Peo in Interest of CK

24CA1286Coloctapp05.02.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

24CA1286 Peo in Interest of CK 02-05-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1286
City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 23JD676
Honorable Laurie A. Clark, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioner-Appellee,
In the Interest of C.K.,
Juvenile-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division I
Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES
Lum and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 5, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Sonia Raichur Russo, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee
Madison R. Whitley, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile-
Appellant
1
¶ 1 C.K., a juvenile, appeals the juvenile court’s judgment
adjudicating him delinquent after finding him guilty of violating the
Colorado Organized Crime Control Act (COCCA), conspiracy to
commit second degree burglary, two counts of second degree
burglary, theft ($20,000-$100,000), and aggravated motor vehicle
theft. We affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 One night, Lakewood police officers arrived at the scene of a
car accident. They learned that the at-fault driver had abandoned
his car after the crash and then fled on foot. Officers searched the
car and found documents with the name “Easton Kochiss,” some
firearm magazines and ammunition, cocaine, Adderall tablets, and
marijuana products labeled “Herbs 4 You.” Herbs 4 You was a
marijuana dispensary that had been broken into the day before the
accident.
¶ 3 Based on the items they found in the car, officers suspected
that Kochiss was involved in the “Herbs 4 You” break-in. They
learned of Kochiss’s Facebook account, which was under the
username “PostedPosted,” and requested and obtained a search
warrant for the account. Kochiss’s messages from the
2
“PostedPosted” account showed that he was the leader of a group
called the Millionaire Motion Boys (MMB) that burglarized various
businesses and sold or traded the stolen items for drugs and guns.
¶ 4 The search of Kochiss’s Facebook account also revealed
messages between him and another account with the username
“Trapboy Kurry.” Officers identified C.K. as the owner of the
“Trapboy Kurry” account. On Facebook, C.K. and Kochiss
messaged about selling fentanyl pills, trading firearms, stealing
cars, and other crimes. For example, C.K. told Kochiss that he had
gotten a “lo” — a stolen Hyundai car. Four days earlier, an officer
had received a report that a gold Hyundai Tucson had been stolen.
And approximately two hours after C.K. and Kochiss messaged
about the stolen Hyundai, officers responded to a burglary at Gold
Casino and Pawn. The suspects had used a gold Hyundai —
bearing the same license plate number as the reportedly stolen
Hyundai — to smash open the front of the pawnshop.
¶ 5 Based on this information, officers requested a search warrant
for C.K.’s “Trapboy Kurry” Facebook account, alleging that the
messages showed probable cause that C.K. had been involved in the
Gold Casino and Pawn burglary. A magistrate issued the warrant.
3
During their subsequent search, officers found a photo of cocaine
with the words “Posted up” and a phone number written next to it.
They also found messages between C.K. and other MMB members
about obtaining crowbars and meeting up to “get on sum money.”
Officers were aware that the burglary suspects used crowbars to
break into the businesses.
¶ 6 Officers also found messages between C.K. and Kochiss a few
months earlier about getting another “lo.” After these messages had
been sent, officers had responded to a burglary at “The Joint,” a
marijuana dispensary. Soon after that burglary, Kochiss had
messaged C.K., “Us n chop next time” and “More profit.”1 C.K.
responded, “Yep brother . . . lmk.”2
¶ 7 Using the information obtained from C.K.’s Facebook account
and information about his relationship to Kochiss, officers executed
a search warrant for caller ID and GPS location information from
C.K.’s cell phone. The subsequent search disclosed location data
from the dates of the burglaries. Jessica Suttle, a cellular phone
1 A detective testified at trial that this meant, “it’s just going to be
[Kochiss], [C.K.], and [a third MMB member] next time they do the
burglary because there’ll be more profit.”
2 “Lmk” stands for “let me know.”
4
data and cell tower mapping analyst with the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), used the data to create
maps of C.K.’s locations around the times of the burglaries. The
maps showed that C.K. was within a 600-meter radius of the Gold
Casino and Pawn and The Joint on the nights of the burglaries.
The data also showed that C.K.’s phone didn’t regularly connect to
the cell towers near these stores, meaning he didn’t regularly spend
time in those areas.
