SHANNON C. ADAMSON and NICHOLAS ADAMSON, Husband and Wife v. Port of Bellingham, a Washington Municipal Corporation

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHANNON C. ADAMSON and
NICHOLAS ADAMSON, Husband
and Wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
PORT OF BELLINGHAM, a
Washington Municipal
Corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 16-35314
D.C. No.
2:14-cv-01804-MJP
SHANNON C. ADAMSON and
NICHOLAS ADAMSON, Husband
and Wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
PORT OF BELLINGHAM, a
Washington Municipal
Corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 16-35368
D.C. No.
2:14-cv-01804-MJP
OPINION

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ADAMSON V. PORT OF BELLINGHAM 2
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Marsha J. Pechman, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 11, 2018
Seattle, Washington
Filed August 14, 2018
Before: Ronald M. Gould and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit
Judges, and John R. Tunheim,* Chief District Judge.
Opinion by Judge Ikuta
* The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chief United States District Judge
for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

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ADAMSON V. PORT OF BELLINGHAM 3
SUMMARY**
Maritime Law / Jurisdiction
The panel affirmed the district court’s partial summary
judgment in favor of the Port of Bellingham, and held that
maritime law did not apply to an injury caused by land-based
equipment in an action brought by a crew member employed
by the Alaska Marine Highway System (AMHS).
The crew member was seriously injured while attempting
to operate a permanent passenger ramp extending from the
Port of Bellingham’s terminal building to an AMHS ferry.
Following the partial summary judgment, the case proceeded
under Washington state law, and after a ten-day jury trial, a
jury found the Port liable under various Washington law
theories of negligence.
The panel held that because the passenger ramp in this
case was an extension of the land, and the Admiralty
Extension Act did not apply to an injury caused by land-based
equipment, maritime law did not apply.
Pursuant to The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649, 651–52
(1935), a gangway or gangplank is part of a vessel, and
injuries on gangplanks are deemed to have occurred on
navigable waters. In light of this gangplank rule, this court
has deemed gangplank incidents to be subject to admiralty
jurisdiction and maritime law.
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ADAMSON V. PORT OF BELLINGHAM 4
The panel noted that there was a circuit split on the
question whether the gangplank rule applied to permanent,
land-based equipment used for access to a vessel to and from
the shore. The panel joined the Fourth and Fifth Circuits in
applying a case-by-case analysis whether the equipment at
issue was analogous to a gangplank; and rejected the First
Circuit’s per se rule that any equipment used to access a
vessel was a gangplank that was subject to admiralty
jurisdiction.
The Admiralty Extension Act extended admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction to cases of injury or damage caused by
a vessel on navigable waters, even though the injury or
damage was done on land. The panel held that in light of
intervening authority, the interpretation of “caused by a
vessel” in Gebhard v. S.S. Hawaiian Legislator, 425 F.2d
1303, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding that a longshoreman
injured on a pier by pier-based equipment could bring a
maritime negligence claim against the vessel owner under the
Admiralty Extension Act), was no longer good law. The
panel held that under the Act, an injury must have been
caused by a vessel or its appurtenance.
Applying these principles, the panel held that the
passenger ramp in this case was a permanent fixture of the
onshore terminal facilities and could not be reasonably
conceived of as an appurtenance of a vessel. Accordingly,
the crew member’s injuries did not occur on or over
navigable waters. In addition, the panel held that because the
crew member was injured by the collapse of the passenger
ramp, which was an extension of land, the injuries were not
proximately caused by the appurtenance of a ship.

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ADAMSON V. PORT OF BELLINGHAM 5
COUNSEL
Michael Barr King (argued), Jason W. Anderson, and Rory D.
Cosgrove, Carney Badley Spellman P.S., Seattle,
Washington; Frank J. Chmelik and Seth A. Woolson,
Chmelik Sitkin & Davis P.S., Bellingham, Washington; for
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Philip A. Talmadge (argued), Talmadge/Fitzpatrick/Tribe,
Seattle, Washington; James Jacobsen and Joseph Stacey,
Stacey & Jacobsen LLP, Seattle, Washington; for Plaintiffs-
Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
OPINION
IKUTA, Circuit Judge:
A crew member employed by the Alaska Marine
Highway System (AMHS) was seriously injured while
attempting to operate a permanent passenger ramp extending
from the Port of Bellingham’s terminal building to an AMHS
ferry. Because the permanent passenger ramp in this case is
an extension of the land, and the Admiralty Extension Act
(AEA), 46 U.S.C. § 30101, does not apply to an injury caused
by land-based equipment, we affirm the district court’s ruling
that maritime law does not apply.1
1 In a concurrently filed order, we certify to the Washington State
Supreme Court a question related to the proper application of Washington
law to Adamson’s Washington law negligence claims. See Adamson v.
Port of Bellingham, — F.3d — (9th Cir. Aug. 13, 2018) (order).

