United States v. 2011-09-19 | 10-35519 | Intermountain Fair Housing V. Boise Rescue Mission |…

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 INTERMOUNTAIN FAIR HOUSING
COUNCIL; JANENE COWLES; and No. 10-35519
RICHARD CHINN, D.C. No. Plaintiffs-Appellants, 1:08-cv-00205- v. EJL-CWD
BOISE RESCUE MISSION MINISTRIES; OPINION
and BOISE RESCUE MISSION, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees. 
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
July 12, 2011—San Francisco, California
Filed September 19, 2011
Before: Sidney R. Thomas and Susan P. Graber,
Circuit Judges, and James V. Selna, District Judge.*
Opinion by Judge Graber
*The Honorable James V. Selna, United States District Judge for the
Central District of California, sitting by designation.
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COUNSEL
Ken Nagy, Lewiston, Idaho, for the plaintiffs-appellants.
Luke W. Goodrich, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty,
Washington, D.C., for the defendants-appellees.
Linda F. Thome, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington,
D.C.; Ayesha N. Khan, Washington, D.C.; Darryl P. Rains,
Morrison & Foerster LLP, Palo Alto, California; Eric S. Bax-
ter, Arent Fox LLP, Washington, D.C.; Steven W. Fitschen,
The National Legal Foundation, Virginia Beach, Virginia; and
Joseph Cascio, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washington, D.C., for
the amici curiae.
OPINION
GRABER, Circuit Judge:
We consider the extent of the protection afforded by the
Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631, against
religious discrimination. Defendant Boise Rescue Mission
Ministries, a non-profit Christian organization, operates a res-
idential drug treatment program and, at the time relevant to
this appeal, two homeless shelters in Boise, Idaho. Plaintiffs
Janene Cowles, Richard Chinn, and Intermountain Fair Hous-
ing Council allege that Defendant engages in religious dis-
crimination in providing shelter and residential recovery
services, in violation of the FHA. The district court granted
summary judgment to Defendant, and we affirm.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant is an Idaho non-profit corporation, originally
incorporated as “Christ’s Gospel Mission, Inc.,” for the pur-
poses of “provid[ing] for the worship of God, the teaching
and preaching of the Word of God, the winning of people to
a personal faith in the Lord Jesus Christ and in the spiritual
improvement of mankind, . . . and to extend the ministry of
the Gospel unto all the earth.” To those ends, Defendant oper-
ates two services that are relevant here. First, Defendant has
a residential drug treatment program that provides an “inten-
sive, Christ-based residential recovery program for people
with chemical dependency or alcoholism.” Second, Defendant
runs homeless shelters to “return the poor, needy and home-
less to society as self-sufficient, productive citizens.” Plaintiff
Cowles participated in the drug treatment program. Plaintiff
Chinn stayed from time to time in Defendant’s homeless shel-
ters.
A. The Residential Drug Treatment Program and Plaintiff
Cowles
Defendant requires all participants in its residential drug
treatment program to be, or to desire to be, Christian. They
must engage in a “wide range” of Christian activities, includ-
ing worship services, Bible study, public and private prayer,
religious singing, and public Bible reading. Defendant does
not charge a fee for attending its drug treatment program.
A “Program Policies and Description” form and a “Pro-
gram House Rules and Procedures” pamphlet apprise poten-
tial participants of what will be expected. The program entails
a full year of treatment to help women1 “to develop a relation-
ship with God, themselves, and others through classes, coun-
1Defendant operates a separate drug treatment program for men.
Because Plaintiffs do not challenge the legality of the men’s program, we
do not address it.
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seling, and group interaction.” The program description
expressly states that participants must engage in Bible study
and attend church services each week.
The program places heavy restrictions on participants’
other activities. For example, they may not make phone calls
or receive mail during the first month. Thereafter, they may
receive visitors only on Sundays between 2 and 4 p.m. They
may leave Defendant’s facility only if the staff grants them a
pass, which is earned through good behavior. Participants
may not work for an outside employer during at least the first
nine months of their treatment.
Cowles wrote a letter to Defendant in November 2005. She
stated that she had been charged with possession of metham-
phetamine. The judge presiding over her criminal proceeding
sentenced her to a year in the county jail, but she recom-
mended that Cowles enroll in Defendant’s drug treatment pro-
gram. If Cowles enrolled in the program, the judge stated that
she would order Cowles’ release on probation pending her
successful completion of the program. Otherwise, Cowles had
to serve out her sentence.
