Peo v Miyamoto

23CA1829 Peo v Miyamoto 10-15-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1829
Douglas County District Court No. 22CR785
Honorable Theresa Slade, Judge
Honorable Ryan J. Stuart, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Franklin Frederick Miyamoto,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division III
Opinion by JUDGE DUNN
Schutz and Martinez*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 15, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Patrick A. Withers, Assistant Solicitor
General and Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-
Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Claire Pakis, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2026.

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¶ 1 Based on evidence that defendant, Franklin Frederick
Miyamoto, strangled his ex-girlfriend, a jury convicted him of
second and third degree assault.
¶ 2 On appeal, Miyamoto contends that the trial court erred by
(1) failing to dismiss two jurors for cause, and (2) using the 2022
model reasonable doubt instruction. We affirm.
I. Challenges for Cause
¶ 3 Miyamoto first contends that the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied his challenges for cause to jurors S.D.
and L.L. We disagree.
A. Additional Background
¶ 4 At the start of voir dire, the trial court instructed the venire on
“some basic rules of law that apply in all criminal cases,” including
the presumption of innocence and the prosecution’s burden of
proof. The court then asked if any juror could not follow the rules
described. While one prospective juror said he could not, jurors
S.D. and L.L. raised no concerns.
¶ 5 During voir dire, defense counsel raised the presumption of
innocence and asked whether any jurors thought that Miyamoto

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“didn’t get to this point unless he’s a little bit guilty.” Juror S.D.
responded,
I’m not extremely familiar with the judicial
system. But I do know that we would not be in
this room if there wasn’t some sort of
underlying cause. I’m a college student, so I
understand that, you know, you get in trouble,
things happen. And you’re not just going to
be, like I said, in a room like this if there’s not
some sort of cause and effect.
Defense counsel then purported to paraphrase what another
prospective juror had said to ask his next question:
I want to look at him like he’s innocent – or
want to look at him through the lens of
innocent, but it sounds to me like there’s . . . a
part of you that’s like, man, I can’t do that.
We’re all here. There’s prosecutors, Judge,
defense attorneys, 65 other jurors here. Like,
you know, I’m thinking he’s a little bit guilty
until you prove to me he’s innocent. Do you
agree with that?
Defense counsel asked any prospective jurors who agreed with his
summary to raise their hands. S.D. raised his hand.
¶ 6 Defense counsel then acknowledged that “something
happened” but explained that “you must presume” the defendant is
innocent and asked S.D. whether he could “one hundred percent”
give Miyamoto that presumption of innocence. S.D. responded,

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It’s, like, black and white and we’re in that
gray area. When you ask a question of, like,
100 percent not at 1 percent prejudice, I think
that’s almost impossible just in regards to,
like, everyone has said here, like, we’re in this
room, we’re here, we’re talking about this thing
. . . . Yeah, like, we’re here. If that makes
sense.
¶ 7 Defense counsel then asked whether anyone else agreed or
disagreed. L.L. responded,
I guess, my bias is more in my assumption
that the prosecution in a criminal case has a
higher burden of proof. And so my bias
coming into any criminal case would be that
they wouldn’t be here unless there was
sufficient evidence. Not a bias towards the
defendant, just in my limited understanding of
legal proceedings.
Defense counsel asked L.L. what she would vote if she “had to vote
right now, guilty, or not guilty[?]” L.L. responded that she guessed
she would “lean towards guilty” based on her “bias towards the
[p]rosecution,” but added that she believed that she “can make fair
assessments based on evidence.”
¶ 8 At a bench conference, defense counsel challenged multiple
jurors for cause — including S.D. and L.L. — on the grounds that
they could not afford Miyamoto the presumption of innocence. The

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parties requested the court to clarify whether the challenged jurors
would follow the court’s instructions on the law.
¶ 9 The trial court agreed and then stated to the venire,
I have a question for everybody, a clarifying
question. On the last topic that [defense
counsel] was talking to you about . . . .
[O]n the – on the issue of innocent until proven
guilty, there was some discussion about, you
know, police maybe did some investigation
and . . . maybe this was a lot of work to get
here. Ultimately, the question that the jury is
going to be asked is whether or not the
[prosecution] has proven the charges that they
brought beyond a reasonable doubt. Right?
It is the responsibility of the People who bring
the charges to prove it. Whether or not they
have evidence, right, whether or not they have
witnesses that could be called, whether or not
those witnesses the jury finds credible or not is
a decision for the jury. Right?
So [defense counsel] asked, you know, as . . .
he sits there today, can you all presume
[Miyamoto] guilty – or not guilty, right? Or do
you presume him guilty? Are you a hundred
percent one way or the other? If I said, “Okay,
ladies and gentlemen, you’re done. Thank
you. And now you’ve heard everything that
you’re going to hear,” does anybody think the
[prosecution] has proven their case beyond a
reasonable doubt?
Is there anybody who says, yeah, they did? We
had this whole discussion; it lasted a couple of
hours. Right? Okay. Because there’s no