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ADAMSON V. PORT OF BELLINGHAM 6
I
AMHS, an entity of the State of Alaska, currently
operates commercial ferries at 36 ports that it owns or leases.
In 1988, the Port successfully submitted a proposal to AMHS
to construct a marine terminal for AMHS’s use in
Bellingham, Washington. The Port designed the Bellingham
Cruise Terminal (BCT) to meet AMHS’s requirements. Per
AMHS’s specifications, the BCT included a passenger ramp
and a vehicle ramp to load and unload ferries.
As part of the BCT’s design, the passenger ramp is an
integral part of the structure of the ferry berth facilities. See
Appendix, p.2. The passenger ramp is built into the terminal
building, with one end extending approximately 75 feet over
the dock. See Appendix, p.2. A retractable “apron” connects
the end of the ramp to a vessel. See Appendix, p.1. The ramp
is controlled by 3/4-inch thick wire cables, which extend from
a steel tower on the BCT dock to the far end of the ramp. The
ramp is locked in place by pins that slot into two long bars.
In order to change the ramp’s position, an operator uses the
ramp’s control panel to unlock the pins and then raise and
lower the cables. Attempting to lower the ramp when it is in
the locked position creates slack in the cables. If the operator
creates such slack and then unlocks the pins, the ramp will
drop until the cables catch the slack.
The Port leased portions of the BCT facilities to AMHS
under a 20-year lease agreement, beginning in 1989 when the
BCT was completed. In 2009, the Port and AMHS renewed
the lease for another 15 years.
On November 2, 2012, Shannon Adamson was working
as a crew member on the AMHS ferry M/V Columbia, which

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ADAMSON V. PORT OF BELLINGHAM 7
had docked at the BCT that morning. Adamson was asked to
lower the passenger ramp to load passengers from the
terminal to the ferry. While she was operating the ramp, it
fell 15 feet, breaking the cables and collapsing all the way to
the pier. Adamson suffered serious injuries from the incident.
Adamson filed this suit against the Port in federal district
court under diversity jurisdiction, alleging that the Port
negligently caused her injuries under maritime law.2 In its
answer, the Port asserted as an affirmative defense that
negligent supervision and training by AMHS personnel,
including the crew of the M/V Columbia, was partly
responsible for Adamson’s injuries. The Port then moved for
partial summary judgment, arguing in part that maritime law
did not apply to Adamson’s claims. The district court agreed,
and subsequently denied Adamson’s motion for
reconsideration. The case proceeded under Washington state
law. After a ten-day trial in March and April 2016, a jury
found the Port liable under various Washington law theories
of negligence. The district court denied the Port’s post-trial
motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.
The Port timely appealed the jury verdict and the district
court’s denial of its post-trial motions. Adamson timely cross
2 Adamson first sued the Port in Washington state court. The Port
impleaded the State of Alaska, but the trial court dismissed those claims
based on Alaska’s sovereign immunity, and the Washington Court of
Appeals affirmed. See Adamson v. Port of Bellingham, 192 Wash. App.
921, 923–24 (2016). While the Port’s appeal of its third-party claim
against Alaska was pending, Adamson requested and received a dismissal
of her state court claim without prejudice and refiled in federal court.
Adamson also received workers’ compensation from the State of Alaska.
See Adamson, 192 Wash. App. at 924.

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ADAMSON V. PORT OF BELLINGHAM 8
appealed, arguing that the district court’s ruling that maritime
law did not apply was erroneous.
II
Pursuant to Adamson’s cross appeal, we consider here
whether the district court correctly applied Washington law
rather than maritime law.3 We review de novo a district
court’s determination that maritime jurisdiction, and therefore
substantive maritime law, does not extend to a tort claim.
H20 Houseboat Vacations Inc. v. Hernandez, 103 F.3d 914,
916 (9th Cir. 1996). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
A
We begin by reviewing the legal framework for
determining whether maritime law applies to a tort claim.4
Plaintiffs may bring maritime law claims under either
diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, or admiralty
3 Because Adamson seeks no additional relief beyond upholding the
jury’s verdict, she need not have presented this claim in a cross appeal.
See Jennings v. Stephens, 135 S. Ct. 793, 798 (2015). Nonetheless, we
consider her argument as an alternative ground on which to affirm the
district court. See Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found.,
862 F.3d 951, 974 (9th Cir. 2017).
4 “We use the terms ‘admiralty’ and ‘maritime’ interchangeably, as
the relevant caselaw often uses both words without apparent distinction.”
Gruver v. Lesman Fisheries, Inc., 489 F.3d 978, 982 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007).