¶ 8 A grand jury indicted C.K. and the other MMB members on
sixty counts, including burglary, motor vehicle theft, and violating
COCCA. C.K. was charged with the offenses noted above and tried
as a juvenile. Following a trial to the court, the juvenile court found
C.K. guilty on all charges and adjudicated him delinquent. The
court sentenced him to two years in the custody of the Division of
Youth Services.
II. Discussion
¶ 9 C.K. contends that the juvenile court erred by (1) denying his
motion to suppress the Facebook records; (2) denying his motion to
suppress the cell phone records; (3) imposing inadequate sanctions
for the prosecution’s failure to timely produce discovery; and (4)
5
imposing inadequate sanctions for the prosecution’s failure to
provide an expert witness report. We reject each of these
contentions.
A. Timeliness of Appeal
¶ 10 Before we can address the merits of C.K.’s appeal, we must
determine whether it was timely.3 If his appeal was untimely, we
lack jurisdiction to consider it. People v. Baker, 104 P.3d 893, 896
(Colo. 2005) (citing Estep v. People, 753 P.2d 1241, 1246 (Colo.
1988)). Jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo.
People v. Lopez, 2020 COA 119, ¶ 21.
¶ 11 At C.K.’s sentencing hearing on May 2, 2024, the prosecutor
verbally requested restitution in the amount of $74,338.35. The
prosecution hadn’t yet filed any restitution request, and the court
noted that, in juvenile court, the prosecution must file the request
before sentencing. At the end of the hearing, the court sentenced
C.K. and set a restitution hearing for two months later. C.K.’s
counsel didn’t object. The prosecution submitted a motion for
3 This court issued an order to show cause requiring C.K. to explain
why his appeal shouldn’t be dismissed as untimely. C.K.
responded. The order was then deferred to the merits division for
resolution.
6
restitution in the amount of $24,210 on June 14, 2024. The
restitution hearing occurred on July 10, 2024, and the court ruled
that C.K. owed restitution in the amount of $9,966.88.
¶ 12 C.K.’s counsel filed a notice of appeal on July 19, 2024,
twenty-nine days after the deadline to file based on his sentencing
date.
¶ 13 C.K. contends that his notice of appeal wasn’t late because the
judgment only became final after the July 10 restitution hearing.
He also contends that, even if his notice was untimely, we have
jurisdiction over his appeal because we may exercise our discretion
to extend the time to file based on good cause or other grounds.
The People agree that we have the discretion to accept C.K.’s notice
of appeal as timely.
¶ 14 We disagree with C.K. that his notice of appeal was timely.
The Colorado Supreme Court has held that a final judgment occurs
when the defendant is convicted and a sentence is imposed. Sanoff
v. People, 187 P.3d 576, 577 (Colo. 2008); see also Tennyson v.
People, 2025 CO 31, ¶ 45 (“The court’s post-sentencing
determination of the restitution amount, while appealable as a
separate judgment, was not part of [defendant’s] sentence.”). And
7
the juvenile court implicitly found C.K. liable for restitution at the
sentencing hearing because it set a date for a restitution hearing.
See Tennyson, ¶ 45. Thus, the time to submit C.K.’s notice of
appeal began to run when the court sentenced him on May 2, 2024,
and his notice of appeal was due by June 20, 2024. See C.A.R.
4(b)(1).
¶ 15 But we have broad discretion to decide whether to accept a
late-filed notice. Baker, 104 P.3d at 896. The rules of appellate
procedure allow us to extend the time to file a notice of appeal if we
find excusable neglect or good cause. Id. at 895-96 (first citing
C.A.R. 4(b)(1); then citing C.A.R. 26(b); and then citing C.A.R. 2).
¶ 16 To establish excusable neglect, there must have been “a failure
to take proper steps at the proper time . . . as the result of some
unavoidable hinderance or accident.” Id. at 896 (quoting Farmers
Ins. Grp. v. Dist. Ct., 507 P.2d 865, 867 (Colo. 1973)). We determine
whether good cause exists by reviewing the totality of the
circumstances. Id.; People v. Ong, 2021 COA 113, ¶ 28 (“Good
cause under C.A.R. 26(b) requires a showing that surrounding
circumstances would cause a reasonably prudent person similarly
to overlook a required act in the performance of some
8
responsibility.”). We consider a nonexclusive list of factors, such as
“1) the potential prejudice the People may suffer from a late filing, 2)
the interests of judicial economy, and 3) the propriety of requiring
the defendant to pursue other remedies.” Baker, 104 P.3d at 896-
97 (citing Estep, 753 P.2d at 1248).