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evidence right now; is that fair? Does
everybody agree with that? Is there anybody
who disagrees with that?
And so our Constitution says that everybody is
presumed innocent. And the obligation lies on
the people who bring a charge, and in this
case, it’s the [prosecution]. So whoever’s
bringing the charge must prove it. And that’s
what the jury’s asked to do. Listen to the
evidence, listen to all of the evidence, and once
the evidence is complete and I give you the law
– because that’s the other piece you all don’t
have, right?
The [prosecution] could charge somebody with
theft – right? – and instead of proving theft,
they prove assault. No evidence of theft,
assault[s] not charged, not guilty. Right? You
don’t have any evidence of theft. Everybody –
that’s the way our system works. Right?
Anybody disagree with that? Anybody think,
that’s not – that’s not right. We heard
evidence of assault, he should be guilty of
assault. Anybody who’s like – everybody’s
back to – shoot, I shouldn’t have answered my
summons? No? All right. Okay.
¶ 10 Neither party asked for any additional questioning. After that,
defense counsel passed the panel. The court denied the pending
causal challenges, including the challenges to S.D. and L.L. The
court explained that during its comments to the venire it focused on
the challenged jurors, which included S.D. and L.L., and that while
it was “having that discussion,” the court specifically observed that

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L.L. “was smiling, laughing, and nodding in agreement” and S.D.
“was nodding.” The court explained that because of this, it did not
ask them any specific questions. S.D. and L.L. served on the jury.
B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 11 The United States and Colorado Constitutions guarantee a
defendant the right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury. See U.S.
Const. amends. V, VI, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, §§ 16, 25; People v.
Abu-Nantambu-El, 2019 CO 106, ¶ 14. To protect this right, the
trial court must sustain a challenge for cause when a prospective
juror has indicated “enmity or bias toward the defendant or the
state,” People v. Clemens, 2017 CO 89, ¶ 15 (quoting
§ 16-10-103(1)(j), C.R.S. 2026), or has manifested “a previously
formed or expressed opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of the
defendant,” Crim. P. 24(b)(1)(X).
¶ 12 A prospective juror who initially misunderstands the law
should not be removed for cause if, after explanation and
rehabilitative efforts, the court believes that the person can render a
fair and impartial verdict based on the instructions given by the
judge and the evidence presented at trial. Clemens, ¶ 16. Rather,
when a juror initially expresses such a belief, the trial court should

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explain the correct legal principles and then determine whether the
juror can fairly and impartially follow the law. Id. at ¶¶ 16-17. To
make this determination, the court must evaluate the juror’s state
of mind based on their responses, demeanor, and body language
throughout voir dire. Morrison v. People, 19 P.3d 668, 672 (Colo.
2000). And a “juror’s silence in response to questions posed to the
venire can be sufficient evidence of rehabilitation after that juror
has indicated a preconceived notion.” Clemens, ¶ 12.
¶ 13 We review the trial court’s ruling denying a challenge for cause
for an abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 13. “We accord great deference
to the trial court’s handling of challenges for cause” because only it
can evaluate the “juror’s credibility, demeanor, and sincerity in
explaining [their] state of mind.” Morrison, 19 P.3d at 672; see also
Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 486 (Colo. 1999) (deference to trial
court’s rulings on causal challenges discourages “an appellate court
from second-guessing those judgments based on a cold record”). A
trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Clemens, ¶ 13.

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C. Analysis
¶ 14 Miyamoto contends that jurors S.D. and L.L. made statements
showing that they could not apply the presumption of innocence
and were not rehabilitated.
¶ 15 To be sure, jurors S.D. and L.L. each expressed statements
that raised questions about their understanding of the presumption
of innocence and their ability to afford Miyamoto that presumption.
As a result, jurors S.D. and L.L. required rehabilitation to be
qualified to serve on the jury. See id., ¶ 21.
¶ 16 We turn then to the court’s comments to the venire seeking to
clarify the challenged jurors’ responses about the presumption of
innocence. Although the trial court’s clarifying comments and
questioning were somewhat inartful, the court reiterated that
Miyamoto is presumed innocent. It also conveyed that he is
presumed innocent until the presentation of evidence is complete
and that the prosecution must prove Miyamoto’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. The court also repeatedly asked the prospective
jurors if they agreed or disagreed with various statements,
including whether the jurors agreed that the prosecution had to
prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