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ADAMSON V. PORT OF BELLINGHAM 9
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1333.5 Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law,
404 U.S. 202, 204 (1971). Under either jurisdictional statute,
“federal maritime law govern[s]” if the claim comes “within
the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction conferred on the
district courts by the Constitution and the jurisdictional
statutes.” Id.; see also Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 628 (1959). In other words,
if the district court could have maritime jurisdiction over a
tort claim, “[s]ubstantive maritime law controls” the claim,
“whatever the forum or asserted basis of jurisdiction.”
Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Corp.,
982 F.2d 363, 366 n.1 (9th Cir. 1992).
Maritime law applies to a tort if two conditions are met.
First, the “location” test requires us to determine “whether the
tort occurred on navigable water or whether injury suffered
on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water.” In re
Mission Bay Jet Sports, LLC, 570 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir.
2009) (quoting Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995)). While this
test historically served “as the exclusive test of admiralty tort
jurisdiction,” the Supreme Court has recognized an additional
requirement: a nexus to maritime activity. Exec. Jet Aviation,
Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 261 (1972). The
nexus requirement avoids sweeping into admiralty
jurisdiction wholly unrelated torts, such as airplane crashes
over water. Id. at 268. Thus, maritime torts must also satisfy
a “connection” test, which requires that the tort have a
“significant relationship to traditional maritime activity.” In
5 28 U.S.C. § 1333 provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he district courts
shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of:
(1) [a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors
in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.”

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ADAMSON V. PORT OF BELLINGHAM 10
re Mission Bay Jet Sports, LLC, 570 F.3d at 1126 (quoting
Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674 (1982)).
Here, the Port agrees that Adamson’s tort claim bears the
requisite connection to maritime activity, so we focus on the
locality where the asserted tort occurred.
B
For purposes of maritime law, “[p]iers and docks [have
been] consistently deemed extensions of land; injuries
inflicted to or on them were held not compensable under the
maritime law.” Victory Carriers, 404 U.S. at 206–07
(footnote omitted). Structures such as “bridges, shore docks,
protection piling, piers, etc., pertained to the land” because
they were “connected with the shore and immediately
concerned commerce upon land.” Cleveland Terminal &
Valley R.R. Co. v. Cleveland S.S. Co., 208 U.S. 316, 321
(1908). “None of these structures were aids to navigation in
the maritime sense, but extensions of the shore and aids to
commerce on land as such.” Id.; see also Rodrigue v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 360 (1969) (concluding that
admiralty jurisdiction did not extend to accidents on artificial
islands because “the accidents had no more connection with
the ordinary stuff of admiralty than do accidents on piers”);
Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625, 627 (1887)
(explaining that a fixed structure, such as a dry-dock, is not
used for the purpose of navigation any more so than a wharf
or warehouse that projects upon water).
While piers and docks are considered extensions of the
land, a gangway or gangplank is part of a vessel; thus,
injuries on gangplanks are deemed to have occurred on
navigable waters. The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649,

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ADAMSON V. PORT OF BELLINGHAM 11
651–52 (1935).6 In The Admiral Peoples, the steamship
owner had placed a 2-foot by 18-foot plank from the vessel
to the dock, and a passenger was injured in a fall from the
plank. Id. at 650. The Admiral Peoples reasoned that the
gangplank at issue “was a part of the vessel’s equipment
which was placed in position to enable its passengers to reach
the shore,” and that “[i]t was no less a part of the vessel
because in its extension to the dock it projected over the
land.” Id. at 651–52. While the plaintiff “was on the
gangplank, she had not yet left the vessel,” id. at 652, and
therefore, the plaintiff’s injury was within maritime
jurisdiction, id.; see also Victory Carriers, 404 U.S. at 207
(noting that while piers and docks are extensions of land,
maritime law applied to gangplanks, which “served as a
rough dividing line between the state and maritime regimes”).
In light of The Admiral Peoples’s gangplank rule, we
have deemed gangplank incidents to be subject to admiralty
jurisdiction and maritime law. See The Shangho, 88 F.2d 42,
42 (9th Cir. 1937) (holding that maritime law applied to a
longshoreman’s claim that he was injured when he fell from
a gangplank that had been unlashed from the ship because the
“gangplank is part of the ship when it is being used for the
purpose of furnishing ingress and egress to and from the
ship”). We have applied this gangplank rule to such injuries
even when the gangplank was not part of the ship’s
equipment. See Solano v. Beilby, 761 F.2d 1369, 1370–71
(9th Cir. 1985) (holding that maritime law applied to a
6 At the time The Admiral Peoples was decided, a gangplank was
defined as “a long narrow moveable platform or bridge, used in entering
or leaving a ship, as from a wharf.” Webster’s Second New International
Dictionary 1032 (1934). The same definition applies today. See
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 934 (2002).

