Cari v Messersmith

25CA0185Coloctapp05.02.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

25CA0185 Cari v Messersmith 02-05-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0185
City and County of Denver District Court No. 23CV31539
Honorable Jill D. Dorancy, Judge
Deysi Cari,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Natalie Jean Vona Messersmith,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE GROVE
Yun and Schock, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 5, 2026
Bachus & Schanker, LLC, Darin L. Schanker, Denver, Colorado; Barrios Wool,
LLC, Zachary L. Wool, New Orleans, Louisiana, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Montgomery Amatuzio, Max K. Jones, Jr., Natalie R. Norcutt, Sarah K. Vogel,
Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
1
¶ 1 Defendant, Natalie Jean Vona Messersmith, appeals the
judgment entered by the trial court following a jury trial and finding
her liable for injuring plaintiff, Deysi Cari, in a motor vehicle
accident. We affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 Messersmith struck Cari with her car while Cari, a pedestrian,
was in a crosswalk. Cari sustained leg and back injuries in the
crash, as well as a traumatic brain injury and ensuing cognitive
defects.
¶ 3 Cari filed a personal injury claim against Messersmith.
Although Messersmith admitted negligence, the case proceeded to
trial on the nature and extent of Cari’s injuries and associated
damages. A jury awarded Cari $7,110,624.00 in damages, and the
trial court calculated the associated interest at $2,428,793.60.
¶ 4 This appeal concerns a pretrial discovery dispute.
Messersmith retained an expert witness, Dr. Laura Rieffel, a
neuropsychologist, to conduct a two-day examination evaluating the
extent and effects of Cari’s traumatic brain injury and to prepare a
report. Although Rieffel completed her report, Messersmith’s expert
disclosures did not include (1) the testing materials Rieffel used
2
during the examination; (2) Cari’s answers; (3) any scoring
analyses; or (4) any guides on test administration and
interpretation.1
¶ 5 Cari’s attorneys insisted that Messersmith disclose this
information to counsel pursuant to C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I)(a) and (b),
as well as C.R.C.P. 35(b)(1). Messersmith’s attorneys declined. As
a result, about a month before trial, in accordance with the case
management order, the parties filed a “Joint Notice of Discovery
Impasse,” requesting that the court resolve the dispute. In the
notice, Cari argued that Rieffel’s testing materials, analysis, and
results constituted “data and information the expert considered
while forming her opinions for the case,” Garrigan v. Bowen, 243
P.3d 231, 237 (Colo. 2010), and, thus, must be disclosed to counsel
under C.R.C.P. 26 and 35. Messersmith countered that those rules
did not require disclosure of the requested materials and that “raw
data is protected from disclosure to non-neuropsychologists
1 As we discuss below, Rieffel did disclose this information to Cari’s
treating neuropsychologist, who was designated as an expert for
Cari pursuant to C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(II). Citing the same ethical
rules as Rieffel, however, Cari’s psychologist declined to share the
materials that he received from Rieffel with Cari’s attorneys.
3
because the tests can only provide accurate information if the test
takers are unaware of the test contents, instruction, and pre-
examination procedures.” Messersmith stressed that providing raw
data to non-neuropsychologists, including Cari’s attorneys, violated
a neuropsychologist’s professional ethical obligations because such
nonexperts were not required to keep testing materials
confidential.2
¶ 6 The trial court held a hearing on the dispute during which
counsel for both sides presented legal argument. Relying in part on
a federal magistrate judge’s reasoning in a nearly identical situation
involving Rieffel’s refusal to disclose testing materials and
underlying data associated with an expert report, see Wright v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 344 F.R.D. 538, 542 (D. Colo. 2023), the
court ruled that Rieffel was required to “produce the facts and data
which were obtained during the [C.R.C.P. 35] exam upon which
[Rieffel] based her opinion to plaintiff’s counsel.” (We will refer to
2 In the notice, Cari seemingly acknowledged that she had not
turned over to Messersmith’s counsel any similar materials
generated by Cari’s treating neuropsychologist. She noted,
however, that Messersmith had never requested such materials and
argued that, at the time the parties filed the notice, the discovery
deadline for any such requests had passed.