¶ 17 Based on consideration of the relevant factors and our review
of the record, we conclude that there is good cause to accept C.K.’s
notice of appeal as timely. The People concede that they won’t
suffer any prejudice by allowing C.K. to appeal, and they also
suggest that judicial economy favors accepting the appeal because
otherwise C.K. “may have two Crim. P. 35(c) claims — defense
counsel’s late filing of the notice of appeal and the court’s failure to
advise him of his right to appeal.” Thus, we exercise our discretion
under C.A.R. 2, 4(b)(1), and 26(b) and accept C.K.’s notice of appeal
as timely.
B. Motion to Suppress Facebook Records
¶ 18 Turning to the merits, C.K. first contends that the juvenile
court erred by denying his motion to suppress the Facebook records
because the search warrant lacked probable cause, lacked sufficient
particularity, and was overly broad. We disagree.
9
1. Additional Background
¶ 19 Based on police reports of the burglaries and vehicle thefts,
messages found on Kochiss’s Facebook account, information from
law enforcement databases concerning Kochiss’s known associates,
and a booking photo of C.K. obtained from another police
department, officers filed a request for a warrant, supported by an
investigator’s affidavit, with a magistrate seeking permission to
search C.K.’s Facebook account. The officers requested six months’
worth of historical records from several areas of C.K.’s account,
including activity logs, photos and videos uploaded by the account,
profile information, and Facebook Marketplace usage. The six-
month period began a few weeks before the burglaries occurred and
ended when officers sought the warrant. The accompanying
affidavit disclosed several messages between Kochiss and C.K. to
support a finding of probable cause. It asserted that the messages
“demonstrate[] that these individuals are closely associated, that
they frequently communicate with one another.” The magistrate
found that there was probable cause and signed the proposed
warrant.
10
2. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 20 “A trial court’s suppression ruling presents a mixed question
of fact and law.” People v. Licona-Ortega, 2022 COA 27, ¶ 11 (citing
People v. Davis, 2019 CO 24, ¶ 14). “We accept the trial court’s
findings of historic fact if those findings are supported by competent
evidence, but we assess the legal significance of the facts de novo.”
Id. (quoting People v. Chavez-Barragan, 2016 CO 16, ¶ 9). In
reviewing the validity of a warrant, we give great deference to the
magistrate’s findings, “but that deference ‘is not boundless.’”
People v. Gutierrez, 222 P.3d 925, 937 (Colo. 2009) (quoting United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984)).
¶ 21 The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is “to safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
governmental officials.” Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296,
303 (2018) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)).
Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, the government must
ordinarily provide a valid warrant before it conducts a search.
People v. Hyde, 2017 CO 24, ¶ 16.
¶ 22 A valid warrant requires a showing of probable cause. People
v. Seymour, 2023 CO 53, ¶ 44. “Probable cause means that ‘there
11
is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place.’” United States v. Cooper, 654 F.3d
1104, 1124 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Tisdale, 248
F.3d 964, 970 (10th Cir. 2001)). The determination “requires ‘less
than evidence which would justify condemnation or
conviction . . . [but] more than mere suspicion.’” Gutierrez, 222
P.3d at 937 (alteration in original) (quoting Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)); see also People v. Kazmierski, 25
P.3d 1207, 1211 (Colo. 2001) (The warrant “must supply a
sufficient nexus between criminal activity, the things to be seized,
and the place to be searched.”).
¶ 23 Determining whether there was probable cause requires an
examination of the totality of the circumstances. People v. Miller, 75
P.3d 1108, 1113 (Colo. 2003). A magistrate makes this
determination “only with reference to the facts contained within the
four corners” of the warrant request and its supporting
documentation, such as an affidavit. Gutierrez, 222 P.3d at 937
(citing People v. Titus, 880 P.2d 148, 150 (Colo. 1994)).