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ADAMSON V. PORT OF BELLINGHAM 12
longshoreman’s claim that he was injured on a ramp to a ship
while attempting to load a vehicle from the dock, even though
the ramp was provided by his employer, a stevedoring
company).
We have not had much occasion, however, to consider
when the gangplank rule applies to other sorts of connecting
equipment used for access to vessels to and from the shore.
Several courts have held that temporary connecting
equipment used for such access is analogous to gangplanks
and therefore subject to admiralty jurisdiction. See Tullis v.
Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 397 F.2d 22, 24 (5th Cir. 1968)
(reasoning that “a row of pilings connected to shore by a
single plank over nine or ten feet of water” was not “in any
way analogous to a fixed pier or wharf” and “could be
considered a part of the vessel’s equipment in lieu of the
usual or customary gangplank”); Mich. Mutual Liab. Co. v.
Arrien, 344 F.2d 640, 642, 644 (2d Cir. 1965) (determining
that “a removable wooden, rectangular platform,
approximately six feet by ten feet” was more analogous to a
gangplank than a permanent pier or wharf).7
7 Arrien arose in the context of interpreting the scope of the
Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), see
344 F.2d at 643–44, which at the time provided compensation for injuries
“occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any
dry dock)” for which recovery could not be provided by state law,
33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1964). This version of the LHWCA “specifically
adopted the . . . line” traditionally drawn between maritime and state
jurisdiction, Nacirema Oper. Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 220 (1969),
making Arrien relevant to our inquiry. In 1972, Congress amended the
LHWCA to extend beyond the reach of admiralty jurisdiction and cover
additional employees involved in land-based operations related to marine
activities. Ne. Marine Terminal Co., Inc. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 251–52
(1977).

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ADAMSON V. PORT OF BELLINGHAM 13
By contrast, there is a circuit split on the question whether
the gangplank rule applies to permanent, land-based
equipment used for access to a vessel to and from the shore.
In the leading circuit case on the issue, the Fifth Circuit held
that the gangplank rule did not apply to a permanent land-
based ramp. See Parker v. S. La. Contractors, Inc., 537 F.2d
113, 115–16 (5th Cir. 1976). In Parker, a truck driver was
injured on a ramp connecting a barge to a landing and sued
the barge owner and lessee, as well as the owner of the
landing and another third party. Id. at 115. The ramp
“weighed several tons, rested on land and had an apron
extending over the water’s edge which could be raised and
lowered by winches to permit ingress and egress from
docking barges.” Id. Parker contrasted this situation with
those involving temporary gangplanks and analogous
connecting structures, reasoning that the ramp “rested on
land, and removing it would involve a major undertaking
calling for heavy equipment.” Id. at 116. Accordingly, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that, “[u]nlike a gangplank, [the
ramp] cannot reasonably be conceived as an appurtenance of
the barges that use it for docking,” and therefore the injury
did not occur at a maritime locality. Id.
The Fourth Circuit reached the same conclusion regarding
a moored fuel flat used to cross from the dock to vessels.8
Russell v. City Ice & Fuel Co. of Point Pleasant, 539 F.2d
1318, 1319 (4th Cir. 1976). Russell reasoned that the flat
“was floating, but more or less permanently moored to the
shore, and it constituted the principal portion of the dock.”
Id. at 1320. While the flat was still capable of use as a vessel,
the Fourth Circuit concluded that “[a]s long as such a
8 A “flat” is generally a “a flat-bottomed boat with a shallow draft and
without keel.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 866 (2002).

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ADAMSON V. PORT OF BELLINGHAM 14
structure is securely affixed to the land and is in use as a
component of the shore facilities, it is not a vessel in
navigation, but a dock.” Id. at 1321. Both the Fourth and
Fifth Circuits thus rejected a per se rule that the gangplank
rule applies to any equipment used to provide access to and
from a vessel.
Contrary to these two circuits, the First Circuit held that
the gangplank rule applies to any equipment providing the
means of ingress to and egress from a vessel. See Romero
Reyes v. Marine Enters., Inc., 494 F.2d 866, 867 (1st Cir.
1974). In Romero Reyes, a longshoreman sued a barge owner
for injuries suffered on a “gangway, which was permanently
affixed to a pier-based tower and did not belong to the barge.”
Id. The gangway was “[s]uspended from a tower on pilings
next to the dock” and “could be raised or lowered by cables
attached to the tower.” Id. at 869. Romero Reyes concluded
that maritime law applied to this accident, reasoning that
“[b]ecause the means of ingress or egress, by whomever
furnished, are an ‘appurtenance’ of the vessel, the [vessel]
owner has a duty of care regarding them.” Id. at 870.9
Although we have not directly addressed this issue, we
have indicated our disagreement with the First Circuit’s per
se rule. See Scheuring v. Traylor Bros., Inc., 476 F.3d 781,
789–90 (9th Cir. 2007). In Scheuring, we considered a claim
involving an injury suffered when the plaintiff was lifting a
9 Other cases have employed broad language suggesting that the
gangplank rule applies whenever a connecting structure is used for loading
or unloading a vessel, but in those cases the ramps were not permanently
affixed to land. See White v. United States, 53 F.3d 43, 47 (4th Cir. 1995)
(wooden platform bridging gap between gangway and dock); Sarauw v.
Oceanic Navigation Corp., 655 F.2d 526, 527–28 (3d Cir. 1981)
(gangway falling to dock).