4
this order as “the disclosure order.”) As for the confidentiality and
ethical concerns underpinning Rieffel’s objection to disclosing these
materials, the court instructed the parties to confer regarding
exactly what materials would be disclosed and to submit a proposed
protective order that would prevent any further dissemination.
¶ 7 Messersmith declined to collaborate on the protective order
and instead filed a motion to reconsider the court’s ruling. In the
motion, she argued that the court erred by failing to hear from
Rieffel directly about her ethical concerns and by leaving her with
no means to appeal its ruling, as she was a nonparty. Messersmith
also maintained that Cari should subpoena Rieffel for the requested
materials since counsel “neither own[ed] nor control[led]” the
ordered materials. Messersmith attached a personal letter from
Rieffel to the motion. In the letter, Rieffel wrote that she could not
“ethically provide” the requested materials to Cari’s counsel — even
pursuant to a protective order — and therefore had “no choice but
to withdraw.”
¶ 8 The court denied the motion to reconsider its disclosure order.
Messersmith failed to produce the materials in question.
5
¶ 9 Meanwhile, with trial about three weeks away, the parties were
still trying to schedule Rieffel’s deposition. Rieffel’s personal lawyer
emailed to confirm that the deposition was canceled given “recent
developments” in the case, but, through counsel, Messersmith told
Cari that Rieffel would still testify at trial. Cari then filed an
expedited motion to strike Rieffel as an expert and for sanctions.
¶ 10 In an order issued less than two weeks before trial, the trial
court precluded Rieffel’s testimony and expert report. As the court
put it, “If Dr. Rieffel is unable or unwilling to comply with a Court
Order or with the Rules of Civil Procedures, she shall not be
permitted to testify at the trial.” The court also ruled in the
alternative that Rieffel’s withdrawal had mooted the issue. In
addition, the court “decline[d] to permit [Messersmith] to include
another neuropsychologist, neuropsychiatrist or psychologist” as an
expert at such a late stage in the proceedings. The court reasoned
that the defense had created the issue by choosing to retain Rieffel
despite the federal magistrate judge’s ruling in Wright, which put
counsel “on notice” that compliance with discovery requirements
“would be an issue for Dr. Rieffel.”
6
¶ 11 The case was tried to a jury. Rieffel did not testify — although
two other defense experts did. After the verdict, Messersmith
sought a new trial under C.R.C.P. 59, arguing that Rieffel’s report
and testimony had been improperly excluded and that, at trial,
“[Cari]’s counsel unfairly leveraged Dr. Rieffel’s exclusion by alleging
that none of [Messersmith]’s experts claimed that [Cari] was
malingering or exaggerating and instead all agreed that [Cari] had
sustained a [traumatic brain injury].”
¶ 12 The trial court denied Messersmith’s post-trial motion and
entered judgment in Cari’s favor. Messersmith now appeals,
contending that the court reversibly erred by (1) requiring
disclosure of the aforementioned materials under C.R.C.P. 26 and
35; (2) sanctioning Messersmith by excluding Rieffel; (3) refusing to
allow Rieffel to be replaced by another expert; and (4) denying
Messersmith’s request for a trial continuance.
II. Mootness
¶ 13 At the threshold, we address Cari’s argument that we should
affirm the disclosure order for testing materials and the order
striking Rieffel as a witness because Rieffel’s withdrawal from the
7
case rendered any challenges to those rulings moot. We agree in
part.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 14 “A case is moot when a judgment, if rendered, would have no
practical legal effect upon the existing controversy.” San Juan Hut
Sys., Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2023 COA 10, ¶ 24 (citation
omitted). The same rule applies to discrete issues within the case
as a whole: “An issue is moot if ‘a judgment which, when rendered,
cannot have any effect upon an existing controversy.’” In re
Marriage of Wiggins, 2012 CO 44, ¶ 16 (citation omitted).
¶ 15 Mootness is a legal question that we review de novo. Colo.
Mining Ass’n v. Urbina, 2013 COA 155, ¶ 23.
