MINDYS COSMETICS, INC., a California corporation v. Sonya Dakar, an individual

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 MINDYS COSMETICS, INC., a
California corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 09-55134
SONYA DAKAR, an individual; D.C. No.
DONNA DAKAR, an individual, 2:08-cv-04459- 
AKA Daniella Dakar, SVW-RZ
Defendants, OPINION
and
KIA KAMRAN, an individual,
Defendant-Appellant. 
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
March 5, 2010—Pasadena, California
Filed July 6, 2010
Before: William C. Canby, Jr. and William A. Fletcher,
Circuit Judges, and John R. Tunheim,* District Judge.
Opinion by Judge William A. Fletcher
*The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the
District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
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COUNSEL
Al Mohajerian, Michael Thomas Smith, MOHAJERIAN
LAW CORPORATION, Los Angeles, California, for the
appellee.
William K. Mills, Justin Davis Denlinger, PARKER SHU-
MAKER MILLS, LLP, Los Angeles, California, for the
appellant.
OPINION
W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-appellee Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. (“Mindys”) is a
cosmetics company owned and operated by members of the
Dakar family. Defendant-appellant Kia Kamran (“Kamran”)
is an attorney. In 2007, Kamran registered two of Mindys’
trademarks in Sonya Dakar’s name. Israel and Natan Dakar
brought suit in the name of Mindys against Sonya Dakar,
Donna Dakar, and Kamran. Kamran moved under Califor-
nia’s anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16, to
strike the claims against him. The district court denied the
motion. Kamran brings an interlocutory appeal of the district
court’s denial. We affirm.
I. Background
This case arises from a dispute among members of the
Dakar family over ownership of two trademarks: the “Sonya
Dakar” mark and “The Problem Skin Specialists” mark. The
family conflict pits Israel Dakar and his son Natan against
Israel’s wife Sonya Dakar, their son Yigal, and their daugh-
ters Daniella (“Donna”) and Michal (“Mimi”).
According to Israel Dakar, he and Natan founded Mindys
Cosmetics in 1994 and have managed the company since
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1999. In 2000 and 2001, Mindys registered the two trade-
marks at issue, listing Donna Dakar as the owner of the
marks. In 2006, Yigal Dakar retained Kamran for a variety of
services “on behalf of the family business.” Kamran was not
involved in the 2000 trademark registration. In 2007, Kamran
noticed that the “Sonya Dakar” mark had expired. Yigal,
Donna, and Mimi instructed Kamran to consult Sonya about
the registration. Sonya instructed Kamran to register both
marks in her name, which Kamran did.
In 2008, Israel and Natan brought suit on behalf of Mindys
against Sonya and Donna (the “Dakar Defendants”) and Kam-
ran. The complaint alleged trademark infringement by Sonya
Dakar, legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty by
Kamran, and fraudulent concealment and conversion by Kam-
ran and the Dakar Defendants. Kamran moved under Califor-
nia’s anti-SLAPP law, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16, to strike
the claims against him. The district court denied Kamran’s
motion. It held that Mindys’ suit against Kamran did not arise
from protected conduct under the anti-SLAPP statute and that,
even if it did, Mindys had demonstrated a probability of pre-
vailing on the merits of its claims.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
We have jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of
Kamran’s anti-SLAPP motion under the collateral order doc-
trine. Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir.
2010); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1024-26 (9th Cir.
2003). We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion
to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. Vess v. Ciba-
Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2003); see
also Flatley v. Mauro, 39 Cal. 4th 299, 326 (2006).
III. Discussion
[1] Kamran contends that Mindys’ suit against him is a
Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (“SLAPP”)
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within the meaning of California’s anti-SLAPP statute. See
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16. California enacted the anti-
SLAPP statute “in response to the legislature’s concern about
civil actions aimed at private citizens to deter or punish them
for exercising their political or legal rights.” United States ex
rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d
963, 970 (9th Cir. 1999). The statute was designed to allow
courts “to promptly expose and dismiss meritless and harass-
ing claims seeking to chill protected expression.” Bosley Med.
Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 682 (9th Cir. 2005). The
statute provides that a party may file a motion to strike a
cause of action against it if the complaint “aris[es] from any
act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of peti-
tion or free speech under the United States Constitution or the
California Constitution in connection with a public issue.”
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1). The statute is to be “con-
strued broadly.” Id. § 425.16(a); Vess, 317 F.3d at 1109.