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ADAMSON V. PORT OF BELLINGHAM 15
“20-foot ramp leading from the water’s edge to an offshore
float,” from which crew members would use a skiff to reach
a barge. Id. at 784. The ramp, which weighed 180 pounds,
“could not be affixed to the float, and, on average, a few
times a week it would fall into the water.” Id. We noted
several cases enunciating a per se rule “that a gangway or
ramp which is ‘necessarily used for embarking or
disembarking’ becomes ‘a basic appurtenance of the vessel.’”
Id. at 790 (quoting Sarauw v. Oceanic Navigation Corp.,
655 F.2d 526, 528 (3d Cir. 1981) and citing Romero Reyes,
494 F.2d at 869). But rather than adopt this rule, we
concluded that “[t]here is a genuine issue of material fact
whether the ramp . . . is more like a gangway than a dock or
pier.” Id. at 789–90.
We now join the well-reasoned conclusion of the Fourth
and Fifth Circuits, and reject the First Circuit’s rule that any
equipment used to access a vessel is a gangplank that is
subject to admiralty jurisdiction. There are several reasons
for doing so. First, our conclusion is consistent with Supreme
Court precedent, which has not indicated that every case
involving a structure or piece of equipment used for access to
a vessel falls within admiralty jurisdiction. Specifically, in T.
Smith & Son v. Taylor, the Supreme Court considered an
accident that occurred when a longshoreman unloading a
vessel was killed by a fall from “a stage that rested solely
upon the wharf and projected a few feet over the water to or
near the side of the vessel.” 276 U.S. 179, 181 (1928). The
plaintiff there conceded that both the stage and the wharf
were extensions of land. Id. at 181–82. The Supreme Court
agreed, concluding that maritime jurisdiction was lacking
because the injured worker had been struck while on the
stage, and therefore on land. Id. at 182. Further, admiralty
jurisdiction does not necessarily apply to injuries caused by

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ADAMSON V. PORT OF BELLINGHAM 16
equipment used to load or unload a ship. See Nacirema Oper.
Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 213, 223 (1969) (admiralty
jurisdiction does not apply to the injuries suffered by a
longshoreman who was working on a pier permanently
affixed to the shore and caused by pier-based crane being
used to load a ship) (construing the pre-1972 LHWCA, see
supra 12 n.7).
Moreover, the historical justification for the gangplank
rule was that the gangplank was actually carried by the vessel
as “a part of the vessel’s equipment.” The Admiral Peoples,
295 U.S. at 651–52; see also Victory Carriers, 404 U.S. at
213 (noting that a purported maritime claim was particularly
attenuated where, in part, the plaintiff “was not injured by
equipment that was part of the ship’s usual gear or that was
stored on board”); O’Keefe v. Atl. Stevedoring Co., 354 F.2d
48, 50 (5th Cir. 1965) (explaining that a gangplank was
“traditionally, if no[t] always so in fact, a part of the
equipment of the ship”). Although courts, including ours,
have extended this rationale to gangplanks and other
analogous temporary equipment that is not carried by the
vessel, see, e.g., Solano, 761 F.2d at 1371; Tullis, 397 F.2d at
24, we agree with the Fifth Circuit that when the ramp at
issue is a permanent part of the shore facility, affixed to the
shore, and bearing little resemblance to a “moveable platform
or bridge” capable of being carried with a vessel, Webster’s
Second New International Dictionary 1032, it “cannot
reasonably be conceived as an appurtenance of the [vessels]”
that use it, Parker, 537 F.2d at 116.
Finally, the rationale for the per se rule in Romero Reyes
derives in part from the vessel owner’s duty to provide a safe
means of access to and from the shore. Romero Reyes
reasoned that the duty of seaworthiness “includes providing