B. Analysis
¶ 16 Messersmith challenges two separate facets of the trial court’s
rulings regarding Rieffel: (1) the order requiring production of
testing materials and related documents pursuant to C.R.C.P. 26
and 35 once a protective order was in place and (2) the decision to
strike Rieffel as an expert witness as a sanction for the defense’s
noncompliance with that order. Cari argues that both arguments
are moot given Rieffel’s withdrawal.
8
1. Order to Produce Testing Materials
¶ 17 Because the disclosure order preceded — and led to — Rieffel’s
withdrawal, we disagree with Cari’s argument that Messersmith’s
challenge to the order is moot. Had the trial court not issued the
disclosure order, Rieffel would have presumably testified on behalf
of the defense, and the trial court would not have prohibited
Messersmith from retaining another “neuropsychologist,
neuropsychiatrist or psychologist” following Rieffel’s withdrawal. As
a result, an appellate determination that the court incorrectly
ordered disclosure of the testing materials and related documents
would likely have a “practical legal effect upon the existing
controversy.” San Juan Hut Sys., ¶ 24 (citation omitted); see also
Stor-N-Lock Partners # 15, LLC v. City of Thornton, 2018 COA 65,
¶ 38 (“An issue is moot when the relief sought, if granted, would
have no practical effect on an existing controversy.”).
¶ 18 Moreover, contrary to Cari’s claim on appeal, the trial court
did not “explicitly recognize[]” at any point that Rieffel’s withdrawal
had any effect on the propriety of the disclosure order. Rather, as
we discuss below, the court found that Rieffel’s withdrawal
rendered moot only its decision to strike Rieffel as a witness. Thus,
9
unlike the order imposing sanctions on the defense, which we
consider next, Messersmith’s failure on appeal to address mootness
with respect to the discovery order does not bar appellate review of
that issue.
2. Order Striking Rieffel as a Sanction for Noncompliance
¶ 19 We reach the opposite conclusion regarding the trial court’s
decision to strike Rieffel as a witness as a sanction for
noncompliance with its disclosure order. In its order imposing
sanctions on the defense, the court acknowledged Rieffel’s letter
stating that she could not ethically comply with the court’s
discovery ruling and that, as a result, she had “no choice but to
withdraw” from the case as a witness. While the court determined
that striking Rieffel was an appropriate sanction for the defense’s
noncompliance with the discovery order, it found that “the issue
[was] also moot” due to Rieffel’s withdrawal.
¶ 20 Messersmith does not address, much less challenge, the trial
court’s alternative mootness determination in her opening brief on
appeal. When a district court’s ruling is based on alternative
grounds, an appellant must address each of those grounds in her
opening brief. IBC Denv. II, LLC v. City of Wheat Ridge, 183 P.3d
10
714, 717 (Colo. App. 2008) (when a lower tribunal gives more than
one reason for a decision, each of which independently supports the
judgment, the appellant must challenge each reason on appeal).
And we do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a
reply brief. See W. Innovations, Inc. v. Sonitrol Corp., 187 P.3d
1155, 1160 (Colo. App. 2008).
¶ 21 We therefore decline to consider Messersmith’s argument,
raised for the first time in her reply brief, that Rieffel’s declaration
that she “ha[d] no choice but to withdraw” was merely “conditional”
and “contingent upon the Trial Court maintaining its prior position
requiring [Messersmith] to produce Dr. Rieffel’s testing materials
and documents.”3
¶ 22 Accordingly, because the issue is not properly before us, we
must leave undisturbed the trial court’s finding that Rieffel’s
3 In any event, the trial court did not interpret Rieffel’s statement as
“conditional.” To the contrary, it explicitly ruled — albeit in the
alternative — that Rieffel’s withdrawal rendered moot its decision on
Cari’s sanctions motion. If the trial court’s understanding of
Rieffel’s statement was wrong (i.e., if Rieffel’s withdrawal was truly
“conditional”), the defense should have raised that issue with the
trial court.
11
withdrawal rendered moot its decision to strike her as a sanction
for noncompliance with the discovery order.
III. The Disclosure Order
¶ 23 Messersmith contends that the disclosure order was erroneous
because it was the result of an incorrect interpretation of C.R.C.P.