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¶ 17 While S.D. and L.L. both actively responded to questions
during voir dire, neither expressed any disagreement when the
court asked the venire if they disagreed with the principles it was
explaining. And while silence in the face of group questioning is not
always rehabilitative, see id. at ¶ 12, we have more than silence
here. The trial court expressly stated that during its explanation
and questioning of the prospective jurors about the presumption of
innocence and burden of proof, L.L. nodded “in agreement” and
S.D. “was nodding.” Having observed these physical reactions to its
explanation about the presumption of innocence and the burden of
proof, the court opted not to ask any venire members specific
questions. And neither counsel asked the court to directly question
S.D. and L.L. Based on its explanations and observations, the
court implicitly found that S.D. and L.L. could apply the law and
were rehabilitated. See Clemens, ¶ 34 (Hood, J., dissenting)
(discussing that the challenged jurors having “nodded their heads”
would have presented a stronger case of rehabilitation than the
silence affirmed by the majority).
¶ 18 To the extent Miyamoto now objects that the court made its
record on S.D.’s and L.L.’s responses after the jury was sworn in,

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defense counsel did not object to that process below and we are
unaware of any authority prohibiting the court from doing that.
¶ 19 The short of it is that we are in no position to second-guess
the court’s direct observation of S.D. and L.L. during voir dire and
their responses to its comments on the presumption of innocence.
And though it perhaps would have been better practice for the trial
court to separately question each individual prospective juror who
expressed an incorrect view of the law, see id. at ¶ 37 (Hood J.,
dissenting), giving the court the substantial deference that we must,
we cannot say the court abused its discretion by denying the causal
challenges to jurors S.D. and LL.
II. Reasonable Doubt Instruction
¶ 20 The court instructed the jury on reasonable doubt using the
2022 model instruction. Though Miyamoto did not object to the
reasonable doubt instruction at trial, he now argues that the
instruction impermissibly lowered and shifted the prosecution’s
burden of proof. We disagree.

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A. Standard of Review
¶ 21 “We review de novo both the constitutionality of a jury
instruction and whether a trial court properly instructed the jury.”
Teran Sanchez v. People, 2026 CO 60, ¶ 12.
B. Analysis
¶ 22 The trial court gave the jury the COLJI-Crim. E:03 (2022)
instruction defining reasonable doubt (2022 Instruction), which
stated in relevant part,
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that
leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant’s
guilt. If you are firmly convinced of the
defendant’s guilt, then the prosecution has
proven the crime charged beyond a reasonable
doubt. But if you think there is a real
possibility that the defendant is not guilty,
then the prosecution has failed to prove the
crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 23 Miyamoto argues that the 2022 Instruction is constitutionally
deficient because (1) the “real possibility” language lowered and
shifted the burden of proof; (2) it failed to expressly tell the jury that
they may consider the lack of evidence supporting the prosecution’s
case; and (3) it failed to inform the jury that a reasonable doubt
“would cause reasonable people to hesitate to act in matters of
importance to themselves.”

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¶ 24 While this appeal was pending, however, the supreme court
held that the 2022 Instruction “taken as a whole, reveals no
concern that it lowers the burden of proof” and the instruction is
constitutional. Id. at ¶¶ 28, 37.1 In so holding, the court expressly
rejected the challenge that Miyamoto now raises that the “real
possibility” language lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof. Id.
at ¶ 28.
¶ 25 And while Teran Sanchez didn’t specifically consider
Miyamoto’s remaining two challenges to the 2022 Instruction,
several divisions of this court have rejected them and concluded
that the 2022 Instruction did not impermissibly lower the
prosecution’s burden of proof. See People v. Melara, 2025 COA 48,
¶¶ 22-23; People v. Schlehuber, 2025 COA 50, ¶¶ 16-17; People v.
Berumen, 2025 COA 93, ¶ 14; People v. Crow, 2026 COA 53, ¶ 16
see also Teran Sanchez, ¶¶ 24-25, 28, 31 (citing Schlehuber and
1 We recognize that the supreme court defined the reasonable doubt
instruction as “the 2023 instruction” based on the publication date
of the 2022 pattern jury instruction. See Teran Sanchez v. People,
2026 CO 60, ¶ 1. But it’s clear that COLJI-Crim. E:03 (2022) is the
instruction at issue in Teran Sanchez and is the same instruction
the trial court used in this case, which we refer to in this opinion as
the 2022 Instruction. See id. at ¶ 6.

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Melara with approval). More specifically, we agree with Schlehuber
that the 2022 Instruction’s omission of the “hesitate to act” phrase
that was in the previous model instruction did not impermissibly
lower the prosecution’s burden of proof. Schlehuber, ¶ 28. And we
are equally persuaded by multiple divisions’ conclusion that
removing the “lack of evidence” language from the 2022 Instruction
“did not impermissibly lower the prosecution’s burden of proof.”
Melara, ¶ 24; see Schlehuber, ¶¶ 19-23; Berumen, ¶¶ 31-33.
¶ 26 Because the 2022 Instruction did not impermissibly lower or
shift the prosecution’s burden of proof, the trial court did not err by
giving it.
III. Disposition
¶ 27 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE SCHUTZ and JUSTICE MARTINEZ concur.