“A court considering a motion to strike under the anti-
SLAPP statute must engage in a two-part inquiry.” Vess, 317
F.3d at 1110. First, the defendant must make a prima facie
showing that the plaintiff’s suit “arises from an act in further-
ance of the defendant’s rights of petition or free speech.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Second, once the defen-
dant has made a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the
challenged claims.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The defendant bringing a motion to strike “need not show that
the plaintiff’s suit was brought with the intention to chill the
defendant’s speech” or “that any speech was actually chilled.”
Id.
We hold that Kamran has made a prima facie showing that
the suit against him “arises from” a protected act under the
anti-SLAPP statute. However, Mindys has made a sufficient
showing under the second part of the inquiry to withstand
Kamran’s motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. We
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therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Kamran’s motion
to strike.
A. Prima Facie Showing of a Protected Act
Defendant Kamran bears the burden of demonstrating that
Mindys’ suit against him arises from a protected act. Vess,
317 F.3d at 1110.
[2] An “act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or
free speech” includes:
(1) any written or oral statement or writing made
before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceed-
ing, or any other official proceeding authorized by
law;
(2) any written or oral statement or writing made in
connection with an issue under consideration or
review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body,
or any other official proceeding authorized by law;
(3) any written or oral statement or writing made in
a place open to the public or a public forum in con-
nection with an issue of public interest;
(4) or any other conduct in furtherance of the exer-
cise of the constitutional right of petition or the con-
stitutional right of free speech in connection with a
public issue or an issue of public interest.
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e). Kamran contends that filing
a trademark application with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (“USPTO”) constitutes a protected act
under categories (1) and (2). The district court did not deter-
mine whether this act constituted a protected act because it
concluded that the suit did not “arise from” the filings even
if they were protected. While it is a close question, we follow
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the California legislature’s direction that the anti-SLAPP stat-
ute be “construed broadly,” id. § 425.16(a), and hold that
Kamran’s act of filing the trademark applications with the
USPTO was a protected act within the meaning of the statute.
1. Protected Act
[3] The filing of a trademark application is a formal com-
munication to the USPTO seeking official action in a process
governed by statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (“Application for
registration; verification”). We conclude that the application
is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute as a “writing made
before . . . [an] executive [or] . . . other official proceeding
authorized by law.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e)(1). The
application may also be a “writing made in connection with
an issue under consideration . . . by . . . [an] executive . . .
body, or any other official proceeding.” Id. § 425.16(e)(2).
California appellate courts interpreting the anti-SLAPP
statute have distinguished between communications made in
the course of “official” proceedings, which are protected, and
mere “ministerial” business communications, which are not.
For example, in ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 93 Cal.
App. 4th 993, 1009 (2001), the court of appeal found that fil-
ing a complaint with the SEC that was designed to solicit an
investigation “qualified at least as a statement before an offi-
cial proceeding” under § 425.16(e)(1). “[C]ommunication to
an official administrative agency . . . designed to prompt
action by that agency is as much a part of the ‘official pro-
ceeding’ as a communication made after the proceeding had
commenced.” Id. (internal citations and some quotation marks
omitted). In Kibler v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital
District, 39 Cal. 4th 192, 199 (2006), the California Supreme
Court held that “a hospital’s peer review procedure qualifies
as an ‘official proceeding authorized by law’ . . . because that
procedure is required under [California] Business and Profes-
sions Code section 805 et seq., governing hospital peer review
proceedings.” In Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 52 Cal.
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App. 4th 1036, 1049 (1997), the court of appeal similarly con-
cluded that an investigative audit conducted by a state auditor
was “an authorized, public proceeding because it is
government-sponsored and provided for by statute.”
In contrast, California appellate courts have held that “min-
isterial” acts involving primarily private transactions are not
protected acts. For example, in Blackburn v. Brady, 116 Cal.
App. 4th 670, 677 (2004), the court of appeal rejected the
contention that statements made in connection with a Sheriff’s
auction could amount to protected speech under the anti-
SLAPP law. “The ministerial event of a Sheriff’s sale or auc-
tion simply does not concern an issue under review or deter-
mine some disputed matter as contemplated under the anti-
SLAPP law.” Id. It was a mere “business dealing or transac-
tion.” Id.; see also Kajima Eng’g & Constr., Inc. v. City of
Los Angeles, 95 Cal. App. 4th 921, 932 (2002) (“The submis-
sion of contractual claims for payment in the regular course
of business before the commencement of litigation simply is
not an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech
within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute.”) (citing Peo-
ple ex rel. 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Bldg. Permit Consultants,
Inc., 86 Cal. App. 4th 280, 285 (2000); Ericsson GE Mobile
Commc’ns, Inc. v. C.S.I. Telecomms. Eng’rs, 49 Cal. App. 4th
1591, 1601-02 (1996)).