26 and 35 by the trial court. Specifically, she argues that the trial
court “erred in ruling that [Messersmith] was automatically required
to produce her expert’s testing materials and raw data under
C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I) and C.R.C.P. 35, neither of which require the
production of documents, especially those not in the custody or
control of [Messersmith].”
¶ 24 Cari defends the disclosure order on the merits, but she
argues at the outset that Messersmith did not preserve the
arguments that she asserts on appeal. Although it is a close call
given the arguments presented in the Joint Notice of Discovery
Impasse and at the hearing on the discovery dispute, we conclude
that the trial court’s disclosure order encompasses at least some of
the arguments that Messersmith advances on appeal. See In re
Estate of Ramstetter, 2016 COA 81, ¶ 71 n.7 (“[W]here a trial court
addresses an argument, whether that argument was preserved is
12
moot.”). To the extent that Messersmith raised her appellate
arguments below or the trial court otherwise considered the issues
on appeal, we address the disclosure order on the merits.
A. Applicable Law
¶ 25 Expert witness disclosures required by C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I)
must be made by a written report signed by the witness. See
Garrigan, 243 P.3d at 235. Among other things, the report must
contain (1) “a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed
and the basis and reasons therefor”; (2) “a list of the data or other
information considered by the witness in forming the opinions”; and
(3) “references to literature that may be used during the witness’s
testimony.” C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I)(a)-(c). “‘[D]ata or other
information’ is a broad phrase inclusive of whatever information an
expert actually considers in forming her opinions.” Garrigan, 243
P.3d at 236. It even includes information the expert reviewed but
rejected when forming her opinions. Gall v. Jamison, 44 P.3d 233,
241 (Colo. 2002). And under C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I), an expert
considers information in forming the opinions if the expert reviews
the information with the purpose of forming opinions about the
case at issue. Gall, 44 P.3d at 241.
13
¶ 26 Similarly, C.R.C.P. 35(b)(1) requires, upon request by the
opposing party, delivery to that party “a copy of a detailed written
report of the examiner setting out his or her findings, including
results of all tests made, diagnoses, and conclusions, together with
like reports of all earlier examinations of the same condition.”
B. Analysis
¶ 27 As we understand it, Messersmith argues that the testing
materials and related documents that Rieffel used during her Rule
35 examination of Cari fall outside the scope of the disclosure
requirements of C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I) and C.R.C.P. 35(b)(1), and
that if Cari’s counsel wanted those materials, they needed to issue a
request for production or subpoena Rieffel for the same. She also
maintains that the testing information was “privileged or protected
from disclosure,” although she offers no legal authority for that
claim.
¶ 28 Regarding the scope of expert disclosure requirements, in
appellate briefing and at oral argument, Messersmith asserted that
C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I) and C.R.C.P. 35(b)(1) do not include a
mechanism that required disclosure of the testing materials and
related documents and that, absent a formal C.R.C.P. 34 discovery
14
request or a subpoena duces tecum issued directly to Rieffel, the
defense had no obligation to produce the documents. We do not
consider this argument because Messersmith did not raise it in the
trial court. See O’Connell v. Biomet, Inc., 250 P.3d 1278, 1282
(Colo. App. 2010) (“Arguments never presented to, considered by, or
ruled upon by a trial court may not be raised for the first time on
appeal.”).4
¶ 29 To support its conclusion that the defense was required to
disclose Rieffel’s testing materials, the trial court appropriately
looked to the federal magistrate judge’s decision in Wright as
persuasive authority. See Garrigan, 243 P.3d at 235 (“Because the
Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure are patterned on the federal rules,
we may also look to the federal rules and decisions for guidance.”).
The Wright court made short work of a virtually identical argument
4 The trial court found, with record support, that Cari’s counsel did
request Rieffel’s testing materials and related documents. The
request appeared be an informal one, however, rather than a
request for production under C.R.C.P. 34 or a subpoena duces
tecum issued to Rieffel directly. Given the trial court’s finding that
Cari’s counsel requested the materials in question, we do not need
to address Messersmith’s claim that the trial court erroneously
ruled that Messersmith was “automatically” required to produce
them.