In her letter to Defendant, Cowles gave the impression that
she understood the religious nature of Defendant’s program
and that she desired to participate in the program because of
its religious nature. She wrote: “I am searching for guidance
and knowledge and peace. When I have had God in my life
things weren’t perfect but I had an inner peace I miss very
much. . . . I am focused on changing my life through God and
spiritual growth.” Cowles asked Defendant to put her on the
program’s waiting list and to contact her as soon as possible.
Defendant’s staff interviewed Cowles on March 2, 2006.
They told Cowles about the program’s rules and “intense,
faith-based curriculum.” They also provided Cowles with a
copy of the program description. Defendant formally accepted
Cowles into its drug treatment program on March 7.
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True to the description of its program, Defendant required
Cowles to participate in religious activities.2 She could not
read secular books or listen to secular music. She had to
attend church every Sunday and, if she refused to attend
Defendant’s services, she could go to one of only four other
nearby churches that Defendant had approved. She also had
to attend daily services, where she had to sing hymns in the
choir, pray silently and out loud, recite Bible verses, and
allow the “laying on of hands.” On a regular basis, she was
required to “cast out demons” in the facility, using oil and
holy water. On May 4, 2006, Plaintiff had to participate in the
National Day of Prayer at the Idaho Capitol Building.
On three occasions Cowles became so upset by these prac-
tices that she ran out of the room crying. At those times,
Defendant’s Women’s Ministry Director told Cowles that she
would go to Hell and would be left behind if she did not “ac-
cept Jesus Christ as her personal savior.” When Cowles asked
if she could graduate from the program without converting to
Christianity, Defendant’s staff told her that graduation with-
out conversion had “never happened.”
At times Cowles heard Defendant’s staff ridicule Mormons.
The pastor who led many of Defendant’s religious services
called Mormons “crazy.” When a Mormon woman entered
the program, a staff member vowed to “straighten her out.”
Within a month, the woman was baptized into Defendant’s
faith.
In late May or early June 2006, about three months after
her acceptance into the program, Cowles asked to transfer to
2Because this case comes to us through Defendant’s motion for sum-
mary judgment, we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable
to Plaintiffs and must draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. Olsen
v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004). Defendant
denies having engaged in any kind of discrimination or retaliation, reli-
gious or otherwise, and denies many of the specific facts asserted by
Plaintiffs and described in text.
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a different, non-religious treatment facility. Purportedly in
retaliation for making that request, the Women’s Ministry
Director restricted Cowles’ activities and required that she
place all of her telephone calls to her lawyer on speaker phone
so that Defendant’s staff could listen to them. Other partici-
pants told Cowles that Defendant’s staff had encouraged them
to make false allegations against Cowles and to exclude
Cowles because she was not Christian.
In addition to the alleged abuse that she received for not
accepting Christianity, Cowles also alleges that she experi-
enced sex discrimination. She could not work outside Defen-
dant’s facility or visit with her 7-year-old son except during
the two hours on Sundays set aside for visitation. Plaintiff
alleges that similarly situated men in the drug treatment pro-
gram could work for outside employers and could have more
frequent family visits.
On June 7, 2006, the Women’s Ministry Director wrote to
Cowles’ lawyer. She asked that Cowles be removed from
Defendant’s program immediately and placed elsewhere
because Cowles was “not in agreement with the biblically
based curriculum and classes that are required” in the pro-
gram. Cowles remained in the program, however, for two
more months.
On August 20, 2006, the director called Cowles to her
office and asked Cowles whether she was Christian. Cowles
confirmed that she was not. On August 30, 2006, the director
contacted Cowles’ probation officer to report that Cowles
could not complete the program. Cowles went back to jail.
Cowles eventually filed a complaint with the Federal
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”),
alleging that Defendant had discriminated against her because
of her sex and religion while she attended Defendant’s drug
treatment program. Cowles further alleged that Defendant had
engaged in unlawful retaliation after Cowles complained to
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Defendant’s staff about the program’s religious components.
