(a). We disagree. Not

only did both incidents involve physical contact, but that physical

contact was combined with verbal insults and attacks — over the

course of several minutes in the case of the April 2023 incident.

¶ 37 Husband is also incorrect that the district court did not make

findings to this effect. As to the April 2023 incident, the court

found that husband grabbed wife “with intent to harass and alarm”

her. As to the August 2022 incident, the court found that husband

“committed harassment under [section] 18-9-111(1)(a) with intent

to harass wife.” Implicit in that finding is that, by his conduct,

husband intended to “annoy[], alarm[], or cause[] substantial

emotional distress” to wife. People v. Moreno, 2022 CO 15, ¶ 20

(citation omitted). The record supports those findings.

¶ 38 We likewise reject husband’s suggestion that Moreno

precluded the district court from finding domestic abuse based on

husband’s intent to harass wife. Moreno invalidated the phrase

“intended to harass” in section 18-9-111(1)(e) — which concerns

harassing communication — as an unconstitutionally overbroad

restriction on protected speech. Id. at ¶ 1. It has no application to

section 18-9-111(1)(a), which prohibits harassing physical contact.

17
See Moreno, ¶ 8 (noting that, by invalidating the phrase in question,

the court was “preserv[ing] the remainder of the statute”).

¶ 39 For similar reasons, the district court also did not err by

finding that the PPO involved an act of “domestic violence,” as

defined in section 18-6-800.3(1), C.R.S. 2024. Domestic violence

includes any crime against a person “when used as a method of

coercion, control, punishment, intimidation, or revenge directed

against a person with whom the actor is or has been involved in an

intimate relationship.” § 18-6-800.3(1).4 Given wife’s testimony

and husband’s demeanor and language in the April 2023 video,

there was ample record support for the finding that husband’s acts

of harassment were intended to coerce, control, or intimidate wife.

C. Continue to Commit Such Acts

¶ 40 The record is also sufficient to support the district court’s

finding that, unless restrained, husband is reasonably likely to

4 The civil protection order statutes were recently amended to

include a new definition of domestic violence. See § 13-14-101(2.1).
But that amendment was not yet in effect at the time of the district
court proceedings, and the PPO included a finding of “an act of
domestic violence, as defined in § 18-6-800.3(1),” C.R.S. 2024.

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commit further acts of domestic abuse or other acts designed to

intimidate or retaliate against wife. See Fiffe, 140 P.3d at 162-63.

¶ 41 As detailed above, the district court found that husband

committed domestic abuse against wife on two occasions within

eight months, and on the first occasion, lied to police to have wife

arrested.5 In addition, wife testified that after the August 2022

incident, husband had been “emboldened” and had repeatedly

threatened to call 911 on her again and “have [her] kids taken away

from her.” She testified that this was “terrifying.” Wife also testified

that after the temporary protection order was entered, husband

filed a police report falsely accusing her of breaking into his home.6

While this testimony did not concern physical harassment, it is

consistent with husband’s conduct during the other two incidents.

5 Although the district court focused on the specific alleged

instances of domestic abuse, wife also testified that husband had
been “very abusive” before the August 2022 incident.
6 Contrary to husband’s assertion, the district court did not reject

this testimony. Although the court did not find wife credible as a
general matter, it did not refer to this portion of her testimony. See
In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 21 (“[W]e presume that
the court considered all the evidence presented.”). The police officer
whom the court did find credible did not testify about this report.

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¶ 42 Moreover, wife testified about another incident after the

parties separated in which husband had been watching wife on the

marital home surveillance system and later sent her text messages

repeating a phrase she had used at the home — another incident

wife testified “terrified” her. Although the district court did not find

this incident sufficiently distressing to constitute stalking under

section 18-3-602(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024, it is nevertheless indicative of

husband’s continued conduct toward wife after their separation.

¶ 43 Husband asserts that there was no basis for concluding he

would harass wife again in the future because he had done so on

“just two occasions,” the parties were now separated, and the PPO

was not based on any act that occurred after the separation. But

none of these facts foreclose the district court’s finding. Certainly,

acts of domestic abuse may occur after separation.7 And although

the court focused on two specific instances of domestic abuse, the

evidence we describe above — concerning additional acts both

before and after the parties’ separation — provides further support

7 Needless to say (but we think it worth saying anyway), we reject

husband’s sweeping and unsupported assertion that the second
prong of a PPO will “almost universally fail” in dissolution cases
after the parties separate and are living in separate homes.

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for the finding that such acts are “reasonably likely to recur in the

future.” Fiffe, 140 P.3d at 162. So long as there is record support,

it is for the district court to make that determination. Id. at 163.

¶ 44 Finally, husband argues that the district court’s findings were

insufficient because it did not explain the basis for its conclusion.

But although it would have been preferable for the court to make

“more explicit findings as to why it was reasonable to believe that

these acts would recur in the future,” the district court’s findings

and the record as a whole are sufficient to sustain the PPO. See id.

IV. Husband’s Other Contentions

¶ 45 Husband also contends that the district court erred by failing

to admit “numerous pages of text messages” that would have

refuted wife’s allegations. But he does not identify those text

messages, much less explain why they were material to the court’s

decision — particularly when the court did not find wife credible

anyway. We therefore do not consider this undeveloped argument.

See Vallagio at Inverness Residential Condo. Ass’n v. Metro. Homes,

Inc., 2017 CO 69, ¶ 40. To the extent husband challenges the

district court’s decision to give “little to no weight” to the text

message exhibit that was admitted, the weight to be afforded

21
evidence is a matter within the sole discretion of the district court.

See In re Marriage of Lewis, 66 P.3d 204, 207 (Colo. App. 2003).

¶ 46 Husband’s final argument is that the district court abused its

discretion by limiting him to forty minutes to present his case

(which was the same amount of time given to wife). See Maloney v.

Brassfield, 251 P.3d 1097, 1102 (Colo. App. 2010) (reviewing time

limits for an abuse of discretion). But he did not object to the

adequacy of the time limitation — originally thirty minutes per

side — at the outset of the hearing. See id. And the only time his

counsel requested additional time, the court granted that request.

¶ 47 A party seeking additional time beyond previously imposed

time limits generally must make a “sufficiently detailed proffer”

identifying “the evidence that is in danger of being excluded.” Id. at

1103, 1105. Husband did not make any such proffer in the district

court. Even on appeal, he does not explain what evidence he was

unable to present. Nor does he address the other factors relevant to

our review of the adequacy of time limits. See id. at 1103. Thus,

22
we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by

allocating to both parties forty minutes to present their case.8

V. Disposition

¶ 48 The permanent protection order is affirmed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.

8 The district court’s decision not to count the playing of the video of

the April 2023 incident against either party’s time limit, where both
parties wanted to play different portions of it, was also well within
the court’s discretion. See Maloney v. Brassfield, 251 P.3d 1097,
1101 (Colo. App. 2010) (noting district court’s discretion over
conduct of trial); CRE 611(a) (“The court shall exercise reasonable
control over the mode and order of . . . presenting evidence.”).

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