15
involving a virtually identical objection to the production of testing
materials asserted by Rieffel herself. Citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 35(b)(2),
which requires production of “diagnoses, conclusions, and the
results of any tests,” and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B), which requires
written reports to contain “‘the facts or data considered by the
witness’ in forming their opinions,” the Wright court ruled that
Rieffel must produce “the raw test data” as part of her expert
disclosures. Wright, 344 F.R.D. at 542 (emphasis omitted) (first
quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 35(b)(2); and then quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(2)(B)(ii)).
¶ 30 The Wright court’s interpretation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and 35 is
consistent with a host of cases nationwide that have addressed
similar questions. See, e.g., Bain v. Wrend, No. 15-cv-202, 2017 WL
11505976, at *2 (D. Vt. Sep. 6, 2017) (unpublished order) (Because
“raw test score[s] are clearly ‘data considered by the witness’” under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B), “[t]here is no basis for skirting the
requirements of the rule, which were added to ensure complete
disclosure in advance of trial of the substance and basis for expert
testimony.”); see also Frazier v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, No. 08-cv-
02730, 2010 WL 447785, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb. 3, 2010) (unpublished
16
order) (“[C]oncerns about contractual or ethical limitations on the
disclosure of [psychological testing materials]” may be addressed by
the entry of a protective order.); Glennon v. Performance Food Grp.,
Inc., No. 20-cv-00038, 2021 WL 3130050, at *6 (S.D. Ga. July 23,
2021) (unpublished order) (granting the plaintiff’s request “for raw
data and test materials, but only subject to entry of a protective
order”); Guinn v. Praxair, Inc., No. 17-11436, 2019 WL 12096811, at
*2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2019) (unpublished order) (observing,
despite restrictions in Illinois law, that “federal district courts in
Illinois have determined that [psychological testing] materials may
be disclosed pursuant to a protective order”).5
5 For the first time on appeal, Messersmith suggests that C.R.C.P.
26(a)(2)(B)(I)(b) should be interpreted differently from the
corresponding federal rule because, while the Colorado rule
requires disclosure of “a list of the data or other information
considered by the witness,” the federal rule requires disclosure of
“the facts or data considered by the witness,” Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(2)(B)(ii), without mentioning “a list.” We decline to consider
this argument because it was not raised in the trial court. See
O’Connell v. Biomet, Inc., 250 P.3d 1278, 1282 (Colo. App. 2010).
Regardless, Messersmith’s claim runs counter to the holding in
Garrigan v. Bowen, 243 P.3d 231 (Colo. 2010), in which the
Colorado Supreme Court relied on federal cases interpreting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(ii) as an interpretive aid for C.R.C.P.
26(a)(2)(B)(I)(b) without ever suggesting that the two rules differ in
scope.
17
¶ 31 We agree with the trial court’s resolution of the discovery
dispute. Consistent with Wright and similar federal cases cited
above, the court correctly ruled that any restrictions Rieffel’s
professional association placed on the dissemination of testing
materials must yield to the requirements of the Colorado Rules of
Civil Procedure. Because they revealed “the basis and reasons” for
Rieffel’s opinion, C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I)(a), the materials were highly
relevant to the admissibility of Rieffel’s testimony, and depriving
Cari of access to them would have hamstrung her attorneys’ ability
to fully explore the reliability of the data underpinning her expert
opinions as contemplated by CRE 702. See People in Interest of
A.F., 2025 COA 76, ¶ 21 (The inquiry under CRE 702 “must focus
on the reliability of the principles underlying the specific opinions
offered rather than of casework in the abstract.”). Moreover, as
many courts have recognized, Rieffel’s concerns about her
professional obligations and the proprietary nature of the materials
could be addressed by the issuance of a protective order. Thus, we
discern no error in the trial court’s disclosure order.
18
IV. Sanctions
¶ 32 Messersmith next challenges the trial court’s imposition of
sanctions under C.R.C.P. 37 based on her failure to comply with the
disclosure order. She does so from several different angles.
¶ 33 First, she argues that the court should not have imposed
sanctions because there was no violation of C.R.C.P. 26 or 35. We
have already rejected that argument, so we do not consider it
further.
