25CA2266•Peo in Interest of Johansson
Gesamter Gesetzestext
25CA2266 Peo in Interest of Johansson 02-05-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 25CA2266 Mesa County District Court No. 25MH30189 Honorable Gretchen B. Larson, Judge The People of the State of Colorado, Petitioner-Appellee, In the Interest of Korey Johansson, Respondent-Appellant. APPEAL DISMISSED Division V Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN* Tow and Lipinsky, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 5, 2026 Todd M. Starr, County Attorney, Richard B. Tuttle, Assistant County Attorney, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee Tezak Law, P.C., Mary Tezak, Florence, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant *Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
1 ¶ 1 Respondent, Korey Johansson, appeals the district court’s order authorizing (1) his certification for short-term mental health treatment at Centennial Peaks Hospital (the hospital) and (2) the involuntarily administration of medication. Because the appeal is moot, we dismiss it. I. Background ¶ 2 Johansson was transported to an emergency room after he attempted suicide. At the emergency room, staff placed Johansson on a seventy-two-hour emergency mental health hold. He was then transferred to the hospital, where he was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. ¶ 3 Johansson’s treating psychiatrist at the hospital sought an order authorizing Johansson’s certification for short-term mental health treatment. The hospital also asked for an order to involuntarily medicate him. In November 2025, the district court held an evidentiary hearing, after which the court granted the hospital’s requests. ¶ 4 Less than two weeks later, Johansson’s treating physician filed a notice of termination of involuntary treatment, stating that Johansson no longer met the criteria for treatment and was
2 discharged from the hospital. This court then issued an order directing Johansson to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed as moot. II. Mootness ¶ 5 Johansson acknowledges that he has been released from the hospital and is no longer subject to the involuntary treatment challenged on appeal. However, he contends that the appeal should not be dismissed because it falls within the exception to the mootness doctrine for issues “capable of repetition but evading review.” People in Interest of Vivekanathan, 2013 COA 143M, ¶ 9, 338 P.3d 1017, 1019. We disagree. ¶ 6 Colorado courts have applied the exception for issues capable of repetition but evading review in mental health appeals involving short-term certifications and involuntary medication administration. See, e.g., Gilford v. People, 2 P.3d 120, 124 (Colo. 2000); People in Interest of Ofengand, 183 P.3d 688, 691 (Colo. App. 2008). In those cases, however, the appeals involved specific procedural issues that were likely to arise in other cases. See Gilford, 2 P.3d at 122 (addressing whether the petition must be personally delivered to vest the trial court with jurisdiction);
3 Ofengand, 183 P.3d at 691 (addressing an argument that the patient waived her right to counsel). ¶ 7 Johansson does not raise any such procedural issues in this appeal. Rather, he asserts only that the district court erred by finding that sufficient evidence supported the requirements for both short-term certification and the involuntary administration of medication. These determinations are fact-specific and turn on Johansson’s condition when the district court ruled. See Vivekanathan, ¶ 14, 338 P.3d at 1019. As a result, the issue of whether the court erred has become moot, and our ruling would have no practical effect. See id. ¶ 8 Still, Johansson asserts that this matter is capable of repetition yet evading review “by its very nature” because “it pertains to short-term certification and involuntary treatment.” In support, he directs our attention to People in Interest of Hoylman, 865 P.2d 918, 920 (Colo. App. 1993), where a division of this court observed that, “[b]y its nature, an order for short-term hospitalization, entered in a proceeding in which a respondent has been denied a hearing before a jury, will expire before the review of such an order may be had before an appellate court.” (Emphasis
4 added.) We do not read Hoylman to hold, as Johansson suggests, that any case involving short-term certification and involuntary medication is categorically exempt from the mootness doctrine. Rather, like the cases cited above, Hoylman involved a procedural issue — the denial of a hearing before a jury — that was capable of repetition yet evading review. See Vivekanathan, ¶ 10 (including Holyman in a list of cases involving procedural issues that were capable of repetition yet evading review). ¶ 9 At any rate, even if Hoylman could be read to suggest that all mental health orders are reviewable simply because they expire before an appellate court can review them, such a proposition is no longer true today. We consistently review orders for short-term certification and involuntary administration of medication before they expire. And the only reason we have not done so in this case is because Johansson was released eight days after he filed the appeal.
5 ¶ 10 We therefore reject Johansson’s contention and conclude that the appeal is moot. As a result, we do not address the merits of his appeal.1 III. Disposition ¶ 11 The appeal is dismissed. JUDGE TOW and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur. 1 Johansson filed his notice of appeal on November 24, 2025. The record indicates that the treating physician, through the People, filed a notice of termination of treatment in the district court on December 2, 2025, eight days after the notice of appeal was filed and seventeen days before the opening brief was filed. Thus, Johansson’s counsel should have known about the notice of termination of treatment before filing the opening brief, yet omitted any reference to that notice in the brief. We remind counsel of her professional duty of candor to this court under Colo. RPC 3.3 and the obligation to include all relevant facts in her brief under C.A.R. 28(a)(5). If this conduct recurs, counsel may be referred to the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel.
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