HUD investigated and found that, “[a]lthough [Cowles] was
directed to [Defendant’s] program by the court, she was aware
that it was faith based.” Moreover, HUD determined that the
FHA’s religious exemption permitted Defendant to reserve its
program for Christians, so Cowles could not base a viable
FHA claim on those activities.
HUD rejected Cowles’ sex discrimination claim because it
lacked evidentiary support. Cowles “acknowledged that she
has never talked to any man who participated in [Defendant’s]
program” and “was not able to personally observe any differ-
ences” between the program for men and the program for
women.
Finally, HUD rejected Cowles’ retaliation claim because a
letter that Cowles wrote to the state court contradicted her
claim. According to HUD, the letter said:
I need the judge to know the program was great. I
was the one displaced. That there were no hard feel-
ings; I need her to know what my behavior was like
and my effort to blend and effort to do the work even
when it didn’t really apply to me. I can’t even keep
it short when I think about [Defendant] and how
much everything and everyone meant to me. . . . I
will never have an experience comparable and there
is so much I miss. I miss my friends.
Because of that letter, HUD disbelieved Cowles’ allegations
of retaliation. For those reasons, HUD dismissed Cowles’
complaint in its entirety.
B. The Homeless Shelters and Plaintiff Chinn
At the time relevant to this appeal, Defendant operated two
homeless shelters in Boise: the Front Street Men’s Mission
(the “Front Street Shelter”) and the River of Life Rescue Mis-
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sion (the “River of Life Shelter”). Only people with no other
safe place to go may stay at Defendant’s shelters. Guests who
stay there must complete and sign an intake form, which asks
them questions about their background.
Although Defendant accepts people of all faiths, the intake
form tells guests:
This is a Gospel Rescue Mission. Gospel means
‘Good News,’ and the Good News is that Jesus saves
us from sin past, present, and future. We would like
to share the Good News with you. Have you heard
of Jesus?
Guests also must read and acknowledge the emergency shel-
ter’s rules, which include the following guidelines:
[Defendant] offers a variety of religious services,
such as chapel services, pre-meal prayers and morn-
ing devotions. [Defendant] encourages [guests] to
attend those services for [their] own spiritual growth
and development, but [guests] are not required to
attend any religious services as a condition of receiv-
ing services from [Defendant].
New guests receive some personal items and a bed assign-
ment, which may require that they sleep on the floor if the
number of guests exceeds the number of beds. No one gets a
private room. Guests who intend to return for the next night
must make their beds and store their pajamas under their pil-
lows. They may not leave any other personal items in the
shelter after they leave for the day. Defendant does not charge
its guests any fee for using its shelters.
Guests may stay for a maximum of seventeen consecutive
nights during the warm months. Defendant imposes no limit
on the number of nights that guests may stay during the cold
months. Defendant bars services for thirty days for guests
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who do not come back to the shelter during their intended stay
“to help prevent the shelter from becoming an ‘occasional
shelter’ that helps enable a homeless lifestyle for the chroni-
cally homeless.”
Defendant provides “spiritual guidance, Christian counsel-
ing, and Christian religious services” to those who stay at its
shelters. It conducts “numerous religious activities” every
day, including “worship services, [B]ible studies and prayer.”
Chinn stayed at the Front Street Shelter in May 2005 and
again in October, November, and December 2005. He also
stayed at the River of Life Shelter in October 2005. When he
first arrived at the Front Street Shelter, Defendant’s staff told
Chinn that he would have to participate in Christian religious
activities if he wanted to stay and eat there. He later observed
that Defendant’s staff forced guests who did not attend reli-
gious services to wait outside or in the dining room until those
services had ended. He also observed that Defendant’s staff
made guests who had not attended services wait to eat until
those who had attended services obtained their food. As a
consequence, guests who did not attend services “received
substitute food of inferior quality when the prepared food ran
out.” Chinn noticed the same practices at the River of Life
Shelter.
According to Chinn, fifteen to twenty of Defendant’s fifty
to seventy guests did not attend services “because they
resented the requirement.” The services offended Chinn in
particular because he is Mormon. Chinn frequently heard
Defendant’s staff make derogatory comments about the Mor-
mon faith, sometimes calling it a “cult.” Because of Defen-
dant’s discriminatory practices and attitudes, Chinn stopped
staying at its shelters.
Chinn also filed a complaint with HUD, similarly alleging
religious discrimination in violation of the FHA. HUD inves-
tigated Chinn’s complaint but found “no reasonable cause . . .