¶ 34 Second, Messersmith argues that the court erred by striking
Rieffel as a witness without first holding an evidentiary hearing at
which the defense could present witnesses to explain the various
barriers to the disclosure of the testing materials and related
documents. Relatedly, she argues that the court abused its
discretion by barring Rieffel from testifying altogether rather than
crafting a narrower sanction that would have prohibited her from
testifying about only the results of the Rule 35 examination. But as
we have already concluded, Messersmith’s failure to address in her
opening brief the trial court’s finding that Rieffel had withdrawn as
a witness precludes us from considering any issues related to either
19
the procedures that preceded the sanction or the scope of the
court’s order.
¶ 35 Finally, Messersmith asserts that the trial court abused its
discretion by ordering that she was not permitted to replace Rieffel
with another neuropsychologist, neuropsychiatrist, or psychologist.
We consider that question below.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 36 We interpret rules of procedure de novo. Cath. Health
Initiatives Colo. v. Earl Swensson Assocs., Inc., 2017 CO 94, ¶ 8.
We review a trial court’s imposition of discovery sanctions for an
abuse of discretion. Pinkstaff v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 211 P.3d
698, 702 (Colo. 2009). A trial court abuses its discretion if its
decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Id. An
appellate court may affirm the trial court’s ruling based on any
grounds that are supported by the record. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co.
Ams. v. Samora, 2013 COA 81, ¶ 38.
B. Scope of the Sanction
1. Applicable Law
¶ 37 When a party fails to make a required pretrial disclosure, the
district court may impose appropriate sanctions, including
20
excluding the undisclosed evidence. See Mullins v. Med. Lien Mgmt.,
Inc., 2013 COA 134, ¶ 37; C.R.C.P. 37(c)(1). But Rule 37(c)(1) is not
an “automatic rule of exclusion.” Cath. Health Initiatives Colo.,
¶ 12. Instead, it is a “flexible” framework that gives the district
court “discretion to fashion an appropriate sanction proportionate
to any harm caused.” Id. at ¶ 11.
¶ 38 The burden is on the nondisclosing party to show that the
failure to disclose was substantially justified or harmless. Todd v.
Bear Valley Vill. Apartments, 980 P.2d 973, 978 (Colo. 1999). Some
considerations that may be relevant to this inquiry are (1) the
importance of the evidence; (2) the party’s explanation for the
failure to disclose; (3) the potential prejudice or surprise to the
opposing party; (4) the availability of a continuance to cure the
prejudice; (5) the extent to which admission of the testimony would
disrupt trial; and (6) the nondisclosing party’s bad faith or
willfulness. Id. The question of harm is not whether the
undisclosed evidence is “potentially harmful to the opposing side’s
case” but “whether the failure to disclose the evidence in a timely
fashion will prejudice the opposing party by denying that party an
adequate opportunity to defend against the evidence.” Id. at 979.
21
2. Analysis
¶ 39 Messersmith maintains that her failure to comply with the
discovery order or otherwise disclose the requested materials was
substantially justified or, alternatively, that the court’s sanctions
were disproportionate to the harm caused.
¶ 40 Regarding the reasons for her noncompliance with the
discovery order, Messersmith argues that withholding Rieffel’s
materials was substantially justified because of (1) applicable
professional ethical obligations; (2) examples of other
neuropsychologists refusing disclosure orders due to their ethical
obligations; (3) academic and professional articles outlining the
rationale behind such refusals; (4) a Colorado district court order
ruling that a neuropsychologist’s raw data was required to be
disclosed only to opposing experts; and (5) defense counsel’s lack of
custody and control over the documents.
¶ 41 Unsurprisingly, many of these arguments mirror those raised
on Rieffel’s behalf in Wright. 344 F.R.D. at 540-41. They also
appear in Rieffel’s letter of withdrawal, which claimed that
disclosing the requested materials “would undermine current and
future use of psychological and/or neuropsychological testing,”
22
given Cari’s “financial motive to misuse the materials”; that it could
create copyright concerns; and that disclosure under a protective
order would still create the risk of “inadvertent” disclosure to
outside sources.
