In re: CPESAZ LIQUIDATING, INC., FKA Community Provider of Enrichment Services, Inc.; v. CPESAZ LIQUIDATING, INC., FKA Community Provider of Enrichment Services, Inc.;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: CPESAZ LIQUIDATING, INC., FKA
Community Provider of Enrichment
Services, Inc.; et al.,
Debtors,
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ROBERT BENNETTI; LINDA MARIANO;
LINKI PEDDY; and CHARLES
FOUST, JR.,
Appellants,
v.
CPESAZ LIQUIDATING, INC., FKA
Community Provider of Enrichment
Services, Inc.; et al.,
Appellees.
No. 22-60039
BAP No. 21-1123
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Lafferty III, Gan, and Taylor, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 18, 2023
San Francisco, California
Before: BEA, CHRISTEN, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED
NOV 9 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Certain participants in an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (“ESOP”) appeal
from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s order affirming the bankruptcy court’s
orders confirming the bankruptcy plan and denying their motions for temporary
allowance of claims and to appoint a Chapter 11 trustee. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). We grant the motion to dismiss the appeal.
1. The amended notice of appeal to this Court identifies appellants as
“Robert Bennetti, Linda Mariano, Linki Peddy, Charles Foust, Jr., and 92 Other
Participants in the CPES Employee Stock Ownership Plan and Trust.” Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) requires the notice of appeal be “sufficiently
definite to ‘give[] fair notice of the specific individual or entity seeking to
appeal.’” Al-Qarqani v. Chevron Corp., 8 F.4th 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2021)
(alteration in original) (quoting Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312,
318 (1988)). Because nothing in the notice of appeal or in the Appellants’ record
on appeal sufficiently specifies the “92 Other Participants,” this Court lacks
jurisdiction over them. See id. Accordingly, only the four named individuals
identified in the caption of this memorandum disposition (“Participants”) have
appealed, and the clerk is directed to revise the docket to reflect that they are the
only appellants.
2. As to the Participants, we dismiss this appeal as equitably moot. This

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Court weighs four factors in applying equitable mootness:
(1) whether a stay was sought; (2) whether the plan has been
substantially consummated; (3) the effect of the remedy on third parties
not before the court; and (4) “whether the bankruptcy court can fashion
effective and equitable relief without completely knocking the props
out from under the plan and thereby creating an uncontrollable situation
for the bankruptcy court.”
Cobb v. City of Stockton (In re City of Stockton), 909 F.3d 1256, 1263 (9th
Cir. 2018) (quoting JPMCC 2007–C1 Grasslawn Lodging, LLC v. Transwest
Resort Props., Inc. (In re Transwest Resort Props., Inc.), 801 F.3d 1161, 1167–68
(9th Cir. 2015)).
There is no dispute that the first and second factors favor equitable mootness
because Participants did not seek a stay and the plan is substantially consummated.
Failure to seek a stay “without adequate explanation” is generally sufficient on its
own to compel dismissal of an appeal. Id. at 1264. As to the third factor,
unwinding the plan would require undoing settlements with and clawing back
payments from third parties not before this Court. It thus favors equitable
mootness. See Motor Vehicle Cas. Co. v. Thorpe Insulation Co. (In re Thorpe
Insulation Co.), 677 F.3d 869, 882 (9th Cir. 2012). Finally, on the fourth factor, the
relief sought by Participants in their briefs1 would require “knocking the props out
1 At oral argument, Participants’ counsel conceded it was too late to seek this relief
and requested this Court remand to the bankruptcy court for an evidentiary hearing
regarding the independence of the current ESOP trustee. Participants forfeited this

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from under the plan” to conduct a new vote on the plan or replace the current
bankruptcy trustee with a court-appointed one. Id. at 881. Unwinding the plan and
clawing back completed payments may be “impossible or inequitable.” Rev Op
Grp. v. ML Manager LLC (In re Mortgages Ltd.), 771 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir.
2014). It is not equitable to provide such relief here.
Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal as equitably moot.2
DISMISSED.
argument because they did not seek this relief in their opening brief. See Martin v.
City of Oceanside, 360 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004).
2 We deny Participants’ motion to supplement the record and/or for judicial notice.

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