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to believe that a discriminatory housing practice [had]
occurred.” HUD disbelieved Chinn’s allegations, finding that
“there did not appear to be any repercussions for not attending
[religious services] and in one facility nearly [one-third] of
the guests did not attend.” HUD dismissed Chinn’s complaint.
C. Procedural History
After HUD refused to act on Cowles’ and Chinn’s com-
plaints, they brought this action in federal district court. The
district court granted summary judgment to Defendant. Plain-
tiffs timely appeal.
DISCUSSION3
A. The Religious Discrimination Claims
1. The FHA’s Anti-Discrimination Provisions
We begin by outlining the relevant statutory framework.
Congress has articulated a policy of providing, within consti-
tutional limits, for fair housing throughout the United States.
42 U.S.C. § 3601. Consistent with that broad policy, Congress
included in the FHA two anti-discrimination provisions that
are relevant here. Under the first, id. § 3604(a), it is unlawful
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a
bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale
or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny,
a dwelling to any person because of race, color, reli-
gion, sex, familial status, or national origin.
3We review de novo an entry of summary judgment. Laguna Greenbelt,
Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 42 F.3d 517, 523 (9th Cir. 1994) (per
curiam). We may affirm an entry of summary judgment on any ground
supported by the record. Olsen, 363 F.3d at 922. Accordingly, although we
affirm the judgment, we do so for reasons different than the ones on which
the district court relied.
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Under the second, id. § 3604(b), it is similarly unlawful
(b) To discriminate against any person in the
terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a
dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities
in connection therewith, because of race, color, reli-
gion, sex, familial status, or national origin.
The FHA defines “dwelling” as “any building, structure, or
portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended
for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families.” Id.
§ 3602(b). The FHA does not define “residence.”
Defendant acknowledges that the anti-discrimination provi-
sions in the FHA apply to the residential drug treatment pro-
gram attended by Cowles. But Defendant asserts that those
provisions do not apply to its homeless shelters, for two inde-
pendent reasons. First, relying on the references to the “sale
or rental of . . . a dwelling” in § 3604(a) and (b), Defendant
argues that Congress intended for those provisions to apply
only in the context of selling and renting dwellings. Because
Defendant operates its shelters at no charge to its guests,
Defendant urges us to hold that its homeless shelters do not
fall within the ambit of § 3604(a) and (b).
Second, Defendant argues that its homeless shelters do not
fit Congress’ definition of “dwelling” because its shelters are
neither occupied as, nor designed or intended to be occupied
as, residences. Relying on authority from the Third and Elev-
enth Circuits, Defendant understands the term “residence” in
§ 3602(b) to mean “a temporary or permanent dwelling place,
abode or habitation to which one intends to return as distin-
guished from the place of temporary sojourn or transient
visit.” Lakeside Resort Enters., LP v. Bd. of Supervisors, 455
F.3d 154, 157 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see also Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d
1201, 1214 (11th Cir. 2008) (adopting the same definition).
Drawing on that definition, both of those circuits held that, at
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a minimum, a “residence” is a place designed for occupants
to treat as their home for a significant period of time. Lakeside
Resort, 455 F.3d at 158; Schwarz, 544 F.3d at 1215.
Defendant urges us to define “residence” as the Third and
Eleventh Circuits did. That definition, according to Defen-
dant, leads to the conclusion that its homeless shelters are not
residences, because Defendant does not permit its guests
either to stay there for a significant period of time or to treat
the shelters as their homes. Plaintiffs and HUD dispute Defen-
dant’s factual and legal conclusions, arguing that § 3604(a)
and (b) do apply to Defendant’s homeless shelters.4 In the cir-
cumstances, we need not and do not decide either of the ques-
tions of statutory interpretation raised by Defendant. Even
assuming that § 3604(a) and (b) apply to Defendant’s home-
less shelters, the FHA’s religious exemption permits the prac-
tices challenged by Plaintiffs in this case. We therefore
express no view on the merits of Defendant’s arguments
about the proper scope of § 3604(a) and (b) and the proper
definition of “residence” in § 3602(b).
