Gary Ronald Warren v. United States Parole Commission; United States Probation and Parole

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GARY RONALD WARREN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES PAROLE
COMMISSION; UNITED STATES
PROBATION AND PAROLE,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 22-16709
D.C. No. 2:22-cv-01584-SPL-MTM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 15, 2023**
Before: TASHIMA, S.R. THOMAS, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
Gary Ronald Warren appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action seeking to enjoin special conditions of parole. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Omar v. Sea-Land
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
AUG 21 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 22-16709
Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Warren’s action sua sponte because
Warren failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that, to avoid dismissal, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Warren’s motion for
a preliminary injunction because Warren failed to demonstrate a likelihood of
success on the merits. See Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d
953, 958, 970 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth standard of review), abrogated on other
grounds by United States v. Alaniz, 69 F.4th 1124, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2023).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Warren’s motion for
appointment of counsel because Warren failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances justifying appointment of counsel. See Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d
1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth standard of review and concluding that no
“exceptional circumstances” justified appointing counsel where plaintiff was
unlikely to succeed on the merits and had been able to articulate his legal claims in
light of the complexity of issues involved).
AFFIRMED.

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