¶ 24 A valid warrant must also be “sufficiently particular that it
enables the executing officer to reasonably ascertain and identify
12
the things authorized to be seized.” People v. Rodriguez-Ortiz, 2025
COA 61, ¶ 22 (quoting People v. Roccaforte, 919 P.2d 799, 803
(Colo. 1996)). A warrant is overly broad (and therefore lacks
particularity) when it “describes in both specific and inclusive
generic terms what is to be seized, but it authorizes the seizure of
items as to which there is no probable cause.” United States v.
Cotto, 995 F.3d 786, 798 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v.
Ninety-Two Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars & Fifty-
Seven Cents, 307 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2002)). To determine whether a
warrant meets the particularity requirement, “courts are required to
read warrants and the accompanying affidavits [together] in a
practical, common sense fashion.” Roccaforte, 919 P.2d at 804.
¶ 25 A search of a Facebook account, even more than searches of
other electronic data sources, potentially threatens an undue
intrusion on a person’s privacy because “Facebook provides a single
window through which almost every detail of a person’s life is
visible.” United States v. Shipp, 392 F. Supp. 3d 300, 308 (E.D.N.Y.
2019), aff’d, No. 21-1284-cr, 2022 WL 16543193 (2d Cir. Oct. 31,
2022). Thus, courts should pay particular attention to whether a
warrant to search such an account describes with particularity the
13
object of the search and the place in which there is probable cause
to believe the object will be found. Id. at 309-10.
¶ 26 However, warrants that discuss complex and far-reaching
crimes, such as organized schemes involving multiple people, “may
be deemed legally sufficient even though they are less particular
than warrants pertaining to more straightforward criminal matters.”
Cooper, 654 F.3d at 1127. Warrants for complex crimes may also
require “less temporal specificity” to be considered sufficiently
particular. United States v. Zelaya-Veliz, 94 F.4th 321, 340 (4th
Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Manafort, 323 F. Supp. 3d 768,
782 (E.D. Va. 2018)).
3. Analysis
a. Probable Cause
¶ 27 The affidavit submitted in support of the Facebook warrant
tied C.K. to the subject Facebook account and provided background
information regarding two burglaries in which C.K. allegedly
participated. It recounted Facebook messages between C.K. and
Kochiss, who was a suspect in the burglaries, discussing C.K.
stealing a Hyundai and a Kia, both of which were the kinds of cars
used by the suspects in the burglaries, and another planned
14
robbery, for which C.K. might provide a stolen Mazda. And the
affidavit explained the scope of the criminal enterprise, which
included selling stolen items. The messages therefore provided
“sufficient facts to allow a person of reasonable caution to believe
that contraband or evidence of criminal activity is located at the
place to be searched.” Rodriguez-Ortiz, ¶ 21 (quoting Miller, 75 P.3d
at 1112).
¶ 28 C.K. argues that the warrant didn’t go into sufficient detail
about how using the Facebook data could help the police identify
those who had participated in the alleged crimes. But the
aforementioned information provided that detail. And the affidavit
said, “If any telephone numbers are discovered, Detectives could
prepare additional search warrants in attempt to obtain cellular
location data, which would assist Detectives with placing the
Facebook users at the crime scenes at the time the offenses were
committed.”
¶ 29 In sum, we conclude that the warrant and affidavit provided
sufficient support for a finding of probable cause.
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b. Particularity
¶ 30 C.K. next argues that, for three reasons, the warrant lacked
sufficient particularity. We reject each argument.
¶ 31 C.K. first argues that the warrant requested access to “every
piece of information within the account” even though there weren’t
any supporting facts demonstrating that any evidence would be
found. For example, C.K. notes, the warrant requested “[a]ll
information about the user’s access to Facebook Marketplace.” C.K.
argues that there are no facts demonstrating that evidence of the
burglaries would be found on his Facebook Marketplace account.
But the affidavit alleges that those who participated in the robberies
“would then reap from the proceeds involving the various stolen
marijuana products and in return would purchase other illicit
narcotics and unregistered firearms though Facebook social media
and Facebook open-source sale platforms.” And there was evidence
that the group was selling narcotics on Facebook. It was therefore
reasonable for the investigator to believe that there would be
evidence of the sales of the stolen products on C.K.’s Facebook
Marketplace page. And though the warrant requested a large
amount of data from C.K.’s Facebook account, that alone isn’t
16
dispositive. See Rodriguez-Ortiz, ¶ 31 (“[T]he quantity of items listed
in a search warrant or the quantity of items seized during the
execution of a warrant does not necessarily have any bearing on the
validity of the search itself.” (quoting People v. Tucci, 500 P.2d 815,
816 (Colo. 1972))).
