Juan Guillermo Sanchez-Ruano v. MERRICK B. GARLAND , Attorney General

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
J UAN GUILLERMO S ANCHEZ-R UANO ,
Petitioner,
v.
M ERRICK B. GARLAND , Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 18-71760
Agency No.
A200-246-286
OPINION
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 16, 2021*
San Francisco, California
Filed August 11, 2021
Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Milan D. Smith, Jr., and
Lawrence VanDyke, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge VanDyke
* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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2 S ANCHEZ-R UANO V . G ARLAND
SUMMARY**
Immigration
Denying Juan Guillermo Sanchez-Ruano’s petition for
review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals,
the panel concluded that Sanchez-Ruano was ineligible for
cancellation of removal due to his conviction of an offense
described under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), which describes a
ground of inadmissibility, even though he had been admitted
into the United States.
The panel explained that, with respect to determining
removability, aliens who have not been admitted and commit
certain crimes are inadmissible under § 1182(a), while aliens
who have been admitted and commit certain crimes are
deportable under § 1227(a). With respect to relief, the panel
explained that § 1229b(b)(1)(C) bars cancellation of
removal if an alien has been convicted of “an offense under”
§§ 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3). Sanchez-Ruano
argued that: (1) because he had been admitted,
§ 1227(a)(2)—not § 1182(a)(2)—applied to him for the
purposes of cancellation, and, accordingly, (2) the personal-
use exception for marijuana possession that is available
under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), but not § 1182(a)(2), rendered him
eligible for cancellation.
The panel concluded that his argument failed at the first
step under Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 649 (9th
Cir. 2004), where the court held that § 1229b should be read
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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S ANCHEZ-R UANO V . G ARLAND 3
to cross reference a list of offenses in the three statutes,
rather than the statutes as a whole. The panel observed that
Gonzalez-Gonzalez concerned a petitioner who illegally
entered and argued that § 1227 did not apply to him, while
Sanchez-Ruano presented the inverse situation because he
legally entered and argued that § 1182 did not apply to him.
The panel concluded that this was a distinction without a
difference, explaining that the point of the holding in
Gonzalez-Gonzalez is that if a petitioner committed an
offense described under any of the three statutes cross-
referenced in § 1229b(b)(1)(C), the petitioner is statutorily
ineligible for cancellation of removal.
Given Sanchez-Ruano’s conviction of an offense
described under § 1182(a)(2), the panel concluded that the
agency correctly determined that he was statutorily
ineligible for cancellation.
COUNSEL
Alejandro Garcia, Law Offices of Alejandro Garcia,
Commerce, California, for Petitioner.
Linda S. Wernery, Assistant Director; Janice K. Redfern,
Senior Litigation Counsel; Office of Immigration Litigation,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.

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4 S ANCHEZ-R UANO V . G ARLAND
OPINION
VANDYKE, Circuit Judge:
In this case, Petitioner Juan Guillermo Sanchez-Ruano
argues that the agency erred in finding him ineligible for
cancellation of removal. The agency found him ineligible
under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) due to his conviction of an
offense described under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2).1 Sanchez-
Ruano argues that § 1182(a)(2) does not apply to him for the
purposes of cancellation of removal because he was
previously admitted into the United States. But we
previously determined that “all offenses described in the
statutes” cross-referenced by § 1229b(b)(1)(C), including
§ 1182(a)(2), “apply to all aliens—regardless of admission
status—for purposes of § 1229b(b)(1)(C)’s bar on
cancellation of removal.” Lozano-Arredondo v. Sessions,
866 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing Gonzalez-
Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 649, 652–53 (9th Cir. 2004)).
Moreover, “[e]ach of the cross-referenced offense sections
is a separate barrier to cancellation of removal.” Vasquez-
Hernandez v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir. 2010).
We therefore deny Sanchez-Ruano’s petition for review.
I.
Sanchez-Ruano, a native and citizen of Mexico, was
admitted into the United States in 1995 as a temporary
visitor. But he overstayed his authorized visit and has since
amassed a string of criminal convictions for various crimes
1 The IJ referenced INA Section 240A(b)(1), which is codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 617
(9th Cir. 2006). The IJ also referenced INA Section 212(a)(2), which is
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). Pondoc Hernaez v. INS, 244 F.3d 752,
756 (9th Cir. 2001).