2. The Religious Exemption
[1] Although § 3604(a) and (b) of the FHA prohibit reli-
gious discrimination generally, in 42 U.S.C. § 3607(a) Con-
gress provided an exemption for religious organizations that
want to limit access to their charitable services to people who
practice the same religion. Specifically, § 3607(a) provides in
relevant part:
(a) Nothing in [the FHA] shall prohibit a religious
4Appearing as amicus curiae at our invitation, the Secretary of HUD
takes the position that § 3604(a) and (b) do apply to some situations in
which a dwelling is neither sold nor rented. The Secretary also thinks that
if Defendant’s guests stay long enough and treat Defendant’s shelters
enough like a home, then the shelters qualify as residences even under the
reasoning of our sister circuits.
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organization . . . from limiting the sale, rental or
occupancy of dwellings which it owns or operates
for other than a commercial purpose to persons of
the same religion, or from giving preference to such
persons, unless membership in such religion is
restricted on account of race, color, or national ori-
gin.
We recognize that we must construe § 3607(a) narrowly.
See City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725,
731-32 (1995) (construing the FHA’s “absolute exemption,”
contained in 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1), narrowly to effectuate
the FHA’s broad policy of providing fair housing throughout
the United States). We nevertheless conclude that § 3607(a)
exempts the practices challenged here.5
No one disputes that Defendant is a bona fide Christian
organization that does not restrict its membership on account
of race, color, or national origin. And no one disputes that
Defendant operates its homeless shelters and drug treatment
program for “other than a commercial purpose.” Because
Defendant satisfies those threshold requirements, this case
presents us with the opportunity to apply § 3607(a) cleanly to
the religious practices at issue.
[2] With respect to the drug treatment program, we see
nothing in Cowles’ allegations to suggest that Defendant does
anything other than give preference to persons of its religion.
To the contrary, those allegations are consistent with Defen-
5As an initial matter, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant lost the opportunity
to challenge the district court’s decision that § 3607(a) does not exempt its
activities when Defendant failed to cross-appeal from that decision. We
disagree. So long as a prevailing party wants us to uphold the judgment
entered below, it need not cross-appeal. See S. Or. Barter Fair v. Jackson
County, 372 F.3d 1128, 1133 n.8 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A prevailing party need
not cross-appeal to defend a judgment on any ground properly raised
below, as long as it seeks to preserve rather than to change the judg-
ment.”).
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dant’s avowal that it restricts membership in its religiously
based drug treatment program to Christians and people who
desire to become Christian. According to Cowles, Defendant
required her “to participate in religious activities as a condi-
tion of continued residence.” Those activities included
“church services every Sunday,” “religiously-based substance
abuse treatment,” and other “religious services . . . throughout
the day.” Eventually, after Cowles made it clear to Defen-
dant’s staff that she was not, and did not want to become,
Christian, Defendant terminated Cowles’ participation in the
program. Because § 3607(a) permits a religious organization
to “limit[ ] the . . . occupancy of dwellings which it owns or
operates for other than a commercial purpose to persons of the
same religion,” we hold that the practices alleged to have
taken place in Defendant’s drug treatment program do not
violate the FHA. Cowles’ religious discrimination claim
therefore fails as a matter of law.6
[3] So too does Chinn’s religious discrimination claim.
According to Chinn, Defendant encourages guests of its
homeless shelters to attend religious services. If they do, they
go to the front of the line for food and housing. If they do not,
they must wait outside the shelters or in the dining rooms
until services conclude. Those who refuse to attend services
also must wait at the end of the food line and sometimes get
6We pause to observe that two organizations, appearing here as amici
curiae, make an Establishment Clause challenge to Defendant’s drug treat-
ment program. Americans United for Separation of Church and State and
the Anti-Defamation League argue that, because the state trial court alleg-
edly gave Cowles a choice between attending Defendant’s religious pro-
gram and staying in jail for a year, and because Defendant, knowing of
that ultimatum, accepted Cowles into its program, Defendant became akin
to a government actor. As a government actor, amici argue, Defendant
cannot constitutionally prefer people of one religion over people of any
other. Plaintiffs nowhere have raised, adopted, or endorsed that argument.
We therefore deem it waived and express no view on its merits. See, e.g.,
United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 607 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“Generally, we do not consider on appeal an issue raised only by an
amicus.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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“inferior” food. Those practices amount to “giving prefer-
ence” to people of Defendant’s religion. Accordingly,
§ 3607(a) exempts them from violating the FHA.
