Sergio Armando Licona-Anaya v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SERGIO ARMANDO LICONA-ANAYA,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 23-6
Agency No.
A215-952-260
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 16, 2023**
Pasadena, California
Before: RAWLINSON, HURWITZ, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Sergio Armando Licona-Anaya, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
review of a Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision dismissing an appeal
from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his motion to continue. Where, as
here, the BIA summarily affirms, we treat the IJ’s decision as the final agency
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 21 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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determination. Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917, 925 (9th Cir. 2004). An IJ may
grant a continuance for “good cause shown,” 8 C.F.R § 1003.29, which we review
for abuse of discretion. Garcia v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 876, 881 (9th Cir. 2015). The
decision to grant or deny a continuance is in “the sound discretion of the judge and
will not be overturned except on a showing of clear abuse.” Id. (citation omitted).
As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. Exercising
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, we deny the petition for review.
The IJ did not abuse its discretion in denying Licona-Anaya’s motion to
continue. We consider various factors when evaluating the denial of a motion to
continue, such as the “(1) the nature of the evidence excluded as a result of the
denial of the continuance, (2) the reasonableness of the immigrant’s conduct,
(3) the inconvenience to the court, and (4) the number of continuances previously
granted.” Ahmed v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2009). Although there
is no evidence that the immigration court would have been inconvenienced by a
delay, all the other factors cut against Licona-Anaya’s request for a nine-month
continuance. In particular, denying the requested continuance did not result in the
exclusion of any evidence in support of Licona-Anaya’s application for relief. See
Cui v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1289, 1292-93 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting an abuse of
discretion where denying a continuance prevented the submission of evidence of
“vital importance”). At the conclusion of the hearing, Licona-Anaya was granted

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the only form of relief he sought—voluntary departure.
The IJ reasonably concluded that Licona-Anaya had not demonstrated good
cause for a nine-month continuance to organize his affairs and sell certain property
prior to his departure. The IJ explained that Licona-Anaya had just received a five-
month-long continuance from his previous hearing and that he could grant his
brother (a U.S. citizen) power of attorney to dispose of his property. Moreover, the
IJ offered Licona-Anaya a nearly two-month-long continuance, which Licona-
Anaya declined—an offer that further supports the soundness of the IJ’s ruling.
In a single, conclusory sentence in his summary of argument, Licona-Anaya
alleges that the IJ’s ruling violated his due process rights. Because Licona-Anaya
failed to argue this point anywhere else in his brief, he has abandoned it. Crime
Just. & Am., Inc. v. Honea, 876 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2017).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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