[4] Filing a trademark application is more than merely a
ministerial act connected with a business transaction. It is an
attempt to establish a property right under a comprehensive
federal statutory scheme. See New Kids on the Block v. News
Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1992); 15
U.S.C. § 1072 (registering a trademark provides “constructive
notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership thereof”). The
filing party seeks a determination by USPTO examiners that
it is the presumptive owner of a protectable mark. See, e.g.,
Applied Info. Scis. Corp. v. eBAY, Inc., 511 F.3d 966, 970 (9th
Cir. 2007) (“Registration of a mark on the Principal Register
in the Patent and Trademark Office constitutes prima facie
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evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the reg-
istrant’s exclusive right to use the mark on the goods and ser-
vices specified in the registration.” (internal alterations and
quotation marks omitted)); Yellow Cab Co. of Sacramento v.
Yellow Cab of Elk Grove, Inc., 419 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir.
2005) (“Federal registration of a mark constitutes prima facie
evidence of the validity of the mark.“). We therefore conclude
that such a filing is a protected act under the anti-SLAPP stat-
ute.
2. “Arising From” a Protected Act
Kamran must also demonstrate that the suit against him
“arises from” his protected act of filing a trademark applica-
tion. “In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical consideration is
whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s pro-
tected free speech or petitioning activity.” Navellier v. Sletten,
29 Cal. 4th 82, 89 (2002); see also City of Cotati v. Cashman,
29 Cal. 4th 69, 76-77 (2002) (“[T]he mere fact an action was
filed after protected activity took place does not mean it arose
from that activity.”).
The district court relied on two California court of appeal
cases in which the court concluded that attorney malpractice
claims do not arise from a protected act. See Benasra v.
Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP, 123 Cal. App. 4th 1179
(2004); Kolar v. Donahue, McIntosh & Hammerton, 145 Cal.
App. 4th 1532 (2006). It is true that in several cases involving
attorney malpractice claims, courts of appeal have concluded
that the alleged malpractice does not arise from a protected
act under the anti-SLAPP statute. See PrediWave Corp. v.
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, 179 Cal. App. 4th 1204,
1221-26 (2009 ) (describing cases). For example, in Benasra,
the court determined that the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply
to a former client’s suit against a law firm for breach of loy-
alty. The court reasoned that “[t]he breach of fiduciary duty
lawsuit may follow litigation pursued against the former cli-
ent, but does not arise from it.” Benasra, 123 Cal. App. 4th
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at 1189. In Jespersen v. Zubiate-Beauchamp, 114 Cal. App.
4th 624 (2003), the court held that the malpractice action fell
outside of the anti-SLAPP statute when it alleged the attor-
neys’ failure to respond to discovery requests and to comply
with court orders. In Kolar, the court explained, “In a mal-
practice suit, the client is not suing because the attorney peti-
tioned on his or her behalf, but because the attorney did not
competently represent the client’s interests while doing so.”
145 Cal. App. 4th at 1540.
[5] However, there is no categorical exclusion of claims of
attorney malpractice from the anti-SLAPP statute. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has observed that “[n]othing in the stat-
ute itself categorically excludes any particular type of action
from its operation.” Navellier, 29 Cal. 4th at 92. “The anti-
SLAPP statute’s definitional focus is not the form of the
plaintiff’s cause of action but, rather, the defendant’s activity
that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and whether
that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.” Id.
[6] Each of Mindys’ causes of action arises not out of a
general breach of duty, but out of Kamran’s act of filing the
trademark application in Sonya’s name. The trademark appli-
cation was not “incidental” to the causes of action, see Free-
man v. Schack, 154 Cal. App. 4th 719, 732 (2007), but was
their gravamen, see Cotati, 29 Cal. 4th at 79. But for the
trademark application, Mindys would have no reason to sue
Kamran. Because Mindys’ claims arose from Kamran’s act of
applying to register the trademarks in Sonya’s name, they are
properly subject to an anti-SLAPP motion.