¶ 32 The warrant was also sufficiently particular in relation to the
complexity of the burglaries and related crimes by MMB. Officers
learned that Kochiss had organized a multi-person criminal group
engaged in car thefts, burglaries, sales of stolen goods, and
purchases of narcotics and firearms. See Cooper, 654 F.3d at 1127
(“In light of the complex nature of the activities being investigated
here, we conclude that the warrants were sufficiently particular
when read in conjunction with their supporting affidavits.”).
¶ 33 C.K. also argues that the warrant’s time limit was overly
broad. Specifically, he argues that the warrant unreasonably asked
for six months’ worth of Facebook data, when the affidavit only
described the two burglaries.
¶ 34 In support of his argument, C.K. relies on United States v.
Irving, 347 F. Supp. 3d 615 (D. Kan. 2018); Shipp, 392 F. Supp. 3d
300; and United States v. Blake, 868 F.3d 960 (11th Cir. 2017). But
17
those cases are distinguishable; the courts held that the search
warrants at issue for the defendants’ Facebook accounts were
overly broad because they didn’t contain a time limit. Irving, 347 F.
Supp. 3d at 624; Shipp, 392 F. Supp. 3d at 310, 312; Blake, 868
F.3d at 974. But the warrant in this case had a time limit of six
months, and the affidavit provided factual support for the
conclusion that the police would find evidence of the alleged crimes
within the different areas of C.K.’s Facebook account during that
timeframe: the MMB members’ activities reflected an ongoing plan
to engage in certain crimes to fund illegal purchases, which they
repeated.
¶ 35 Lastly, C.K. argues that the warrant lacked particularity
because it contained “stock language, copied and pasted from
another affidavit.” He points to the statement in the affidavit that
“there is probable cause to believe that the Facebook accounts
contain evidence of the shooting incidents,” even though he wasn’t
being investigated in connection with a shooting. But a warrant
doesn’t become invalid merely because it contains a misstatement.
See Johnson v. Staab, 2025 COA 45, ¶ 28 (“[A] warrant may be
supported by probable cause even if the supporting affidavit
18
contains negligent or mistaken misstatements.”); see also Kaiser v.
Lief, 874 F.2d 732, 734 (10th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he misstatements do
not invalidate the warrant because they are not material, and
because the affidavit included sufficient accurate statements to
support the issuance of the warrant.” (citations omitted)).
¶ 36 We therefore conclude that the warrant and affidavit satisfied
the particularity requirement.
C. Motion to Suppress Cell Phone Records
¶ 37 C.K. argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to
suppress his cell phone records because the search warrant
pursuant to which those records were obtained lacked probable
cause, lacked sufficient particularity, and was overly broad. Again,
we disagree.
1. Additional Background
¶ 38 Based on the information found from searching C.K.’s
Facebook account, officers filed a request for a search warrant, with
a supporting affidavit, to obtain permission to search C.K.’s cell
phone data. The warrant covered C.K.’s cell carrier’s data on C.K.’s
incoming and outgoing calls and GPS location information from
October 2022 to when the warrant was to be executed, in June
19
2023. The accompanying affidavit provided that the request was
based on Facebook messages between C.K. and other MMB
members in which C.K. discussed stealing a Dodge Charger and
providing firearms for MMB members. The affidavit also said that,
at the time of the request, C.K. was subject to an arrest warrant for
first degree murder out of Arapahoe County, that C.K. was a danger
to the community, and that his location was unknown. A
magistrate signed the warrant.
2. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 39 As previously noted, “[a] trial court’s suppression ruling
presents a mixed question of law and fact.” Licona-Ortega, ¶ 11
(citing Davis, ¶ 14). We accept the trial court’s findings of fact if
they have record support, but we review issues of law de novo. Id.
