Carlos A. Landeros v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CARLOS A. LANDEROS,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 19-72855
Agency No.
A034-266-469
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of an
Immigration Judge
Submitted March 26, 2024**
Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.
Carlos A. Landeros, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se for
review of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order affirming an asylum officer’s
negative reasonable fear determination. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252. We review for substantial evidence an IJ’s negative reasonable fear
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 29 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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determination, and we review de novo due process challenges to reasonable fear
proceedings. Orozco-Lopez v. Garland, 11 F.4th 764, 774 (9th Cir. 2021). We
deny the petition for review.
Because Landeros does not challenge the IJ’s determinations that he failed to
show a reasonable possibility of persecution on account of a protected ground or a
reasonable possibility of torture if returned to Mexico, we do not address
them. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013).
We decline to reach Landero’s claim of harm that was raised for the first
time in his reply brief. See Bazuaye v. INS, 79 F.3d 118, 120 (9th Cir. 1996) (court
need not reach issues raised for the first time in the reply brief).
Landeros’ contentions that the asylum officer violated due process by
denying him access to an attorney, interviewing him under duress, and
demonstrating prejudice against him, are not supported by the record.
We reject Landeros’ contention that the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”) provides the right to apply for asylum for individuals in reinstated
removal proceedings. See Maldonado v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1155, 1162 & n.7 (9th
Cir. 2015) (the two available forms of CAT protection are withholding of removal
and deferral of removal); Perez-Guzman v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1066, 1081 (9th Cir.
2016) (“Although the availability of asylum is an important component of our
immigration law, it is not unreasonable to conclude Congress intended to bar this

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form of relief to persons in reinstated removal proceedings while preserving relief
for individuals able to meet the higher standards for withholding of removal and
CAT relief.”).
To the extent Landeros raises a Sixth Amendment right to counsel claim, it
is foreclosed by Usubakunov v. Garland, 16 F.4th 1299, 1303 (9th Cir. 2021)
(“[N]oncitizens have the right to counsel in removal proceedings, albeit not the
right to counsel paid for by the government.”).
Landero’s motions to take notice (Docket Entry Nos. 34, 38, and 40) are
denied.
The stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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