¶ 42 None of these concerns justify Messersmith’s noncompliance.
As the cases above explain, “Any concerns about test security can
be dealt with via the protective order and the designation of the
materials to be produced as ‘confidential.’” Id. at 542. The trial
court agreed with this view, noting that it had reviewed Wright and
agreed with its determination that Rieffel’s concerns could be
addressed if all the requested materials were “subject to a protective
order.” The court performed a separate analysis of Rieffel’s
professional ethical obligations and found she could adhere to the
orders without violating them. As for defense counsel’s argument
that he lacked custody and control over the requested materials,
that does not relieve him of the obligation to disclose Rieffel’s
written report with all required inclusions. See C.R.C.P. 35(b)(1);
C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I).
¶ 43 Turning to the proportionality of the sanction, Messersmith
argues that barring her from replacing Rieffel was a
23
disproportionate penalty and that, in imposing it, the trial court
failed to account for (1) the importance of Rieffel’s testimony to the
defense; (2) professional ethics that prohibited compliance; (3) the
minimal prejudice suffered by Cari, given that Cari’s expert had the
materials; (4) the court’s denial of a requested continuance; and
(5) the fact that the noncompliance was not the result of bad faith.
¶ 44 We conclude that the trial court sufficiently addressed both
prejudice and proportionality. See Todd, 980 P.2d at 979 (observing
that a party will “likely” be prejudiced in cases when the failure to
make expert disclosures without substantial justification occurs
close to the time of trial). While Rieffel’s testimony may have been
important to the defense, providing Cari with a full and fair
opportunity to test the admissibility and credibility of her opinions
was no less significant. Cf. Gall, 44 P.3d at 240 (“If an adverse
party is to determine the extent to which the expert’s opinion has
been shaped or influenced by the version of the facts selected and
presented by the counsel retaining the expert, she must have
access to the documents or materials that the expert considers.
Without such access, the opposing party will be unable to conduct
a full and fair cross-examination of the expert.”). The court
24
recognized the importance of the testing materials and related
documents when it acknowledged that they might bear on its
assessment of the reliability of Rieffel’s testimony under CRE 702
and 703. The refusal to disclose the materials impeded Cari’s
counsel from laying the groundwork for that inquiry by thoroughly
exploring the basis for Rieffel’s opinions. See Todd, 980 P.2d at 978
(“The purpose of [Rule 37(c)] is to provide parties with an incentive
to make timely disclosures and to resist the temptation ‘to try to
gain a tactical advantage at trial by exposing for the first time at
that stage evidence that is favorable to their position.’” (citation
omitted)).
¶ 45 The court also considered Rieffel’s professional ethical
obligations. It observed that under the ethical standards set forth
by the American Psychological Association, “test data” — defined as
“raw and scaled scores, client/patient responses to test questions
or stimuli, and psychologists notes and recordings concerning
client/patient statements and behavior during exams” — could be
provided “only as required by law or Court order” absent
“client/patient release.” It therefore reasoned that Rieffel could
comply with the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure and its court
25
order compelling production of the requested materials under a
protective order.6
¶ 46 As for the claimed lack of prejudice because Cari’s own
neuropsychological expert possessed the requested materials, Cari’s
counsel explained that a “‘just trust me’ opinion by an expert”
unaccompanied by direct access to the testing materials and related
documents would hinder his ability to test the reliability of Rieffel’s
opinions and to effectively depose her and then cross-examine her
at trial. The court agreed, reasoning that, in order to determine
under CRE 702 and 703 whether an expert’s testimony is reliable
and therefore admissible, “it is . . . appropriate and necessary to
produce both the test materials and raw data” so that the basis for
the Rule 35 examiner’s expertise and opinion can be established.
¶ 47 And finally, as outlined below, the court also found that there
was no good cause for a trial continuance.
6 The Wright court made the same observation, pointing out that in
a 2003 bulletin, the National Academy of Neuropsychology advised
clinicians that if production of testing data is ordered, the “court
order should be issued ensuring that all parties given access be
required to maintain the confidentiality of the test data.” Wright v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 344 F.R.D. 538, 540-41 (D. Colo. 2023).