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over an eight-year span. These crimes include possessing
marijuana, receiving stolen property, driving under the
influence, and being the driver in two hit-and-runs.
In May of 2013, DHS served Sanchez-Ruano with Form
I-261, which charged him with removability under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(B) for remaining in the country longer than
permitted.2 Sanchez-Ruano conceded the charge before the
IJ. He indicated that he would seek cancellation of removal
but requested a continuance pending the status of his
U Nonimmigrant Status (“U-visa”) application. After
numerous continuances and years of litigation on his U-visa
application (which USCIS ultimately denied), the IJ denied
Sanchez-Ruano’s application for cancellation of removal.
The IJ determined that he was statutorily ineligible for
cancellation of removal due to his conviction for marijuana
possession, which is a conviction for an offense described
under § 1182(a)(2).
Sanchez-Ruano appealed to the BIA and argued that,
given his previous admittance, § 1182(a)(2) did not apply to
him for the purposes of cancellation of removal. He further
argued that the personal use exception for violations
involving 30 grams or less of marijuana under
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) rendered him eligible for cancellation of
removal. The BIA dismissed his appeal without expressly
analyzing this argument.
Sanchez-Ruano petitioned this court for review, arguing
again that § 1182(a)(2) does not apply to him for the purpose
of cancellation of removal given his previous admittance,
2 Form I-261 specifically referenced INA Section 237(a)(l)(B),
which is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). See Shin v. Mukasey,
547 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 2008).

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6 S ANCHEZ-R UANO V . G ARLAND
and that the personal use exception under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)
rendered him eligible for relief.3
II.
Where, as here, “the BIA’s analysis on the relevant
issues is confined to a simple statement of a conclusion, we
[] look to the IJ’s oral decision as a guide to what lay behind
the BIA’s conclusion.” Jin v. Holder, 748 F.3d 959, 964 (9th
Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).4 “We review issues of
statutory interpretation de novo.” Gonzalez-Gonzalez,
390 F.3d at 651.
In determining whether the agency properly interpreted
8 U.S.C. § 1229b, “we employ the analysis set forth … in
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., as further explained in Food and Drug Administration
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.” Gonzalez-
Gonzalez, 390 F.3d at 651 (citations omitted). But when
binding precedent and the statutory language dictate the
result, we have simply looked to precedent and statutory text
without engaging in a detailed Chevron analysis. See
Vasquez-Hernandez, 590 F.3d at 1056–57.
3 Sanchez-Ruano’s petition does not raise any arguments pertaining
to obtaining a waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), like he did before the
BIA. He has therefore waived that issue. See Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d
1083, 1091 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011).
4 The fact that the BIA did not expressly analyze Sanchez-Ruano’s
argument raised in his petition is of no import. The BIA’s “simple
statement of a conclusion” dismissing Sanchez-Ruano’s appeal directs
us to review the IJ’s analysis of that issue. See Avetova-Elisseva v. INS,
213 F.3d 1192, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000).

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S ANCHEZ-R UANO V . G ARLAND 7
III.
To fully understand the statutory nuances at issue, some
background is helpful. There are a variety of reasons aliens
may be removed from the United States under federal
immigration law. Those reasons include, as relevant here,
convictions for various crimes. But which crimes trigger
removal depend on the alien’s status. Aliens who have not
been admitted legally and commit certain crimes in the
United States are inadmissible. See Vasquez-Hernandez,
590 F.3d at 1055; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). Aliens who have
entered the United States lawfully and have committed
certain crimes are deportable. See Vasquez-Hernandez,
590 F.3d at 1055; 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2). “The list of
offenses related to inadmissibility [] in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)[]
and the list of offenses related to deportability [] in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a) .… are sometimes overlapping and sometimes
divergent.” Ortega-Lopez v. Barr, 978 F.3d 680, 682 (9th
Cir. 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
“Before an alien is removed from the United States, a
court usually completes two separate inquiries.” Vasquez-
Hernandez, 590 F.3d at 1055. “First, a court must find that
an alien is removable.” Id. As explained, at that stage,
whether the government seeks to show an alien is
inadmissible or deportable makes a difference; the reasons
why an alien can be removed vary “depend[ing] on whether
the alien is inadmissible or deportable.” Id. But once the
inquiry moves to the second stage—i.e., relief from removal
(which includes seeking cancellation of removal)—the
distinction between an inadmissible and deportable alien
becomes irrelevant. As our court has explained:
Once an alien is found removable, the alien
may seek relief from removal through
cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b).

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8 S ANCHEZ-R UANO V . G ARLAND
Cancellation of removal is available for both
inadmissible and deportable aliens. Unlike
the removal statutes, the cancellation of
removal statute does not treat inadmissible
and deportable aliens differently. Rather, the
requirements for cancellation of removal
apply regardless of whether the alien is
inadmissible or deportable for removal
purposes.
Id. (citing Gonzalez-Gonzalez, 390 F.3d at 652) (second
emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
Cancellation of removal is not available if an alien has
been convicted of “an offense described in §§ 1182(a)(2),
1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3).” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)).5 Because it is
irrelevant whether the alien seeking
cancellation of removal was in the country
unlawfully (and therefore subject to grounds
of inadmissibility) or was in the country
lawfully (and therefore subject to grounds of
deportability) …. [T]he alien d[oes] not
qualify for cancellation of removal if the
alien ha[s] been convicted of an offense listed
in any of the three statutes.
5 Only 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), which applies to cancellation of
removal and adjustment of status for certain nonpermanent residents, is
at issue here. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), which applies to cancellation of
removal for certain permanent residents and contains different
requirements, is not implicated in this case.