¶ 40 The protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment “apply
with particular force in the case of cell phone searches. . . . [C]ell
phones have ‘immense storage capacities’ and can ‘collect and store
many distinct types of data in one place.’” People v. Thompson,
2021 CO 15, ¶ 19 (quoting People v. Coke, 2020 CO 28, ¶ 37). Cell
phones also constantly collect data, as “[m]ost modern devices,
such as smartphones, tap into the wireless network several times a
20
minute whenever their signal is on, even if the owner is not using
one of the phone’s features.” Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 300-01. By
tapping into the network, cell phones register time-stamped data of
the owner’s location. Id. at 301. Location data “provides an
intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not only his
particular movements, but through them his ‘familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations.’” Id. at 311
(quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring)). Thus, the government must obtain a
valid warrant to obtain cell phone data. See id. at 304.
¶ 41 As with warrants allowing searches of social media accounts,
warrants for cell phone data must show probable cause and be
particular to what content will be searched. Id. at 316-17. A
warrant that “broadly authoriz[es] police to search a cell phone for
all texts, videos, pictures, contact lists, phone records, and any data
showing ownership or possession violates the particularity”
requirement. Thompson, ¶ 19.
21
3. Analysis
a. Probable Cause
¶ 42 The affidavit supporting the request for the cell phone warrant
asserted that detectives were “investigating a series of criminal
offenses including burglaries, robberies, narcotics distribution,
[and] illegal weapons.” The messages referenced in the affidavit
between Kochiss and C.K. included C.K. discussing stealing a
Dodge Charger and the price of 1,000 fentanyl pills, and C.K.
asking if Kochiss wanted a gun for “either cash or trade.” These
messages directly related to the crimes alleged and created more
than a mere suspicion that C.K. was involved.
¶ 43 And, at the time the warrant was executed, C.K. had an active
felony warrant for his arrest for first degree murder. The search
warrant affidavit said that C.K. “is a substantial risk of serious
harm to others,” and his location was unknown. Courts regularly
approve warrants to collect cell phone location data to assist in
apprehending fugitive suspects. See, e.g., United States v. Artis,
919 F.3d 1123, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2019) (warrant for obtaining cell
phone data validly executed to apprehend fugitive); United States v.
Patrick, 842 F.3d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Police were entitled to
22
use a warrant to obtain [cell phone location] data that would help
them track down [the fugitive’s] location.”). Officers thus had
probable cause independent of C.K.’s involvement with MMB to
obtain C.K.’s cell phone location data.
b. Particularity
¶ 44 The affidavit requested that C.K.’s cellular company provide
location data for C.K.’s cell phone. Different cellular carriers have
different names for this data, and the affidavit listed all the names.
C.K. argues that because the warrant listed all the different names
for the location data, rather than only his cell carrier’s, the warrant
lacked particularity.4 But the standard for particularity is “whether
the description in a warrant is sufficiently particular that it enables
the executing officer to reasonably ascertain and identify the things
authorized to be seized.” Roccaforte, 919 P.2d at 803. Listing the
different names that cell carriers use to describe their location data
ensures that the cell carrier who receives the warrant knows the
4 Specifically, the warrant said, “The wireless carrier shall provide
any specialized location data referred to by different cellular carriers
as Timing Advance data, Call Per Measurement Data (PCMD), Real
Time Tool (RTT) data, Network Element Location Service (NELOS)
data, and/or AriesoGeo data for the authorized historical date
range.”
23
particular data the officer is looking to obtain. And even though the
warrant listed all the different names for the data, the request was
for one form of data.
¶ 45 The affidavit also requested eight months’ worth of C.K.’s
location data, from October 1, 2022, through June 1, 2023. C.K.
argues that this time period was much longer than needed to
investigate the burglaries. However, the crimes alleged in the
warrant were a series of car thefts, robberies, burglaries, narcotics
distribution, and other crimes that were committed by several
different people working as a criminal enterprise. The first offense
in this series occurred in October 2022. And, as discussed, C.K.
had an active arrest warrant for first degree murder at the time of
the cell phone warrant’s execution. The officers requested C.K.’s
location data up until the day the warrant was issued because they
needed to apprehend him. Lastly, the warrant only requested
location data; it didn’t request the content of calls, text messages,
or other communications. Cf. Coke, ¶ 38 (warrant issued to search
24
the defendant’s “texts, videos, pictures, [and] contact lists” violated
the particularity requirement).5
D. Sanctions Against the Prosecution
¶ 46 C.K. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by
imposing insufficient sanctions against the prosecution for alleged
discovery violations. We disagree.