26
¶ 48 Therefore, we conclude that the court did not abuse its
discretion by prohibiting defense counsel from retaining “another
neuropsychologist, neuropsychiatrist or psychologist” prior to trial.
V. Motion To Continue Trial
¶ 49 Finally, Messersmith maintains the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied her motion to continue filed less than
three weeks before the scheduled trial date. We perceive no error.
A. Additional Facts
¶ 50 Messersmith filed a motion to continue the trial two days after
Cari sought sanctions for noncompliance with the disclosure order.
The motion asserted that Messersmith was “facing the loss of her
primary expert witness” and therefore needed a continuance to
allow her to “retain non-neuropsychologist experts” since “no
neuropsychologist would comply with a court order requiring
disclosure” of the requested materials. The court denied the
motion, reasoning that Messersmith had not established good cause
and that, in any event, the arguments were premature given that it
had not yet ruled on the motion for sanctions and to limit Rieffel’s
testimony.
27
¶ 51 The court then revisited the request for a continuance in its
order striking Rieffel as a sanction for noncompliance with the
disclosure order. Based on the decision in Wright, the court
observed that defense counsel had been “on notice since at least
2023 that this would be an issue for Dr. Rieffel.” The court thus
ruled that it was “also on this basis” that it had denied the motion
to continue the trial.
B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 52 We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a
continuance for an abuse of discretion. Cherry Creek Sch. Dist. No.
5 v. Voelker, 859 P.2d 805, 809 (Colo. 1993). Continuances are
granted only for good cause. C.R.C.P. 121, § 1–11. The trial court
must consider “the circumstances of the particular case, weighing
the right of the party requesting the continuance to a fair hearing
against the prejudice that may result from delay.” Voelker, 859
P.2d at 809 (quoting Butler v. Farner, 704 P.2d 853, 858 (Colo.
1985)). Trial continuances “should be limited to circumstances in
which unforeseen and exceptional circumstances require diligent
attorneys to request an adjournment.” Kallas v. Spinozzi, 2014
COA 164, ¶ 41 (citation omitted). An appellate court may affirm the
28
trial court’s ruling based on any grounds that are supported by the
record. Rush Creek Sols., Inc. v. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, 107 P.3d
402, 406 (Colo. App. 2004).
C. Analysis
¶ 53 The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Credible trial
dates are a vital component of our civil justice system, and parties
rely on meaningful dates to plan and prepare accordingly. Todd,
980 P.2d at 976. When considering requests to continue trial, a
court must “be careful not to reward a party who fails to make
timely disclosures” and uphold the rules of civil procedure to
disincentivize “dilatory discovery tactics and inefficient trial
preparation,” as well as “abuse.” Id. at 979.
¶ 54 The record demonstrates that defense counsel had already
evinced less-than-diligent discovery tactics prior to his renewed
motion, including missing discovery deadlines, failing to read the
court’s case management order, violating a court order to audio
record Rieffel’s examination, failing to diligently schedule Rieffel’s
deposition, and failing to participate in the drafting of a court-
ordered protective order, among others.
29
¶ 55 Against this backdrop, defense counsel complained that the
court’s disclosure order was “unanticipated” and “unexpected.”
However, counsel handpicked Rieffel as a Rule 35 expert despite the
fact that the same issues had arisen in Wright. When the trial court
adopted Wright’s reasoning and ordered disclosure, defense counsel
did not comply and instead sought reconsideration, declined to
participate in drafting the protective order, refused to produce the
materials as ordered, and submitted a letter from Rieffel
announcing her withdrawal as a witness. The reconsideration
motion did not suggest that counsel was proactively attempting to
secure another expert witness in light of Rieffel’s withdrawal and
her refusal to comply with court-ordered discovery.
¶ 56 Based on these facts, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the
trial court’s failure to find good cause for a continuance. See
Kallas, ¶ 43 (explaining it was not an abuse of discretion to deny a
motion for a continuance in light of foreseeability and numerous
discovery violations).
VI. Disposition
¶ 57 We affirm the judgment.
JUDGE YUN and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

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