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S ANCHEZ-R UANO V . G ARLAND 9
Ortega-Lopez, 978 F.3d at 688; see also Lozano-Arredondo,
866 F.3d at 1090.
IV.
Sanchez-Ruano argues that: (1) because he was
previously admitted into the United States, only
§ 1227(a)(2)—not § 1182(a)(2)—applies to him for the
purposes of cancellation of removal, and, accordingly,
(2) the personal-use exception for marijuana possession that
is available under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), but not § 1182(a)(2),
renders him eligible for cancellation of removal. His
argument fails at the first step under Gonzalez-Gonzalez.
In Gonzalez-Gonzalez, the petitioner illegally entered the
United States and was charged with removability pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) for entering the country
without being admitted or paroled. 390 F.3d at 650. The IJ
found the petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal
due to a domestic violence conviction, which “is listed as an
offense under § 1227(a)(2).” Id. On appeal before the BIA,
the petitioner argued that he would only be ineligible for
cancellation of removal “for commission of offenses listed
under § 1182(a)(2)—and not the § 1227 offenses—as he
[wa]s an inadmissible, rather than deportable, alien.” Id.
The BIA rejected this argument, reasoning that the Ҥ 1229b
phrase ‘convicted of an offense under’ [means] ‘convicted
of an offense described under’ any of the three statutes.” Id.
A unanimous panel of our court agreed, concluding that
“[t]he plain language of § 1229b indicates that it should be
read to cross-reference a list of offenses in three statutes,
rather than the statutes as a whole.” Id. at 652. Since then,
our court has repeatedly affirmed the rule that “all offenses
described in the statutes apply to all aliens—regardless of
admission status—for purposes of § 1229b(b)(1)(C)’s bar on

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cancellation of removal.” Lozano-Arredondo, 866 F.3d
at 1090.
Gonzalez-Gonzalez controls this case. Sanchez-Ruano
concedes that he was convicted for an offense described in
§ 1182(a). And just like the petitioner in Gonzalez-
Gonzalez, Sanchez-Ruano argues that one of the statutes
cross-referenced in § 1229b(b)(1)(C) doesn’t apply to him
given his admission status. But pursuant to Gonzalez-
Gonzalez, we must reject his argument under the rule that a
conviction for an offense described under any of the statutes
cross-referenced in § 1229b(b)(1)(C) renders an alien
ineligible for cancellation of removal, regardless of
admission status. See Ortega-Lopez, 978 F.3d at 692
(discussing Gonzalez-Gonzalez).
To be sure, Gonzalez-Gonzalez concerned a petitioner
who illegally entered the United States and argued that
§ 1227 did not apply for the purposes of cancellation of
removal. 390 F.3d at 650–52. Here, Sanchez-Ruano
presents the inverse situation; he legally entered and
therefore argues that § 1182 does not apply for the purposes
of cancellation of removal. But this is a distinction without
a difference under Gonzalez-Gonzalez’s rationale, where the
panel reasoned that:
The plain language of § 1229b indicates that
it should be read to cross-reference a list of
offenses in three statutes, rather than the
statutes as a whole. The most logical reading
of “convicted of an offense under” is that
reached by the BIA: “convicted of an offense
described under” each of the three sections.

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S ANCHEZ-R UANO V . G ARLAND 11
Id. at 652. This reasoning applies fully here.6 The
commission of an offense listed under any of three statutes
cross-referenced in § 1229b(b)(1)(C) bars cancellation of
removal, regardless of whether the petitioner entered
illegally and committed an offense described under
§ 1227(a)(2), or whether the petitioner entered legally and
committed an offense described under § 1182(a)(2). As
subsequent panels have recognized, the point of our holding
in Gonzalez-Gonzalez is that if a petitioner committed an
offense described under any of the three statutes cross-
referenced in § 1229b(b)(1)(C), the petitioner is statutorily
ineligible for cancellation of removal. See Lozano-
Arredondo, 866 F.3d at 1090. Given Sanchez-Ruano’s
conviction of an offense described under § 1182(a)(2), the
agency correctly determined that he was statutorily
ineligible for cancellation of removal.7
PETITION DENIED.
6 At least one other circuit has concluded that, just like in this case,
an admitted alien who overstayed his visa and was charged with
removability pursuant to §§ 1227(a)(1)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), and
1227(a)(2)(B)(I) was ineligible for cancellation of removal due his
conviction of an offense listed under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). See Barma
v. Holder, 640 F.3d 749, 749–51 (7th Cir. 2011).
7 Sanchez-Ruano’s reliance on Matter of Bustamante, 25 I. & N.
Dec. 564 (BIA 2011), and Guerrero-Roque v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 940 (9th
Cir. 2017) (per curiam), is unpersuasive, as neither case suggests that the
applicability of the statutes cross-referenced in § 1229b(b)(1)(C)
depends on an alien’s admission status.

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