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ADAMSON V. PORT OF BELLINGHAM 17
[crew members] with a suitable means to board and
disembark,” and that this duty “extends to the gangway by
whomever supplied, owned, or controlled.” 494 F.2d at 869.
Romero Reyes concluded that because this duty made the
gangway at issue “an ‘appurtenance’ of the vessel,” the vessel
owner’s duty of care required the owner to inspect the
gangway and warn against apparent defects. Id. at 870. The
duty of seaworthiness does not apply to the Port in this case.
See Fla. Fuels, Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 6 F.3d 330,
332 (5th Cir. 1993) (“It is well-settled, however, that the
doctrine of ‘seaworthiness’ is not applicable to a dock owner
who does not occupy the position of owner or operator of the
vessel.”).
Having rejected the First Circuit’s per se rule, we follow
Scheuring’s guidance and hold that courts must consider, on
a case-by-case basis, whether the equipment at issue is
analogous to a gangplank and therefore subject to admiralty
jurisdiction, or is a permanent land-based structure subject to
state law.
C
While our analysis above can guide us in determining
whether the asserted tort occurred over the water or on land,
this is not the end of the voyage for admiralty jurisdiction. In
1948, Congress enacted the AEA, which provides that “[t]he
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States
extends to and includes cases of injury or damage, to person
or property, caused by a vessel on navigable waters, even
though the injury or damage is done or consummated on
land.” 46 U.S.C. § 30101(a). Congress passed this law
“specifically to overrule or circumvent” a line of Supreme
Court cases that had “refused to permit recovery in admiralty

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ADAMSON V. PORT OF BELLINGHAM 18
even where a ship or its gear, through collision or otherwise,
caused damage to persons ashore or to bridges, docks, or
other shore-based property.” Victory Carriers, 404 U.S. at
209.
Interpreting this Act, the Supreme Court has held that a
tort may fall within the AEA regardless whether it is
“committed by the ship itself” or “by the ship’s personnel
while operating it.” Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,
373 U.S. 206, 210 (1963). In Gutierrez, a stevedore was
injured on the dock while unloading defective cargo
containers from a ship when he slipped on loose beans that
had spilled from the containers. Id. at 207. Gutierrez held
that the AEA applied to the stevedore’s negligence claim,
noting that the vessel owner “allowed the cargo to be
discharged in dangerous and defective bagging,” and
reasoning that the impact of this action was “felt ashore at a
time and place not remote from the wrongful act.” Id. at
210–11.
Applying Gutierrez, we held in Gebhard v. S.S. Hawaiian
Legislator that a longshoreman injured on a pier by pier-
based equipment could bring a maritime negligence claim
against the vessel owner under the AEA. 425 F.2d 1303,
1305–06 (9th Cir. 1970). In Gebhard, an employee of a
stevedoring company was directing straddle carriers (large
vehicles which moved container vans to the water’s edge)
into position beneath a crane used to hoist the vans aboard
ship. Id. at 1305. The employee was injured when a straddle
carrier ran into him and crushed his leg. Id. We reasoned
that there was “no substantial difference for jurisdictional
purposes between an allegation that the shipowner was
negligent in allowing beans to be unloaded by means of
dangerously defective bagging, [as in Gutierrez,] and one that

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ADAMSON V. PORT OF BELLINGHAM 19
he was negligent in allowing vans to be loaded [on their way
onto the vessel] by means of dangerously defective
equipment.” Id. at 1306. Therefore, we concluded that we
had jurisdiction under the AEA. Id.
When we decided Gebhard, however, we did not have the
benefit of Victory Carriers, which clarified and narrowed
Gutierrez’s scope. 404 U.S. at 210–11. In Victory Carriers,
a longshoreman was injured while driving a forklift loaded
with cargo to a point on a pier where the cargo could be
hoisted onto a vessel. Id. at 202–03. During this process, the
overhead protection rack of the forklift (which was owned by
his stevedore employer) came loose and struck him. Id. The
Court held that because the longshoreman was injured by
alleged defects in his employer’s forklift while operating on
a pier, federal maritime law did not apply even though the
longshoreman was in the process of loading a vessel. Id. at
210–11. Distinguishing Gutierrez, the Court explained that
the decision in that case “turned . . . upon the fact that [the
stevedore’s] injury was caused by an appurtenance of a ship,
the defective cargo containers,” which led to the on-shore
injuries. Id. at 210–11. Victory Carriers emphasized that
where an individual is “injured on a pier by pier-based
equipment,” the injury “remain[s] outside the” AEA. Id. at
211 (quoting Nacirema, 396 U.S. at 223). Noting that
extending admiralty jurisdiction to the injury would “raise a
host of new problems as to the standards for and limitations
on the applicability of maritime law to accidents on land,”
Victory Carriers stressed that “[r]eliance upon the gangplank
line as the presumptive boundary of admiralty jurisdiction,
except for cases in which a ship’s appurtenance causes
damage ashore, recognizes the traditional limitations of
admiralty jurisdiction, and decreases . . . arbitrariness and
uncertainties . . . .” Id. at 214 & n.14 (emphasis added).