[4] Plaintiffs urge us to reach the opposite conclusion.7
With respect to Defendant’s homeless shelters, they reason
that, because homeless people who attend Defendant’s reli-
gious services are not necessarily Christians, the exemption
does not allow Defendant to give preference to Christians. We
find that construction of § 3607(a) too restrictive. Defendant
reasonably assumes that those who come to its shelters, who
read and complete the admission form that apprises them of
Defendant’s religious purposes, and who thereafter attend its
religious services are Christian. The exemption does not
require Defendant to make intensive inquiries of those whom
it serves or to prove that every person to whom it gives a pref-
erence believes sincerely in Christianity.
With respect to the drug treatment program, Plaintiffs rea-
son that, because Defendant admitted Cowles to its drug treat-
ment program even though Cowles was not a Christian,
Defendant cannot credibly claim that it restricts membership
in its program to Christians. They further argue that, because
§ 3607(a) does not in their view allow Defendant to require
its participants to become Christian before graduating, Defen-
dant’s drug treatment program violates the FHA. We disagree.
[5] First, the record shows that Defendant had every reason
to think that Cowles was Christian when it admitted her.
Cowles knew when she applied that Defendant required all
participants to engage in a “wide range” of Christian activi-
ties. In her letter requesting admission, she expressed a deep
desire to find God. To be sure that Cowles understood the
nature of its program, Defendant’s staff interviewed her. Staff
7The Secretary of HUD agrees that § 3607(a) exempts Defendant’s reli-
gious practices from violating the anti-discrimination provisions of the
FHA.
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members emphasized the Christian religious requirements of
the program, and Cowles gave no indication that she had any
concerns about those requirements.
[6] Even if there were a genuine issue of fact with respect
to Cowles’ religion at the time of her acceptance into Defen-
dant’s program, however, Cowles’ religious discrimination
claim still fails. Requiring participants to convert to Christian-
ity before permitting them to graduate from the program con-
stitutes “giving preference” to Christian participants.
Accordingly, even under Cowles’ version of the facts, Defen-
dant’s drug treatment program does not violate the FHA
because the preference for Christians, and those who desire to
become so, falls within the scope of § 3607(a).
B. Cowles’ Sex Discrimination Claim
[7] We affirm the summary judgment on Cowles’ sex dis-
crimination claim because Cowles put forward no competent
evidence to establish that Defendant treats the men in its par-
allel drug treatment program any differently than it treats the
women in the program that she attended. The only evidence
submitted was Cowles’ own affidavit, in which she stated:
While residing at the [drug treatment facility for
women], I was not permitted to work and was per-
mitted to have only very brief visits with my then
seven-year-old son for a two hour period on one day
per week. Similarly-situated male residents at the
male-only facility operated by [Defendant] were per-
mitted to work and have more frequent visitors of
the opposite sex.
Cowles provides no explanation for how she became aware of
the alleged differences between Defendant’s programs, and
she therefore has failed to demonstrate that she has personal
knowledge of those differences. Her conclusory affidavit is
insufficient to defeat summary judgment on her sex discrimi-
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nation claim. See Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1527 (9th Cir.
1993) (“Conclusory affidavits that do not affirmatively show
personal knowledge of specific facts are insufficient [to defeat
summary judgment].”).
C. The “Interference, Coercion, or Intimidation” Claim
[8] Plaintiffs’ final claims for relief rely on 42 U.S.C.
§ 3617, which makes it unlawful
to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any
person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account
of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of
his having aided or encouraged any other person in
the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or
protected by [§ 3604].
Those claims depend on the validity of Plaintiffs’ religious
discrimination claims. Defendant’s alleged retaliation against
Chinn and Cowles runs afoul of § 3617 only if Chinn and
Cowles were “exercis[ing] or enjoy[ing] . . . [a] right granted
or protected by [§ 3604].” Because Chinn had no right to be
treated the same as Defendant’s Christian guests, and because
Cowles had no right to participate in Defendant’s drug treat-
ment program unless she agreed to become Christian, we con-
clude that neither Chinn nor Cowles was exercising a right
granted to them by § 3604. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s summary judgment for Defendant on the retaliation
claims.
AFFIRMED.
17773 INTERMOUNTAIN FAIR HOUSING v. BOISE RESCUE

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