B. Probability of Success on the Merits
1. Legal Standard
At the second step of the anti-SLAPP inquiry, the burden
shifts to Mindys to show a probability of success. Navellier,
29 Cal. 4th at 95. To satisfy this second prong, the plaintiff
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“must show a ‘reasonable probability’ of prevailing in its
claims for those claims to survive dismissal.” Metabolife Int’l,
Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 840 (9th Cir. 2001). The court
is to consider “the pleadings, and supporting and opposing
affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense
is based.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(2).
“Reasonable probability” in the anti-SLAPP statute has a
specialized meaning. The statute requires only a “minimum
level of legal sufficiency and triability.” Linder v. Thrifty Oil
Co., 23 Cal. 4th 429, 438 n.5 (2000). Indeed, the second step
of the anti-SLAPP inquiry is often called the “minimal merit”
prong. See Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Rick-
ter & Hampton LLP, 133 Cal. App. 4th 658, 675 (2005)
(quoting Navellier, 29 Cal. 4th at 95 n.11); Navellier, 29 Cal.
4th at 93 (“[T]he statute poses no obstacle to suits that possess
minimal merit.”). To establish “minimal merit,” the plaintiff
need only “state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim.”
Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 31 Cal. 4th 728, 746
(2003); Mann v. Quality Old Time Serv., Inc., 120 Cal. App.
4th 90, 105 (2004) (“A plaintiff is not required to prove the
specified claim to the trial court; rather, so as to not deprive
the plaintiff of a jury trial, the appropriate inquiry is whether
the plaintiff has stated and substantiated a legally sufficient
claim.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Put another way,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both
legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie
showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evi-
dence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” Wilson v. Par-
ker, Covert & Chidester, 28 Cal. 4th 811, 821 (2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
While a court’s evaluation of a claim under the anti-SLAPP
statute has been called a “summary-judgment-like procedure,”
see Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 39 Cal. 4th 260,
278 (2006), a motion to strike does not impose an initial bur-
den of production on the moving defendant. Tuchscher Dev.
Enters., Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 106 Cal. App.
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4th 1219, 1238-40 (2003). The applicable burden “is much
like that used in determining a motion for nonsuit or directed
verdict, which mandates dismissal when no reasonable jury
could find for the plaintiff.” Metabolife Int’l, 264 F.3d at 840
(internal quotations omitted). The court “does not weigh the
credibility or comparative probative strength of competing
evidence,” but “should grant the motion if, as a matter of law,
the defendant’s evidence supporting the motion defeats the
plaintiff’s attempt to establish evidentiary support for the
claim.” Wilson, 28 Cal. 4th at 821; see also Wilcox v. Supe-
rior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 828 (1994), overruled on
other grounds by Equilon Enters. v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29
Cal. 4th 53 (2002) (citing Carson v. Facilities Dev. Co., 36
Cal. 3d 830, 838-39 (1984)); Coll. Hosp. Inc. v. Superior
Court, 8 Cal. 4th 704, 718 (1994) (“[T]he motion required by
[the statute] operates like a demurrer or motion for summary
judgment in ‘reverse,’ . . . [requiring] the plaintiff to demon-
strate that he possesses a legally sufficient claim which is sub-
stantiated, that is, supported by competent, admissible
evidence.”) (some internal quotation marks omitted).
2. Application
[7] As a preliminary matter, we note that under California
law, Kamran cannot use the litigation privilege to defend
against Mindys’ claims. See Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b). The liti-
gation privilege “grants absolute immunity from tort liability
for communications made in relation to judicial proceedings.”
Jarrow Formulas, 31 Cal. 4th at 737. “The usual formulation
is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made
in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or
other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects
of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical
relation to the action.” Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205,
212 (1990). Although § 47(b) encompasses “official proceed-
ings,” it is not coextensive with the anti-SLAPP statute. See
Kibler, 39 Cal. 4th at 201-02 (“The [§ 47(b)] privilege is a
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substantive rule of law, whereas the anti-SLAPP statute is a
procedural device to screen out meritless claims.”).
[8] The trademark registration application was not filed in
anticipation of litigation, nor was it intended to instigate offi-
cial investigation into wrongdoing. See Hagberg v. Cal. Fed.
Bank FSB, 32 Cal. 4th 350, 369 (2004). Further, California
courts of appeal have concluded that the litigation privilege
does not protect an attorney from a suit by a former client
because if it did, “no malpractice suit could be brought.” See
Kolar, 145 Cal. App. 4th at 1541; Mattco Forge, Inc. v.