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ADAMSON V. PORT OF BELLINGHAM 20
After Victory Carriers, all circuits considering the issue
have agreed that “to invoke maritime jurisdiction under the
Admiralty Extension Act, a plaintiff injured on shore must
allege that the injury was caused by a[n] . . . appurtenance of
a ship on navigable waters.” Margin v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc.,
812 F.2d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Garret v. Gutzeit,
491 F.2d 228, 232 (4th Cir. 1974) (“Victory Carriers and
Gutierrez, read and considered together, combine to
formulate the following rule: Admiralty jurisdiction extends
to shorebased workers who are injured by an appurtenance of
the ship at a time and place not remote from the wrongful act
of the shipowner.”). In other words, when read in light of
Victory Carriers, Gutierrez’s statement that admiralty
jurisdiction applies to torts committed “by the ship’s
personnel while operating it,” 373 U.S. at 210, applies only
where the injury is “caused by an appurtenance of [the] ship”
or the ship itself, Victory Carriers, 404 U.S. at 211. As the
First Circuit put it, “[t]he [Supreme] Court’s later decision in
Victory Carriers . . . headed off whatever inclination lower
courts might have had to read Gutierrez in as unbounded a
manner as the passage [regarding torts committed by the
ship’s personnel], taken literally, might have sanctioned.”
Kinsella v. Zim Isr. Navigation Co., Ltd., 513 F.2d 701,
703–04 (1st Cir. 1975) (holding that the AEA did not apply
where the object that caused the injury “was not an
appurtenance in relation to plaintiff’s injury”); see also MLC
Fishing, Inc. v. Velez, 667 F.3d 140, 142 (2d Cir. 2011)
(holding that the AEA did not apply when a vessel passenger
slipped and fell on a ramp deemed to be an extension of land,
and the accident was not “‘caused by’ the vessel or its
appurtenances.”); Scott v. Trump Ind., Inc., 337 F.3d 939,
944–45 (7th Cir. 2003) (concluding that AEA jurisdiction
depended on whether “an appurtenance of the” vessel
“proximately caused” the injury); Anderson v. United States,

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ADAMSON V. PORT OF BELLINGHAM 21
317 F.3d 1235, 1237 (11th Cir. 2003) (reasoning that whether
injuries caused by aircraft dropping bombs were “caused by
a vessel” turned on “whether the aircraft is an appurtenance
to the” aircraft carrier (first quoting Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534;
and then citing Victory Carriers, 404 U.S. at 210–11)).
The Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Grubart,
supports this reading of Victory Carriers and Gutierrez.
Grubart involved allegations that a dredging company had
negligently caused flooding in a tunnel and numerous
buildings. 513 U.S. at 529. The dredging company had
“used a crane, sitting on [its] barge in the river next to a
bridge, to drive piles into the riverbed above the tunnel.” Id.
In examining whether the tort was committed “by a vessel,”
Grubart explained that “[t]he fact that the pile driving was
done with a crane makes no difference under the location test,
given the maritime law that ordinarily treats an
‘appurtenance’ attached to a vessel in navigable waters as
part of the vessel itself.” Id. at 535 (citing Victory Carriers,
404 U.S. at 210–11; Gutierrez, 373 U.S. at 209–10). The
Court went on to hold that proximate causation was the
appropriate standard by which to measure whether the
damage was “caused” by the appurtenance of the barge. Id.
at 537–38. Of course, had the AEA required only that the tort
be “committed . . . by the ship’s personnel while operating
it,” Gutierrez, 373 U.S. at 210, Grubart’s discussion as to
whether the crane was an appurtenance of the barge would
have been unnecessary, as the AEA would have been satisfied
by the allegations that the dredging company’s employees
were negligent in their pile driving, regardless whether the
crane was an appurtenance.
In light of this intervening authority, we conclude that
Gebhard’s interpretation of “caused by a vessel” no longer

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ADAMSON V. PORT OF BELLINGHAM 22
remains good law. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889,
893–94 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). We join our sister circuits
in holding that, under the AEA, an injury must have been
caused by a vessel or its appurtenance. See, e.g., Scott,
337 F.3d at 944–45. Therefore, the AEA does not extend to
injuries “on a pier by pier-based equipment.” Victory
Carriers, 404 U.S. at 211 (quoting Nacirema Oper., 396 U.S.
at 211).10
III
We now apply these principles to Adamson’s arguments.
Adamson first argues that her injury occurred on
navigable waters because the BCT passenger ramp is
analogous to a gangplank, and therefore subject to admiralty
jurisdiction.
We disagree; there is no genuine issue of material fact as
to whether the passenger ramp is a gangplank or analogous to
one. Unlike a traditional gangplank, the passenger ramp at
the BCT is not equipment carried with the ship. See The
Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. at 651; O’Keefe, 354 F.2d at 50.
10 This conclusion is consistent with our holding in Christensen v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., where we considered a claim that a dock owner’s
negligence in the construction and operation of its dock had allowed a ship
to break free. 279 F.3d 807, 811 (9th Cir. 2002). A longshoreman injured
his back while pulling on the ship’s line to retie the ship. Id. We
explained that this injury was covered by the AEA, reasoning that it “was
caused by a vessel on navigable water breaking free from a dock and
needing to be retied.” Id. at 814–15 n.29. In Christensen, the vessel did
not directly cause the injury by striking the longshoreman, but because he
was injured while attempting to rein in the vessel, the vessel was clearly
a proximate cause of the damage. See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 537–38.