1. Late Discovery Disclosure
a. Additional Background
¶ 47 C.K.’s counsel moved for sanctions against the prosecution for
Crim. P. 16 violations less than one month before trial. Defense
counsel asserted that she hadn’t received the Facebook warrant and
affidavit, cell phone data, or police reports about the Gold Casino
and Pawn burglary. And the day before filing the motion, defense
counsel had received 256 body-worn camera videos from the
prosecution that she would need to review before trial. Defense
counsel argued that the prosecution had failed to disclose this
5 The People argue that, even if the warrants were invalid, the
evidence was admissible under the good faith exception. Because
we conclude that the warrants were valid, we don’t need to address
that argument. People v. Rodriguez-Ortiz, 2025 COA 61, ¶ 35.
25
discovery before the Rule 16 deadline and requested that the court
suppress the evidence from the late-disclosed discovery.
¶ 48 Following a hearing on the motion, the court issued a written
order recognizing that the defense had been prejudiced by the late
disclosure of discovery and that rescheduling C.K.’s trial to give the
defense time to review the discovery materials would result in a trial
beyond the speedy trial deadline. As a sanction, the court ordered
that if C.K. consented to a continuance, and was subsequently
adjudicated delinquent following a trial, he would be given credit for
time served for each day between the speedy trial date and his
sentencing date. The defense didn’t ask for a continuance, and the
trial began as scheduled.
b. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 49 We review a trial court’s discovery sanction for abuse of
discretion. People v. Lee, 18 P.3d 192, 196 (Colo. 2001). “[A]
discovery sanction will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.” Id.
¶ 50 Under Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(1)(I) and (IV), the prosecution must
make available to the defense, among other things, “(I) Police, arrest
and crime or offense reports . . . [and] (IV) [a]ny books, papers,
26
documents, photographs or tangible objects.” The prosecution
must do so no later than twenty-one days after the charges against
the defendant are filed. Crim. P. 16(I)(b)(1). If the prosecution fails
to comply with its obligations, “the court may . . . enter such other
order as it deems just under the circumstances.” Crim. P. 16(III)(g).
¶ 51 “Choosing an appropriate sanction for discovery violations lies
within the sound discretion of the trial court . . . .” People v. Tippet,
2023 CO 61, ¶ 34. A trial court should impose “the least severe
sanction that will ensure that there is full compliance with the
court’s discovery orders.” Lee, 18 P.3d at 197 (quoting People v.
Cobb, 962 P.2d 944, 949 (Colo. 1998)). “[T]he goal is to impose a
sanction that sufficiently encourages a ‘modification of a party’s
discovery practices.’” Tippet, ¶ 39 (quoting People v. Daley, 97 P.3d
295, 298-99 (Colo. App. 2004)); see also People v. Dist. Ct., 808 P.2d
831, 837 (Colo. 1991) (“In fashioning a sanction to achieve the goal
of eliminating the due process violation, a court must strive to
restore as nearly as possible the level playing field that existed
before the discovery violation.”). When imposing a discovery
sanction, a trial court should consider: “(1) the reason for and
degree of culpability associated with the violation; (2) the extent of
27
resulting prejudice to the other party; (3) any events after the
violation that mitigate such prejudice; (4) reasonable and less
drastic alternatives to exclusion; and (5) any other relevant facts.”
Cobb, 962 P.2d at 949. We consider “whether the trial court’s
decision fell within a range of reasonable options.” Tippet, ¶ 64
(quoting Churchill v. Univ. of Colo., 2012 CO 54, ¶ 74).
c. Analysis
¶ 52 C.K. argues that the juvenile court’s offer of a continuance and
time served was an insufficient sanction because the discovery
violations prejudiced his defense and forced him to choose between
“his right to a speedy trial and his right to a fair one.” We conclude
that the court didn’t abuse its discretion.
¶ 53 In its order, the court recognized that because C.K. was
serving a commitment on other charges, a delay in this case
wouldn’t impact his service of that commitment. And the court
fashioned a remedy that would preclude the possibility of him
serving additional time resulting from a continuance. This sanction
also would have effectively reduced the length of C.K.’s time served
on his sentence in this case. We also observe that C.K. doesn’t
point to anything in the record showing that his ability to defend
28
against the charges was actually compromised by proceeding to
trial on the scheduled date. Therefore, we conclude that the court
didn’t abuse its discretion.
2. Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony
a. Additional Background
¶ 54 On December 13, 2023, fifty-four days before C.K.’s trial was
set to begin, the prosecution provided a list of witnesses it intended
to call at trial. The list included Jessica Suttle, the ATF cellular
data and cell tower data analyst. The list didn’t identify Suttle as
an expert, and the prosecution didn’t provide any reports made by
Suttle in connection with the case.
¶ 55 On January 11, 2024, twenty-five days before trial, the
prosecution identified Suttle as an expert witness. That same day,
defense counsel filed a motion to exclude Suttle’s testimony.
Defense counsel argued that the prosecution had failed to endorse
Suttle and provide her expert report thirty-five days before trial, as
required by Rule 16. At a hearing on January 22, C.K.’s counsel
also argued that, without the report, counsel couldn’t effectively
cross-examine Suttle.
29
¶ 56 The court issued an order agreeing with C.K.’s counsel that
the prosecution had failed to meet its obligation to disclose Suttle’s
report. To cure the deficiency, the court required the prosecution to
submit the report by January 26, 2024. Instead of excluding
Suttle’s testimony, the court said that it would grant a continuance
of the entire trial or for Suttle’s testimony if defense counsel wanted
one. Defense counsel didn’t request a continuance.
b. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 57 Under Crim. P. 16, the prosecution must disclose to the
defense “(III) [a]ny reports or statements of experts made in
connection with the particular case, including results of physical or
mental examinations and of scientific tests, experiments, or
comparisons . . . [and] (VII) [a] written list of the names and
addresses of the witnesses then known to the district attorney
whom he or she intends to call at trial.” Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(1)(III),
(VII). The prosecution must make these disclosures no later than
thirty-five days before trial. Crim. P. 16(I)(b)(3).
¶ 58 “[E]xclusion [of a witness’s testimony] is a drastic remedy and
therefore is strongly disfavored.” Cobb, 962 P.2d at 949. When
lesser sanctions, such as a continuance or a recess, will cure the
30
prejudice to the defendant, “the trial court should go no further in
crafting a sanction to address a due process violation.” Dist. Ct.,
808 P.2d at 837 (citing People v. Dist. Ct., 793 P.2d 163, 168-69
(Colo. 1990)).
¶ 59 We review a trial court’s discovery sanction for an abuse of
discretion. People v. Acosta, 2014 COA 82, ¶ 10. A court abuses its
discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable,
or unfair. Id.
c. Analysis
¶ 60 C.K. contends that the trial court’s offer of a total or partial
continuance was insufficient because “C.K.’s agreement with a
continuance would have meant waiving his right to a speedy trial.”
We conclude that the trial court didn’t abuse its discretion.
¶ 61 C.K. first argues that the prosecution failed to endorse Suttle
as an expert prior to the deadline. But Rule 16 doesn’t require the
prosecution to endorse a witness as an expert. People v. Greer, 262
P.3d 920, 930 (Colo. App. 2011). And, as C.K. concedes, the
defense was aware before the deadline that Suttle would testify
about the cell phone data.
31
¶ 62 C.K. also argues that the prosecution failed to provide Suttle’s
written report until eleven days before trial and that excluding
Suttle’s testimony was the proper remedy for that violation. As
noted, Rule 16 did require disclosure of any such report at least
thirty-five days before trial. But while the prosecution disclosed
Suttle’s report late, the disclosure wasn’t so egregiously late that it
prejudiced C.K.’s defense. See Lee, 18 P.3d at 198. And the
burden on C.K.’s counsel wasn’t such that exclusion of Suttle’s
testimony was the least drastic alternative. A continuance would
have provided C.K.’s counsel with additional time to prepare for a
cross-examination and ensured that the court could continue its
truth-finding purpose. See id. (“[T]here was no indication that a
further continuance would have been inadequate to compensate for
any violation or would have unfairly prejudiced the defendant.”).
Thus, the court didn’t abuse its discretion.
III. Disposition
¶ 63 We affirm the judgment.
JUDGE LUM and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

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