Arthur Young & Co., 5 Cal. App. 4th 392, 407 (1992).
a. Malpractice and Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims
Mindys alleges that Kamran committed malpractice and
breached his fiduciary duty by representing Mindys and
Sonya Dakar simultaneously. Mindys alleges that Kamran
failed to protect Israel and Natan’s ownership interests when
he registered the trademarks in Sonya’s name and that Kam-
ran has refused to turn over the client file to Israel and Natan.
[9] Mindys has made a sufficient prima facie showing of
facts supporting its claims for malpractice and breach of fidu-
ciary duty to withstand a motion to strike under the anti-
SLAPP statute. Kamran contends that he represented only
Mindys at all relevant times, but if Mindys’ evidence is cred-
ited Kamran was at least negligent in determining who had
authority to act on behalf of Mindys. Kamran admits that he
took instructions to register the trademarks from Yigal,
Donna, Mimi, and Sonya. Israel states in his declaration that
Sonya was never a shareholder of Mindys and Kamran never
inquired whether Yigal, Donna, or Mimi, who were share-
holders, had actual authority to act on behalf of the company.
Mindys also introduced evidence that in January 2002, Yigal
assigned away his shares in Mindys, and thus as of that time
he was only an employee of the company. If this is true, Yigal
had no authority to give instructions to Kamran on behalf of
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Mindys. Moreover, according to Israel and Natan, Donna and
Mimi were minority shareholders and therefore had no
authority to take action on behalf of Mindys without Israel or
Natan’s approval. Mindys has thus made at least a minimal
showing that Kamran did not “use such skill, prudence, and
diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly
possess and exercise in the performance of the tasks which
they undertake.” Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 591 (1961).
Crediting the evidence submitted by Mindys, as we are
required to do, Mindys has demonstrated a “reasonable proba-
bility,” within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute, of pre-
vailing on its malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty claims.
b. Fraudulent Concealment and Conversion Claims
[10] Mindys alleges claims of fraudulent concealment and
conversion based on its contention that the registration of the
trademarks in Sonya’s name deprived Mindys of its “lawful
ownership interests in the subject trademarks.” Mindys has
made a sufficient prima facie showing of facts supporting
both claims to withstand an anti-SLAPP motion to strike.
When there is a fiduciary relationship between two parties,
“any material concealment or misrepresentation will amount
to fraud sufficient to entitle the party injured thereby to an
action.” Ford v. Shearson Lehman Am. Express, Inc., 180 Cal.
App. 3d 1011, 1020 (1986). Natan states in his declaration
that Kamran “never advised Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. of the
legal consequences to Mindys Cosmetics’ intellectual prop-
erty rights that the [trademark registrations] were about to
expire or be transferred to Sonya Dakar.” Kamran contends
that he emailed Natan about the trademark registration, but at
this phase we must credit the evidence submitted by Mindys.
Although the tort of fraudulent concealment usually requires
a showing of intent to defraud, see, e.g., Kaldenbach v. Mut.
of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 178 Cal. App. 4th 830, 850 (2009),
Mindys’ claim is grounded, at least in part, on constructive
fraud. An action for constructive fraud does not require a
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showing of intent to defraud. See, e.g., Quintilliani v. Man-
nerino, 62 Cal. App. 4th 54, 70 (1998).
“Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the
property of another.” Oakdale Vill. Group v. Fong, 43 Cal.
App. 4th 539, 543 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). The elements of a
conversion claim are (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or right to
possession of the property at the time of the conversion; (2)
the defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of
property rights; and (3) damages. Id. at 543-44. It is necessary
to show that the alleged converter has assumed control over
the property “or that the alleged converter has applied the
property to his own use.” Id. When Kamran registered Sonya
Dakar as the owner of the trademarks, she began requesting
license fees from the company.
[11] If Sonya did not have an ownership right over the
trademark, as Israel and Natan contend, Kamran may have
caused a wrongful appropriation of trademark rights held by
Mindys.
[A]ny act of dominion wrongfully exerted over the
personal property of another inconsistent with the
owner’s rights thereto constitutes conversion. . . .
Where the conversion is the result of the acts of sev-
eral persons, which, though separately committed,
all tend to the same end, there is a joint conversion.
. . . If the principal is a wrong-doer, the agent is a
wrong-doer also.
McCafferty v. Gilbank, 249 Cal. App. 2d 569, 576 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1967) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although it is
a close question, we hold that, under a generous interpretation
of the alleged facts, there is a reasonable probability that
Kamran was an agent of Sonya such that he, along with
Sonya, could be held liable for conversion.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
denial of Kamran’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike Mindys’
claims for malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent
concealment, and conversion.
AFFIRMED.
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