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ADAMSON V. PORT OF BELLINGHAM 23
Nor is it a temporary platform or piece of equipment that can
be “placed in position to enable its passengers to reach the
shore,” The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. at 651; see also
Solano, 761 F.2d at 1370–71. Rather, the BCT’s passenger
ramp is a permanent fixture of the onshore terminal facilities.
The ramp itself is permanently extended partially over water
and, though it is raised or lowered, remains roughly in the
same place. Only the apron can be retracted to cover less of
the water, and it still remains permanently affixed to land-
and dock-based structures. Like the ramp in Parker, the
passenger ramp here can only be moved mechanically, “and
removing it would involve a major undertaking calling for
heavy equipment.” 537 F.2d at 116. Given these
characteristics, the passenger ramp “cannot reasonably be
conceived of as an appurtenance” of the M/V Columbia and
other AMHS ferries. Id. Therefore, Adamson’s injuries did
not occur “on or over navigable waters.” Taghadomi v.
United States, 401 F.3d 1080, 1084 (9th Cir. 2005).
Alternatively, Adamson argues that even if the passenger
ramp is part of the land, the AEA applies because the Port
argued as an affirmative defense that AMHS personnel,
including the crew of the M/V Columbia, were negligent in
their training, supervision, and control of Adamson. Relying
on Gutierrez, 373 U.S. at 210, and Gebhard, 425 F.2d at
1306–07, Adamson reasons that when the negligence of ship
personnel causes injury on shore, the AEA extends admiralty
jurisdiction to that injury. Again, we disagree.
Even assuming that the Port’s allegations in an
affirmative defense could form the basis for jurisdiction
under the AEA, the substance of these allegations is

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ADAMSON V. PORT OF BELLINGHAM 24
insufficient.11 As explained above, Adamson’s reliance on
Gutierrez and Gebhard is unavailing because Adamson was
injured by the collapse of the passenger ramp, which is an
extension of land. Adamson’s injuries were thus not
proximately “caused by an appurtenance of a ship,” Victory
Carriers, 404 U.S. at 211; see also MLC Fishing, Inc.,
667 F.3d at 142; Parker, 537 F.2d at 116, making the
officers’ role in her injuries irrelevant to AEA jurisdiction.
Therefore this case does not involve an injury “caused by a
vessel on navigable waters.” 46 U.S.C. § 30101.12
11 To the extent that Adamson contends that the Port is judicially
estopped from asserting that maritime law does not apply, this argument
is meritless because Adamson has not shown that “the court relied on, or
accepted, [a] previous inconsistent position” of the Port, or that any of the
other factors favoring judicial estoppel are present. Hamilton v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 782–83 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). We GRANT the Port’s contested
motion for judicial notice of the briefing in a related state court case,
Adamson v. Port of Bellingham, 192 Wash. App. 921 (2016). See
Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d
1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1998).
12 We reject Adamson’s argument that maritime law applies because
the passenger ramp’s collapse also damaged the M/V Columbia. The
locality of the tort depends on whether “the tort occurred on navigable
water,” In re Mission Bay Jet Sports, LLC, 570 F.3d at 1126 (citation
omitted), and Adamson has provided no authority holding that damage to
a ship which is on navigable water confers admiralty jurisdiction even
when that damage is not part of the lawsuit. Northern Insurance Co. of
New York v. Chatham County, on which Adamson relies, is inapposite
because the plaintiff there sought to recover for damages to a vessel and
the damage plainly occurred on navigable waters. 547 U.S. 189, 192
(2006).

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ADAMSON V. PORT OF BELLINGHAM 25
Accordingly, we hold that maritime law does not apply to
Adamson’s claims, and we affirm the district court’s grant of
partial summary judgment on that issue.
AFFIRMED.

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ADAMSON V. PORT OF BELLINGHAM 1
APPENDIX
Bellingham Cruise Terminal and Passenger Ramp

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ADAMSON V. PORT OF BELLINGHAM 2

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